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Abstract 
Maria Walsh - Identitv-In-Motion: The Narrative Duration of the Dis/continuous Film Moment 
The trajectorv of this thesis is set out like a journey upon which encounters are staged 
between two films. film theor), and philosophers. such as Slavoj Zizek. Gilles Deletize, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. An encounter with a moment of image suspension. a cut to the blank 
screen- in Tacita Dean's film, Disappearance atSea (1996). motivates the beginning of this 
journey's narrative. My reading of this moment counters the way that suspended film moments 
have been discussed in terms of non-narrative in 1970s film theory and in the contemporary 
psychoanalýlic filin theory of Slavoj Zizek. Using Gilles Deleuze's notion of narrativization as a 
process of serialization. I argue that the supposedly non-narrative moment is coextensive with the 
spectator's dis/continuity in time as opposed to Slavoj Zizek's static suspension or film theory's 
distanciation. 
A performative text based on Disappearance at Sea, which I refer to as a 'montage text' 
and for which precedence is found in Roland Barthes' writing, acts as an interlude that runs in 
tandem to the main theoretical trajectory. 
The generativity of absence that emerges from these encounters, both theoretical and 
poetic. is heightened in the second half of the thesis by the appearance of another 'montage text' 
based on Chantal Akerrnan's News From Home (1976). In this text. I reconfigure the negativity of 
historical readings of absence in Neus From Home where it was related to the impossible 
question of a woman's desire. In my reconfiguration, absence. rather than suspending time. 
generates a temporalized space and a spatialized time in which the spectator performs the 
dis/continuity of narrative duration. 
In the theoretical trajectory of this movement, Gilles Deleuze is hybridized with aspects 
of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, my argument being that the sublime infinity of Deleuzian 
serialization requires a relation to embodiment in order for it to be useftil in considering the 
spectator's relation to the two film encounters with absence. I read this hybridization in terms of a 
feminine mode of the sublime, which suggests the possibility of the real rather than its negation 
in representation and contributes to current thinking in feminist philosophy, particularly the work 
of Elizabeth Grosz. 
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Chapter One 
I'l INTRODUCTION -A MAP OF THE JOURNEY. 
The journey is a narrative motif par excellence. The motif of the journey, in 
comprising of a movement over time, which draws two same-but-different terms into a 
synthesis, e. g. the place of disembarkation and the place of arrival, fits the category of 
'narrative transfortnation' set out by Tzvetlan Todorov. ' The model of 'narrative 
transformation' is useful for thinking of narrative as a totalizing system that plots 'the 
structure of action in closed and legible wholes' (Brooks, 1984: 9 1), while at the same 
time attending to the differential nature of narrative sequence, which can appear to 
deviate from such 'wholes'. However, the journey of this thesis is a narrative with a 
difference. 
While the trajectory of my narrative does follow the forin of narrative 
transforination, whereby 'an initial point of stasis is activated into a process of 
movement and change', the return 'to a same yet different stasis at the end' is held in 
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abeyance (Mulvey, 200 1: unpaginated) .I argue instead 
for the interminability of 
movement and change. How can I maintain this position? Are not all narratives fated to 
end? And, even more fundamentally, do not all narratives begin from the point of the 
ending, metaphorically giving structure to the ultimate inconceivable end, i. e. death? ' 
Undoubtedly, narratives do have endings, at least if they are thought of as stones 
with plots, which is how narrative is thought of in literature. Even Chantal Akerman, 
whose film News From Home provides one of the staged encounters in my thesis, would 
say in reference to film that '[w]hen you write something where the end is the same as 
the beginning it's really boring. That's very cliched, to have no ending' (Akernian, 1976: 
217). This is no surprise as the literary model of narrative as story pervades in film 
4 
analysis . 
However, I shall propose that the filin sequences I encounter engender a 
different narrational engagement whereby the actual end of the film is not the goal of 
narrative plotting/editing, but the beginning of a new space of inten-ninable flux. I shall 
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make a case for this flux as having a structural dynamic to it that does not necessitate 
being ordered into the overarching whole of a narrative as story. In this, I deliberately go 
against the sentiments of Frank Ken-node that 'tracts of time unpunctuated by meaning 
derived from the end are not to be bome' (Kerfnode, 1967: 162). Inspirational in my 
move awav from the conventional notions of endings as narrative frames will be 
Gilberto Perez's discussion of narrative as 'an additive thing that can go on and on 
without closure' and of how camera editing can serve in this respect (Perez, 1998: 72). 
However, the written narrative of my thesis is a little more conventional than the 
interminable narrational engagement I shall propose in relation to a film image. The 
written narrative of my thesis does have a plot. Although, as we shall see, the goal of the 
end Nvill be redirected there too in the sense that the concept of intenninability will leak 
out and overwhelm the desire for an ending, leaving us instead with a series of 
repetitions and accumulations. The plot of in, %, thesis will start out from the initial point 
of stasis in the model of narrative transfon-nation. This point can be deemed the place of 
disembarkation, often referred to as the home. Embarking on a journey ruptures the 
secure surety of home, a disturbance necessary for the progressive drive of narrative. To 
embark on a journey involves a desire for something else, something new, to replace or 
at least reposition the relation to the home. It therefore involves an urgent search, often 
instigated by an occurrence or event that unsettles the protagonist's home-based stasis. 
The movement that ensues is digressive being littered with encounters, which may 
inhibit narrative's progressive drive for resolution. In classical narrative, digressions and 
detours, which Peter Brooks refers to as the 'daemonic middle', are ultimately overcome 
by narrative's desire for the end (Brooks, 1982: 288). 5The j oumey's end is a resolution 
of one kind or another, either a return to the home which will itself be transformed due 
to the effects of the journey, or the finding of and settling down in another destination, 
or, as I've already intimated, the most final of resolutions, death. For Brooks it is the 
'deathlike ending' and its interrelation to initiatory desire that shapes the narrative's 
'daemonic middle' (Brooks, 1984: 96) 6 Brooks' articulation of this I nterrelation borrows 
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heavily from Sigmund Freud's Beyond the Pleasnre Principle. As we shall encounter 
that text later, I cite Brooks' model here: 
We emerge from reading Beyond the Pleasure Principle with a dynamic 
model that structures ends (death, quiescence, non-narratability) against 
beginnings (Eros, stimulation into tension, the desire of narrative) in a 
manner that necessitates the middle as a detour, as struggle toward the 
end under the compulsion of imposed delay, as an arabesque in the 
dilatory space of the text' (Brooks, 1984: 107-8). 
I shall take issue with the principle that the delays and temporal stretching of the dilatory 
middle serves the purpose of preventing the collapse of narrative desire (Eros) into its 
other, i. e. the non-narratable, stillness of death. This model of narrative desire ultimately 
maintains a conservative notion of subjectivity, whereby the subject's movements, his 
narrative, are perfort-ned in reaction to a stillness that threatens to overwhelm his desire 
for meamng. Narrative then is a way of controlling a non-narratable space that is itself 
the motivator of narrative and yet is relegated outside of its borders, its supposed 
collapse of meaning haunting the subject. 
Teresa de Lauretis illuminates the unacknowledged gender stakes involved in 
this dichotomy. Tracing of the outcome of Propp's work in the 1930s and 1940s to Jurij 
Lotman's in the 1960s and 1970s, where the thirty-one functions of what Propp calls the 
dramatis personae of narrative are reduced, in the rise of structuralist thinking, to the 
two functions of hero and obstacle. 
[I]f the work of mythical structuration is to establish distinctions, the 
primary distinction on which all others depend is not, say, life and death 
but rather sexual difference [ ... 
] Opposite pairs such as inside/outside, 
the raw/the cooked, or life/death appear to be merely derivatives of the 
fundamental opposition between boundary and passage; and as passage 
may be in either direction, from inside to outside or vice versa, from life 
to death or vice versa, nonetheless all these terms are predicated on the 
single figure of the hero who crosses the boundary and penetrates the 
other space. In so doing the hero, the mythical subject, is contracted as 
human being and as male, he is the active principle of culture, the 
establisher of distinction, the creator of difference. Female is what is not 
susceptible to transfori-nation, to life or death, she (it) is an element of 
plot-space, a topos, a resistance, matrix and matter (de Lauretis, 1984: 
119). 
While I shall not be couching my thesis in overtly feminist tenns, a feminist subtext will 
reappear constantly throughout the various chapters, as the type of film image that I 
engage Nvith in this thesis, an image of absence, could be categorized as a 'plot-space, a 
topos, a resistance, matrix and matter'. It is also of interest at this stage to note that in 
seeking to engage with the space of non-narrative, I would seem, according to de 
Latiretis' model, to be siding with the criminal role of Oedipus as the destroyer of 
differences. Whereas 'the combined work of myth and narrative is the production of 
Oedipus' (de Lauretis, 1984: 120), which is why, writing in 1984, de Lauretis would say 
that '[t]he most exciting work in cinema and in feminism today is not anti-narrative or 
anti-Oedipal, quite the opposite. It is narrative and Oedipal with a vengeance, for it 
seeks to stress the duplicity of that scenario and the specific contradiction of the female 
subject in it' (de Lauretis, 1984: 157). However, part of my thesis will be to raise the 
possibility of another way of engaging with difference, using my chosen film scenarios 
as a model. 
In this thesis, I will explore the prolongation of moments, in film rather than 
literature, which 'appear to suspend temporal process', arguing that these kinds of 
moments, which for Brooks would be in excess of the ten-rilnus of classical narrative 
forrn because of their 'indetenninate shuttling or oscillation', are generative of a forrn of 
narration freed from the end that propels Oedipus towards his destm-, 7 (Brooks, 1982: 
288). In the moments of suspension encountered on this _journey via 
two film scenarios, 
another narrational dynamic emerges that obviates against narrative closure, 
engendering new forins of subjectivity for the spectator in the process. I shall argue, 
contrary to Brooks' narratology, that this indeten-ninacy in not in excess of narrative but 
imbricated within its temporal folds. My sh1ft In emphasis is not simply due to the fact I 
am referring to film, not literature. ' My shift in emphasis, while related to the fact that 
the films I encounter on this j ourney can loosely be termed 'avant-garde' and therefore 
considered as being disposed to generating alternative forms of narration, is not simply 
due to that fact either. In fact, as Gilberto Perez states, while different in genre, the 
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avant-garde and Hollywood may have more in common than is supposed. They both set 
up self-sufficient realms, the fori-ner iii terrns of the materiality of the medium, the latter 
in tenris of the diegesis, that are 'closed off from the rest of the world' (Perez, 1998: 85). 
My shift in emphasis has to do with a revelation that the film moment of suspension, its 
supposedly non-narratable stillness, generates the enlivening movement of being 
continuously fractured, rather than revealing an ontological void at the heart of the real. I 
shall qualiA, what I mean by the real as I move through the protagonists of this journey. 
But for now. following Stanley Cavell's claim that film's ontological basis in 
photography means that it transcribes reality rather than represents it, I suggest that the 
use of this medium in a mechanically reproductive way, a characteristic of the films I 
use as interludes in my thesis, may allow for a proximity between image and viewer that 
can be characterized as real. 
Early in its history the cinema discovered the possibility of calling 
attention to persons and parts of persons and objects, but it is equally a 
possibility of the medium not to call attention to them but, rather, to let 
the world happen, to let its parts draw attention to themselves according 
to their natural weight (Cavell, 1979: 25). 
This does not mean that film is an innocent record of a pre-existing real, but that because 
of its intimate relation to reality, it can allow for a perfon-nance of the real far removed 
from the pursuit of the real characteristic of realism. ' Although a problematic tenii, to 
think of the real as a continuously fractured continuity and of film narration as 
replicating this movement, is productive of engendering the subject of narrative as 
herself a continuously fractured continuity without the goal (the doomed eventuality) of 
an Oedipal narrative trajectory. In order to demonstrate the movement of this alternative 
mode of narration, which I categorize for now as a mode of 'continuous discontinuity'. 
the narrative trajectory of this thesis will be comprised of repetitious movements that 
accumulate serially and loop back upon one rather than operating teleologically. In this 
way, the plot of my thesis is redirected towards the movements of interminability that I 
stage in the pieces of writing, i. e. the 'montage texts', that are generated by an 
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engagement N,, vith the film moments themselves and act as interludes in the propulsion 
towards my inten-ninable ending. 
1.2 MEETING THE FILMS: TACITA DEAN'S DISAPPEARANCE ATSEA (1996) 
AND CHANTAL AKERMAN'S NEWS FROM HOME (1976). 
The two film encounters that inspire this journey are Tacita. Dean's 
A. sappearance at Sea (1996) and Chantal Akennan's News From Home (1976). These 
films can loosely be categorized as avant-garde. However, Disappearance at Sea is 
generally seen in the context of contemporary artist's film installation, Dean being an 
artist who also works in other mediums such as drawing and sound, albeit with an 
oblique filmic dimension. Disappearance at Sea is intended for the gallery rather than 
for the cinema, whereas News From Home is an experimental film destined for the 
cinema theatre, Akerman being an avant-garde film director per se. (Although of late she 
has taken to making gallery installations using both footage from her previous films as 
well as specially commissioned film). 9 Current debates around the distinctions between 
these filmic modalities have tended to contrast the mobility of the gallery installation 
film viewer and the loop presentation of the gallery film as opposed to the immobile 
cinema theatre viewer and the set duration of the cinema screening. However, while 
these different locations for screening film do partake of different modes of distribution 
and can be said to encourage different modes of reception, my thesis takes issue with the 
literalness of how mobility/immobility is used to describe the viewer in these spaces. 
The peripatetic physicality of the gallery film spectator is not to be celebrated as a 
simple deconstruction of the supposed seduction of the immobile spectator by the 
cinematic spectacle. In that supposed immobility, I shall argue, other forms of mobility 
are occurring. As Stephen Heath says in another context, but it is appropriate here, 
'[w]hat moves in film, finally, is the spectator, immobile in front of the screen' (Heath, 
1981: 99). The argument I shall present for a mobility that is sensory yet not purely 
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physical or simply psychic in relation to Disa earance at Sea and News Erom Home I pp 
undern, imes distinctions between the gallery and the cinema in claiming the films 
themselves as screening theatres which generate the perforinance of a sensibility 
irreducible to the literal conditions of reception. 10 
Disappearance at Sea is a 14 minute l6mm cinemascope colour film comprised 
of seven shots that last approximately 2 minutes each. The film was shot on location at 
St. Abb's head lighthouse and focuses on the revolving lighthouse bulbs and the sunset, 
as day becomes dusk and then night. The camera is static. The film was obliquely 
inspired by the Journey of the amateur yachtsman Donald Crowhurst who attempted to 
sail around the globe single-handedly in the Golden Globe race of 1968. Realising 
within a few weeks of his departure from Teignmouth, Devon, that his boat would not 
make it, he hid out in the Atlantic and falsified his radio reports back to England so that 
it seemed as if he was actually winning the race. Eventually he lost all sense of human 
time and scale, developing 'an obsessive relationship with his faulty chronometer' (Dean, 
1997: unpaginated). The wreckage of his boat was found floating on the ocean months 
later. His body was never recovered. He is believed to have jumped overboard, 
overwhelined by the enonnity of his deceit and the extraordinary delusions he was 
subject to, accounts of which were found in one of his logbooks. " 
News From Home is a 90 minute colour film comprised of pnmanIN, static shots 
of New York City. Its voice-over features Aken-nan intermittently reading the letters she 
received from her mother during her first extended stay in the city in 1972. It was on 
returning to the city after a three month visit back to Belgium that Akerman decided to 
make a film about the city, related to her mother's letters. Although Akerman refutes the 
label of feminist, News From Home, in combining documentary codes and 
autobiographical material, shares the critical approach to narrative common in 'feminist' 
filmmaking in the 1970s, especially Yvonne Rainer's Lives qfPeýfbrmers (1972) and 
Michelle Citron's Daughter Rite (1978). 12 
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While neither News From Home nor Disappearance at Sea is a classical 
narrative film, the avant-garde procedures they deploy could be said to be structured 
against the horizon of classical narrative in the sense that both films have definitive 
beginnings, middles, and ends. Disappearance at Sea opens on a scene at dusk, and by 
means of elliptical cuts, progressively moves towards nightfall intercut with shots of the 
sunset, and ending Nvith a scene where nightfall is transformed into something more 
indeterminate. Neivs From Home opens on a New York street scene, continuing to cut 
from one static shot to another for about ten minutes, until the first of the letters occurs 
on the voiceover. This 'daemonic middle', mostly static camera shots of the city, 
interspersed with the letters, comprises about an hour of the 90 minute film. Then a 
progression towards the ending is introduced by a lengthy tracking shot, the subsequent 
shot sequences eventually leading into the shot of a dark momentarily indefinable space 
from which the camera pulls away, ending with a transformed view of the city, the 
letters having stopped. 
What interests me though is how within the 'dilatory space' of narrative middles 
that Brooks refers to, a moment occurs which suspends the minimal narrative schemas 
of both these films and changes the space of delay from being a mere respite into 
something full of possibility in its own right (Barthes 'in Brooks, 1984: 92). These 
moments generate the prolongation of a temporality other than the desire for the end. 
The film ends, but the force of these moments continue in another direction. It is the 
attempt to articulate the sensibility of these moments that motivate the journey of this 
thesis. In Disappearance at Sea, this dis/continuous moment occurs in the final cut when 
the screen goes blank for a few seconds, followed by the appearance of a beam of light 
that paces rhythmically across the image of darkness on the screen re-tracing a horizon 
of sorts. This confrontation with the disappearance of the image, with a moment of 
absence, had a strangely generative effect for me rather than it being a suspension to the 
flow of narrative. In News From Home, the dis/continuous moment occurs towards the 
end of the film when the camera cuts to an indeten-ninate dark space, (under a city 
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bridge), from which it then pulls slowly away from the city, continuously re-framing the 
image of the New York skyline. In the process of this re-framlng, the horizon becomes 
absorbed in the blue opacity, yet shifting surface of the image. For me, this moment in 
New, s From Home provides another encounter with an absence that is generative rather 
than statically mute. In order to voice the new movements, the transportations, 
encountered in relation to the non-narrative, apparently suspended moments of these two 
films, I felt it necessary to produce an alternative method of writing referred to in the 
thesis as the 'montage text'. 
1.3 THE'MONTAGE TEXT'METHOD: PUTTING THE DISJUNCTIVE FILM 
MOMENT INTO WRITING 
Each of the two films engender a separate 'montage text', which acts both as an 
interlude to and a motivator for the theoretical arguments that follow and precede them. 
The 'montage text' based on Disappearance at Sea appears in chapter three, the one 
based on News From Home in chapter four. These texts will montage different voices, 
descriptive, theoretical, analytical, which will 'inaccurately' replicate the film's static 
camerawork and the irregularity of the rhythm of cuts from shot to shot (Bersam, 
1977). 13 The purpose of this method is to create a network of rigorously woven 
fTagments, between whose Juxtapositions, something of the movements generated by 
these disjunctive film moments emerges. I am calling these movements 'dis/continuous' 
in the sense that they emerge due to a cut that suspends the film's minimal propulsion 
forward,, but this suspended rupture paradoxically engenders new movements, which are 
chaotically multi -directional rather than adhering to the notion of narrative as a structure 
wit ing, middle, and, end. These multi-directional movements could be called iha beginn I 
the narrative of experience itself 
The tenn 'experience' is an inherently slippery one due to its implication of being, on 
the one hand, something that naturally happens to someone, and, on the other hand, 
17 
something that T formulate as being mine, i. e. a construction under the guise of natural 
and authentic immediacy. In claiming that the multi-directional movements unleashed 
by the moment of suspension could be called the narrative of experience, what I mean is 
that this moment reveals the bifurcating movements of temporality in which the 
spectator is caught up and carried away, the force of these temporalities impacting on the 
spectator at varying points in the motion. By means of this oscillation between being 
carried away and being impinged upon, a new form of embodied subjectivity is 
generated that contrasts with the mastery of owning one's experience in narrative. I shall 
go on to show. using a selective combination of the ideas of Gilles Deleuze and Maurice 
Merleau-Pont-v, how the film moment of prolonged duration, unleashes the temporal 
plaN, of expenence as a dis/continuitv that narrative as story seeks to order as a 
continuity from the perspective of the end. In other words, the moment of suspension, 
rather than being a delay or postponement of the end, reveals the simultaneous interplay 
between the temporal orders of past, present, and future that comprise the dis/continuity 
of experience. 'Experience' then is happening to someone, but that someone does not 
own it. She is lived by the force of its temporally disjunctive directions. As Joan Scott 
puts it: 
It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted 
through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of 
our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that 
grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about 14 
which knowledge is produced (Scott, 1991: 779-780 . 
For the spectator-someone then, the sensibility of this force is simultaneously connective 
and estranging. T become invisible to myself, yet at the same time, these movements of 
bifurcating registers of time express Imel. 
In emphasizing the discontinuous aspect of this experience, I am not following 
recent critiques of experience which are suspicious of embodied experience and insist on 
the constitution of experience via language (Lacan (1977), Derrida (1981). Butler 
(1993)). While I agree with the notion that words are anonymous, I do not subscribe to 
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the conclusion that this results in melancholic alienation of the personal in the 
impersonal. 
This not owning of one's words is there from the start, however, since speaking 
is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself, the 
melancholic reiteration of a language that one never chose, that one does not 
find as an instrument to be used, but that one is, as it were, used by, expropriated 
in, as the unstable and continuing condition of the "one" and the "we", the 
ambivalent condition of the power that binds (Butler, 1993: 242). 
By contrast, a more recent, post-Derridean, analysis of how language and embodiment 
are imbricated and mutually inforining can be found in Vicki Kirby's Telling Flesh: The 
Substance Qf the Corporeal ( 199 7). Kirby, using Derrida to good effect, posits the body 
as itself a scriptural force as dynamic as other fonns of writing like language. My 
'montage text' method seeks to voice the fractured continuity of experience rather than 
apply an analytical method to it. This notion might sound naive at this point. In Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, 'the real' of experience is forever lost to the subject on entry to 
the symbolic order. In taking issue with Lacan's absolute divorce of the real of the body 
from the subject, I repeat that I am not returning to the body as the ground of experience. 
As will become clear later on, incorporating the body as a variable constant in the 
process of signification does not exclude the body as an unknown entity (Kirby, 1997: 
65-66). Gilles Deleuze's reworking of Henri Bergson's concept of the virtual and the way 
it is taken up by Elizabeth Grosz in Architecture From the Ontside: Essays on Virtual 
and Real Space will allow me to argue for the 'real' effects of the unknown body without 
it becoming an object of knowledge for a subject or an object that is absolutely lost to 
the subject. 
My rationale for the 'montage text' method is that in order to argue for the 
ienating, nature of the movmg/transfon-native, as opposed to the static/all film moments, 
the writing has to position itself inside them in a manner that replicates (inaccurately) 
the way T was seized by the movements generated by these moments. The notion of an 
I inaccurate' replication serves to distance my attempt from ascribing the authenticity of 
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self-possession to the narrational movements generated by the 'montage texts' and from 
claiming these texts to be accurate copies of the experience of those movements. 
Adopting a writing position from where one might apply theory to the encounter with 
the film moments would be to impose a meta-narrative on the dis/continuous experience 
they generate. It would be to impose, what Brooks, and others I shall critique in chapter 
two, might call narrative stabilitv on these moments which, in suspending the forward 
trajectory of narrative desire, expose narrative's other, the life world, thereby generating 
a continuity between the fictional world and the world of 'the passive entanglement of 
subjects in stories that disappear into a foggy horizon' (Ricoeur, 1: 74). Cut from the 
imposition of narrative order, the dis/continuous film moment opens out onto the 
cacophony of the 'pre-thematic' aspect of experience, an openness, which obviates 
against closure (Carr, 1986: 3). 15 Traditionally seen as the chaos that narrative forin 
binds, this cacophony has, I shall claim, its own narrative logic to which we are blind in 
everyday life. Encountering, in the preordained space of the film installation, either 
gallerv or auditorium, a simulation which unleashes a kind of 'pre-thematic' cacophony 
allows for a renegotiation of identity that breaks through the parameters of clich6 and 
stereotype. 
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PRECEDENTS 
In her introduction to Yves Lomax's Writing the Image: An Adventure with Art and 
Theory, Int Rogoff succinctly captures the ethos of what I am trying to do in the 
'montage'texts and how I see their relation to the main argument of my thesis. She says 
there that there are 'shifts taking place in the project of "theory" where it 'can become the 
space of making' rather than taking a purely critical distance to Its object of analysis 
(Rogoff in Lomax, 2000: xvi). Her sentiments are echoed by Kathy Acker's discussion 
of writing strategies that mix 'object language' and 'metalanguage', without privileging 
the latter in any way, there being'... no more need to cleconstruct, to take apart 
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perceptual habits We have to find somewhere to go, a belief, a myth' (Acker, 1997: 
11). Acker calls for 'wavs of breaking with the essay forin' by using 'chance structurally: 
by viewing sulýjects through the lens of supposedly unrelated subjects-, by reading a 
text's content only through its structure, by reading a non-literary text, say a painting, by 
trying to imitate it literally, in words' (Acker, 1997: viii). This last is particularly apropos 
in regard to the descriptive nature of my approach to putting the films into writing. The 
films I encounter 'create a condition of hyper-fixity' (Singer, 1990: 5 8) in their use of 
static camera and the presentation of shots whose duration lasts for longer than is 
necessarv for a viewer to identify their ostensible information as content. The continuous 
irregular jump cuts that disrupt and displace each shot creates a context in these films for 
the emergence of singular moments that generate a transformative displacement for the 
viewer. These dis/continuous moments are like 'poses' before which I say things, am 
forced to speak and remember, seized upon by reverie and theory. 17 This practice echoes 
Gregory Ulmer's assertion in Teletheor : Grammatology in the Age of Video that Y 
electronic media, film and video, provide the model for new practices of writing. He 
names this practice of writing, "euretics" (invention), and, in a wav that echoes Acker 
above, charactenzes it in tenns of a shift from cnticism as metalanguage to hybrid fonns 
of linguistic intermixture where the emphasis is on a 'poetic or associational mode of 
composition' (Ulmer, 1989: 15). " The film images present figures of absence. In the 
'montage texts', I associate with the material presentation of these absences and conjure, 
'other ideas, other images, other significations' (Barthes, 1986b: 3 1). 1 fill in these poised 
absences with an indistinct mix of evocation and analysis to create an "I" that'is 
constituted as immediately contemporary with the writing, being effected and affected 
by it' (Barthes, 1986b: 19). 
As well as Roland Barthes' writing, which I shall look at in more detail in chapter 
two in relation to the narrating the moment of excess, there is further precedence for this 
method of engagement with oNects and texts in contemporary cultural studies, This 
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precedence is currently institutionalized as 'perfon-natve writing' (Butler ( 1997), Phelan I 
and Lane (1998), Lomax (2000)). 19 
Performative writing evokes worlds that are other-wise intangible, unlocatable: 
worlds of memorv. leisure, sensation, imagination, affect, and in-sight. Whereas 
a mimetic/realist perspective tends to reift' absent referents in language, thus 
sustaining an illusion of full presence, a perforniative perspective tends to 
favour the generative and ludic capacities of language and language encounters 
- the interplay of reader and writer in the joint production of meaning. It does 
not describe, in a narrowly reportorial sense, an objective]y verifiable event or 
process but uses language like paint to create what is self-evidently a version of 
what was, what is, and/or what might be (Pollock, 1998: 80). 
Terformative writing' attempts to banish the so-called transcendent beyonds of a 
representational aesthetics and instead to write "'into" disappearance ... to move 
"from a 
representation of loss ... to an-enactment of 
loss... (Blocher cited in Pollock, 1998: 84). 
This writing is characterized by movement. the shifting movements of the voices 
invoked, evoked, and cited being integral to this mode of argument as enactment 
(Phelan, 1997: 5). Phelan sees it as forging 'a different fonnal relation between the 
critical thinker and reader', which she refers to as a 'phantasmatic staging of "me" and 
"you" ' (Phelan, 1997: 18). While Phelan's account of the rationale of perforniative 
writing corresponds in part to my theoretical impulse to make"montage texts', there is 
perhaps one main distinction between my position and hers. In the emphasis on 
I enactment' in perforinative writing, lurks an underground insistence on giving a true 
account of a past (lost) event, albeit with the consideration of temporal delay taken into 
account. Perfonnative writing here shows its legacy. 
Emerging on the cultural studies scene in the wake of post-structuralist theory, it 
. 
ferance with the return to an emphasis on authentic attempts to combine the play of dýf 
experience in identit Y PolitiCS. 
2( 'This return to experience has many causes, one of 
which could be claimed as being a reaction to the occlusion of positive stabilized forms 
of identity that post-structuralist theory, particularly its DerrIdean variety, was said to 
promulgate in the cultural sphere. Contrary to the endless deferral of presence and the 
continuous positing of absence, metonymy in performative writing, while marking 
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absence, 'also marks itself an active, material signifting process that is neither a prison 
house nor a fun house, not a place even, but a boundary space, inviting laughter and 
transfon-nation' (Pollock, 1998: 85-86). Perfon-native writing attempts to combine two 
seemingly mutually exclusive positions: authenticity and diftý, rance. It uses the later's 
continual undennining of authenticity to prevent the full-blown embrace of positive 
identity claimed in identity politics, but it is at the same time mindful of witnessing 
identity. These positions, identity and the play of dil, ferance, are not perhaps as mutually 
exclusive as thev have been deemed to be. " However, their combination under the 
rubric of 'perforinative writing', brings in its train an unacknowledged attachment to the 
lost (authentic) event, a trajectorv still under the sign of melancholy that the turn to 
perfon-nativity sought to escape. Pollock refers to 'a kind of melancholy hopefulness' 
(Pollock, 1998: 93). Something of this dichotomy can be seen in the following citation 
from Phelan: 
Contemporan, theory's paranoia animates the ash of critical writing, transforms 
it into a landscape composed of thousands of horizontal breathropes. These 
prose ropes slap the page like jump ropes sweeping concrete. Its nervous 
mutating catastrophic reach propels what I call performative writing. 
Performative writing is different from personal criticism or autobiographical 
essay, although it owes a lot to both genres. Performative writing is an attempt 
to find a forin for "what philosophy wishes all the same to say. " Rather than 
describing the performance event in "direct signification, " a task I believe to be 
impossible and not terrifically interesting, I want this writing to enact the 
affective force of the performance event again, as it plays itself out in an 
ongoing temporality made vivid by the psychic process of distortion ... 
The 
events I discuss here sound differently in the writing of them than in the 
"experiencing" of them, and it is the urgent call of that difference that I am 
hoping to ampliA, here (Phelan, 1997.12). 
While I myself also turn to 'performative writing' as a way out of the melancholic 
reification of absence, the suspended moments, the absences, in my film encounters 
generate a writing space where 'phantasmatic staging' itself breaks down, and what 
occurs in its stead is a continual displacement of the terms of identity per se. 22 In that 
space of displacement or dis/continuity, the positions "me" and "You" will collapse. 
However, rather than this collapse resulting in a fused "we", which, as Roland Barthes 
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shows is the logic of the shifters "I" and "you", i. e. the two positions are reversible, this 
fusion is displaced in relation to an anonymous "it", which I shall call, for now, the "It" 
of duration (Barthes, 1986b: 16). 
THE "I". 
In the 'montage texts', I shall continue to use the tenn "I", but it is in this sense 
that I mean it: as a grarnmatical pronoun that stands for a personal locution In language, 
It signifies "me", but also signifies anyone who utters it to refer to themselves, therefore 
it is an empty and shared point of enunciation. When I use it to point to myself in 
relation to the film scenarios especially but also in the thesis in general, my location in 
its environs is crossed by an accumulation and exchange of influences and experiential 
motifs that intersect with anyone instance of my uttering it. As filmmaker and writer 
Tnnh T. Minh-ha puts it: 
Whether I accept it or not, the natures of 1,1, you, s; lhe, We, we, they, 
and wolman constantly overlap. They all display a necessary 
ambivalence, for the line dividing I and Not-1, us and them, or him and 
her is not (cannot) always (be) as clear as we would like it to be. 
Despite our desperate, eternal attempt to separate, contain, and mend, 
categories always leak. Of all the layers that forrn the open (never finite) 
totality of the "I", which is to be filtered out as superfluous, fake, 
corrupt, and which is to be called pure, true, real, genuine, original, 
authentic? Which, indeed, since all interchange, revolving in an endless 
process? (Minh-ha in Jones, 2002: 160). 
To say "I" then is a momentary stabilization of an endless process of moving in time. It 
it. The separabili y of is connected to a particular location but not permanently fixed to II it 
the deictic "I" from definite location opens it to the penneability of the outside. It is this 
multi-layered "I" that is put into play by the'montage texts'. The notion of narrational 
experience then takes on an aspect of reversibility. No longer totally mine, no longer 
mine in total, "I" move into and out of it In relation to the other scene generated by the 
moments of absence in the film encounters. On a superficial level, there is Donald 
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Crowhurst's disappearance and the absent daughter, the filmmaker. I am not the viewer 
who seeks to identlA, NvIth these story absences nor the critic who seeks to define the 
23 films interins of these absences. Performative writing is not 'the site where a 
previous N, stored-up person is innocently restored' (Barthes, 1986b: 17). 
Performative writing is generated by means of what Barthes calls 'the middle 
volcel. a position which condenses the opposition between active and passive voice, 
, whereby the "I" retains agency and yet is dispersed in the action (Barthes, 1986b: 18). 
Following Barthes, Ulmer associates the middle voice, as a way of writing whereby the 
subject is not held apart from the object, with the will to invent (Ulmer: 1989: 86-87). It 
is for this reason, as well as for the fact that I am taking 'electronic media' as writing 
models that the layout of the 'montage texts' will differ from the main academic 
argument. Because of the density and poetic nature of the repetitious accumulations of 
'identity' located in relation to the image, I shall leave any necessary theoretical 
referencing as endnotes, as inserting them into the text would disrupt the continuity of 
the scene I am trying to evoke. In the 'montage texts', a transformative continuous 
displacement will be shown to take place across a textual space comprised of the deictic 
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shifters "I", "you 'here", now My goal in this is to voice the relational flux in the 
dis/continuous moment. as opposed to the emphasis on absolute disjunction in 
psychoanalytic film theory's insistence on symbolic castration and formal film theory's 
insistence on distanciation. (Critiques of these approaches to disjunction will comprise 
chapter two of this thesis. ) 
While the 'montage texts' based on the film encounters act as supplements to the 
main body of the theoretical argument of the thesis, itself a journey comprised of a series 
of encounters with various 'film' philosophers, their impact on and importance to that 
main body far exceeds their brevity. The processual knowledge that issues from them 
and leaks into the main theoretical argument makes up for the quantifiable Imbalance 
between the two modes of writing. While chronologically the 'montage texts' act as 
interludes in the academic argument, thematically they work in tandem with the main 
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argument as parallel modes of analysis articulating the generativity of the film moments 
of absence. As the thesis progresses, the feminist subtext underlying the notion that these 
film moments generate something other than mute suspension gains ground. This 
subtext \\, III evolve into a rationale of why I had, to repeat Kathy Acker, 'to find 
somewhere to go' (Acker, 1997: 11). 
1.4 MOVING ABSENCE FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS TO PHILOSOPHY. 
The theoretical 'home'that this journey departs from is the Lacanian position of 
philosopher Slavoj Zizek. My attraction to his ideas had to do with how they offered a 
structure for third,, ing of film moments, albeit from Hollywood film, as constituting a 
mode of subjectivitv liberated from ideological identification. I shall refer to his ideas in 
more detail in chapter two. Briefly put, the main conceptual notion that I was attached to 
when I encountered the first film moment in this thesis, i. e. the final cut in 
Disappearance at Sea, was Zizek's notion of 'subjective destitution' (Zizek, 1989: 123). 
The moment of 'subjective destitution' has to do with a moment when the subject not 
only confronts the fundamental fantasy that structures his/her identity but renounces the 
shoring up of lack that the fantasy allows. In this process, referred to by Lacan as 
'traversing the phantasy', the subject's imaginary identifications are destroyed (Lacan, 
1979: 273) . 
2' The subject is deprived of his/her fundamental reference points and 
embodies a desire beyond the pleasure principle. To illustrate Lacan's concept of 
'traversing the phantasy, Zizek uses examples from Hollywood film where protagonists 
are confronted with a suspension of their ideologically positivized identities, which, for 
Lacan, are the fictions (narratives) we invent to cover the traumatic kernel of emptiness 
at the heart of subjectivity (Zizek, 1989: 122). This moment of suspension or destruction 
is considered an occasion of possibility. The bleakness of this confrontation with the 
ground zero point of identity is offset by the fact that this gap in signification, this 
suspension of narrative, is the opening whereby the subject might assume a true rather 
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than an ideologically compromised desire. Although Zizek's analyses end at the point of 
suspension, the idea is that after this moment the subýject might be able to reconstruct a 
less persecuton, more liberating identity, it being the unconscious attachments to our 
fantasy structures that keep us blindly reproducing the dictates of the symbolic order. 
The notion of liberation is echoed somewhat differently in the work of Parveen 
Adams, another Lacanian theorist who uses film. Her approach to the image is more 
fon-nal than Zizek's illustrational one, but her analyses of art and film also tenninate at 
the point of suspension which she describes as the point where the subject gains some 
lee-way from the signifier (Adams, 1991: 89). Needless to say, for both Zizek and 
Adams, this (suspended) encounter with a fundamental absence is of course an 
encounter Nvith the bedrock of psychoanalysis, i. e. castration. While Zizek characterizes 
this encounter in terrns of 'subjective destitution' and Adams in terms of '[a] moment of 
blindness' in the image, Nvhereby the absence behind identity discloses itself (Adams, 
1991: 96), the problem with this analytical structure is perhaps obvious. It can be used to 
approach any work of art or film where a moment occurs that suspends narrative, either 
as a gap in signification or an excess of signification, with the same interpretive 
outcome. The analytical structure is preserved intact while the specificity of the image 
disappears, because in Lacanian analysis, attachments to the image have to be broken as 
they delude us into thinking we see ourselves reflected in them. 26 As Gilberto Perez puts 
it: 'For the Lacanian we are all fetishists at the movies who fasten on to the image to 
deny the absence of reality' (Perez, 1998: 17). 
At one level, I could see the cut to the blank screen in Disappearance at Sea 
neatly fitting into this model. In the final cut, which follows the elision of daylight in the 
close-up of the lighthouse lamp, the screen is blank for a few seconds. Although this 
literal absence of an image occurs for only a few seconds before the appearance of a 
light beam that punctuates the screen's darkness, It correlated in my mind with the 
deconstruction/destruction of the image called for in radical film practice and 
psychoanalytic film theory. The encounter with this momentary blankness resonates 
27 
with the state of 'subjective destitution' that Zizek discusses whereby the subject (here 
the spectator) is divested of all illusion and narcissistic attachment to images. Indeed I 
physically felt this detachment, but it did not seem to have that quality of mute 
suspension that Zizek's analysis implies. There was something else going on in that 
blank space, which I shall refer to for now as a joyous sense of continuity. As if to 
confinn my sense of a tNrpe of eontinuity as opposed to suspension, a faint light beam 
began to punctuate the darkness, enabling me to retrace a hazy horizon line from its 
highlighting of the fringes of clouds in the night sky. In the psychoanalytic framework 
that I had adopted prior to the journeying of this thesis, such a tracing of the night sky 
would be seen as a restoration of illusion that pacifies the ego in the face of its 
destitution. Needing this sort of restoration would be a sign of moral weakness in terms 
of the ego. In terms of a materialist practice of filmmaking, it would point to a lack of 
critical attitude and an embrace of a romantic sensibility frowned upon by the 
contemporary emphasis on the critique of representation. 
However, what I found doubling captivating in Disappearance at Sea was that 
the sense of restoration did not seem to be on the side of the ego. The film opened up the 
possibility that destruction of ego illusions does not simply mean an empty subject 
facing the artifice of its construction of identity as in Zizek's formulation, but that there 
is always restitution going on In the world outside of the perspective of the subject. The 
film, in the way it breaks down the usual co-ordinates of perspective, takes on a view, 
which is not mine to own in any sense of mastering the image. It is a frighteningly 
autonomous view, the view of a machine looking dispassionately at a scene. It goes on 
without me. It doesn't need me to function. This view would be robotically alienating if 
not for the simultaneous presentation of change in the cuts from day to night. This 
overlay of a planetary/cosmological revolving with a mechanical revolving captures two 
motions of the world without me. But somehow, I found the combination of these two 
views, which do not depend on my agency, strangely uplifting. The film presented the 
Iy intervention. This doesn continuity of things regardless of in iI 't absolve me from 
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responsibility, but shows that I am not the centre of the world. More than this, the film's 
detached refraction of these two views, inachinic and cosmic, was combined with an 
intimate refraction of rivulets of light in which "I" was carried away. This intimate 
refraction, fluid and ever-changing, seemed to provide a shifting continuity rather than a 
kind of mirroring. The "I" could continue in dispersion, held as a series of moments in 
relation to, sometimes minute, sometimes catastrophic, shifts in perspectives beyond my 
control. By contrast, the renunciation of self-identity in the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
framework is still from the perspective of that self, substituting the form (empty) of the 
subject for the delusions of self-presence . 
2' Therefore the empty image mirrors the 
emptiness at the heart of the subject. Only the subject as a stronghold, a fortress identity, 
needs such an extreme critique of its frontiers. Only such a subject desires extreme 
destitution - to hang off the edge of the world suspended in the black void of the night. 
By contrast, what mv encounter with Disappearance at Sea opened up for me 
was the fact that the suspension of an image and the encounter with absence could have 
a positive signifý7ing force. The force of this intuition created the rupture necessary for 
me to break xvith prior theoretical allegiances and conceptual habits and seek other ways 
of articulating the sense of continuity, of narrational possibility, in the face of extinction 
that this encounter instilled in me. However, prior allegiances are not easily dispensed 
with and in chapter two of the journey. I struggle with them. 
1.5 CIRCULARITY: LOOPS AND INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE 
'MONTAGE TEXTS'AND THE MAIN THEORETICAL ARGUMENT. 
Following this Introduction will be three chapters. Chapter two will set a context for 
looking at narrative and non-narrative. It will set Slavoj Zizek's work in relation to 
1970s film theory and look at film moments generally in terms of excess and 
29 
distanciation. Chapters three and four will each contain a 'montage text' and an extensive 
theoretical commentarv, the former motivating the expositions of the latter. The 
'montage text' in chapter three is inspired by Disappearance at Sea. It will elaborate in,,, 
encounter Nvit the moment of emptiness, the disappearance of the image, in terins of the 
movements of a dis/continuous narration based on evocative descriptive passages that 
28 materialize the cut and join of the process of external and internal montage. 
Incorporated into these generated descriptions, I will stage a subliminal battle between 
the ideas of Slavoj Zizek and Gilles Deleuze that refer to film images of emptiness. The 
conflict of ideas that rage in this subliminal battle will be staged outright in the 
following theoretical commentary that comprises the rest of chapter three. The direction 
of the commentary will in part be suggested by 'information' derived from the 'montage 
tex. t'- therefore it will favour Deleuze over Zizek. Although there are in fact links 
between these two very different philosophers, Deleuze's philosophical approach is more 
conducive to my attempt to account for the sense of continuity I felt in relation to the 
film image of absence . 
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only is his writing itself suggestive of a'method'for 
voicing the affective dimension of film encounters, but his concept of time-image 
cmema allows for conceptualizing an immersive, continuous, relation to an image of 
disjunction/discontinuity. In this alternative trajectory, a cut to blankness does not 
simpl-N,, destroy the fantasy structure that the subject uses to shore up the empty core of 
its identity as a Lacanian theorist might have it, but is the occasion for encountering the 
embeddedness of the body in temporality itself Rather than 'the aporetics of temporality' 
bringing the subject to a full stop, a mute awe, as in Zizek's 'subjective destitution', what 
Paul Ricoeur calls 'the poetics of narrativity', 'responds' and, perhaps more importantly 
for my purposes, 'corresponds' to that aporia (Ricoeur, 1: 84). This encounter, I shall 
claim, is invested with narrative strands, albeit vague ones, ones that 'aim at obscurity 
and dissimulation rather than illumination', the purpose being to resonate with 'those 
aspects of our being-in-the-world that cannot be talked about directly' (Ricoeur, 1984: 
74 & 80). 
30 
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My shift from Lacanian psychoanalysis is not idiosyncratic. Aside from the 
commitment to Lacanian psvchoanalysis in the sphere of visual culture by Adams, Zizek 
and Joan Coplec, there is a general move away from psychoanalytic theory in film 
studies itself 31 It is sometimes still invoked in its Freudian fon-nulations, but its 
employment is anecdotal and illustrative rather than being an attempt to account for the 
structural relationships between the text and the spectator that dominated what David 
Bordwell calls 'subject-position theory' (Bordwell, 1996: 8). While identifying the 
various strands of those theoretical positions from Stephen Heath to Christian Metz to 
Laura Mulvey- Bordwell usefully sumi-narizes the general commonality of all these 
positions, a summary, which allows me to gain a perspective on my former allegiances. 
He defines 'subject-position theory' in the following terms: 
According to this theory, alternative and oppositional filmmaking tries to block 
Imaginary identifications, to offer alternative identifications (for example, films 
of "feminine writing"), and to "deconstruct" the ideological underpinnings of 
dominant cinema (Bordwell, 1996: 8). 
In his brief account of the waning of this týpe of theorizing in the late 1980's, one of the 
reasons he gives is that it seemed that '[t]here was ... no room 
for "agency" in a 
framework in which ideological representations so thoroughly detennined subjectivity' 
(Bordwell, 1996: 8). This lack of agency has been reacted to by the emphasis on 
reception in 1990's cultural studies. As Bordwell concisely puts it: 
The culturalist trend has sought to distinguish itself from subject-position theory 
by emphasizing that the object of study is not texts (dominant, oppositional, or 
whatever) but instead the uses made of texts Rather than locating diverse 
meanings in texts, the culturalist can locate them amongst audiences. Resisting 
readers can be read. And the reading of such readers can itself be "historicized" 
through consideration of advertising campaigns, exhibition circumstances,, and 
the multifarious discourses that circulate through a culture (Bordwell. 1996: 
1 o). 32 
My approach could be said to sit somewhere in-between 'subject-position theory' and the 
claim in 'reception theory' that a 'text's significance derives from the contextual 
determination of the reader's interpretation as a process of reception' (Staiger in 
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Bordwell and Carroll, 1996: 479) . 
33 1 certainly agree with the emphasis in reception 
theory that the interaction between 'reader' and text is a space of dynamic encounter 
rather than (negative) critique. However, I will maintain with 'subject-position theory' 
the notion of the spectator as a somewhat 'abstract' entitv as one's cultural/social identity 
in reception theory relies on sets of presupposed generalizations and locations 
(Bordwell, 1996: 11), As Bordwell sardonically puts it: 'the self-misrecognizing subject 
of 1975 Film Theory has become an active, self-conscious social agent' (Bordwell, 1996: 
16). As opposed to this self-knowing, which implies a model of transparency, I am 
interested in exploring the space of the d-Nmamic encounter between the 'text' and the 
'reader', rather than either of these entities dominating the meaning making process. 
Therefore, for me, the spectator is a useful abstraction as it implies the notion that a 
process of being constituted, as well as pre-constituted effects, comes into play in the 
dynamic space of being engaged by a film. 
In order to explore a dynamic, affective relation to film images of absence, as 
opposed to the predictable stasis of either Lacanian 'subjective destitution' or identity 
ion'more Ii erally, and si ultaneously politics positive substantiation, I shall take 'recepti it im 
more metaphysically, than it is meant in film studies per se. For me reception is closer to 
Barthes notion of 'the middle voice' in being a composite of active and passive rather 
than siMply active, as in the assertion of agency in cultural studies, or simply passive 
unwitting consumers of images, a position avant-garde film theory and practice sought 
. 
34 ormative tocritique The notion of 'reception' that I shall deploy is linked to perf 
wnting which, insists on the conveyance of the affective and embodied dimension of a 
performance/theatrical event, how it is lived through. 35 This affective dimension. as I 
have said, is largely bound up with absence, loss, trauma, but performance attempts to 
izes absence. It make these entities palpably felt, spatialized. Perfonnative wnting mobill 
attempts to create 'a spatial architecture [ ... 
I beyond the frames of our very best cameras' 
(Phelan, 1997: 165), but it is, in my thesis, a space engendered by them. Engaging this 
space reveals absence as an enlivening force rather than an 'event of unliving', which it is 
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usually conceived as being (Phelan, 1997- 60). The slight but crucial difference between 
rendering absence as the unrepresentable and envisioning the possibility of putting it 
into discourse as dialogic forin is crucial to my prqject. " 
Some of the questions generated bN, the encounter with absence in 
Disappearance at Sea that get taken up in the 'montage text' and its academic companion 
piece are: where and how was an "I" located in relation to the image which seemed to 
displace the "I" as predicate of engagement'? How was the experiential relation 
dependent on the image'? How was it distinct from the image? Where was it happening? 
Could the sense of something elusive, something falling between the spaces of 
identification and recognition, in relation to this film moment of absence, be akin to 
some form of narrative'? Referring to film criticism's dependence on theory to guide and 
make sense of its practice, Gilberto Perez states that 'theory that applies to experience in 
its turn rests on experience; it must not take off into a realm of its own but must instead 
construct its schemes in vital give and take with concrete reality' (Perez, 1998: 15). If 
not for the performative demonstration of the encounter with the dis/continuous film 
moment, my thesis that the latter has narrative duration would only be the setting out of 
a critical context for the subjectivity that is constituted in this encounter rather than an 
enactment of it. The theoretical commentary in chapter three evolves into a discussion of 
displacement as a fonn of feminine sublime subjectivity, a tum which, will link up with 
the rationale for the feminist subtext from chapter two, which pervades the trajecton, of 
the j oumey. 
Chapter four follows a similar pattern, opening with a'montage textwhose 
outcomes and rationale are elaborated in the following and preceding theoretical 
commentary. After weighing up Deleuze's ideas in terms of their use for re-conceiving 
how the cut to an image of absence might generate a real (felt) continuity, I searched for 
1 ht help me to thin other film moments that mig Ik further about the form of dis/continuous 
subjectivity. This proved difficult. While all the films I went to see in either galleries or 
cinemas confirmed the redundancy of a Lacanian approach for an engagement with 
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images, none of them generated anything like the continual displacements of 
Disal)I)earance at Sea. I wasn't simply looking for a repetition of the scenario generated 
by Disappearance at Sea or for a film that would affinn Delcuze's ideas on subjectivity, 
i. e subjectivity as a kind of impersonal continuity in a disýjunctive relation to time. I was 
looking for an encounter, which would tell me more about the embodiedspatiality of 
immersion in the disýjunctive image. An emphasis on filmic space might, I hoped, throw 
further light on why, while I found Deleuze's ideas compelling, I had some reservations 
about their embodiment in the techne of the film installation. An apparent dichotomy 
raises its head here. Why not just jump to phenomenological ideas, as these would seem 
to automatically deal with questions of embodied spatiality rather than attempt the 
seeming N, possible task of using a theorist, such as Deleuze, whose references to 
space in the transition from the movement-image to the time-image describe the 
progressive incapacity of the sensory-motor schemata to organize space in favour of 
what he calls a pre-hodological space of plural temporalities ? 37 
While I shall want to retain the capacity of the sensory-motor schemata, albeit in 
a transformed respect, I have good reason not to adopt a phenomenological position 
immediately. While there has been a return to the phenomenological tradition in recent 
film theory (a special issue of Quarterly Review ol'Film & Video, (1990); Casebier, 
(1991), Sobchack, (1992). Marks, (2000)), these returns, as I shall detail in section 4.2, 
tend to reassert verv traditional concepts of the body in space (Marks) or the spectator as 
a self-consciousness who exerts an ideal form of intentionality in comprehending 
phenomena (Casebier). As I am concerned with invisible existents generated by film 
images of absence, I deliberately hold onto Deleuzian principles that are closest to 0 
phenomenology in order to re-read aspects of phenomenology that are obliquely 
pertinent to the film moment in chapter four that eventually satisfied my search. " 
At a series of screenings scheduled to coincide with Tacita Dean's retrospective 
at Tate Britain in March 2000,1 finally encountered Chantal Aken-nan's News From 
Tl- hume (1976). An-ned with the readiness to be entranced by static camera shots whose 
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juxtapositions and irregular editing create a minimal narrative, an-ned with the readiness 
to be cast bv a film-cut into a moment of blankness, I was still unprepared for the 
emotive impact of the reconfigurations of space that ensued from the reframing of the 
film's final sequence. This spatiality seemed liquid and coagulated at one and the same 
time. The feeling of a kind of fractured expansion (dis/continuity) induced a similar 
sense of Joy to the final shot sequence of Disappearance at Sea. In order to expand on 
the unhinging containment of space in this film moment, I look to Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology, particularly his posthumously published The Invisible and the 
Visible. The later text, I shall maintain, has links to Deleuze's ideas on the 
constitution/narration of the subject, with the important distinction that, in Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology. this dynamic is rendered in terins of location as opposed to 
Deleuze's emphasis on the vertiginous, de-spatializing effects of the empty form of 
time. 39 The latter tend towards eternal vacultv whereas some notion of embeddedness in 
the life world is crucial for my account of spectatorship which, while being to do with 
inner (invisible) movement, does not foreclose on an attachment to location. 
Merleau-Ponty's ideas on the virtual spaces of location leak out of the 'montage 
text' based on News From Home. This text sets out more deliberately than the one based 
on Disappearance at Sea to perfonn the viewing experience of News From Home, as I 
precede my text with a link to Stephen Heath's chapter in Questions qf Cinema, 'Film 
Perfon-nance', which is historically contemporary with Aken-nan's film. (Heath 
specifically mentions News From Home in the chapter 'On Suture'). I re-read his call for 
new film performances in terms of the contemporary notion of performative writing 
referred to above. In an interesting historical constellation, News From Home brings 
minimalism's spatial and modular questions to resonate in the 21" century with 
Disappearance at Sea, a film itself historically pitched between two moments: Dean's 
own avowed interest in 1970s art, Robert Smithson in particular, and her insistence on 
manual editing in a digital era. It would be tempting to read this constellation in ternis of 
Hal Foster's characterization in the Return qf the Real of how the rupture of an earlier 
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avant-garde caii only be deciphered later in its repetition (Foster, ( 1993)). Although I 
will not take this up, it is pertinent that the two films that have affected me and informed 
the theoretical passage of this thesis span 1976 and 1996, the eras Foster singles out in 
his narrativization of the moment of tratima in art history. In the narrative of this thesis, 
if there is a connection to be read between these films in terms of 'tranversality', it has to 
do with how both filmmakers are concerned with the link between fictional and real 
time. 
1.6 BETWEEN CIRCULAR DISPLACEMENTS: A NEW SPACE OF 
SPECTATORSHIP 
I have never been so affected by a film as I was by. Jeanne Dielman. 
After my introduction to Aken-nan's work I sought out her films but they 
are not easy to find, being rarely screened in this country. I once tried to 
see her 1991 film Nuit De Jour but got stuck on a bus in London's 
Walworth Road with a ffiend for nearly the duration of the film. Now, 
thinking back, it somehow feels very appropriate and in keeping with 
Akerman's documentary style and extraordinary relationship to time 
(Dean, 1999a: 12). 
Earlier in this article Dean comments that'we know we are not spending every 
minute of the day with her [Jeanne Dielman] in a real time event, yet it feels like we are. 
It is so finely edited that we can no longer differentiate our real time flom her real time. 
What is fictional time? What is time? (Dean, 1999a: 12). My encounter with News From 
Home expands on the question left open by the 'montage text' generated by 
Disappearance at Sea and by the conu-nentary on Deleuze's ideas, i. e. the question of 
location,, the where of the body. My point will be that it is this intersection of our real 
time with a fictional construction of 'real time' is what brings us to a heightened 
awareness of our embeddedness in the abstract nature (empty forin) of time, the tune 
that continues without us. We overlook our dependence on this temporality by 
ize its constructing measurements that organi abstraction for us, removing its affect on us. 
Paradoxically, these measurements, clocks, deadlines and so forth, which are banal in 
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themselves, actually remove us from experiencing the banal as the everyday sense of 
being embedded iii time/life. It is my claim that a film that forces us to spend time with 
the image of reality brings us into an inu-nanent relation with this temporality that we 
avoid, or maybe have no access to, in functional space . 
4' This relation is heightened all 
the more so when within the filmic rhythin of slow pace, a particular moment occurs that 
suspends even this attention and exposes the dynamism of a flow of time invisible to us 
in everyday life. I shall develop this dynamism in relation to Deleuze's account of the 
differentiating movements of a passivity that is not in simple opposition to active 
viewing. I NN-11 I here be countering contemporary 'culturalist' and 'phenomenologist' film 
theorv's insistence on the active spectator. MN, contention is that the active spectator is to 
be located on the scale of measurement and mastery which militates against the 
affectivitv of what Nve cannot control or measure. Reconsidering passivity in relation to 
receptivity and location in tum reconfigures the negative connotations of passivity that 
are most often mapped onto the female spectator in traditional feminist film theory. 
Hence the return of the feminist subtext at this point and in the conclusion. The 
theoretical allegiances to Lacanian psychoanalysis that I struggle with in chapter two, as 
well as mv ambivalence to Deleuze as posing an alternative to those allegiances, are 
overthrown in this final chapter in favour of a re-imagined phenomenological approach 
consisting of a hybndization of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. At this final port of call, the 
dis/continuous embodiment of the film moment of absence, will have become an 
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'Identity-in-motion' . 
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' See his essay 'Narrative Transformations' in his The Poetics qf Prose. trans. Richard Howard, 
foreward Jonathan Culler, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1977). pp. 218-233. 
Todorov extends the criteria for understanding narrative structures in terms of ftinctions as set out 
bN Vladimir Propp in hisAforphologv o the Folktale, (Austin and London: University of Texas 
Press. 1968). See Peter Brooks. Readingfor the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. 
(Massachusetts- Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 90-92. 
Although Mulvey doesn't make her reference to Todorov explicit. it can be inferred due to her 
extensive use of Peter Brooks' Reading, for the Plot which does refer to Todorov's essay 
'Narrative Transformations'. 
3 Frank Kermode in The Sense qf an Ending: Studies in the Theoýv of'Fiction, (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1967). speculates that fictive ends are probably "figures" for death, p. 7. 
Walter Benjamin, whom Brooks cites, states that '[d]eath is the sanction of everything that the 
stomeller can tell' (Beqjamin. 1992: 93). Similar sentiments can be found in the writings of Pier 
Paolo Pasolim. 
It is therefore absolutely necessarý' to die, because, so long as we live, we have 
no meaning. and the language of our lives (with which we express ourselves, 
and to which we therefore attribute the greatest importance) is untranslatable; a 
chaos of possibilities. a search for relations and meanings without resolution. 
Death effects an instantaneous montage of our lives, that is, it chooses the truly 
meaningful moments (which are no longer modifiable by other possible 
contrarv or incoherent moments) and puts them in a sequence, transforming an 
infinite, unstable. and uncertain - and therefore linguistically not describable - 
present into a clear, stable, certain, and therefore easily describable past ... It is 
on4v thanks to death that our life serves us to express ourselves (Pasolini, 1988: 
236-7). 
4 The study of narrative in film borrows heavily from literary studies and linguistics. As well as 
looking to literary studies such as Propp's, with the rise of structuralism. film theory borrowed 
terms from the linguist Emile Benveniste. Benvensite distinguished between story, by which he 
meant narration where no speaker intervenes, and discourse, by which he meant a kind of 
utterance (enounce) marked by the act of uttering (enunciation), i. e. 'a speaker's act of saying this 
in this situation' (Perez, 1998: 54). Imported into the film theory I engage with in my thesis, i. e. 
the dominant mode of film theory disseminated in Screen magazine, which relies on distinctions 
between mainstream and radical avant-garde, Hollywood film was seen as story that masks the 
signs of discourse. The task of the avant-garde film was to unmask the signs of enunciation. 
thence the attention to the material signifiers of the medium. the camera, the film stock, the 
projector, and, the screen. 
Not all film theorists adopt the linguistic model. However, David Bordwell who attempts to look 
at narrative in film outside of a linguistic model, is still impelled to subject it to the dynamics of 
plot. See David Bordwell. Narration in the Fiction Film, (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985). For an account of film's potential as a form of expression other than the literary, or 
prose narrative, see Pier Paolo Pasolini's 1965 essay 'The Cinema of Poetry', in Bill Nichols (ed), 
Hovies andAlethods: An Anthology, vol. I L, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). pp. 
530-558. 
5 Brooks relates 'the daemonic middle' to Roland Barthes notion of '[t] he "dilatol), space" of 
narrative'. [This] 'space of retard, postponement, error. and partial revelation - is the place of 
transformation: where the problems posed to and by initiatory desire are worked out and worked 
through' (Brooks, 1984: 92). 
6 Although Brooks justifiably cites Benjamin, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre, as evidence of how 
death structures the retrospective action of narrative, it is perhaps useful to note, in relation to my 
thesis, that Benjamin contrasts the continuity of the story to the finite ending of the novel 
(Benjamin, 1992: 99). 
' For a thought-provoking discussion of the difference between film and literature, see Seymour 
Chatman's 'What Novels Can Do That Films Can't (and Vice Versa)'. Contrasting Maupassant's 
short story "Une Partie de campagne" and the Jean Renoir film based on it, Chatman looks at how 
the use of description and point of view greatly differ between these mediums. 
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" See chapter two of Andrew Klevan's Disclosure qf'lhe Everydoy: Undramatic Achievement in 
, N'arrative Film, (Wiltshire: Flick Books. 2000) for a brief but cogent discussion of the difference between realism as a drainatic invocation of a stereotyped real and the real as an indeterminate disclosure of the ordinary in film. 9 Akerman's installations include Women Sitting After Killing (2001) which was shown in the 2001 Venice Biennale and comprised of seven dispersed monitors showing the same image - the final moments of her film Jeanne Dielinan, 23 Ouai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975). A 
new commission Border (2002) was shown at Documenta XI. Kassel in 2002. It comprised of 
two large screens on which live feedback of the Texas border was shown. In fact. my first 
encounter with screened work by Akerman was her gallery installation Self-Portrait,, An 
Autobiography (1999) at the Frith Street Gallery, London. 
10 The presentational format of Disappearance at Sea, while differing from cinematic screening 
in that the projector is included in the viewing space, does borrow from the cinema theatre 
format. The single screen is frontally placed before a vieNver who is enticed to sit and watch the 
film from beginning to end regardless of when he/she enters the space. This is not simply due to 
the seating provided in the space, but to the fact that the film's cuts ostensibly express a structure 
of beginnings. middles. and ends, rather than being a repeated loop of a singular event which is 
characteristic of much film installation. e. g. Douglas Gordon's l0ms, 1994. 
" See Nicholas Tomalin and Ron Hall, The Strange I O. Vage ofDonald Crowhurst, (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1970). 
See Annette Kuhn's Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema for a concise account that links 
the different autobiographical approaches of Rainer's and Citron's films to Akerman's Jeanne 
Dielman, 23 Ouai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975). Kuhn discusses this era of 'feminist' 
filmmaking in terms of a feminine cinematic writing - see especially pp. 16 3 -17 1. News From 
Home has also been specificalINT discussed in a feminist context (Penley, and Bergstrom. (1978); 
Longfellow (1989) cited in Barker (1999)). This film, and Akerman's work in general have also 
been discussed in the context of Andy Warhol's and Michael Snow's filmmaking (Singer. 
(1989/90)- Kwietnio-vvski (1990); Margulies (1996)). For Akerman's refutation of their influence, 
see her intervieNN with Gary Indiana, 'Getting Ready for The Golden Eighties: A Conversation 
with Chantal Akerman by Gary Indiana'. Arýforum, 2 1.10, Summer, 1983, pp. 56-6 1. 
Sarah Montgomery in 'Women's Films', Feminist Review. no. 18, Winter 1984, states that while 
'Akerman would be the first to refuse the label of "feminist filmmaker"... [ilf her films have been 
taken up bý feminism, it's not because they are overtly feminist/militant, but because of the way 
in which female audiences have been able to relate to them in a very unique way' (Montgomery, 
1984- 47). 
13 1 am borrowing the term 'inaccurate replication' from Leo Bersani, who suggests that an 
alternative model of subjectivity can be derived from the narcissistic desire to repeat forms that 
resonate with the self By reaching beyond one's own "form" elsewhere in the mode of 'inaccurate 
replication'. the result would be a form of narration that exacts difference, rather than executing 
the sameness of an accurate repetition, which would contain difference in a static form of unity. 
See 'A Conversation with Leo Bersani', October, n. 82, Fall, (1997). pp. 3-16. 
14 While Scott is concerned with the writing of history and the historicizing of experience and the 
identities it produces, I am more interested in what Martin Jay, in an article on Walter Ben amin's 
notion of experience, calls 'experience without a subject' (Jay, 1993: 145). This would be 
'experience with more than one subject inhabiting the same space' (Jay, 1993: 155). Jay is here 
referring to the concept of the middle voice in literature, which I shall discuss shortly with 
reference to Roland Barthes. 
15 This view is of course paradigmatically phenomenological. For an account of the interrelation 
between pre-reflective experience and reflective consciousness in relation to film, see Vivian 
Sobchack's The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology ofFilm Experience (1992). Although, I 
am interested in this interrelation, I shall attempt in this thesis not to fall prey to the shuttling 
effect between the two that Derrida critiques in chapter five of Writing and Difference, "'Genesis 
and Structure" and Phenomenology', pp. 154-168, as being the deadlock of phenomenology 
16 In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze discusses the 'real image' that tears through the clichd 
(Deleuze, 1989: 2 1). In fact, in that volume, Deleuze goes so far as to claim that we need cinema 
to show us how to live now that life itself has become subject to clichd'd images. 
" My allusion to a 'pose' here is taken from Gregory Ulmer's Teletheolýv: Grammatology in the 
Age of Video. Ulmer discusses Roland Barthes' model of writing in fragments as stemming from 
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confrontations with various figures and asking oneself the question "what is happening"? (Ulmer, 
1989: 117). 
1" Ulmer's thesis that electronic media can provide a model for textual practices of writing is 
inspirational. but his conflation of film and video in this respect is rather suspect (Ulmer, 1989: 
103). He concedes that film is an allegorical medium, while video is associated vv ith immediacy 
but does not distinguish how these electronic media should generate different inventions of 
\Nriting if lie is to be taken at his word (Ulmer, 1989: 96). For an interesting discussion on video's 
relation to language in terms of immediacy and presence see artist Gary Hill's writings in Gaty 
Hill, Robert C. Morgan (ed), (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000). For a concise 
account of the shifts in video history where 'video's immediacv and its special relationship to real 
time became obscured by complex collaging and editing which have traditionally belonged to 
film'. see Chrissie Iles essay 'Luminous Structures', COIL. no. 3,1996, unpaginated. Her analysis 
might lend some credence to Ulmer's untheorized conflation of the two mediums. 
19 In Phelan and Lane's edited volume The Ends of Perfbrmance, two essays by other well-known 
practitioners in this field have been of particular interest and relevance to my project here: Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick's 'Teaching "Experimental Critical Writing"', pp. 104-115 and Della 
Pollock's 'Performative Writing', pp. 73-103. 
'('Differance is a term coined by Jacques Derrida in 1968 to account for the implications of 
Ferdinand de Saussure's insight that 'language in its most general form could be understood as a 
system of difference. "Nvithout positive terms" ' (Lechte, 1994: 107). This unconceptuali sable 
differance. challenges the notion of identity and the notion of the origin (true event). It makes 
NN-riting wholly permeable to what it attempts to position outside of its boundaries, e. g. nonsense. 
21 Indeed Sean Burke in The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectiviýv in 
Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida shows that the identity of the author function can be renewed 
'NNithout compromising the anti -representational ethos of a writerly writing' (Burke, 1992: 49). 
11 As an aside on melancholy tendencies in philosophy, it is no surprise that Gilles Deleuze 
should be one of my main companions on this journey, as Derrida in his text on Deleuze in The 
Work of Mourning says that 'Deleuze was the one among all of this "generation" who "was 
doing" philosophy the most gaily, the most innocently' (Derrida, 2001: 193). 
23 To define the films in terms of these story absences would counter the generative modality of 
transportation that the encounter with the force of these absences engendered for me. While News 
From Home has been read in terms of the melancholic absence of the mother (Heath, 1981 
Barker, 1999) and the loss and failure implicit in the Crowhurst story obliquely inspires 
Disappearance at Sea and features strongly in Dean's writing around the film, my thesis is based 
on the reanimation of these filmic absences in the embodied spatiality of viewing. 
24 In an insightful essay on Michael Snow's work, Thierry de Duve writes about the inherent 
mobility of the deictic shifters "I", "now", "here" that linguistically comprise the conditions of 
experience. De Duve's point is that in Snow's modernism, these deictics, are not only detached 
from their connections with one another, but reach an autonomous purity that severs them from 
reference to the observer's body and 'to a there defined as a goal or a faraway horizon' (de Duve, 
1995: 34). In chapter four of my thesis, I shall make a case for the paradox of experience as a 
disconnected synthesis of these deictic terms by contrasting Snow's work with Chantal Akerman's 
News From Home. 
25 Lacan's concept is discussed in depth in Anne Dunand's 'The End of Analysis (11)' in Reading 
SeminarXI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanaývis, Richard Feldstein, Bruce 
Fink, Maire Jaanus (eds), (Albany, State University of New York Press: 1995), pp. 251-256. 
26 David Bordwell., in his essay 'Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand 
Theory'in Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, says that, by the mid-1980's, Lacanian 
influenced film theory had become 'sterile through repetition' producing 'discriminable effects' 
whereby 'this film or that television show always converted the Imaginary into the 
Symbolic or 
positioned the individual as a knowing and desiring subject' (Bordwell, 1996: 12). 
27 For an illuminating account of how philosophical positions derived from Freud and Kant that 
posit the ground of the subject in terms of an inherent splitting that exceeds the subject's attempts 
to know itself. are versions of the very form of romantic self-reflection that they set out to 
critique, see Andrew Bowie's Aesthetics and Subjectiviýv: From Kant to Nietzsche, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 199 1). In this they reproduce difference as identity or the 
(transcendental) stasis of non-identity. Bowie looks at early romantic philosophers such as Fichte, 
to establish a different ground to the subject whereby the "I" is characterised by a lack of 
limitation that does not require the subject to transcend this infinity by a mental comprehension 
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of it as sublime object (Bowie. 1991: 66). In chapter three. I shall come at this question in relation 
to the feminine sublime which could be said to be characterized by the lack of a limit, a lack 
which is only a problem within a discourse Of limits such as the discourse of self-reflection. 2" The notion of internal montage is derived from Sergei Eisenstein's allusion of there being a 
'distinctive montage complex withiii the shot that arises from the collisions and combinations of 
the individual stimulants inherent within it' (Eisenstein in Taylor, 1998: 113). Although he is 
referring to the shot's contents. I am expanding the notion to encompass the interface between the 
internal juxtaposition of details in a shot and the spectator's intercutting between lived time and 
fragments of viewing tirne that occur in the shot whose duration exceeds the time frame of 
recognition. For me it is this particular accumulation of 'stimulants' that produces 'the 
physiological sum total of the resonance of the shot' (Eisenstein in Taylor, 1998: 113). 
My appropriation of the notion of 'internal montage' in this way can be related to Roland Barthes' 
discussion of Eisenstein's concept in 'The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Several Eisenstein 
Stills' in The Responsibilit 
*v (#'Forms: 
Critical Essa 
, vs on 
A lusic, Art, and Representation. 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986a), p. 6 1. This expanded notion of montage can be related to Boris 
Eikhenbaum's concept of internal speech. a process he attributes to the film spectator. As opposed 
to the reader. the film spectator moves 'from the subject - visible movement - he progresses to 
comprehension of it. the construction of internal speech' (Eikhenbaum, 1974: 11). 
This reprint of Eikhenbaum's 1927 essay 'Problems of Cine-Stylistics' was discussed in the 
following issue of Screen, vol. 15. no. 4. Winter 1974/75 by Ronald Levaco, 'Eikhenbaum, Inner 
Speech and Film Stylistics', pp. 47-58, and Paul Willemen, 'Reflections on Eikhenbaum's 
Concept of Internal Speech in the Cinema, pp. 59-70. The concept is interesting because it offers 
a way of thinking about the non-verbal relation between thought and the (film) image, as 
displaying the use of signs and linguistic operations of substitution and difference (Levaco, 
1974/5: 57). It is therefore linked to Deleuze's analysis of cinema as'a composition of images and 
of signs ... a pre-verbal 
intelligible content ... whilst serniology of a 
linguistic inspiration abolishes 
the image and tends to dispense with the sign' (Deleuze, 1992: ix). Hence his use of C. S. Peirce's 
sermosis as an alternative to the dominant mode of linguistic analysis in film theory derived from 
(interpretations of) Ferdinand de Saussure's theories of the signifier. 
For a useful summary of the distinctions between Saussure and Peirce see Robert Scholes, 
'Afterthoughts on Narrative 11: Language, Narrative, and Anti -Narrative', in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), 
On Narrative, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1980), pp. 200-208. 
19 Their difference can be succinctIv drawn around the trope of castration. Deleuze criticizes 
psychoanaINTsis as '[a] project directed against life., a song of death, law, and castration, a thirsting 
after transcendence, a priesthood, a psychology (all psychology being priestly)' (Deleuze, 1995: 
144). For Deleuze, the emphasis in Lacan on'a central fixed signifier', i. e. castration, prohibits 
the 'transformational' dispersion of sense (translator's notes in Deleuze, 1995: 187). Zizek 
critiques Deleuze's occlusion of the structural trope of castration (Zizek, 1994: 126-133). At a 
talk at the National Film Theatre, London. on 5 June 1998, Zizek cited Deleuze as being the 
philosopher implied in Lacan's assertion that he raises himself up against the philosophy of 
perversion. At a lecture at the Royal Holloway University of London. Egham, on 15 October 
2002, entitled 'Lacan Against Deleuze', Zizek convincingly elaborated the similarities between 
the Lacanian subject as an empty formal structure and Deleuze's early work in The Logic ofSense 
where he discusses the pure affect of sense. Zizek maintained that his more popular Anti- 
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and the other books co-authored with Felix Guattari, 
overshadows this aspect of Deleuze. Zizek discussed how the tension between the abstraction of 
the pure affect of sense and the sensational world of human bodies becomes a site of conflict for 
Deleuze. I agree with this point as it explains my own dilemma in chapter two of this thesis with 
contradictions that I find in Deleuze. which I elaborate as the tension between everyday banality 
and an inhuman eternity. 
30 Paul Ricouer's attention to the relation of 'the life world' to forms of narrative has helped me to 
think about narrative in terms of dis/continuous continuity. See especially volume 11 of Time and 
Narrative where he suggests that what is narrated yet not given in the narrative as such is 
'essentially the "temporality of life" ' (Ricouer, 1985: 78). 
31 Many recent film theory books make this point - (Shaviro, (1993); (Bordwell & Carroll, (1996); 
Perez, (1998)). As Perez puts it: 'The time of Lacanian-Althusserian theory is past. But its legacy 
still lingers' (Perez, 1998: 18). 
32D. N. Rodowick's The Crisis of Political M`odernism: Criticism and Ideology in Contemporarv 
Film Theory ends with a similar 'culturalist' emphasis. This emphasis raises questions about who 
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is doing the reading and on whose behair? 'Texts' become representative of particular groups. 
Readers become representative of homogenous bodies in society. This approach is similar to the 
stress on authenticity in identity politics in art. 
33 The key example given by Bordwell of reception theorý, is Janet Staiger's Interpreting Films: 
Stutlies In the Historical Reception of, I merican Cinema, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989). 
34 See Kaja Silveriuan's'The Author as Receiver'in October, no. 96, (Spring, 2001). pp. 17-34 for 
an interesting discussion of Jean-Luc Godard as autuer in terms of passive reception. 
35 Performative theory. as I have suggested earlier, also situates itself and can be situated as 
bridging identity politics' emphasis on agency and the perceived absence of agency in post- 
structuralism. 
The writing/subject puts his/her own status on the line not in the debased- 
Demdean sense of reveling in absence, in the winking spectacle of nakedness 
to which the emperor is now invited, but in the name of mobilizing praxis, 
breaking the discursive limits of the emperor's stage. and invigorating the 
dynamics of democratic contest in which the emperor and his new clothes (or 
lack thereof) are now continually refigured (Pollock, 1998: 96). 
36 The concept of dialogic form is taken from Mikhail Bakhtin's The Dialogic Imagination: Four 
Essaiýs b, ý, . 11. H. Bakhtin. ed. Michael 
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. 
(Austin: University of Texas Press. 198 1) where he offers an alternative conception of 
authorship. There he discusses the novel in terms of an arena, which engages different levels of 
speech to produce an unpredictable heteroglossia, a multiplication of speaking positions that 
undermine the notion of a singular authoritative voice. 
'_ Hodological space is the space presupposed by the action-image. It is a space 'in which ends, 
obstacles. means. subordinations, the principle and the secondary. predominances and loathings 
are distributed' (Deleuze, 1989: 203). Pre-hodological space is the 'space before action- always 
haunted by a child. or by a clown- or by both at once. [It] does not, as in the action-image, allow 
itself to be determined in relation to goals and means which would unify the set, but is dispersed 
in "a plurality of ways of being present in the world", of belonging to sets. all incompatible and 
vet coexistent' (Deleuze, 1989: 203). While the sense of space I shall go on to elaborate is also 
not organised according to narrative goals, I am reluctant to adopt the notion of a pre-hodological 
space as it seems akin to the notion of pre-Oedipal space, which is problematic because of its 
association with marginalized femininity. the choatic pulsions of the drives and the reassertion of 
binary thinking that I am at pains to avoid. Because of this emphasis on the pre-hodological, 
Deleuze is generally read as neglecting 'the embodied situation of the spectator and of the film'. 
which is the scenario I shall develop in chapter 4 (Sobchack, 1992: 3 1). Laura U. Marks makes a 
similar point in The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses, 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000), see especially p. 150. 
38Deleuze is sometimes classed as a phenomenologist, although he was very critical of 
phenomenology (Studlar (1990). Zizek (1994). An issue of the Journal of the British 
Socieýyfor 
Phenomenology, vol. 24. no. 1. January, 1993, was dedicated to him. 
39These sentiments are echoed in Diana Coole's 'Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty' in 
Radical Philosophy, vol. 108, July/August. 200 1, pp. 17-28. As she puts it: 
There is a dialectic rather than a discontinuity between the visible and the 
invisible, the actual and the virtual. Phenomenology is not. then- a 
foundationalist philosophy, but it does find a grounding for meaning in (albeit 
shifting and inexhaustible) bodily experience, rather than propelling meaning 
into the vertigo of sheer difference (Coole, 2001: 20). 
40 Transversality is the term Deletize uses in Proust and Signs to categorize the transmission of 
essential links between works of art across diverse 
historical periods. 
For if a work of art communicates ... with other works of other artists and gives 
rise to works to come, it is always within this dimension of transversality, in 
which unity and totality are established for themselves. withou! unifying or 
totalizing objects or subjects (Deleuze, 2000: 168-169). 
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41 At the I foving Images series of filmmakers talks at Tate Modern, London (2002). these 
sentiments on the relation between film and access to time were echoed by both Chantal 
Akerman and Agnes Varda. Referring to her film I'agabond (1985), where the heroine spends a 
lot of time NNalking in the landscape, Varda spoke about trying to capture the texture and feeling 
of time inside the image, which would in turn give the spectator time for him/herself (Varda, 
2002: 25 April - my notes). 
After a screening of her film DEst (1993). Akerman discussed her intention to generate for the 
viewer a sense of being xvith themselves (Akerman. 2002: 8 March - my notes). Andrei Tarkovskv also discusses the access to time that film can give the viewer. In Sculpting in Time: 
Rýflections on the Cinema, he suggests that people go to the cinema to regain time and that film's 
prerogative over literature is its ability to allow the viewer'to take over, as deeply personal and 
his own. the experience imprinted in time upon the screen, relating his own life to what is being 
shown' (Tarkovsky. 1989: 183). 
4' 1 am appropriating this phrase from an essay by Kathleen J. Cassity entitled 'Identity In 
Motion: BhoNvani Junction Reconsidered' in Daniel Jewesbury's artists book Of Lives Between 
Lines. (London: Bookworks. 200 1). In an otherwi se unrelated essay to my thesis, which attends 
to the socio-hi ston cal -cultural context for John Masters 1952 novel of the title, Cassity discusses 
the possibility of an identity whereby fluctuation does not occlude stability. Ciaran Benson in The 
Psvcholog,,, v ofSelf. ' Place, Aforaliýy ond, -Irt in Human Worlds links current thinking in neurology 
to aesthetics and discusses how the role the brain plays in 'anchoring the self as a unity over time' 
does not occlude the notion of identity as a 'dynamic, always changing, forward-moving field of 
experience' (Benson. 2001: 35& 187). 
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Chapter Two 
2.1 PREPARING FOR DEPARTURE: UNPACKING THE FALSE BINARY 
BETWEEN NARRATIVE AND NON-NARRATIVE/RUPTURE 
This chapter Nvill be comprised of three main points that constitute the context as 
to how and N\, Iiv I came to theorize my experience of the final cut in Disappearance at 
Sea in the way that I have. Having said that, it is important to state that this context Is 
oblique rather than causal. As opposed to chapters three and four, which are motivated 
by a 'montage text', the three main points in this chapter function as narrative digressions 
that parallel the main argument. The first point will elaborate how film moments of 
suspension have been considered as anti-narrative in 1970s film theory. I will perform a 
reading of Slavoj Zizek's work set in the context of 1970s film theory, discovering 
uncannN, linkages between these different bodies of theory. I will then use Roland 
Barthes' writing to undermine the binary distinction between narrative and non-narrative 
that pervade 1970s film theory and Zizek's film analyses. My final point will be to show 
the feminist stakes involved in undermining this binary. 
2.2 NARRATIVE SUSPENSION 1: THE RADICAL SPECTATOR IN 1970S 
FILM THEORY 
While neither Slavoj Zizek nor Gilles Deleuze can be said to be film theorists 
per se, my pitting them against one another replays in another guise, the contrast in 
1970s film theory between theorists influenced by the Saussurian account of language as 
a system of differential relationships that occludes the referent and those whose 
semiology maintained a more dynamic relation between linguistic signs and imagistic 
ones. I shall argue that Zizek contmiues in the tradition of the former, while Deleuze, in 
his reference to C. S. Peirce's semiosis, resurrects the other. Christian Metz and Pier 
Paolo Pasolini respectively exemplify these positions in 1970s and 1980s film theory. In 
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a series of articles on Metz' work in Screen magazine, Stephen Heath expresses the 
dominant view of 1970s film theory which valorized Metz' study of cinema as a 
language made up of a system of codes over the perceived naivete of Pasolini's notion 
that 'cinema is a language which expresses reality with reality'(Pasolim in Heath: 1973: 
109). Pasolim's realisation that 'the cinema is a system of signs whose semiology 
corresponds to a possible semiology of the system of signs of reality itself was 
interpreted by Heath (and others) as a simplistic equation of film with reality (Pasolim In 
Heath, 1973: 109). While this interpretation of Pasolini has been taken issue with since, 
(de Lauretis (1984), Nichols (1985)), and shoNkm to be more sophisticated and sensitive 
to the relation betAveen film images and reality, my purpose here is simply to point out 
that the predominance in 1970s film theory of the linguistic interpretation of film has 
meant the occlusion of the image as a signifting entity in its own nght. This situation 
gets aggravated by Metz' turn to psychoanalysis where the image is reduced to a 
reflection (imagmary) of an absence (real), a fantastical hallucination that the viewer 
must be awakened from all together. 
Reduced to its most fundamental approach, any psychoanalytic 
reflection might be defined. in Lacanian terms as an attempt to disengage 
the cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic, in 
the hope of extending the latter by a new province: an enterprise of 
displacement, a territorial enterprise, a symbolising advance, that is to 
say, in the field of films as in other fields, the psychoanalytic itinerary is 
firom the outset a semiological one, even (above all) if in comparison 
with the discourse of a more classical serniology it shifts from attention 
to the enonce to concern for the enonciation (Metz, 1975: 14). 
I mention this dichotomy between Pasolim's 'real' and Metz''imaginary signifier' for two 
reasons, one of which I shall explore in this chapter of the thesis. This dichotomy, albeit 
summarily- hints at the connections between Zizek and Deleuze and earlier film theory. 
In a sense, Zizek is an unwitting contemporary proponent of the ideas that stem from the 
occlusion of the image in psychoanalytic semiological film theory, while Deleuze, in his 
emphasis on cinema as a pre-verbal signifying material, is more sympathetic to 
Pasolini's position. Indeed, Deleuze refers extensively to Pasolini in his books on 
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cinema. Also, in making this, at the moment, slightly extravagant claim, I want to briefly 
allude to the path I will eventually be diverging from, i. e. that an immediate relation to 
real phenomena is foreclosed on our entry as suýjects into the system of language. In 
fact, not only shall I advance the case that film images can give us real access to things, 
but that film moments of absence give us access to the real of experiential movements in 
time. In this chapter I shall concentrate on the links between Zizek and 1970s film 
theory in terms of how they consider film moments of suspension to be disenchanting, 
non-narrative moments that awaken the viewer from imaginary hallucinations. However, 
it is towards the position of considering the image of absence as expressive of the reality 
of narrative duration that I shall return my turn to Deleuze. 
Film theory's ready adoption of both Saussurian semlotics and Lacanian 
psvchoanaINtic theory M the 1970s Nvas to protect itself from the supposed Bazinian 
naivete that cmema reproduces reality without mediation. This reality-effect was 
declared to be cmema's illusory aspect. Film theory looked to semiotics to understand 
cmema as a language and to Lacanian psychoanalysis to reinforce the view that as 
language cinema cannot present an unmediated access to reality. The adoption of 
Lacanian psvchoanalysis also introduced a structure, the mirror phase, which seemed to 
offer a plausible account of how and why the narcissistic desires inherent in the medium 
could be analysed and critiqued. I Much of this theoretical critique took place in relation 
to the Hollywood narrative film. And certainly Zizek's current work situates itself M 
relation to the Hollywood classical narrative film forin. Avant-garde film practice and 
the theoretical texts that contextualized it followed a different trajectory, although it too 
borrowed from semiotics and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. ' The difference being its 
eschewal of narrative per se rather than 'reading It against the grain', as in the critical 
film theory that took on board Hollywood narrative film to produce radical readings out 
of its seemingly stereotypical, illusory, reproductive, construction of reality. 
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However, what I want to show in this chapter, is that while the conditions and 
stakes of critique are obviously different in avant-garde film theory and in Zizek's 
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contemporan- 'reading against the grain' of Hollywood narrative film, there are formal 
analogies to be made between them. The main protagonists of avant-garde film theory 
that I shall stage encounters with in this context are Peter Gidal, Peter Wollen, and 
Stephen Heath, The priman, texts by these protagonists that I shall refer to are Gidal's 
'The Anti-Narrative (1978)'(1979), Wollen's ... Ontology" and "Materialism" in Film' 
(1976). and Heath's 'Narrative Space' (1974/5). 1 shall also make extensive use of D. N. 
Rodowick's Political Modernism: Criticism and Ideology in Contemporary Film Theory, 
as I am less concerned with doing an original, in-depth, analysis of 1970s film theory 
than I am in making a selective reading that shows a connection between that period and 
Slavoj Zizek's Nvork. In making this connection, I aim to expose the pitfalls in Zlzek's 
anaIN-ses of film moments of suspension. In connecting Zizek's 'Hollywood' approach 
and these historical approaches to avant-garde film, I also somewhat justify my situating 
of Dean's 'avant-garde' Disappearance at Sea in relation to a Zizekian approach, which 
would ordinarily be unsympathetic to avant-garde filin. However, it is also the case that 
Dean's film, while inheriting the legacy of avant-garde filmmaking, does not have the 
same antipathy towards narrative that characterized theories of avant-garde film practice 
in the 1970s. -' Ultimately, m chapter three, I shall use Disappearance at Sea as a 
performative critique of the extreme formalism inherent in the legacy of avant-garde 
film theory and the extreme fon-nalism at the heart of the Lacanian subject. I shall show 
how Disappearance at Sea, while inheriting an avant-garde emphasis on materiality, 
affirms, by contrast, a belief in the image without this affirmation being a supposedly 
ideological seduction that removes the viewer from his/her real time and space. 
Zizek's Lacanian analyses of the moment of 'subjective destitution' in the 
Hollywood film, which produces the subject/spectator as a fonnal entity divested of 
imaginary identifications, thematically echoes Peter Gidal's call for the production of 
'anti and non-identificatory works' which combat 'the structure of identification' (Gidal, 
1979: 83). For Gidal, as for Le Grice in'Towards Temporal Economy' (1979/80), the 
production of the spectator in the here and now of relating to the materiality of film 
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production relied on the exposure of filmic signifiers. i. e. editing processes, an attention 
to celluoid as material, and the deployment of such effects as 'flicker effect, time lapse, 
rephotograpliN, loop printing, strategic alterations of focus, focal length, and exposure' 
(Rodowick, 1994: 129). S The idea was that in foregrounding the materiality of filmic 
signification, a spectator divested of illusory ideological identifications would be 
produced. As D. N. Rodowick puts it: 'the objective of antinarrative or the goal of a 
structural/material film practice is to perfonn the seemingly impossible task of defining, 
over and against the massive domination of film by narrative style and ideology, a series 
of negative strategies capable of derailing that history' (Rodowick, 1994: 127 - emphasis 
mine). Although an-ned with different goals, stakes, and derivations, the radical spectator 
desired by both Zizek and avant-garde film theory is empty of content. Rather than 
finding herself In the substance of narrative projections. she reflects/mIrrors the non- 
substantial effect produced, in the avant-garde instance, by the emphasis on the 
signifiers of a disjunctive materiality. As Le Grice puts it: 'The spectator ... encountered 
the film experience as phenomena which, from reflection on its materials, mechanisms, 
processes, transformations and manipulations in production as well as the spectator's 
own mechanisms of perception and conceptual structuring, became the "content" of the 
work' (Le Grice, 1979/80: 63 -64). In Zizek's instance, the non-substantial effect is 
produced by the fall out of narrative meaning that ensues as a result of encountering an 
unsutured moment in the Hollywood film. Let me elaborate these positions more fully. 
For Gidal narrative has to be eschewed as it 'is an illusionistic procedure, 
manipulatory, mystificatory, repressive. The repression is that of space itself, the 
distance between the viewer and the object, a repression of real space in favour of 
illusionist space' (Gidal in Rodowick, 1994: 13 3). The goal of avant-garde filmic 
procedures, the negative strategies mentioned above, is, ostensibly, to open up real space 
between the viewer and the film object by creating a tension between represented object 
and reality. This tension operates by moving the viewer between the desire to recognize 
the image as an integral whole and the frustration the film places in the way of that 
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desire b,,,, its assertion of the material conditions of representing or presenting that image. 
For example in Condition offflusion (1975), we not only have a classic example of the 
camera movement that characterizes Gidal's work - shots of relative stability being 
followed by frenetic shifts in point-of-view and a kind of disinterested nomadism - but 
there is also an overt critique of the image of seduction par excellence. The camera 
keeps on returning to a photograph of a woman, or at least It seems that way because this 
is the most stable image in the film, but the graininess, rapid camera shifts in point-of- 
view, and the loop structure of the editing, serve to make any imaginary inhabitation of 
the image impossible. 6 
However, for Gidal real space is implied rather than actual. 
[\V]e must get "back" to work on the signifier and process of 
production, the inscribed oneness of diegesis with process of its 
production. And that is a social reality, if such a concept must be used to 
justify the obviously political of such work (Gidal, 1979: 82). 
The problem with Gidal's notion of tension between real time and space and represented 
time and space here is that while it potentially points in the direction of the spectator, 
that spectator is framed by the material conditions presented by the film. In fact D. N. 
Rodowick insists that Gidal does not consider a spectator as anything other than a 
structural component in a set of predescribed relations between image and reality 
(Rodowick, 1994: 136). This isn't quite the case, as Gidal does talk about the 
distanciation he is interested in creating another film in the viewer's head and he also 
puts forward a useful distinction between narrative and diegesis which unintentionally 
points to a space beyond mirror reflection. 7 However, in the main, I agree with 
D 
Rodowick that it is difficult to see how the spectator has anv room to manouevre other 
than to continually follow the propositions of the image as it perforins what Gidal refers 
to as 'the distance between knowledge and perception' (Gidal, 1979: 78). 
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The intractable nature of Gidal's emphasis on the present to present moment of 
filmic diegesis can be seen in his absolute ban on identification and identifying with. In 
Gidal's extreme fon-nalism 
[t]he whole concept of identification is problematic, as that force which 
impels a movement from one's position in a social space of social 
meanings or a political space to and into a different human residence - 
another body or another figure - where the phantasms and fantasies, the 
realities of ones projections, are enacted (Gidal, 1979: 82). 
Rodowick mentions how the image of reduced connotation features in Gidal's Silent 
Partner ( 197 8), in the wav that shots of relatively equal length are separated by black 
leader tape, shots as repetitive units of duration, This approaching of emptiness in the 
image is productive of the arbitrariness of meaning and works to counter the ideological 
impetus to-ward meaning (Rodowick, 1994: 136). 1 haven't seen Silent Partner, but, on 
vieNN-mg a recent film No Night No Day (1997), 1 was struck by the appearance of shots 
that seemed to be black leader and would consequently be revealed as dark comers and 
close-ups of walls. On viewing this film, I was constantly asking myself the question, "is 
there an image here? ", a question that I was not allowed to dwell on due to the fast 
jumpcut editing and movements of the hand-held camera. It is to escape, as he sees it, 
the inherent fascism of fantasy that Gidal proposes 
that emptying of meaning, that making of meaninglessness which is the 
construction and constructedness of signification presented, is formed 
from a defensive resistance against the reproduction of meaning: the 
latter which is the reproduction of dominant ideological meaning, the 
representation. This is the area where political does not mean 
aestheticising politics [ ... 
] (Gidal, 1979: 89). 
2.3 NARRATIVE SUSPENSION 2: SUBJECTIVE DESTITUTION'- SLAVOJ 
ZIZEK ENCOUNTERS ROBERTO ROSSELLINI'S STROMBOLI (1949). 
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For Zizek too the stibýject must be detached from the fascism of fantasy. The 
political dimension of Zizek's work is to suspend the suýject's relation to the order of 
signification. The goal of a Lacanian anaINtic practice is to traverse, to go through, the 
fantasy support of the subject, which keeps him or her intact but misguidedly attached to 
all kinds of conservative ideological desires. Traversing the fantasy effects a state of 
subjective destitution whereby the suýject recognizes the structural emptiness that 
supports him/her and so is momentarily released from the dictates of fantasy. 
When we are confronted with the patient's symptoms, we must first 
interpret them and penetrate through them to the fundamental fantasy as 
the kernel of enjoyment which is blocking the further movement of 
interpretation, then we must accomplish the crucial step of going 
through the fantasy, of obtaining distance from it, of experiencing how 
the fantasy-formation just masks, fills out a certain void, lack, empty 
place in the Other (Zizek, 1989: 74). 
While Zizek uses narrative cinema to illustrate this, he too maps the suspension of 
ideological attachments onto forrnal cinematic features. My first example of this echoes 
the process of interpretation and penetration in analytic practice - Zizek maps this onto a 
forinal feature, the fade-out, in Krzysztof Kieslowski's Three Colours: Blue (1993). He 
says that in this film, the fade-out, rather than being used to mark the passage from one 
spatio-temporal continuity to another, Is used to pass 
from one sequence to the next via a direct cut, in the midst of a 
continuous conversation the shot of the speaker fades out all of a 
sudden, and the following fade-in brings us back to a continuation of the 
same shot. Here we are dealing with something that resembles the 
Lacanian practice of the variable ending of the psychoanalytic session: 
the analyst's gesture of signalling that the session is over, like 
Kieslowski's fade-out, does not follow an externally imposed logic (the 
preordained fifty-minute span), it cuts all of a sudden in the midst of the 
scene and thus acts as an interpretative gesture sui generis by 
highlighting an element in the analysand's speech-flow (or, in 
Kieslowski, in the speech of a person on the screen) as especially 
significant (Zizek, 1989: 170-7 1). 
This type of suspension in mid flow is the first stage towards traversing the fantasy. 
Zizek illustrates traversing or going through the fantasy proper by means of a film 
moment, the final sequence of Roberto Rossellini's Stromboli (1949). Zizek uses this 
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film moment to show that what occurs in the encounter with the empty place of the 
Other is a relinquishing of symbolic (identificatory) ties, which he phrases in terms of an 
encounter Nvith the Lacanian Real, the blind point of existence beyond the signifi r It Ie- is 
noteworthy that 1970s film theory did not tend to refer to Lacan's order of the Real, 
putting their faith in either the mobility of the symbolic to perfonn new significatIons or 
the rupture of the imaginary to give new representations. These positions can be 
respectively exemplified by, on the one hand, Stephen Heath, on the other, Laura 
Mulvey and Peter Wollen. ' The change in emphasis that the Real might have brought to 
1970s film theory can only be speculation. 9 Emphasis on the Real, as the illustration that 
follows demonstrates, would show the futility of putting one's faith in the symbolic or 
the imaginary. not only because these two orders are wholly imbricated and inseparable 
from one another, a factor not fully recognized in 1970s critique, but because the Real is 
the point where all attachments amount to nothing. While the hysteria of Zizek's 
narrative would undoubtedly be foreign to Gidal, Gidal's insistence that all images and 
meanings are contaminated through and through by ideology, and that the production of 
non-mearung, rather than alternative ones, is the only feasible strategy, shares a 
commonality with this aspect of Lacanian theory. 
The scene from Stromboli that Zizek uses to illustrate the Lacanian concept 
of traversing the fantasy occurs towards the end of the film. Stromboli is a story about 
Karin, an Estonian emigree, played by Ingrid Bergman, who, at the end of World War 
11, finds herself in a reftigee camp in Italy. Failing to get an Argentinian visa, she 
marries a poor Italian fisherman from Stromboli and goes to live with 
him on that island. 
She finds life on the island intolerable, the closed community and their 'primitive 
patnarchall attitude towards women (Zlzek, 1990: 32). To escape the 
island, she has to 
cross over a volcanic mountain to get to the other shore where a 
boat leaves for the 
mainland. Ascending the volcano, smoke and 
fumes from the crater surround and choke 
her. The force of this raw nature overwhelms her and her identificatory desires fades 
away in the face of this real threat of extinction. 
For Zizek, this scene is emblematic of a 
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terrifVing encounter with the Real, evidenced here as the brute force of nature. The 
Italian version of the film, as opposed to the American studio version, ends with Karin 
repeating officreen "M,, - God! Oh merciful God! " over a shot of the billowing smoke of 
the volcano. 'o As Zizek puts it: 
Karin reaches her lowest point of despair and dejection when, on running 
ftom the village (the social link). she finds herself surrounded by the 
volcano's smoke and fumes. In the face of the primordial power of the 
volcano, all social ties pale into insignificance, she is reduced to her bare 
"being there". running away from the oppressive social reality, she 
encounters something incomparably more horrifying, the Real. Sobbing 
Nvildly. she cries out: "I'll finish it, but I haven't the courage-, I'm afraid. " 
(Zizek, 1992: 43). 
Karin has reached what Zizek refers to as the point of subjective destitution, all her 
identifications laid bare by, this encounter with a force that exceeds symbolic and 
narrative meaning. (Although Zizek makes his point only in reference to Karin's 
character, the shots that show the billowing smoke of the volcano could be said to 
threaten the frame of the image itself)" However, in the poising of Karin's outcry over 
the shot empty of everything but the volcanic smoke, a space seems to be held open 
whereby something new might come into being. Is this where the analogy ends between 
Gidal's negativity and Zizek's Lacanian-derived negativity? Critics, wanting a desire for 
narrative closure, asked Rossellini about the ending of the Italian version of this film, 
whether Kann is leaving or returning to the village. He alledgedly replied: 
I don't know. That would be the beginning of another film.... There is a 
turning point in every human experience in life - which isn't the end of the 
experience or of the man, but a turning point. My finales are turning points. 
Then it begins again - but as for what it is that begins, I don't know 
(Rossellmi in Zizek, 1992: 42-3). 
The irresolution of the ending holds out the possibility that ensues 
following the 
afterynath of going through the fantasy, i. e. the possibility of a new 
life founded upon 
'the fact that we have nothing to lose in a loss' (Zizek, 1992: 43). The film doesn't end 
with the billowing smoke of the volcano, 
but on a shot of the ridge of the now stilled 
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volcano, Kariii's voice is heard saving "Oh God! " twice. This shot, empty except for 
some birds that fly over the crater's horizon, is held static for a long time, even 
considering that this is art cinema. (Zizek doesn't mention this shot duration or the 
birds. ) He reads the encounter with the volcano, this suspended moment, as 
demonstrating that '[a]fter we pass through the "zero point" of the symbolic suicide, 
what a moment ago appeared as the whirlpool of rage sweeping away all determinate 
existence changes miraculously into supreme bliss - as soon as we renoiince all 
symbolic ties' (Zizek, 1992: 43). However, Zizek insists on resisting the trap laid by 
Stromboli's ending to interpret this bliss as an epiphany. 
What lies ahead of Karin is undoubtedly what, in a vulgarly pathetic 
way, we call "a new life": sooner or later, she will return to the village, 
make peace with her husband or return to the mainland and assume new 
symbolic mandates, a new place in the community, in one way or 
another, she will begin again to be active - but the film ends before 
Karin finds her place in a new symbolic identity (or reassumes the old 
one)- before the new performative, the new "founding word" (ZIzek, 
1992: 44). 
There is a symbolic withdrawal that clears the space for a new action but does not show 
it, therem lies the non-prescriptive aspect of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. Here agaM 
there are links with Gidal's anti-narrative stance - Zizek's zero point here might be 
suggestive of future narrative links, (or not, as the subject may not survive 'subjective 
destitution'), but the theory does not invest in them as that would be to prescribe an 
ideological position. The film spectator too is left, like the character, poised on the edge 
of an abyssal image. But more importantly, this suspension has removed one from the 
image, its deceptions having been laid bare. My problem with this analysis is that it does 
not invest in the image of emptiness as itself proffering a line of continuity between 
symbolic suspension and futurity. An epiphantic image need not necessarily effect 
resignation or closure, as we shall see when we look at Disappearance at Sea. 
While Gidal. aligns his critique of representation with a notion of material film 
izek aligns his critique wi h practice, which is, in theory, procedural and Zi I it a notion of 
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psychoanaMic practice, which is, in practice, procedural, they could both be said to fall 
12 
pre, v to the stasis of reflection. Although, to be fair to Zizek, there is mileage to be 
gained from his attribution of the act (traversing the fantasy) as introducing 'a cut 
separating Ila envard" from "before, " a discontinuity which cannot be accounted for 
within a spatial disposition of elements' (Zizek, 1992: 64). However, in chapters three 
and four, especially the latter, I will take issue with the attribution of formal stasis to the 
moment of discontinuity which Zizek relates, like Deleuze, to the unhinging effects of 
the form of time. I shall argue, using Elizabeth Grosz's work, that the lack of 
consideration of a more dynamic conception of space in both their work, leads to the 
imposition of an eternal, unchanging structure, which I see the film moments I encounter 
as militating against. 
2.4 MORE NARRATIVE SUSPENSION 1: THE RADICAL SPECTATOR IN 
1970S FILM THEORY 
Other protagonists of 1970s film theory do not so readily foreclose on the power 
of the image for a project of new signification, e. g. Peter Wollen's critical writings. 
(Wollen has direct links with feminist film theory and practice in his collaborative work 
with Laura Mulvey. ) This aspect of 1970s film theory would seem foreign to Zizek's 
extreme negativity. However. there is an aspect of commonality between Zizek and 
Wollen too. While Wollen holds out for the coming into being of new representations, 
they are still supposed to come into play via rupture. While the suspended film moments 
encounter via the cut to an image of blankness in the two films in this thesis, could be 
said to issue from a rupture, I will deliberately set out to undermine that categorisation. 
The notion of rupture is always in relation to something coherent, (narrative), whereas I 
shall attempt to situate a continuity of rupture, a dis/continuity, rather than see it as an 
absolute break or cut in a structure. 
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Similar to Gidal, narrative is seen by Wollen as acting as an imaginary substitute 
for reality. However, unlike Gidal, '[flilm-making can be a pr ject of meaning with 01 
horizons beyond itself (Wollen, 1976: 22). These horizons can be generated by 
cinematic codes, i. e. the insertion of 'mistaken signifiers, that disturb the natural order of 
things to generate a new signification which does not act as an imaginary substitute for 
reality. The literal nature of how these new significations may be produced is seen in 
Wollen's insistence that they derive from the insertion in film of de-mystificatory breaks 
bv use of scratching, text, and, disjunction. These breaks induce a kind of 
conu-nunication that is 'unintended, unanticipated, unconsciously derived', as opposed to 
being the 
intentional act of a subject, a transcendental ego, the generator of 
thought which finds embodiment in language as an instrumental 
necessity for the communication and exchange of ideas between 
equivalent subjects, alternating as source and receiver (Wollen, 1976: 
19). 
The difficulty with this notion of new signification generated by the insertion of 
'nustaken signifiers' is its reliance on a model of signification that opposes narrative 
coherence to rupture, the foriner representing orthodox, dominant ideology, the latter, 
revolutionary potential. For Wollen and Laura Mulvey, this revolutionary potential 
would be theorized *in terms derived from Julia Kristeva. s interpretation of Lacan's 
notion of the ImagMary. " However, the allocation of the Imaginary in their work as the 
underbelly of signification has superficial, though not structural, links with 
Zizek's 
location of the Real. The 'new structural protocols' that Wollen sees these 'mistaken 
signifiers' introducing into the filmic process are related to Kristeva's 
'semiotic chora, 
the pre-linguistic, or pre-symbolic, means of expression' (Wollen, 
1976: 16). Yet these, 
as in Kristeva's analysis, have to pass from the imaginary 
into the symbolic in order to 
be understood and have an effect on the symbolic. 
They alter, negate, divert, subvert and 
convert, the flow of signifieds, but 
into what? 
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Here lies one of the problems with Kristeva's analysis, a problem that is the 
inverse of Zizek's capitulation to the stasis of reflection, but is nonetheless a problem of 
stasis. In Zizek's forinalism, signifying activity is suspended, a position I found echoes 
of in Gidal. For Kristeva, the serniotic chora is a site of (chaotic) signifying activity, 
which is tamed when it registers on the symbolic, the latter taking on the role of a 
conservative structure, a dichotomy derived from the Saussurean divisions of la langue 
and la parole, the fon-ner being an abstract system that the users of language cannot 
ultimately shift. Underlying this split in Kristeva, which seeps into Wollen's analyses, is 
a problematic split between the body and language. In a Kristevan approach to 
signification, as Ann Rosalind Jones cogently argues, the radical activity of semiotic 
practice 
is defined over against a structure that is assumed to be unchanging and 
unchangeable: any political group in the ascendant, the Symbolic as law 
in language. One theoretical source for this opposition must have been 
Saussure's founding technique for structuralism, by which language is 
analysed synchronically, as a fixed system of oppositions, rather than 
diachronically, as a system open to evolution or change. Such a notion 
of fixed, a-historical structure certainly underpins Kristeva's notion of 
the serniotic text, which needs the Symbolic order to work against it 
(Jones, 1984: 68). 14 
Wollen relates the effect these material substrates of language might have to 
Brechtian distanciation -a gap of space opens up within the realm of perception to 
which the spectator would remain external and which would lead him/her to acquire 
'knowledge about (not experience of) the society in which he/she, himself/herself lived 
(not the life of another/others)' (Wollen, 1976: 18). While the emphasis on knowledge in 
Wollen, and as we saw earlier in Gidal, is different from Zizek's 'traversing the fantasy' 
which is not so much an occasion for conscious knowledge as an involuntary passage 
towards its annihilation, there are still important commonalities between them. While 
Zizek reads the narrative rupture of Karin's encounter with the excess of the volcano as a 
dissolution of her symbolic ties, she is simultaneously supposed to able to perceive the 
fissure opened in reality by this non-ideological kernel of the Real, 'insofar as she 
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occupies the position of a stranger, i. e. insofar as her gaze is external' (Zizek, 1992: 55). 
This is by contrast to those who find themselves within the substance of the Real who, 
Zizek says, are necessarily blinded. While this concept is undoubtedly problematic, 
particularly the categorisation of this passage to the position of stranger as feminine, the 
emphasis on knowledge in political modernism is no less problematic. For Wollen, the 
viewer's symbolic attachments are challenged and dissolved by the textual production of 
the film-text. Yet, at the same time the viewer is supposed to come to some kind of 
super-consciousness of reality whereby they remain extemal/superior to the film as an 
object of knowledge, which causes the viewer to reflect on his/her social reality and 
engage in what Wollen calls 'productive deciphering' (Wollen, 1976: 2 1). 
[T]he concept of text that I am developing here [ ... ] does not exclude, 
indeed is constructed on the need to produce beyond signifieds, 
meaning. It sees meaning however, as a material and forinal problem, 
the product of material and formal deten-ninations rather than the 
intention of an ego cogitans, a thinking and conscious (le self- 
conscious) subject. Indeed, the very concept of such a subject is 
dissolved by textual production in this sense, as Kristeva and others 
have repeatedly argued. This does not mean, of course, that the 
conscious subject of ideology is simply replaced by an automatism or by 
a random process. Rather, it transforms the thinker, or imaginer, or seer, 
into an agent who is working with and within language in order to make 
something which cannot be precisely pre-conceived, which must remain 
problematical and in a sense unfinished, interminable. This manufacture 
must not suppress its material substrate, the sensuous activity which is 
its process of production, but nor is that sensuous activity its own 
horizon (Wollen, 1976: 20-2 1). 
Noel Carroll's criticism of psychoanalytic semiotic film theory is apropos here. As 
Carroll commonsensically points out, once the spectator becomes disengaged, how are 
they simultaneously supposed to be able to reflect on the perspective/image and remain 
disengaged? (Carroll, 1982). " How, if the spectator has been so totally removed from 
the image are they supposed to keep the right connection/distance to it to be able to 
perceive two positions simultaneously? Suffice to say at this point that the spectator in 
this thesis will occupy a very different position, a position from inside, rather than one 
suspended above, the image of absence. And this inside position will not 
be blinding, but 
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an arena, a placement, where sensuous activity and real space are not mutually exclusive 
honzons. 
Another commonality between Zizek and 1970s film theory is the advocacy of 
Bertolt Brecht's distanciation effect as productive of a radical alienation in the spectator. 
Zizek links this to Lacan's notion of subjective destitution (Zizek, 1992: 177) and there 
were numerous articles in Screen magazine detailing the value of this phenomenon for 
film theory. " However, readings of Brecht subsequent to 1970s film theory's 
appropriation of him show how that appropriation was selectively based on certain 
misunderstandings of Brechtian notions of self-reflexivity, as well as promoting Brecht's 
own confusion between illusion and mimetic representation (Carroll (1982), Harvey 
(1982), Silven-nan (1996)-, Smith (1996)). 17 1 shall explore Kaja Silven-nan's critique of 
Brecht's distanciation effect here as she sets it in opposition to a model of spectator 
immersion in the image, which is close to the scene I attempt to create in the first 
'montage text'. 
Silverman discusses how Brecht, and the film theorists who adapted him, object 
to character identification because it carries the spectator away from him or her self 
(Silvennan, 1996: 86). While I will not be considering 'character' in any positive sense, 
im thiscitationisequallyvalidifonesubstitutes" age'forcharacter. InBrecht'stheatre, 
the idea was to create a distanciation effect in the spectator, i. e. to engender a critical 
detachment from or irony towards the spectacle by isolating textual elements from one 
another so that each can conunent on the others, rather than seemmg to be an ostensible 
harmonious whole. However, Silverman makes the point that Brecht's theatre, rather 
than making the familiar strange, made the strange familiar as he places the theatrical 
event on a continuum with the auditorium thereby creating the equalization of spectator 
and spectacle (Silverman, 1996: 86). Isolating textual elements 
from one another so that 
each can comment on the others, rather than seeming to create an ostensible 
harmonious 
whole, is not incompatible with Brecht's notion that the spectator should 
feel he could 
smoke a cigar during the performance as 
if at home. Silverman's criticism that this 
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actually safeguards the position of the ego resonates with the criticism of Kristeva's 
semiotic rupture that it leaves the dominant system intact. These gaps get closed over, 
only troubling the dominant system for moments, which in a sense the system depends 
on for its generation, the model of stability and rupture being the two sides to one story. 
Murray Smith, in a non-psychoanalý4ic context, puts it: 
There is [ ... 
] something intrinsically self-defeating in the idea of 
"producing" a critical spectator. The project is self-defeating because the 
means by which the result is arrived at negates the difference between it 
and its supposed opposite, the naive or incredulous spectator. The 
estranging text becomes simply a miniature "Ideological apparatus, " 
eliciting a different set of ideological answers, but still through a 
process of interpellation" (Smith, 1996: 139). 
While Silverman insists on the necessity of a gap separating the spectator from the 
spectacle, something she sees cinema as innately possessing, she maintains, contrary to 
the negativity of distanciation, that it is the subjective qualities of allusion, memory, and 
desire that need to be engaged in this gap. That it is not simply a question of cutting 
ideological ties, but a reconfiguring of them via an estrangement of the co-ordinates of 
the body *in space rather than psychic and/or conscious knowledge. In her adherence to 
Lacaman theory, there are echoes of Zizek's notion of the gaze of a stranger, Le. the 
estranged point-of-view removed from the image. However, the crucial difference in her 
analysis is that this point is simultaneously dependent on the image for establishing the 
reconfiguration of the sensory ego. 
The image does not necessarily, as in Lacan, provide an illusory unity of 
sensation and the specular. Silvennan re-focuses on Henri Wallon's 'Les Origines du 
Charactere Chez PEnfant', 1934, one of Lacan's sources for his mirror-stage 'theory', to 
show how the disjunction between the sensational body and the specular is not 
pathological, as in Lacan. Rather it forins the necessary 'basis for our ability to identify- 
at-a-distance, i. e. to extend our feeling of material or bodily existence to objects, 
whether these be near of far away' (Silvennan, 1996: 18). For Wallon, what 
he calls the 
proprioceptive/sensational ego is not an essential ground from which we are 
barred by 
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entry into language, but is itself subject to continual movement in relation to the 
cxteroceptive/specular ego. The fon-ner, as the body's sensation of occupying a point in 
space, is continuously in the process of being defined by means of the various sense 
organs in all their different spaces and registers (Silverman, 1996: 16). This non-visual 
mapping of the body's form can be realigned and repositioned because of its continual 
dialogue Nvith the separate images of itself formed by the visual register, which in turn is 
informed by the other registers of sensation that intersect within its environs. In other 
-%vords, the inside and the outside are not in seamless coexistence, or absolute separation, 
but in continuous negotiation. 
I shall claim that my encounter with Disappearance at Sea engendered such a 
realignment. If one takes Disappearance at Sea as a kind of metaphor of the mechanism 
of the cinematic apparatus, which is one of the ways the film initially struck me, the look 
one would identify with is the blind seeing of a lightbulb. Immersed vision here is blind. 
This reminds me of Zizek's critique above that those who are immersed in the substance 
of things are blind, this blindness being what the estranged look is supposed to obviate 
against. One could see the cut to the blank screen as a rupture that wakes one out of this 
blind seeing, suspending immersion or absorption in the image. One could also see the 
light beam that follows this cut as the suspension of disbelief whereby one no longer 
blIndly identifies with the light but sees it for what it is - faked. (The light beam, 
contrary to suggestion, is not emitted from the lighthouse but was 'faked' by scanning a 
torch against the surface of a bent sheet of steel. ) However, that approach to the film 
leaves out the sensational ego, only taking account of the visual register and dimension 
of seeing equated with knowledge or blindness. By contrast, in the experience of being 
immersed in a kind of blind seeing, other kinds of movements are occurring, internal 
shards of corporeal pulsations unleashed by and attempting to realign themselves 
according to the irrational logic of this blind seeing. The point also is that the visual 
register is not cohered in a static image but is itself changing and moving within the 
frame, so the movements of the sensational ego fall between recognition and non- 
61 
recognition of the image. To be cut from this negotiation, i. e. the blank screen, suspends 
that movement, but rather this suspension being an absolute cut, it intensifies the force 
of the processual negotiation of body and image that has been occurring in the state of 
blind seeing. The impact of this force unleashes the multi -directi onality of sensation. 
Another Mist of sensorial movement is instigated by the 'return' of the light beam that 
rhN, Ihmicall, %,, punctuates the 'darkness' as if in visual answer to what was felt in the 
emptiness, the beat of time's passage through the body. 
The non-visual mapping of the body, proprioception, continues in the face of a 
lack of image. The image is not simply a support for the body. The visual alignment of 
bodily fragments by the image in Lacan, bars them from their own differentiating 
movements. However in the Wallon that Silverman brings to my attention, the important 
thing is the disjunctive dialogue between the image at a distance, visual estrangement, 
and the body's sensation of occupying a point in space, sensorial estrangement and 
negotiation. This point is not fixed but is what allows for imaginary transportation and 
rewriting of the body's co-ordinates. The result is an internal narration that will transport 
us elsewhere, this elsewhere not being an 'escapist wrap-up' (Sharits in Wollen, 1976: 
17), but a site of difference that redistributes the self-same body that Brechtian 
distanciation, in ignormig sensory affinities, leaves intact. This site of difference 
addresses the condition of corporeal alignment not considered in the film theory that 
deploys distanciation - the question of how not to return to identity after dissolution. 
(Remember Zizek's allusion to Karin's inevitable return to the village. ) The moment of 
the cut is an irruption of sorts but rather than distanciation per se, it is the occasion for 
another spectatorial engagement not based on identification, but on a non-reflecting, yet 
non-alienating, surface that opens the self up to other devolutions of itself The irruption 
of the cut as a material signifier creates, rather than distanciation or knowledge, an 
occasion for a dialogue between a foreign body (for Deleuze this will 
be Time) and an 
experiential one, the singularity of the lived body. A narration of the Intersection 
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between these fonns of self-devolution unfolds in the cinematic space of static 
suspension. 
Although SlIvennan's phenomenological psychoanalytic analysis would not be 
conducive to 1970s film theory, Stephen Heath raises aspects of the relation between 
spatia ity and narrative in interesting ways. Heath shall reappear in chapter four of this 
thesis as a main protagonist, however, here I want to situate him in the 
narrative/stability, cut/rupture stakes. Heath is less disdainful of narrative than either 
Gidal or Wollen. Although he states the necessity of 'destroying the narrative frame in 
the interests of the action of the film as flow of images' (Heath in Rodowick, 1994 - 15 2), 
this is bound up with the problematic of narrative itself rather than narrative being 
bracketed out of the equation. Although Heath's allusion here to 'the film as flow of 
images' sounds a little like Deleuze's reference to 'image narration', Heath's distinction 
here is derived from the serniological one of narrative codes as linguistic determinants 
that underlie and into which film images are shaped. Therefore narrative would have to 
be 'destroyed' to release the image from its perceived straightjacket. For Deleuze, 
linguistic determinants do not underlie the construction of Image flow. For Deleuze, 
contrarv to this Metzian formulation, 'it seems to us that narration is only a 
consequences of the visible ... images themselves and their combinations - it is never a 
given' (Deleuze, 1989: 26). 1 shall return to Deleuze in the next chapter. For now, lets 
look at Heath's predicament. 
Heath begins his essay Narrative Space' with the observation that 'early film 
space tends simply to be tableauesque' with 'the set of fixed-camera frontal scenes linked 
as a story' (Heath, 1974/5: 74). For Heath, continuity editing provides the narrative 
framework that would contain, what he calls, the excessive movement of these earINII film 
spaces in a 'homogeneously continuous space' which cuts the spectator in as 
'subject 
precisely to a process of vision, a positioning and positioned movement' 
(Heath, 1974/5: 
74). This is interesting on two counts. One, which I shall just note here as it will return 
to it in the 'montage texts', is that both Disappearance at 
Sea and News From Home are 
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comprised of fixed-camera frontal scenes, the latter including a few pans and a tracking 
shot near the end. Clearly different from early film per se, Heath's reference to an 
excessive movement unleashed by the sharp cutting from one tableau to the next is 
something that I shall claim reappears in another guise in these post-continuity edited 
films and generates a narration other than that of story linkage. This generative 
narration, which -%vill appear in the perforinative texts, overrides the oscillation that 
Heath proffers between flow and rupture in narrative space, 
The second point of interest, i. e. Heath's attribution of narrative with stability 
and coherence of film form, I shall pursue here. For Heath, as D. N. Rodowick 
summarizes, 'it is the spatial organisation of a coherent and continuous vision and point 
of view, according to the demands of narrative meaning and pleasure, that define 
cinema's appeal to the spectator and its status as a discourse' (Rodowick, 1994: 18 1). 
Narrative is deemed to be the psychological modality of the coherence of the images, the 
abstraction of the technology of continuity editing being reproduced in the perceptual 
psychological processing of spectator. Again, we see here the notion of the spectator as 
an effect of the fihnic apparatus. '[F]ilm runs across the subject that runs through the 
film, as the game loses its experience of a central presence in a radical excentering. It is 
this run that narrative is used to hold, to suspend in image and representation' (Heath in 
Rodowick, 1994: 202). Breaks, ruptures in continuity editing are deemed to disrupt the 
pleasures of narrative cognition. If not for narrative, film would simply be a series of 
discontinuous frames or cuts divided by black splices, needing a story to give them 
coherence, or if, existing without a story, taking on the random status of a sequence of 
images much like certain avant-garde films. As well as providing continuity of 
movement for what would otherwise be a series of potentially disconnected tableaux, 
narrative also provides the cohermg into static points of fictional identity of the mobility 
of the cinematic apparatus. Narrative turns these mobile, spatial, cuts into definite 
places, narrative as 'the taking place' of film (Heath, 1974/75: 92). Heath repeats the 
bN 
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now familiar opposition between linearity and excess, narrative identification and/or 
dissolution, 
Narrative in the classical narrative film, (Heath refers to Hitchcock's Suspicion 
194 1)), operates in two ways - it proceeds in the construction of a linear story, but it is 
also that force which recovers moments that deviate or are in excess of that story, 
keeping potentially derailing details in order. In other words, narrative is a suturing 
process that binds shots to one another, preventing rupture/negativity, and binds the 
spectator to their continuous flow. Suture was a much-debated concept in 1970s film 
theon-, following the translation by film critic Jean-Pierre Oudart of an article by 
Jacques-Alain Miller, 'La Suture', based on a paper delivered In 1965 by Lacan at his 
seminar at the Ecole Normale Superiere. 18 Heath, in Questions of Cinema, uses this 
concept to articulate the division in the subject, which is put into operation in relation to 
the film text. Paraphrasing Miller, Heath states: 
To instance suture, Miller points at once, as though to its immediate 
index, to the T of an utterance: the utterance states a place of the subject 
at the same moment that it splits from that place by the very fact of the 
place of the utterance itself, the place from which the statement is made, 
the subject of the enounced and the subject of the enunciation never 
ftilly come together, are always in the distances of the symbolic, the 
subject not one in its representation in language' (Heath, 1981: 85). 
However, the machinations of the classic narrative film work to deny this splitting. 
Heath gets confusing here in his dual usage of suture to describe both the 'junction of the 
imaginary and the symbolic' that occurs in the binding processes of narrative as well as 
the non-coincidence of the "I" with its representations. 
'9 Heath sees narrative as a 
sutunng process, 
discursive ordering pulling the image towards unity for us, its activity of 
meaning transposed into the coherence of a nearness, we enter the 
structure of address, join the filml- the spectator is recast as the subject 
of the film's relations of the symbolic and the imaginary together, its 
suturing. Which, moreover, is very much a question of time, there are 
multiple times between spectator and film [ ... 
] but the film, classically, 
is always brought into time with its significant flow, its balance, its 
narrativization, producing thereby its essential contemporariness - 
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constantIv Nvith you for you, moving you with it in its narrative image (Heath, 1981- 108). 
Suture is identified with narrative binding, the film as narrative continuity in a linguistic 
mode of soldering one signifier to another ad finitum. Heath states that '[t]he system of 
suture, be it noted, breaks as soon as the time of the shot hesitates beyond the time of its 
narrative specifications' (Heath, 1981: 109). In fact, Heath refers explicitly to News 
From Home as an example of a film that suspends the suturing process. However, what 
is of interest here is that again we have a clear example of the logic of narrative and 
rupture, suspension being seen as contrary to narrati I ivization, a freezing of that process. 
Because this suspension of the logic of the signifier occurs in News From Home, 
according to Heath, around an image of absence, he claims that the film leaves the 
question of 'filling in' open - the film does fill in but differently, a difference he can only 
quantify as 'the impossible question of a woman's desire' (Heath, 1981: 99). (The linking 
of suspension and impossibility with female desire is a link that my attempt to unhinge 
the binary of narrative/rupture wants to break - see my feminist subtext, 2.7 below. ) 
For Heath the direction a radical cinema should take would not eschew narrative 
per se but would complicate it. To this end he celebrates a film that refuses to suture, 
that poses 'film exactly as montage in its multiple possibility of engaging drive, its 
critical potential for pleasure' (Heath in Rodowick, 1994: 197). We can see here 
Kristeva's influence on Heath with this emphasis on the drive as destructive of narrative 
coherence and the mapping of this psycho-biological entity onto a fort-nal principle. 
Montage is seen as expressive of disunity/rupture that *in turn expresses the subject as he 
is riddled by contradiction, ambiguity, the unconscious. In this mapping of subjectivity 
onto a formal principle, a lack of agency is ascribed to the spectator. The spectator can 
only follow blindly the image production, whether classical narrative's continuity editing 
or avant-garde montage. So even in Heath's opening up of the question of narrative as a 
process of oscillation between suspension and flow, there is an underlying assumption 
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that narrative re-produces the ideological sulýject. D. N. Rodowick usefully summarizes 
the binarisms at work in Heath as being between the 'either/or of suture/negativity that 
repeat at the level of the subject what other political modermsms organized in the 
opposition between narrative/non-narrative' (Rodowick, 1994: 203). Needless to say, it 
is this very opposition that I want to find a way out of It reproduces at the level of the 
subject a model of identity based on the presence/absence dialectic or, in Lacanian 
terins, the soldering of identity versus the fading of identity in 'subjective destitution' 
that Zizek uses Stromboli to illustrate. While the importation of Lacan and Kristeva into 
film theory Nvas initially for the sake of opening film analysis up to take account of the 
spectator and unconscious desire beyond a reduction to linguistic codes, this critique 
ultinlately flounders on the binarism of identity/image/narrative coherence versus non- 
identiby/blindspot/narrative excess. 20 
However, while the contradictions in Heath around this question are rife, aspects 
of his ideas are relevant to my notion of generative spectatorship as opposed to his call 
for productive spectatorship, which is, in essence, as we have seen, re-productive. (The 
difference between a generative spectatorship and a productive one being that the fon-ner 
is unpredictable whereas the latter is a reflection of form. ) I would want to maintain with 
Heath that '[w]hat moves in film, finally, is the spectator, immobile in front of the 
screen' (Heath, 1974/5: 99), but I go against his attribution that[flilm is the regulation 
of that movement, the individual as subject held in a shifting and placing of desire, 
energy, contradiction, in a perpetual retotalisation of the imaginary (the set scene of 
image and subject). This is the investment of film in narrativisation, and crucially for a 
coherent space, the unity of place for vision' (Heath, 1974/5: 99). Although, as D. N. 
Rodowick shows, Heath also paradoxically offers space for'a multiple and complex 
articulation of different discursive practices', which suggests the potential for differences 
between subject and text (Rodowick, 1994: 212). 
The other contradiction in Heath is that on the one hand he criticizes Noel 
Burch's 'phenomenological fon-nalism' for simply providing 'an aesthetics of 
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transgression' and tending towards the impasse of fon-nal device as a stylistic trope, 
when what is needed is 'an activity of transfon-nation' (Heath, 1974/5: 104 & 108). 
However, on the other hand, in Heath's reading of Oshima Nagisa's Death by Hanging, 
which he proffers as an example of the latter, the contradictions in shot-reverse shot and 
the strange use of the off-field, i. e. forinal devices, are what the argument of difference 
hangs on. Heath maintains that '[t]he intensity of Oshima's work lies in a "going beyond" 
of content that constantly breaks available articulations of "forin" and "content" and 
poses the film in the hollo-vv of those breaks' (Heath, 1974/5: 109). This mapping of the 
I activity of transfon-nation' onto the fon-nal devices of a film is, as we have seen, 
21 common to the protagonists of 1970s film theory and, in a different way, to Zizek also . 
Am I not, in part, guilty of the same dependence on formal devices in attributing the cut 
to the blank screen in Disappearance at Sea with the power to generate a 
transformational narrative? No, because in my thesis, the cut will not be claimed as 
being on the side of negativity. rupture, and therefore, as other to narrative, but itself part 
of its trajectory, its dis/continuity. For Heath 
the relations of the subject set by film - its vision, its address - would be 
radically transformed if the intervals of its production were opened in 
their negativity, if the fictions of the closure of those intervals were 
discontinued, found in all the contradictions of their activity' (Heath, 
1974/5: 107 - emphasis mine). 
I will maintain, by contrast, that 'the relations of the subject' engendered'by film - its 
vision, its address - would be radically transformed if the intervals of its production were 
opened in their' temporality, 'if the fictions of the closure of those intervals were 
, 
ferenciation 'of their activity'. My recasting of Heath's discontinued, found all the'dýf 
formulation has a dual aspect to it. As well as establishing my divergence from his 
emphasis on negativity and pointing in the direction I shall go in, it is worth noting that 
Heath's forinulation is itself a recasting of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of seeing 'the 
intervals between things' as things (Merleau-Ponty in Heath, 1974/5: 107). Heath takes 
the opening of the interval to be an opening of contradiction, a movement suggestive of 
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oscillation, whereas I shall develop a more phenomenologial view of the dual sided 
nature of the interval. The fact that the form of the interval is constituted by the outsides 
of things creates its 'identity' as a space, which exceeds contradiction and which allows 
for momentary realignments of identity to take place (See Grosz, 2001: 91-4). These 
identificatorv realignments are in turn exchanged by the motions of intervallic space to 
engender further transformations. Film as a medium, both in its continuous movement 
but also in the force of its discontinuities/cuts, is particularly analogous to the dynamism 
of how intervallic space works to unite and separate, form and reform, differenciating 
identities between things. 
2.5 FILM MOMENTS 
While narrative today is not held in the disdain that it was by Structuralist 
filmmakers and related avant-garde film practices and theories in the 1970s, the 
assumptions that narrative is synonymous with cohesion and that it serves dominant 
ideology still circulate. There is an underlying assumption that a break or suspension or 
cut/disjunction in the narrative creates or designates a site of distanciation for the 
viewer, a site of critical reflection. 22 What I am taking issue with is situated and summed 
up in the following quote from a catalogue essay on the Australian artist, Tracey 
Moffatt, who makes films as well as photographs: 
Avant-garde and experimental film has moved closer to the art world in 
recent years, separating itself from mainstream narrative cinema, which 
may have incorporated some of its innovations but has rejected its 
radical vision. Hollywood and the art world are opposed on the question 
of meaning: where Hollywood likes meaning to be self-evident (but 
often makes it either inconsequential or a reinforcement of conventional 
systems of understanding), postmodern art of the nineties is concerned 
with meaning's absence, or with the suspension of narrative' (Julien & 
Nash, 1998: 18 - emphasis mine). 
What is interesting about this citation is that it unwittingly repeats the very binaries 
inherent in 1970s film theory, promulgating an unquestioning acceptance into the 1990s 
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of the opposition between narrative suspension as radical/avant-garde and narrative 
continuity as ideologically contaminated by Holkwood. 23 The lingering of this 
distinction is all the more surprising given the collision of film forms that are occurring 
contemporaneously between artists film and cinema. 24 However, as Kaja Silven-nan 
suggests, there is an unexammed continuity between the 1970s and the 1990s in tenns of 
how mainstream narrative cinema is thought of 
It was assumed during the 1970's - and we are far from being liberated 
of this assumption today - that the pleasure of identifying with a 
fictional character always turns on the spectator's rediscovery of his or her preordained place within gender, class, and race (Silverman, 1996: 
85). 
I \\-III attempt to override this distinction by claiming that the supposedly non-narrative 
moments in the so-called avant-garde films I shall look at have a narrative content as 
opposed to being purely fon-nal moments of excess or the absence of meaning. 
The seepage and maintenance of these distinctions into contemporary art 
discourse can be linked to the traditional comparison of film narrative with literary 
models. This is as true of narratalogical approaches as psychoanalytic ones. In Narration 
in the Fiction Film, David Bordwell, referring to Russian Formalist theories of narrative, 
mainly Viktor Shklovsky, puts fonvard the thesis that narration in cinema is comprised 
of the three elements of fabula, syuzhet, and style. The fabula can loosely be ten-ned 
plot. It is the film's story put into chronological and causal order. The syuzhet is how the 
plot unfolds, i. e. the way in which the film images are presented. This latter will differ 
from the summary of the plot, as the way we are presented with the unfolding of the plot 
will have many detours and digressions. Style will contribute to this, usually remaining 
subservient to the syuzhet, except in art cinema where stylistic features can dominate. 
However, these are seen as being equally narrative, even if momentarily seeming to be 
anti-narrative, because they do not ultimately distract from the plot. The point here is 
that this theory of narration is as equally applicable to a novel as to a film. In fact this 
model is derived from literature, although Bordwell uses it less to compare film to 
70 
literature than to proffer a general theory of narration applicable to any medium 
(Bordwell, 1985: 49), While the syuzhet and the stylistic features of different media will 
be particular, the processing of the fabula will be the same. In Bordwell's theory of 
narration in the fiction film, 'narration is the process whereby the film's sy-uzhet and style 
interact in the course of cueing and channeling the spectator's construction of the fabula' 
(Bordwell, 1985: 53). However, Bordwell does not deal with avant-garde cinema 
thereby participating in film history's maintenance of the category 'mainstream narrative 
film' against which all deviations are measured and radical effects claimed. 25 In answer 
to his question as to whether there is really anything non-narrational in a narratiVe film, 
Bordwell mentions Roland Barthes' concept of the third meaning in film as 'the realm in 
which casual Imes, colors, expressions, and textures become "fellow travelers" of the 
ston-'(Bordwell. 1985: 53). 
I shall come back to Barthes''third meaning' in a moment, as it will be useful in 
disengaging the argument from the Lacanian psychoanalytic principle that language 
divides that which can be said from that which is mute. Although Barthes in part buys 
into Lacan's positMig of a mute Real/m beyond language, I shall show that in Barthes' 
performative writing, the boundary between language and its outside cannot be 
maintained. This slippage in his writing is useful in undermining the opposition that 
Barthes makes between the static frame and the moving image, my purpose being to 
point out the mobilizing effects of the seemingly static shot. However, Bordwell's 
borders are well maintained. He says that while '[t]hese "excessive" elements are utterly 
unjustified, even by aesthetic motlvatlon' (Bordwell, 19 8 
5: 5 3) and that excess as a 
critical concept remains outside his concerns, in some cases 
it may offer a useful way 
into a film's overall formal work. 
A perception of a film that includes its excess implies an awareness of 
the structures (including conventions) at work in the film, since excess 
is precisely those elements that escape unifying impulses. 
Such an 
approach to viewing films can allow us to look further 
into a film, 
renewing its ability to intrigue us by its strangeness (Bordwell, 
1985: 
53). 
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So what can be gleaned here is that the fon-nal work of excess marks a boundary 
between the unift'ing principles of story and its suspension in the narrative film. Not 
only that but excess can take on a structural principle in a film that knowingly uses 'it'to 
create moments of strangeness. In order for these moments of excess to be recognized, 
the conventions of narrative have to be in operation. What is interesting about both 
Disa earance at Sea and News From Home, is that while the conventions of narrative pp 
are minima N, operative, the suspended moments in these films are not moments of 
excess. 26 What occurs in these moments, I shall claim, is that something (the interval) 
extends into the real time and space of the spectator, but instead of enjoining his/her 
location, displaces it. 
There is a subtle distinction between such moments of temporal displacement in 
Disa earance at Sea and News From Home and the reception of moments (of excess) PP 
in films where a plot, however haphazard, dominates. What I'm thinking of here Is the 
difference between how particular moments of estrangement in Michelangelo 
Antomoni's films affected me and how the moments in Disappearance at Sea and News 
From Home affected me, although there is some parallel between them. The former were 
tinged with something beyond comprehension, combined with a physical frisson, 
rermniscent of that associated with the psychoanalytic concept of the uncanny, or, in 
keeping with the terminology of this thesis, Zizek's encounter with the Real, the mute 
realm beyond symbolization. In other words, they had a kind of frozen quality to them, a 
formal stasis that suspended movement. Whereas in relation to my two film encounters, 
the suspended moment engendered a temporal liveliness that is both intensely felt and 
almost unnoticeable, the awareness of it occurring after the fact (of being displaced and 
transPorted elsewhere). 
The difference between how the moments of displacement in Michelangelo 
Antomom's LA vventura (1960) and LEclisse (1962) affected me from those I encounter 
in Disappearance at Sea and News From Home is due in part to a 
difference in genre. In 
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the avant-garde film in which the conventions of narrative are barely in operation, the 
moment of estrangement can become dominant rather than, as in Antonioni, being 
ultimately suppressed by the film's narrative/story, perhaps as a stylistic feature. 
Although what I would say distinguishes 'moments' in Antonion"s films from being 
purely stylistic. pace Bordwell, is that when they occur they seem to leap out of the 
temporal constraints of screen time, unhinging the viewer's sense of location in relation 
to the image. In Antonioni's films, these moments are usually images of emptiness that 
seem to instil the sense of another time into cinematic space, akin to the kind of temporal 
dislocation discussed by Walter Benjamin in his concept of the aura where a receding 
gaze from the past impacts on the present. This concept has been rescued from the 
dustbins of art theon, recently by both Kaja Silverman and Jodi Brooks to discuss the 
notion of a corporeally disorienting yet deeply affecting film experience. Jodi Brooks 
charactenzes the auratic moment in tenns of the opening of a distance, which is also 
proximate, in which the present is suspended in favour of a sensuous loss of self in an 
opening that incorporates an indefinite time (Brooks, 1995: 84). However, regardless of 
the Temmist' rescuing of Benjamin's aura as something enlivening, its modemist 
sensibility of radical disjuncture has more in common with the frozen quality of 
AntoMoffl's moments than with the kind of generative suspension that I will make a case 
for in relation to Disappearance at Sea and News From Home. 
When I encountered these frozen moments in LAwentura and LEclisse, I had 
read next to nothing on Antonioni and was therefore happily surprised when I later 
discovered that others, namely, Sam Rohdie and Gilberto Perez, had singled out the 
same or almost the same moments in their analyses of this filmmaker. Although neither 
of them is building a 'theory' of such moments, they both categorize them in terms of an 
encounter with strangeness/absence, which is exactly the position I start with and move 
away from when I begin formulating my encounter with Disappearance at 
Sea in 
section 3.2. In Rohdie, we again meet with the idea that this suspended moment is a 
halting of narrative that in itself cannot be spoken and he couches his analysis 
in the 
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very terrns of oppositional oscillation that I found rampant in 1970s film theory, is, in 
effect, its legacy. 
Most narratives move forward consequentially, causatively, and within 
pre-detennined structures. Antonioni's films are different from this, they 
seem to move, or rather to oscillate, not between event and event, but between narrative and its absence, between the fullness of story and 
activity, and the emptiness of an image, as if it were not only hopes and desires and perspectives within the fiction that were threatened with being lost, but the very fiction itself The fragility and interest of the films are precisely here, in the tenuousness of the narrative and the 
feeling that what is being represented is less a thing or a substance, or an 
idea, than an intermediate zone, a line between the appearance of things, 
and their loss and which can't precisely be spoken (Rohdie, 1990: 176 - 
emphasis mine). 
One of the particular moments that Rohdie picks out in Antonioni's oeuvre and which 
incidentally coincides with the one that hit me on my viewing of the film is when the 
camera isolates the church which Sandro and Claudia encounter on their drive towards 
Noto in search of the disappeared Anna in L Avventura. The romantic interest in the 
characters relationship which is dominating the meandering narrative is completely 
suspended by the focus and framing of this building in the landscape. The camera lingers 
on the church as if the two characters are of no importance. The church starts to take on 
a presence of its own, blankly confronting the viewer's gaze. When I watched this scene, 
I was struck, quite literally, by the impact of being confronted with an image that did not 
meet my gaze but threatened to stop it in its tracks, keeping it from wandering through 
the film. "I" was suspended by a gaze that hovered on the edge of the narrative. (In the 
example I looked at earlier, Zizek's analysis of Rossellini's Stromboli, the film ended at 
this moment. Here, this moment is dramatically followed by a cut to a close-up of 
Sandro's and Claudia's heads as they make love in a nearby meadow. ) Rohdie discusses 
how in disjoining the image from the action of characters, he has made the image a 
'subject' in its own right: its shape, its colour, its movement, its time and the regarding of 
it (Rohdie, 1990: 66). He refers to Italian film critic Lorenzo Cuccu's tenn 'la visione 
estraniata' (the estranged vision) to describe Antomom's displacement of a one-to-one 
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sense of correspondence between a viewer and an image by a look, not only 'from 
outside of events, but ... a 
look upon that look' (Rohdle, 1990: 72). Not psychoanalytic in 
approach, this can still be linked to Zizek's moment of 'subjective destitution', the look 
from the position of a stranger whose gaze is external to the scene. Rohdie's analysis 
stops there, but Gilberto Perez, who also refers to what he calls 'the point of view of a 
stranger' (Perez, 1998: 367) as the point from which we view Antonioni's films, links 
this estrangement to a notion of possibility in the world outside the film. Again, the link 
to Zizek's moment of 'subjective destitution' being a position whereby the subject might 
gain liberation from the signifier is apropos, although Perez would not intend such a 
link, mentioning Zizek only in passing in his introduction. 
For Perez, one of these moments of 'the point of view of a stranger', which again 
hit me on viewing the film prior to having read Perez, is the final scene of LEclisse. The 
camera lingers at the street crossing where the lovers, Vittoria and Piero, had parted 
earlier that day with a view, we think, to meeting again later. The space is now empty, 
the camera seeming to be hours early for their 'appointment'. The camera's stare at the 
zebra crossing at this street comer makes the space palpably felt. The editing then 
performs a series of fast jumpcuts of different aspects of the scene, a cyclist passing by, 
a bus turning the comer, etc., finally jumping to a close-up of an electric street light that 
fills the frame with a strange kind of blinding blankness. This image remains for a 
moment, then the film ends. In my view, this shot unifies all the previous spatially and 
temporally disjunctive shots of the meandering narrative by cancelling them out. Its 
bright unseeing glare freezes/destroys the narrative. Of course narrative meaning can be 
given to it. 'Called by some a paradoxical eclipse by light, taken by others as suggesting 
an atomic explosion' (Perez, 1998: 394), this light is of course a reference to the film's 
title. However, for Perez, the 'dialectical give and take' (416) between beauty and 
disinterest that occurs in Antonioni's absences or 'spaces between' (414) has to do with 
the real world rather than a self-enclosed film world. '[T]his sudden dazzling halt of the 
progressing gloom may also be construed as a bright new day that our artifice may yet 
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bring about' (Perez, 1998: 394). Again, as in Zizek, we have the notion of suspension as 
offering possibility of liberation, although Zizek would perhaps see Perez' description 
here as being too much of an epiphany. However, what unites both of their approaches is 
that the future is postponed - as possibility in Perez and as impossibility in Zizek. What 
about the possibility of the moment of suspension generating a real future "now" rather 
than it being the occasion for negative reflection? To open up this possibility, the 
oscillation and distinction between narrative and non-narrative has to be re-examined, if 
not unden-nined. 
2.6 THE MOMENT OF SUSPENSION MOVES OUT INTO THE SPECTATOR'S 
WORLD: ROLAND BARTHES AND THE GENERATIVE CUT 
In answer to his question as to whether there is really anything non-narrational 
in a narrative film, Bord-well points us in the direction of Roland Barthes concept of the 
'third meaning'. It is ironic that this takes us to the film still, which is closer to the 
photograph than to film narration. 27 Although, I insist that a dis/continuous film moment 
in a film that employs a static camera is only still at the level of the framed image and 
not at the level of the projected image which is still in constant motion, Barthes' 
attention to the film still as an excessive moment cut from a film's diegesis will lead me 
towards the notion of alternative narration. It will lead to reconsidering the moment cut 
out from a film's diegesis, not in terms of excess, which engenders the mute stasis of the 
unrepresentable, but as a moment that entails the ongoing negotiation between 
differentiating locations of the "I". (This is what I shall demonstrate in the 'montage 
texts'. ) While, for Barthes, the film still is different from the photograph because it has a 
diegetic horizon against which its internal relationships can be read, what Barthes 
doesn't deal with, and which will become important in what follows, are moving still 
images, which are not only different from photographs but also from (still) film stills 
(Barthes, 1986a: 60). For Barthes, the excess that erupts from the Eisenstein stills that he 
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looks at, which he calls 'a third meaning' outside of commonsense and symbolism, is 
dependent on the cut-out isolation of a fragment of a moving text, the film itself 
However imbricated their relation, the still, Barthes insists, 'flouts logical time' (Barthes, 
1986a: 6 1). The assumption being made here is that the movement that traditionally 
characterizes film, condemns it to temporal constraints - it 'cannot move faster or slower 
* hout los' II wit ing its perceptual figure' (Barthes, 1986a: 62). My thesis is that the use of the 
static camera in both Disappearance at Sea and News From Home also 'flouts logical 
time' in a manner that is reminiscent of photographs but importantly not the same. " In 
fact Barthes' attempt to still film in attending only to the film still makes the image into a 
fetish object, and thereby static. However, his analysis is useful because it points to the 
impossibility of stilling the film, even when one has taken all the necessary fetishistic 
precautions. Even the film still, this stilted diegesis, opens out onto a world beyond its 
frame. It is not a suspension but an occasion for another narration not bound by the 
constraints of the frame. Therefore Barthes' analysis here, aside from its attempt to deal 
with some kind of meaning outside of the traditional conventions of narrative, is relevant 
in an iromc way to what I shall go on to perforin in the 'montage texts. 
While Bordwell points to Barthes' concept of the obtuse meaning as perhaps 
being a way of dealing with non-narrative aspects of film narration which are beyond his 
remit, the interesting thing about Barthes' 'inarticulate meaning' is just how generatiVe of 
discourse, i. e. performative narrative, it actually is (Barthes, 1986a: 60). Barthes claims 
that this meaning is not in the language system. Hence Bordwell's emphasis on excess. 
But it generates narrative, the spectator's narrative, which Barthes alludes to as a mode 
of description that designates a site. 29 
In this documentary image (XVI) ftom Ordinary Fascism I readily read 
an obvious meaning, that of fascism (an aesthetic and symbolics of 
strength, the theatrical hunt), but I also read an obtuse supplement, the 
(again) disguised blond stupidity of the youth carrying the arrows, the 
slackness of his hands and his mouth (I am not describing, I cannot 
manage that, I am merely designating a site), Goering's coarse nails, his 
trashy ring (here we are already at the limit of the obvious meaning, like 
the vapid smile of the man in glasses in the background, obviously an 
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ass-kisser). In other words, the obtuse meaning is not structuraliv 
situated, a semantologist would not acknowledge its objective existence (but what is an objective reading'? ), and if it is evident to me, this is still 
perhaps (for the moment) because of the same "aberration" which 
compelled the unfortunate Saussure alone to hear an enigmatic, 
obsessive, and unoriginated voice, that of the anagram in ancient poetry (Barthes, 1986a: 54-55 - emphasis mine). 
Barthes sees this obtuse meaning as subverting narrative, but it can also be viewed as the 
pivot, which generates more narrative in that he attempts to give an account of what he 
feels via description. While for Barthes description is in excess of narrative meaning and 
sigMfies 'the real perceived as a resistance to meaning' (Barthes in Perez, 1998: 402), it 
is also a narrational mode of pointing to that reality that exceeds our comprehension of 
It. 30 Hence Barthes' emphasis on disguise. 'The obtuse meaning, then, has something to 
do with disguise' (Barthes, 19 8 6a: 4 8). It 'carries a certain emotion, caught up in the 
disguise, this emotion is never viscous, it is an emotion which simply designates what is 
loved, what is to be defended, it is an emotion-as-value, an evaluation' (Barthes, 1986a: 
5 1). This becomes even more apparent if this essay is related to Barthes' Camera Lucida. 
In Camera Lucida the contrast between two forins of meaning is categorized as studium 
and puncturn, the foriner having to do with inforination, the latter with disruption 'an 
element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me' 
(Barthes, 2000: 26-27). Again, this disruptive element is compared to a cut, a gash. But 
more importantly, it is also 'an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what is 
nonetheless already there' (Barthes, 2000: 55). 
There is some parallel between Barthes emphasis on affect and indescribable 
meaning in relation to the film still and my claim that so-called non-narrative moments 
within avant-garde films generate another narration, but the main distinction would be 
the sense of time. In Barthes' example, the film-still allows for a technical mastery over 
the flow of images. It allows for a vertical as opposed to a horizontal reading. A moving 
still image is not the same as a static, frozen, moment. In the former, time is added to the 
image. And this 'vertical' addition is continually intercut by the generation of narrative 
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on the side of the spectator, as well as being subýjected to the horizontal flow of 
mechanical time - the filmstrip moving through the projector. It is never stopped frozen, 
until the film is over. While Barthes' mode of description, the 'designation of a site', 
animates the image, which is a moving relation, that animation returns to the still image, 
whereas the animation of the moving still image is itself being displaced by time. 
Therefore the generation of narrative or description as a mode of narration does not 
pivot around a singular detail in the static shot, as, even in a lengthy duration, the 'still' 
detail is moving and so continually differentiating itself from itself Therefore, the frame 
of reference, the pose, that generates my 'addition' to the image is itself changing. Or it 
seems to be. 
Barthes refers to Eisenstem's notion of internal montage, which cuts the image 
up within the frame (Barthes, 1986a: 6 1). According to Barthes, this internal cutting up 
within the shot makes the still into a kind of superior distribution of features of the film 
itself and 'demands a vertical reading' as opposed to the syntagmatic, horizontal, flow of 
film (Barthes, 1986a: 61). However, this internal imaginative audio-visual montage 
phenomenon can also occur in horizontal tenns, the parameters of stillness and 
movement being undermined in the process. It is my thesis that in a film where the 
camera maintains the same image for an extended period of time, the internal audio- 
visual montage of the shot is not only intercut by an intemal audio-visual montage 
process occurring on the side of the spectator, but that process is itself being intercut by 
the accumulation of further shots. What Barthes calls 'syntagmatic disjunction', which 
for him occurs within the frame, can also occur across the film as a whole, thereby 
destroying the control of the frame and allowing the cut to occur and recur in a series of 
layers as opposed to being an isolated fragment of excess removed from diegesis. 
Peter Brunette & David Wills give an interesting account of Barthes''third 
meaning' which brings it closer to what I shall go on to develop, although I shall not 
be 
using a Derridean approach as they do. While their approach is extremely useful in 
further undermining the borders between narrative and non-narrative excess, they 
79 
emphasize the signifier in excess of the stiýject/spectator rather than, as I shall, the 
mutual imbrication of spectator and image in temporal unfolding. They assert, as I have 
insisted above, that Barthes' 'so-called still image' is 
a contradiction in ternis, for its multiple lines of force always put it into 
movement. This collapse of the st'll/movIng distinction removes film from a simple binary, oppositional relation with the other, so-called 
static visual arts (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 108-109). 
Their reading of Barthes' notion of the punctum corresponds with mine in showing how 
he ultimately 'endows the photograph with the structure of the moving image' via the cut 
that is the punctum (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 111). As they point out, for a moment in 
Camera Lucida, Barthes appropriates a cinematic field for the photograph via the 
punctum, rather than regretting the lack of registration of the past that the movement of 
images in te cinema instills, as he does later in the book and in 'The Thi 1 31 ird Meaning'. 
Yet the cinema has a power which at first glance the Photograph does 
not have: the screen (as Bazin has remarked) is not a frame but a 
hideout, the man or woman who emerges from it continues living: a 
"blind field" [champ aveugle] constantly doubles our partial vision. 
Now, confronting millions of photographs ... I sense no blind field ... Yet 
once there is punctum, a blind field is created (is divined) ... The 
punctum, then, is a kind of subtle off-screen [hors-champ] - as if the 
image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see.... (Barthes in 
Brunette& Wills, 1989: 111). 
The influence of Lacan's notion of the gaze, desire as the blind spot in the unage, on 
Barthes' thinking is immediately apparent here . 
32 But it is coupled with a 
phenomenological bias that has been criticised as a reversion to a precritical idealism 
(Brunette & Wills, 1989: 112). However, I find this interesting as it points to the strange 
mixture in Barthes' approach between investment in the transparency of signifier and 
investment in the image as a signifying force that predates/exceeds that transparency. 
While for Barthes this excess has to do with the affect of mouming that the image 
generates in the subject, in my 'montage texts', I shall attempt to lead this investment in 
the image away from mourning. However, I find Barthes' movement of loving the image 
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as signifVing a real absence (the loss of his mother) to be generative of a way of 
overcoming the affective dimension of the image as a blockage, an unrepresentable 
rupture that is in opposition to discursive meaning. The unleashing of the affective 
power of the image, which Barthes calls the punctum, is the taking place of a narrative 
of the subject that obviates against loss by means of duration. Brunette & Wills, 
referring explicitly here to the photograph, but having already unden-nined the 
distinction between static and moving, which allows the cinematic into the picture, put 
the scenario Nvell, saying 
that the punctum comes to trouble the invisible "frontal" frame 
separating image from viewer and so to rend the signifying surface, by 
rewriting the relation between the framed rectangle and the viewer by 
placing him or her within a kind of three-dimensional rectangle or 
cuboid extending outward from the screen (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 
113). 
However, they ultimately subscribe to the traditional view of film theory that movement 
in cinema gives an impression of reality, which works to mask the image's relation to 
death, repressing its discontinuities (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 116). It is the writing of 
death that is generated by the collapse of boundaries between the inside and the outside 
of the image. 
The play of the punctum as described by Barthes, once reactivated as a 
form of writing, folds reference in upon itself to place reality in a kind 
of chiastic symmetry with death, presence with absence, confounding 
inside with outside (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 117). 
In this sense the cut that generates description away from the image is always held as a 
melancholy renunder of the failure of narrative to master the very absence at the heart of 
representation, i. e. death. 
For my purposes, the play of the punctum as a model for engaging with a 
Cinematic cut, the 'chiastic symmetry' engendered by the putting into writing of the 
sensibility of the suspended film moment, does not serve to acknowledge the mark of 
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death in reality, but life. I am interested in Barthes' writing that comes to fill in the space 
of absence generated by the cut of the punctum, but for me that writing does not relate to 
a photographic stillness, but to an image that is itself changing (living). Thereby 
perforinative writing in this thesis, rather than approaching an opaque detail (death) 
which it pivots around but ultimately fails to unsettle, attempts, in its pivoting, to engage 
a sense of liveliness outside of the oppositional parameters of life versus death. In my 
appropriation of Barthes, I've tried to show how, while being considered as an excess of 
meaning outside the language system, and thereby as non-narrative, the 'third meaning' 
and the punctum are 'cuts', which generate more narrative. 
Where I distinguish my thesis from Barthes' approach is that in Barthes, this 
generation of narrative pivots around an opaque detail, which remains opaque. While 
generatiVe, this detail is also an obstacle to the subject's desire, a limit-point beyond 
which one cannot go, which in effect constitutes the subject's desire. It is a melancholy 
detail. However, the processual engagement of body and image in Barthes'writing can 
be read in a way that shifts the melancholy relation to the film image. This is my goal. 
This is all the more urgent in that in Disappearance at Sea and News From Home, 
-11 ausence could be narrated (in ternis of story) as a kind of melancholy death. In 
Disappearance at Sea, the image of the blank screen refers obliquely to Donald 
Crowhurst's death at sea, as well as being a moment where the blank screen of the film's 
foreseeable end is inserted into the film's middle, an intimation of finality that forecloses 
on the future horizon of film (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 115). News From Home images a 
separation that could be read as a kind of death in the silencing of the voice that connects 
the invisible protagonist to the life world of the mother's letters, the blankness of the 
final sequence, an ending. From the viewpoint of a Zizekian film analysis, separation 
would be akin to 'subjective destitution', the death of imaginary identifications that 
opens the void of possibility, but freezes the subject in this confrontation. However, my 
experience of the abyssal moments of these two films counters this view, transporting 
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me instead into the movements of the life world. " There are political stakes involved in 
this slight shift in emphasis, which I sball explore In the following subtext. 
2.7 A FEMINIST SUBTEXT: THE NARRATIVITY OF RUPTURE RESCUES 
THE FILM MOMENT OF ABSENCE FROM THE STASIS OF THE 
FEMININE IN OEDIPAL LOGIC 
Asserting that the cut (to the blank screen) is a pure instance of the signifier 
depends on a binan- split between narrative and non-narrative, content and form, 
meaning and the 'obtuse'. In claiming that this binary is impossible to maintain, I aim to 
show how In the supposedly non-narrative moment,, the spectator is mobilised into 
another kind of narration, instead of passively reflecting the emptying of content deemed 
to occur in that kind of film moment. This aim has a feminist subtext to it. I will not 
frame my argument in terms of sexual difference, as that would be to frame (and limit) 
an alternative narration as being feminine per se, in a binary opposition to the classical 
narrative forin associated with the Oedipal model of ordering, recounting and, more 
importantly, thinking about endings. 'It may be significant that it is at the same moment 
(around the age of three) that the little human "Invents" at once sentence, narrative, and 
the Oedipus' (Barthes in de Lauretis, 1984: 104). In fact, one of my future allies, Gilles 
Deleuze, hiiinself succumbs to the attraction of couching alternative narration in terms of 
the feminine when referring to Chantal Akerman's work in relation to the nomadic 
situations characteristic of time-image narration. He says that 
Akerman's novelty lies in showing [ ... 
] bodily attitudes as the sign of 
states of body particular to the female character, whilst the men speak 
for society, the environment, the part which is their due, the piece of 
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history which they bring with them I ... 
I But the states of the female 
bodv is not closed: descending from the mother or going back to the 
mother, it serves as a revelation to men, who now talk about themselves, 
and on a deeper level to the environment, which now makes itself seen 
or heard only through the window of a room, or a train, a whole art of 
sound. In the same place or in space, a woman's body achieves a strange 
nomadism which makes it cross ages, situations and places. (This was 
Virginia Woolf s secret in literature). The states of the body secrete the 
slow ceremony which joins together the corresponding attitudes, and 
develop a female gest which overcomes the history of men and the crisis 
of the world (Deleuze, 1989: 196). 
I cite this in full as it encapsulates what I am up against. Although, in chapter three I 
shall also make a case for the openness of female suýjectivity in terms of a 
dis/continuous mode of sublime experience, I aim to do this without the essentialism that 
I think pervades the crevices of Deleuze's attribution here. In fact, his positing of the 
female gest as that which overcomes history is synonymous with Zizek's positing of 
'subjective destitution' as a feminine act, which overcomes the refuge men take in 
relentless activity in order to avoid confronting the radical negativity which founds the 
svrabolic network of fictions. 
In this perspective. the difference masculme/feminme no longer 
coincides with that of active/passIve, spiritual/sensual, culture/nature; 
rather, masculine activity is an escape for the abyssal dimension of the 
feminine act. The "break with nature" is on the side of the woman, and 
man's compulsive activitv is ultimately nothing but a desperate attempt 
to repair the traumatic incision of this rupture (Zizek, 1990: 37). 
To avoid attributing subversive power to the female, a notion which stems from the male 
imaginary and inadvertently confirms the marginality and otherness of the feminine, I 
pose the question of an alternative forin of narration within the context of underniming 
the frame of the binary narrative/non-narrative, content/form. 
This is obliquely feminist in at least two ways. One - it addresses the notion of 
content, which is important to feminist aesthetics. In her essay 'Film, Feminism and the 
Avant-Garde', an essay written later and less polemically than'Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema', Laura Mulvey states that in a feminist aesthetics of film '[t]he 
language of form should not intrude or overshadow the free flow of the story and must 
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allow content to come to the fore' (Mulvey in O'Pray, 1996: 115). Teresa De Lauretis, in 
her cataloguing of then recent, i. e. 1980s, films by female directors such as Yvonne 
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Ramer, Sally Potter, and, Chantal Akerman, stated that '[t]he most exciting work in 
cinema and in feminism todav is not anti-narrative or anti-Oedipal; quite the opposite. It 
is narrative and Oedipal with a vengeance'(de Lauretis, 1984- 157). In feminist 
aesthetics, the emphasis on the fon-nal play of the signifier is never embraced simply as 
fori-nal play. It is always a vehicle, potentially creating other fonns of narrative which 
open the film to its outside, an outside which, for de Lauretis, is the social constitution of 
real women. These positive assertions of the possibilities and contradictions in cinematic 
representation counter the radical negativity of Peter Gidal's extreme formalism. For him 
'[wlhat is not needed is "a different narrative" ' (Gidal, 1979: 78). As opposed to what he 
calls the '[flecent valorising of certain representations of women', (he mentions 
Aken-nan), 'if anything I would have thought that absence of (the) body/figure(s) in (the) 
film would demand a re-call outside the film - such a voice, not a representation of, for 
instance, woman's voice inside'(Gidal, 1979: 77). Gidal's absolute ban on positive 
images may be seen as untenable today given the emphasis in visual practice on the 
representation of so-called 'authentic experience' in identity politics, a trend which 
ignores earlier feminist awareness of the ambiguity and contradictions inherent in the 
tenn 'expenence'. 34 However, the contrast between Gidal's position on the (formal) 
absence of content and de Lauretis' on positive content and how these positions relate to 
the outside of the film is useful for my purposes - 
As I have already discussed, in Gidal's formalism, the problem is how change 
can be effected in the outside given the stringent self-reflexivity of the 
film-text. De 
Lauretis I attention to forms of narrative is for a cinema that would 'enact the 
contradictions of women as social subjects' and 'perform the ternis of the specific 
division of the female subject in language, in imaging, in the social' 
(de Lauretis, 1984: 
69). She is strictly opposed to '[t]he minimalist strategies of materialist avant-garde 
cinema - its blanket condemnation of narrative and illusionism, 
its reductive economy of 
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repetition, its production of the spectator as the locus of a certain "randomness of 
energy" to counter the unity of suýject vision', which, as I will discuss in more detail in 
section 4.4, are 'predicated on, even as they work against, the (transcendental) male 
subject' (de Lauretis, 1984: 68). However, there is an uneasy commonality between 
these vieNvs in their emphasis on the production of a spectator by a text, albeit a different 
kind of text in de Lauretis'turn to forins of narrative. Again, what is at stake is the 
boundarv between the inside and the outside. While in de Lauretis' position, the inside 
and the outside would seem to be interspersed, the categories that constitute them as 
such are predetermined by historical definition. Thus her insistence that '[t]he question 
then is how to reconstruct or organize vision fTom the "Impossible" place of female 
desire, the historical place of the female spectator between the look of the camera and 
the image on the screen' (de Lauretis, 1984: 69). While I am in sympathy with this 
proposition, I resist the mscription of identity attributed to the 'historical place of the 
female spectator'. My encounters in the twenty-first century with the 'absence of (the) 
body/figure(s)' in the film moment of suspension in Disappearance at Sea and News 
From Home neither produce an empty reflection nor a socially constructed female 
subject split between her image and invisible being. Instead, something in-between is 
generated that takes its form from the outsides of these historical discourses, i. e. from 
the intervallic spaces between them. 
For my purposes, i. e. the spectator's relation to the blank screen in a film t at is 
barely narrative, consideration of content as positive representation is beside the point, 
but perhaps content can be thought differently. I am sympathetic to Gidal's view, which 
is suspicious of positive content, a position, which echoes Lacan's critique of the 
seduction of images. On the other hand, I agree with Mulvey that content is important, 
although I do not subscribe to her politics of the imaginary, which would inscribe new 
meanings to the pre-Oedipal, mapping this space onto fon-nal operations in film which 
results in predictable framing and cutting of images. 
" Rather than relegating the 
feminine to the place it has always occupied, i. e. beyond discourse, my reconfiguring of 
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the image of absence, will attempt to pose the question of content dIfferently, so that It Is 
not simply positive or alternative. In my reconfiguration, content is not a property of an 
image/film, but becomes a dynamic in-between space that receives its forin from the 
intersection between the image and an embodied spectator. In claiming and 
demonstrating that there is a narration occurring in the supposedly non-narrative 
moment, I want to undermine the usual mapping of the non-narrative moment as a 
rupture of narrative onto the feminine. I will attempt to incorporate the negative into a 
continuous trajectory as opposed to maintaining a distinction between narrative and its 
outside as excess or negativity. 
For Mulvey, the image of the female itself signifies excess, the collapse of 
narrative. In 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' she discusses suspension in relation 
to the female image, saying that 'her visual presence tends to work against the 
development of a story line, to freeze the flow of action in moments of erotic 
contemplation' (Mulvey, 1975: 11). 
36 Using the psychoanalytic model of the image as a 
disavowal of lack, Mulvey couches this contemplation in the negative terins of the fetish 
object. The beautiful, frozen (her term), image has a double-sided nature - it evokes the 
anxiety it was erected to allay for the male gaze. She is captured in his gaze, thereby 
reassuring him of his power, but like all fetish objects, she threatens to overwhelm him, 
reminding him of the illusory pedestal his power is based upon. I see this feminine 
characterization of narrative excess as underpinning the analysis of film moments of so- 
called rupture, which do not image the woman at all. The negation of the system, its 
other, no matter how abstractly analyzed, has inadvertent links with woman as the other 
to the dominant system of patriarchy. Any celebration of this space of excess has to be 
met with great ambivalence, as it corresponds with the patriarchal equation of excess 
with the feminine in the first place. Zizek, pitting himself in opposition to the feminist 
interest in content, a factor that further exposes his avant-garde credentials, promulgates 
this view. Neutrally forinal when dealing with the structure of the subject, the bias of 
this structure comes into being when it is taken to its logical conclusion in his claim, 
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following Lacan, that the Lacanian subýject par excellence is Antigone who has broken 
all ties with the svnibolic order and in so doing commits voluntary suicide. 
Stephen Heath, in his essay 'Difference', while in part advocating the Lacanian 
emphasis on the symbolic register where meaning can be contested, critl I its c zes 
stereotyping of the woman as the 'locus of dis-order' and the 'downfall of interpretation' 
(Heath, 1978: 72 & 73). The feminine always acts as a limit to representation. I am not 
interested in countering this view per se, but in finding a way of thinking about identity 
other than in terms of the either/or of positive substantiation or negative critique. 
Thinking differently about identity in terms of the film encounter generating the space 
for a new kind of identity not premised on the available subject positionalities of 
identification and lack, but also not in opposition to those positionalities as this is merely 
reactive, thereby confirming the dominant, albeit negatively. Feminist film literature on 
this topic is vast. In order to further encapsulate the selective positions of negative 
'content' versus positive 'content', I want to take two feminist readings of achnittedly 
mainstream films, one from the 1980s, and one from the 1990s, which, in my view, 
highlight the pitfalls of relegating an alternative position in ternis of the feminine. The 
first example is Teresa de Lauretis' analysis of Nicholas Roeg's Bad Timing: A Sensual 
Obsession (1980). The second analysis by Emma Wilson retums to a film I have 
mentioned previously in relation to Zizek, Krzysztof Kieslowskis Three Colours: Blue 
(1993). The influence of Kristeva pervades both of these analyses and they both, in 
different ways, refer to absence in the image. (As we have seen, Kristeva's notion of the 
signifying power of semiotic rupture in relation to the homogeneity of the symbolic 
order was widely adopted by 1970s film theory, especially by Wollen and Heath. 
) 
In de Lauretis' insistence on working with and against the Oedipal narrative 
form to proffer an alternative, the female image on film is considered in terms of 
resistance. This corresponds with the space of contradiction that the 
female spectator 
finds herself in, in relation to the film itself and in relation to patriarchal power. For de 
Lauretis, Milena, the female character in Roeg's Bad Timing, images a limit of cinematic 
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discourse. While Bad Timing is ostensibly a love story that follows the pattern of 
investigation familiar in Hitchcock's Vertigo and Marnie, here 'access to narrative 
pleasure is blocked rather than enhanced by the film's generic contiguity with familiar 
patterns of expectations' (de Lauretis, 1984: 89). In the film, the psychoanalyst Dr. Alex 
Linden, plaved by Art Garfunkel, is obsessed by Theresa Russell's character, Milena. 
She telephones him after swallowing pills in a suicide attempt. Finding her unconscious 
on reaching her apartment, instead of calling ambulance immediately, he rapes her. 
Harvey Keitel's detective, Inspector Netusil, attempts to piece the enigma of this crime 
together in his investigation. However, de Lauretis maintains that Milena's refusal to be 
incorporated into the patriarchal structures of law that pervade the film, a refusal imaged 
by the temporal discontinuities of the film's montage, opens the film up to the 
'impossibilities' of expressing another kind of time. 37 For her, Milena's evasion and 
blockage of the Oedipal investigatory drive of narrative unhinges both the linear time 
frame of detection and the repetitious time of obsession, creating another temporal 
possibility, which de Lauretis classifies in terms of Julia Kristeva's notion of 'women's 
time', a time that 'is not yet' (de Lauretis, 1984: 95 ). 38 Milena's, and by inference the 
female spectator's, 'now' cannot be represented. The space of resistance is the space that 
signifies the 'not here yet' of representation. 
This position sounds similar to the maintenance of negativity in the avant-garde 
film theory I have looked at and in Zizek's notion of the feminine act. However, there is 
one crucial difference, which, I think, has more potential than the way de Lauretis puts 
it, due to the predominance of negativity in film discourse in the 1980s. She contrasts 
Kristevan negativity to Michel Foucault's positing of negativity as an absolute 
difference, which, in being in dialectical opposition to representation, constitutes its 
'impossible' other. Negativity in Kristeva, as I have already discussed, operates as a 
'radical and irreducible difference' (de Lauretis, 1984: 95). From my perspective, there is 
not much to chose between these two positions, but de Lauretis makes the startling claim 
that this 'radical and irreducible difference' is not simply the other half of a dialectic, as I 
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have been posing it, but 'is in excess of dialectical opposition' (de Lauretis, 1984: 95). 
The notion of a difference in excess of dialectical opposition comes close to Gilles 
Deleuze's forinulation of ontological difference (Deleuze, 1994: 65). 
In Deleuze's forinulation, difference is not posed in terms of negativity, but is in 
itself the differenciator of being and non-being, where 'non-being is not the being of the 
negative, rather, it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question' 
(Deleuze, 1994: 64). In other words, non-being is not the opposite of being but is what 
keeps things fTom being solidified in a static, codified, picture of the real. The 
interruption of Deleuze here is a bit premature in view of the (sequential) i oumey I am 
taking in this thesis, but the hint of a link to and a divergence from de Lauretis' position 
make it necessary at this point. (My main discussion of Deleuze will occur in chapter 
three. ) The point I am trying to make here is that de Lauretis, writing in the 1980s, opens 
the question of a film posing 'the possibility of different temporality, another time of 
desire', but she is constrained by her time's subjugation of difference to representation. 
Therefore, in tenns of the film image as an object of representation, she articulates this 
difference in terms of ... nowhere" + "now" = the place and time of feminine desire that 
can only be stated as negativity, as borders - this is the most the film can say' (de 
Lauretis, 1984: 97-99). 
As regards the film moments I shall look at, it is this site of negativity that I 
shall attempt to eradicate, which is why I am attracted to Deleuzian ideas. Does this 
mean that I am trying to eradicate conflict/tension, which could be thought of as being 
the necessary components of any identity relation and as being necessary to the 
promulgation of narrative? The answer is yes and no. Yes, in the sense that for de 
Lauretis 'radical difference cannot perhaps be represented except as an experiencing of 
borders' where 'borders stand for the potentially conflictual co-presence of different 
cultures, desires, contradictions, which they articulate or simply delineate' 
(de Lauretis, 
1984: 99). No, in the sense that the difference I shall go on to discuss in relation to the 
dis/continuous film moment is not a radical difference, but an ontological one. If, to use 
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de Lauretis' words, it is in 'excess of dialectical opposition', this excess is not resistance 
but an ungrounding of the categories of identity In other words, a border/cut doesn't 
stand for a site of contradiction and/or resistance, but creates an opening for a 
differenciation to occur which both unites and separates things and in the process the 
border/cut is itself repositioned to generate another series of questions elsewhere. 
Writing in the 1990s, Emma Wilson attempts to move past the Kristevan 
problematic that I have referred to in relation to 1970s film theory of how the rupturing 
signifVing power of the serniotic actually effects change in relation to the dominant 
system of the symbolic. '9 She begins by situating Blue in tenns of the same deadlock of 
Knsteva's senuotic, whereby the fact that the semlotic is deemed to exist 'beneath and 
before the territory of paternal law' relegates it to a position outside culture (Wilson, 
1998.360). 'This film is caught in contradiction between representation and its refusal' 
(Wilson, 1998: 35 1). In one scene where the image subsides into blankness, Wilson 
writes that '[i]n the blank screen, Blue testifies to an absence, a space which will fissure 
the filin as representation. The film will remain split between intense subjectivity and 
the denial of vision' (Wilson, 199 8: 35 1). It is this notion of oscillation between 
representation and its other, i. e. rupture, excess, absence, that I want to undermine by 
positing the blank film image as a dis/continuity. For most of this article, Wilson seems 
to subscribe to the orthodox and problematic reading of Kristeva that pervaded 1970s 
film theory: 
The moving blueness which fills the screen creates an effect analogous 
to Kristeva's description of entering the Arena Chapel where blue takes 
hold of us at the extreme limit of visual perception. For the viewer of 
Blue, these swimming scenes afford moments of near abstraction, 
interludes of sensory pleasure and clear, intense blue light. These 
episodes disturb, yet demarcate, the structure of the film and its internal 
dynamic of denial and recovery. They are central to the film, since both 
chromatically and psychologically they are prime spaces of the 
serniotic: they are spaces which allow the viewer to question the 
imbrication of colour, trauma and denial. They offer a prefiguring of a 
space which will be re-entered at the close of the film (Wilson, 1998: 
355). 40 
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However, towards the end of this article, Wilson makes an interesting shift, which 
although referring to 'positive content', resonates obliquely with my prqject. Conscious 
of Judith Butler's critique of Kristeva which echoes the aforementioned one by Rosalind 
Ann Jones, that '[b]y relegating the source of subversion to a site outside of culture 
itself, Kristeva appears to foreclose the possibility of subversion as an effective or 
realizable cultural practice' (Butler in Wilson, 1998: 360), Wilson attempts to reclaim 
the semlotic as a 'point of departure ... a 
fluid series of identifications which are moving 
and interchangeable' (Wilson, 1998: 362). While this reclamation changes the identity of 
the semiotic so that it loses its specificity, I am in sympathy with Wilson's analysis of 
the last shots of the film which puts forward the notion of the main protagonist's re-birth 
in terms of a moving forward. While this 'moving forward' is situated in terms of 
narrative (positive) content, the way that Wilson maps this onto the film's final sequence 
of images has a formal movement that relates in part to the kind of movement I shall 
attribute to the spectator relation in my film encounters. 
Blue ends with a cut from a close-up of an ultrasound image of a foetus to the 
iris of the man, Olivier, who aids the main protagonist to leave her past behind. Wilson 
concludes: 
The spectator is never allowed an entirely unselfconscious, regressive 
pleasure in the pools of blue, the blue crystals and the blue lights of 
Kieslowski's film. Nevertheless, in its synthetic ending, in the multiple 
facets of Julie's psyche, Blue achieves, for me at least, a prefiguring of 
the pleasure beyond the paternal law of which Butler speaks (Wilson, 
1998: 362). 
The problem with this analysis for me is that it relies on narrative as story. It relies on an 
opposition between the blockage of trauma and the mobility of recovery and on a notion 
that images illustrate this, i. e. blank ones image the fortner, shifting montage the 
latter. 
However, the notion that the protagonist's identity 'is projected for us as the product of a 
mobile series of images borrowed from her external reality' 
(Wilson, 1998: 362 - 
emphasis mine) is not dissimilar to the kind of sensibility 
I shall attribute to the 
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spectatorial encounter in relation to my two film moments. The main difference being of 
course that I shall not be using substantial images to fill out the trajectory of movement. 
The mobile series of images that I shall be motivated to 'perform' will not posit content 
in terins of positive substance. For me, the reconfiguring of the pleasure beyond paternal 
law is a utopian idea, thereby becoming another kind of futurity held in abeyance rather 
than an actuality. The reliance on the positivity of image content tends to close off the 
actualitv of new subjectivities, which is why, while I depart from his static negativity, I 
am initially sympathetic to Zizek's idea of 'suNective destitution'. In Wilson, recovery is 
a positive alternative rather than a state that III is never achieved. While there are elements 
of both de Lauretis' and Wilson's analyses that I find conducive to my thesis, I will align 
mN, self to the wavs in which feminist theorists are currently trying to think about 
futurity's dynarnic relation to the present. Rather than it being either held in negative 
abeyance, as In de Lauretis, or positively occurring in a utopian narrative, as In Wilson, I 
shall attempt to think of futurity as a moment of differentiation that separates and unites 
the units of relation that are occurring in a present moment. The present moment I am 
referring to being the encounter between the film image and the spectator in the moment 
of dis/continuity. 
In chapter four, I shall refer to Elizabeth Grosz's appropriation of ideas from 
Henn Bergson and Deleuze that are relevant to the notion of futurity as an enlivening 
formal opemng in the present. My encounter with Disappearance at Sea made me feel 
the force of absence as a positive generator of sense and as being sense-full in itself The 
notion of absence as something generative rather than it being a dead space is something 
that Vicki Kirby, an ex-student of Grosz', discusses In Telling Flesh: The Substance of 
the Corporeal. Her point that as long as difference is equated with the lack or absence of 
identity, which it has been in dominant trends in Western metaphysics, then an absence 
can only be a dead thing. The task, she claims, is to argue for the differential nature of 
the supposed gap or lack between or within supposedly pregiven entities, i. e. identities. 
Rather than difference being what separates pregiven identities, how can it be seen as 
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instead itself 'a "becoming entity"... not a name for the gap of supposedly dead space and 
time between pregiven entities' (Kirby, 1997: 65). The 'montage text' method that I shall 
use in the next chapter perforinatively attempts to present absence as a differential 
opening that acts as a site of corinection between registers of being. 
Kirby, in a somewhat phenomenological move close to the ethos of this thesis, 
although she does not mention Merleau-Ponty except in passing, insists on the 
interrelation between language and the body as mutuall-N, consti I ituting entities. Her 
assertion that there is always a connecting current working across the originating 
constancy of the body and the creation of its objects (images? ), is as valid, if not more 
so, for the blank image, as it is for the supposedly substantial/positive one. This is 
because rather than beginning from the notion of the body as 'raw and unmediated 
nature', or, as in Zizek, the trace of a barred 'raw and unmediated nature', Kirby talks of a 
corporeography of the body whereby its substance is continually writing itself (Kirby, 
1997: 79). This corporeography is in play even in so-called moments of detachment. 
Therefore the move in materialist avant-garde film theory to undermine the mythic 
plentitude of narrative, by exposing the material signifiers of film, not only inadvertently 
subscribes to the myth it attempts to undermine, but denies the continuous, fluid act of 
si 671 , of narration in 
its discontinuous mode of connecting and separating. gm 
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ing 
Narrative is not a super-connective layer placed on top of an a-signifying brute reality, 
but is itself the interpretative current between states of being and the things that interrupt 
them. Therefore, I shall claim that in relation to the film moment of absence, an 
interpretative current flows between the discontinuity of the screened film and the 
invisible continuity of the 'other film' being engaged with by the spectator . 
4' This 'other 
film' is linked to but not dependent on the flow of the image screened or the reification 
of filmic signifiers. Unlike as in Gidal, Wollen, and, Heath, the cut in my film 
encounters opens onto a series of dis/continuous movements that expend themselves in 
the multi-directional temporality of the here and now. It does not hold open a space of 
criticality as a guardian of the future. An infinitely transformative sense of being moved 
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by temporal and spatial discontinuities rather than the stasis of negativity is what the two 
films I encounter on thisjourney lead me towards. The abstraction at work in this 
transfon-native displacement is alvvays interconnected with the corporeality of the 
spectating/narrating body as a channel/passage for discursive affects. 
1 The notion of the mirror phase was appropriated from Jacques Lacan's 1949 essay 'The Mirror- 
Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience' in Ecrits: 
A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1977), pp. 1-7. In that 
essay, Lacan argued that the infant's recognition and identification with his reflection in the 
mirror is a mis-recognition of an ideal image that the human being forever strives to be like. The 
notion of the subject being primed to identify with and project its fantasies of perfection onto 
idealized, fictional, reflections of itself was ripe for a film theory, which compared the screen to a 
mirror and the film apparatus . 
See Jean-Louis Baudry, 'Ideological Effects of the Basic 
Cinematographic Apparatus' in Phillip Rosen (ed), Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film 
Theo, ýv Reader, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). pp. 286-298. Laura Mulvey's use 
of the mirror phase in her 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' sums it up: 
Important for this article is the fact that it is an image that constitutes the matrix 
of the imaginary, of recognition /misrecognition and identification, and hence 
of the first articulation of the 1, " of subjectivity. This is a moment when an 
older fascination with looking (at the mother's face, for an obvious example) 
collides with the initial inklings of self-awareness. Hence it is the birth of the 
long love affair/despair between image and self-image that has found such 
intensity of expression in film and such joyous recognition in the cinema 
audience. Quite apart from the extraneous similarities between screen and 
mirror (the fran-dng of the human form in its surroundings, for instance), the 
cinema has structures of fascination strong enough to allow temporary loss of 
ego while simultaneously reinforcing the ego. The sense of forgetting the world 
as the ego has subsequently come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I 
was) is nostalgically reminiscent of that presubjective moment of image 
recognition (Mulvey, 1975: 10). 
2 See Malcolm Le Grice's'Towards Temporal Economy', Screenl vol. 20, no. s 3/4, (1979/80), pp. 
58-79, where he makes a case for an avant-garde film in opposition to dominant narrative 
cinema's construction of a coherent ego position for the spectator, invoking concepts from Metz 
and Baudry along the way. 
' See Mulvey's reading of Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958) as exposing the stereotypes that keep the 
look in the place of patriarchal power by means of the disorienting erotic involvement with the 
look that occurs in that film for an example of her strategy of 'reading against the grain' (Mulvey, 
1975: 15). While Mulvey is critical of the dominant form of narrative, she does not equate the 
eschewal of narrative with an avant-garde cinema. Neither does Teresa 
de Lauretis (1984). In a 
feminist avant-garde aesthetics, deconstructive work on narrative form seems more 
in line with a 
radical film practice, in this perhaps echoing the avant-garde tradition of 
Godard and Straub- 
Huillet. See Peter Wollen's 'The Two Avant-Gardes', Studio International, vol. 190, no. 978, 
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Nov/Dec (1975), pp. 171-175 for a useful distinction between the materialist avant-garde that 
stemmed from modernist painting. in which he includes Le Grice, Paul Sharits, and Peter Gidal, 
and the cinematic avant-garde descended from Eisenstein. in which he includes Godard. The latter approach is interested in 'an alternative route between content-ism and formalism, a 
recognition that it is possible to work within the space opened up by the disjunction and dislocation of signifier and signified' as opposed to dissolving 'signification into objecthood or 
tautology' (Wollen. 197-5- 173). 
' See for example the positions advocated by Malcolm Le Grice inAbstracl Film and Beyond, 
(London: Studio Vista, 1977) and Peter Gidal in'The Anti-Narrative (1978)', Screen, vol. 20, no. 2, Summer, (1979), pp, 73-93. 
' Also see Phillip Drummond's 'Notions of Avant-Garde Cinema' in Film as Film: Formal 
Experimentation in Film, 1910-1975, (London: Arts Council of Great Britain, 1979), pp. 9-16. 6 In Condition of Illusion (1975), Gidal edited three inter-negatives together to suppress the 
connecting splices. Two film strips 'A and B' were rolled to create a loop structure that 
Toregrounds the presence in absentia of the connecting splices' (Gidal, 1975: sleeve notes of 
video cop), of Condition of Illusion). This foregrounding of materiality is supposed to engender 
the understanding of film process that Gidal aims at. 
Gidal asserts that non-narrative films, (he refers to Peter Kubelka's ArnulfRainer (1958/60)). 
are not necessarily non-diegetic. Gidal is keen to separate narrative defined as story content from 
diegesis defined as the presentation of specifically cinematic and spatial and temporal codes, a 
separation I find useful although I shall take the second part of this equation in a totally different 
direction. In making this distinction. Gidal is referring to Christian Metz's definition of diegesis 
in Film Language as being denved from the Greek term narration, which means a judiciary 
recital of facts, and as designating the 'sum of the film's denotation: the narration itself, but also 
the fictional space and time dimensions implied in and by the narrative, and consequently the 
characters, the landscapes, the events, and other narrative elements, in so far as they are 
considered in their denotated aspect' (Gidal in Rodowick, 1994: 144). Defining diegesis as 
facticity of discourse, Gidal thereby maintains that there can be a rejection of narrative and 
narrativity, yet diegesis is inevitable. The latter comes to designate the subordination of image- 
content to image production, a process which devolves around the tension produced between real 
time and space and represented time and space. 
' See Heath's 'Difference', Screen, vol. 19, no. 3, Autumn 1978, pp. 50-112, where he discusses 
negativity in terms of struggle and transformation. See Judith Williamson's critique of Mulvey 
and Wollen's film Riddles of the Sphinx (1977) where she takes them to task for ignoring the 
social meanings already inscribed in and associated with the (female) imaginary. As she states: 
This mysteriousness is set up in the "stones" chapter with blurry shots of the 
Sphinx accompanied by electronic music: it almost has the aura of a Turkish 
Delight advertisement, "full of Eastern Promise". This use of the Sphinx can be 
seen as part of a strategy intended to evoke mystery and an image of inscrutable 
womanhood, as a preliminary to their "deconstruction" with the later role of the 
Sphinx as a speaking subject: "she " is given a voice. But this involves a 
fundamental misconception: you don't dispel a myth by trying to make it speak, 
or reject an image by giving it a voice with which to deny itself. The film 
undercuts its own strategy, by not recognising that the power of an image of 
Female Mystery is so strong that it functions in the most traditional way and is 
too strong to be undercut by anything later in the film - even if this were 
intended (Williamson in Gidal, 1979: 91-2). 
9 Jacqueline Rose in Sexuality in the Field of Vision, (London: Verso, 1986), speculates on the 
occlusion of the Real of desire from Christian Metz' article The Imaginary Signifier'. 
See 
especially pp. 194-197. 
10 The American studio version, put together by RKO against Rossellini's will, ends with Karin 
waking up to a bright new morning and descending gaily to the village while a male voiceover 
tells us: "Out of her terror and her suffering, Karin had found a great need 
for God. And she knew 
now that only in her return to the village could she hope for peace" (Zizek, 
1990: 32). 
11 Rossellini's Journey to Italy (1954) also features shots where the camera follows the billowing 
volcanic smoke. Using a different methodological approach to 
Zizek, Laura Mulvey suggests that 
in these shots in Journey to Italy 'the image moves away from its fictional 
frame of reference. 
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Film turns into something beyond its usual subservience to iconic representation, dissolving into 
Nvispy grey tones ... The volcanic activity and the smoke from the ionisation process have a flow 
and a movement which animates an inanimate material, the earth itself Of course, the "coming to life" of the earth brings death to man... (Mulvey, 2000: 106). 
1 However, Gidal can be further read against himself as offering a possibility for the kind of 
narrative I shall go on to develop in his insistence on duration. Duration for Gidal is, as is diegesis, completely bound up with the material presentation of the film. '[Djuration defines the 
specificity of cinematic denotation as the point where spatial and temporal articulations converge in the material instance of the filmstrip' (Gidal in Rodowick, 1994: 137). Gidal, theoretically at least. reduces the potential temporal disorder that could, and, in my view, does, ensue from a durational intra-filmic space between viewer and film, to the ideal of a one-to-one 
correspondence between production time and viewing time. For him, all extraneous details are 
potentially ideologically contaminated. However, Gidal's deliberation to negate extraneous 
influences bet-vveen the vIeNver and the image by means of his 'procedural interaction between 
viewer and "viewed"... within a non-associative structure' is paradoxical (Gidal in Rodowick, 
1994: 138). 
The mental dialectical activation of the viewer is necessary for the procedure of 
the film's existence. Each film is not only structural, but structuring ... The viewer is either forming an equal and more or less oppositefilm in his or her 
head or else constantly anticipating, correcting, recorrecting ... constantly re- determining the confrontation with the given reality, i. e. the isolated chosen 
area of each film (Gidal in Rodowick, 1994: 138), (italics mine). 
While Gidal's films deliberately set out to minimize the other film being formed in the viewer's 
head. only an ideal (subjectively empty) viewer could bracket any extraneous associations 
altogether. By contrast, when duration and the diegetic processual (presentational mode) flow of 
image production are emphasized even Gidal's unexpressive reduction is subject to 
'contamination' by the viewer's place in real time and space, a placement which is intersected by 
bodily and psychical co-ordinates extraneous to what is on-screen. 
13 Although in cultural studies the imaginary as a site of semiotic activity is associated with image 
production, Kristeva mainly looks at poetry with only a few excursions into visual production. 
See her 'Giotto's Joy' and 'Bellini' in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and 
Art, Leon S. Roudiez (ed), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). Also, her essay 
'Jackson Pollock's Milky Way: 1912-1956', Journal ofPhilosophy and the Visual Arts, (Academy 
Group, 1989), pp. 34-38. Her one excursion into cinema, the essay'Ellipsis on Dread and the 
Specular Seduction', rehearses the same suspicion of the image as a seductive lure from which we 
need to be distanced that I have already discussed in Lacanian psychoanalytic and 1970s semiotic 
film theory. 'Specular fascination captures terror and restores it to the symbolic order ... Calm 
reigns before the sight of hell captured in the image' (Kristeva, 1986b: 241-2). To her rhetorical 
question 'No antifilm possible, thenT she answers: 
There remains, here as elsewhere, the laugh: but, when it is the image laughing, 
identity crumbles and the "Great Dictator" is sawed in half Chaplin, or 
Specular Mortification: the worm in the successful order of psychosis 
incarnate, eating away at it and laughing with the full knowledge of what it is 
doing ... 
The film actor in Chaplin, but also the discrepancy or conflict between 
sound and image, discourse and representation, or the "impious fracturing of 
projection" possible in camera movement itself (Godard, Bresson), hold the 
spectator, still inside a phantasm, but at a distance from his own fascination' 
(Kristeva, 1986b: 242 - my emphasis). 
Disjunction and laughter are held to have inherent destabilizing effects, while the goal is still to 
effect distanciation from the seduction of the image. 
14 D. N. Rodowick echoes these sentiments in his discussion of the impact of Kristeva's ideas on 
both Wollen and Heath. See chapters 6 and 7 of Political Modernism: Criticism and Ideology in 
Contemporary Film Theo)ýy. 
15 Carroll is critical of psychoanalytic semiotic film theory in its attribution of the irrationality of 
psychical processes to film, its analogy of the screen as a mirror, and 
its attribution of 'illusion' to 
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mimetic representations. See his MN, s(iA, Ing Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
16 Two issues of Screen were devoted to Brecht: vol. 15, no. 2, Summer 1975 and vol. 16, no. 4, Winter 1975-6. Stephen Heath's 'Lessons From Brecht' in vol. 15 had a particular psychoanalytic 
emphasis. reading Brecht's 'fourth wall' via Freud's fetishism. " Sylvia Harvey in 'Whose Brecht'? Memories for the 80's', raises the crucial point that for Brecht, unlike the theorists of political modernism such as Gidal and Wollen, the subjectivity of the reader/viewer was not a mere effect of textual strategies, but that the viewer was a producer. Murrav Smith makes the same point in'The Logic and Legacy of Brechtianism'in Post-Theory: 
Reconstructing Filni Studies. (eds) David Bordwell and Noel Carroll (Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1996). pp. 130-148. Harvev cites Brecht: 
It is also as spectator that the individual loses his epicentral role and disappears: , he is no longer a private person "present" at a spectacle organised by theatre 
people. appreciating a work which he has shown to him; he is no longer a 
simple consumer, he must produce. Without active participation on his part, the 
Nvork would be incomplete ... (Brecht in Harvey. 1982: 56). 
Noel Carroll also makes the point that Godard, in drafting Brecht into service, ignored the latter's 
commitment to entertainment and accessibility, while 'imitating his politically committed 
reflexivity' (Carroll. 1982: 103). However, Carroll accuses Brecht himself of confusing illusion 
with mimetic representation (Carroll, 1982: 104-7). 
1" This translation, entitled, 'Suture (elements of the logic of the signifier)', was published in 
Screen. vol. 18. no. 4. Winter 1977/78, pp. 24-34. The same issue contained Jean-Pierre Oudart's 
'Cinema and Suture', pp. 35-47 and Stephen Heath's'Notes on Suture', pp. 48-76. 19 D. N. Rodowick claims that Heath does not pay attention to the aspect of radical nonidentity 
that Miller posits as suture. 'For Miller, suture requires a radical nonidentity -a dispersion of the 
unity of the subject and its representations through their regulated distribution along the 
signifying chain' (Rodowick, 1994: 209). 'Indeed, the most radical ambition of Miller's analysis is 
to describe the logic of the signifier as excluding the subject from the field of truth as the very 
foundation of signification' (Rodowick, 1994: 2 10). However, Heath, in his reformulation. 
interprets suture as a junction of the imaginary and the symbolic. Miller's notion of suture as a 
radical nonidentity is not unlike Zizek's notion that a hollow or blindspot appears in the image 
when 'the belong to me aspect' of representation is drained from it (Zizek, 1989: 48; CopJec, 
1989: 69). 
20 Laura Mulvey's insistence on Riddles of the Sphinx is interesting in this light. She states: 'The 
film is really "about" the imaginary - it doesn't go beyond that - that's what it's raising questions 
about. It's opening out a space within the imaginary and not making a leap into the symbolic. It's 
all about pre-Oedipal issues' (Mulvey in Rodowick, 1994: 267). 
21 Another example from Zizek: Hitchcock's use of montage in PsvCho, whereby a point of 
coincidence between the character, Lilah, and the object she approaches, the house, is held in 
abeyance, thereby creating the point of view of estrangement necessary to suspense (Zizek, 
1989a: 46). Hitchcockian montage intervenes in the tracking shot when the latter 
is "subjective, " when the camera shows us the subjective view of a person 
approaching the object-spot ... Hitchcock usually alternates 
the "ob ective" shot j 
of this person in motion, his or her walking toward the uncanny Thing, with the 
subjective shot of what this person sees, i. e., with the subjective view of the 
Thing (Zizek, 1989a: 45-6). 
Thereby creating suspense and imbuing an ordinary object with the aura of anxiety and 
uneasiness. For Zizek the point is that we are induced to imagine a gaze outside and observing 
the field of representation, thereby destabilizing the spectator in the scopic field. 
22 Michel Chion proposes that film theory has made a fetish out of the distanciation effects of 
diSjunction, especially that of sound and image. Whereas in his refreshing view, discord between 
sound and image is an example of dissonant harmony and does not necessarily 
break the essential 
unity of the sound-image relation (Chion, 1994: 37). 
23 Constance Penley and Janet Bergstrom discuss the disagreements over what counts as avant- 
garde cinema in their essay 'The Avant-Garde Histories and Theories, Screen, vol. 
19. no. 3, 
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1978. Michael O'Pray. in his introduction to The British A vant-Garde Film 1926-1995: An 
g, Anthologv qf 11'ritin 's, acknowledges the problematic use of term but also asserts its convenience as it allows us to cover a broad range of film-making. '_ 4 While there are those who retain a purist attitude to filmmaking, more filmmakers currently inhabit the gallery exhibition format, either screening films there or making film installations. I've already mentioned Chantal Akerman's film installations. In the 2001 Venice Biennale, she was one of a list of film directors invited to make gallery installations, including Abbas Kiarostami, Atom Egoyan (with Juliao Sariniento), Yervant Gianikian (with Angela Ricci Lucchi), Edward Yang. and David Lynch, who pulled out at the last minute. Egoyan was commissioned by Artangel to make the film installation Steenbeckett, based on Samuel Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape, at the Museum of Mankind, London, 2002. Many artist/filmmakers are using more traditional screening fon-nats. Artist Sharon Lockhart's singular image, static camera film, Teatro Amazonas (1999) was screened at the Lux Cinema, London, March 2001, while gallery-goers to Eija Llisa-Ahtila's Consolation Service (2000) film installation at the Anthony Reynolds Gallery, London, 2000, could only enter the gallery at the specified screening times during which a rope 
was hung across the exit. Douglas Gordon's Feature Film (2000) took place as a film installation 
at Atlantis. London, 2000, but was screened in the Royal Festival Hall's auditorium, London, 2001. 
25 Brunette and Wills make the point that film histories marginalize all non-narrative films in 
order that a coherent historical narrative be constructed. 'They form the "other" that 
retrospectively is then used to constitute mainstream narrative film as some kind of distinguishable entity held up as a totality ready for description' (Brunette & Wills, 1989: 38). 26 In Dean's case this is in contrast to many contemporary artist's film installations. 
Disappearance at Sea is compelling in that, given the usually shorter duration of artist's films in 
comparison to mainstream film, Dean's film includes moments that fall out of the films minimal 
narrative trajectory and yet the film is self-contained rather than being a distillation of something 
larger. A lot of artist's film installation works seem either like moments cut from a larger 
narrative film. e. g. Salla Tykka's Lasso (200 1), or, are framed as self-contained moments that 
refer (critically) to an implied narrative trajectory. A good example of the latter is Pierre 
Huyghe's The Ellipsis (1998), a three-screen installation where he literally films and inserts the 
moment of ellipsis implied in a montage sequence in Wim Wenders The American Friend (1977). 
27 It is also ironic that Bordwell's own analysis of narration is dependent on the film still, on 
breaking the film down into its component frames in order to attend to the film as a whole. See 
Raymond Bellour's 'The Unattainable Text', Screen, vol. 16, no. 3, Autumn. 1975, for an 
interesting discussion of this phenomenon. 
Sven Lutticken, referring to De Rijke and De Rooij's Bantar Gebang (2000), a single image 
lasting the 10-minute length of a film reel, shows a shantytown on a vast rubbish dump near 
Jakarta, notes that there is a resurrgence in contemporary film installation of the use of the static 
camera and the single frame image which he claims results in 'a kind of dull primitivism' 
(Lutticken, 2002: ICA exhibition pamphlet). One could also think of Sharon Lockhart's Teatro 
Amazonas (1998)., a 40 minute film, in which the stationary camera records the auditorium of the 
Teatro Amazonas opera house in Manaus, Brazil, from the stage, framing a hand-picked "cast" of 
locals as they listen to a live performance by the Choral do Amazonas. By contrast to these 
contemporaries, Dean's use of editing is cinematic, but is not used to tell a story in the 
conventional sense. Through the editing, Disappearance at Sea, moves out of the Warholian 
condition of being a moving painting, and addresses the filmic condition of the hors-champ, not 
as a space that is missing from the image, but as a space brought into play by the screenal. 
interconnectivity of the viewer's internal montage process. Interestingly, Lutticken goes on to 
distinguish Barthes'use of stills, which generate motion in the mind of Barthes as viewer, from 
the contemporary use of the static image which he sees as pushing the time-image 'to such a 
degree that it turns into its opposite -a timeless image' (Luttichen, 2001: 19). 
29 Seymour Chatman in 'What Novels Can Do That Films Can't (and Vice Versa)' observes that 
description in literature interrupts and freezes story time, whereas in film, while the presentation 
of descriptive details are in excess of verbal description, the pressure of narrative flow and 
temporality doesn't allow us time to dwell on these details. 
interestingly, this reference to Barthes in Perez' The Al aterial Ghost: Films and their Alledium 
occurs when Perez is discussing both Rossellini and Antonioni. 
31 Barthes describes film's continuous voracity, which doesn't allow the spectator time to add to 
the image (Barthes, 2000,55). See Laura Mulvey's 'Death 24 times a second: the tension between 
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movement and stillness in the cinema', COIL. no. 9/10,200 1. unpaginated and Raymond Bellour's 'The Film Stilled', Catnera Obscura, no. 24,1990, pp. 98-123 for further discussion of the issue of mobilitý, and immobility in relation to film. 32 Note that Lacan's concept of the gaze was greatly influenced by Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasmatic relation of visibility and invisibility in The Fisible and the invisible. See Martin Jay, Doit, ncasl Eýves, - The Denigration of* Iision in Twentieth-Centuýv French Thought, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 357-400. 33 This phrase, 'the movements of the life world'is perhaps problematic, although it signifies what I am trN, ing to get at. Initially, I invented the phrase by adapting Paul Ricoeur's notion that 
everv narrating is narrating something, yet something which itself is not a 
narrative ... what is narrated and is not narrative is not itself given in flesh and blood in the narrative, but simply "rendered and restored"... what is narrated is 
essentially the "temporality of life" (Ricoeur, 1985: 78). 
However. at the end of writing my thesis, I read Jean-Luc Nancy's The Evidence ofFilm: Abbas Kiarostami. where he discusses the relation of life and death in the director's work: 
Death is neither the opposite of life nor the passage into another life: it is itself 
the blind spot that opens up the looking, and it is such a way of looking that films life 
... a way of looking through which we have to look but that is not to be 
seen itself, that is not of this order (Nancy, 2001,18). 
The notion of the blind spot here can be related to Barthes'punctum, the difference being that in 
NancN'. the look that is given in film is the realization of the world in the process/motion of its being made real, sentiments that resonate with my argument. 
The e0dence of cinema is that of the existence of a look through which a world 
can give back to itself its own real ... a world moving of its own motion, without heaven or a wrapping, without fixed moorings or suspension, a world shaken, 
trembling, as the winds blow through it (Nancy, 2001: 44). 
34 For a concise account of the debates around 'experience' in feminist film theory, see Janet 
Bergstrom and Mary Ann Doane, 'The Female Spectator: Contexts and Directions', Camera 
Obscura, no. s 20 &21, May-September., 1989, p. 10. Also see de Lauretis' chapter 'Semiotics and 
Experience' in, 4 lice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema, (Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan Press: 1984). 
35 I've already cited Judith Williamson's critique of Mulvey's Riddles of the Sphinx. Jacqueline 
Rose also critiques Mulvey's mapping of alternative content onto the imaginary. 'By defining 
feminine specificity in reference to preoedipality, the imaginary, and as outside the terms of 
representation... "Film process is then conceived as something archaic, a lost or repressed 
content ... terms to which the 
feminine can so easily be assimilated"' (Rose in Rodowick, 1994: 
268). 
36 In her account of von Sternberg's cinematic procedures, Mulvey inadvertently hints at a more 
positive outlook on the suspension of narrative, although for her this is still couched in the 
negative terms of the fetishistic image of woman. For Mulvey, Sternberg's assertion that 'he 
would welcome his films being projected upside down so that story and character involvement 
would not interfere with the spectator's undiluted appreciation of the screen image' is ingenuous 
in the sense that 'his films do demand that the figure of the woman ... should 
be identifiable' 
(Mulvey, 1975: 14). However, her account of the flattening of space in his films points to a 
possible disengagement from the body, female, that bears the image. She says: 'Sternberg plays 
down the illusion of screen depth; his screen tends to be one-dimensional, as light and shade, 
lace, steam, foliage, net, streamers, etc., reduce the visual field' (Mulvey, 1975: 14). Following 
Mulvey's essay, Mary Ann Doane would later develop the notion that the paraphernalia of 
femininity provide the means of displacement by which the female spectator can positively 
identify with the image in her theorization of the masquerade (Doane, (1982)). My interest here is 
in the notion that 'paraphernalia' can take on the function of screenal protagonists that disengage 
the spectator from narrative as plot for the purpose of an 'undiluted appreciation of the screen 
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image'. These other screenal protagonists can be stylistic, e. g. flatness, as well as objects. As 
Stanley Cavcll says, the photographic medium of filin does not ontologically favour human 
beings over the rest of nature (Cavell, 1979: 36). At a post-screening talk at the National Film 
Theatre. London, 15 March 200 1, director Bela Tarr insisted that, while his films do follow 
human existential dilemmas, the rain and the animals have their own stories, stories that are more 
important than so-called human stories. He mentioned scenery, the weather, and time as being 
other protagonists in his films and that locations have their own faces (my lecture notes). These 
attributions resonate with how objects and sites convey an affectual sensibility in both 
Disappearance at Sea and News From Home. 
It is no coincidence that de Lauretis footnotes Stephen Heath's Questions of Cinema in 
reference to 'impossibilities', a reference which will impact more emphatically on my thesis in 
chapter 4 when I deal with his analysis of Akerman's News From Home. 
3' De Lauretis is referring here to Kristeva's essay, 'Women's Time', in A Kristeva Reader, Toril 
Moi (ed), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 187-213. In'Women's Time', 
Kristeva categorizes the three temporalities of feminism. One being cyclical time, the other, the 
logical time of patriarchal law. and, in a third phase, a combination of these temporalities which 
produces the possibility for women to create a new signifying space. This possibility is the 'not 
yet' that de Lauretis refers to. It is linked to the ftiture. The problems of this kind of ftiturity will 
be addressed later in this thesis. 
39D. N. RodoAick refers to Kristeva: 
In Kristeva. the irruption of poetic excess in the modernist text involves an 
effect of jouissance that is feminine and a logic that is necessarily opposed to 
the repression and continuity endemic to patriarchy, splitting its forms of 
subjectivity - "For feminists this split, the possibility of foregrounding the 
signifier, has a triple attraction: aesthetic fascination with discontinuities; 
pleasure from disrupting the traditional unity of the sign-, and theoretical 
advance from investigating language and the production of meaning" 
(Rodowick, 1984: 228-9 - emphasis mine). (He is citing Laura Mulvey's essay 
'Feminism., Film and the Avant-Garde'. ) 
40 Wilson is not wrong in her reading of Kristeva. In fact, Kristeva's essay on cinema, 'Ellipsis on 
Dread and the Specular Seduction', makes this equation of the serniotic with the chromatic in film 
even more emphatic. However, there is a moment in Kristeva's 'Giotto's Joy', (the essay Wilson 
cites), where, rather than blueness leading us 'back to the stage before the identification with 
objects and individuation' (Wilson, 1998: 349), the arrangement of its chromatic hues is 
symptomatic of a socialized spatial relation far removed from a regression to pre-oedipal fusion. 
Kristeva's unresolved juggling of the pre-oedipal and the social points to the contradictions in her 
work that Jones and Rodowick identify. 
41 Pier Paolo Pasolini also refers to the 'other film' in his essay 'The Cinema of Poetry', in Bill 
Nichols (ed), Movies and Methods, vol. 11, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 
530-558. However, for Pasolim. this other film is related to a kind of subterranean, primordial 
unconscious, his version of the unconscious of film being a return to its 
'original oneiric, barbaric, 
irregular, aggressive, visionary qualities' (Pasolini, 1985: 552). 
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Chapter Three 
FROM STASIS TO MOVEMENT: FILM ENCOUNTER NO. I 
It was a bright September afternoon in 1997.1 left the sunlit city streets and 
wandered into the basement of the Frith Street Gallery, London, where I was taken 
captive by the film being screened there. It was Tacita, Dean's Disappearance at Sea 
(1996). While watching it, I kept on telling myself that I should have found it boring. 
After all, there was very little happening, the film being mainly comprised of static 
camera shots of a lighthouse lamp revolving on its axis, as dusk becomes night. On one 
level, I did find it boring, but at the same time, its lack of stimuli was paradoXically 
engrossing., the continuous revolving of the lighthouse lamp, hypnotic. Two things 
sinlUltaneouslv struck me. On the one hand, the film seemed to be a comment on the 
cinematic apparatus itself, its illusory manufacture laid bare by the exposure of the 
projector and by the exposure of the screen when the image momentarily disappears. 
Not to mention the fact that the image itself of the lighthouse lamp was a mirror of what 
cinematic illusions are made of - light and motion. This excited me because, as I've 
already explained in my introduction, I was always on the look out for artist's film works 
that appeared to counter the narcissistic pleasures and soldering associated with 
cinematic illusion. I was primed to look out for moments where that suturing process 
came undone and the negativity of the subject would be laid bare, this zero point 
offering the promise of an identity freed of ideological constraints. 
On the other hand, an association incompatible with the position of critical 
spectator loomed up before me. This 'empty' film, (I'm using empty here to mean 
without obvious characterological identifications), resonated with a narrative fragment 
of my personal history. Once upon a time, a particular lighthouse set on the end of a 
headland where I used to walk had fascinated me. This headland was particularly 
exposed to the elements. Walking on it, you couldn't speak to anyone because of the 
unmerciful wind, so you ended up listening to its whirring through the electric pylons, 
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an eerie sound that seemed like an extra-planetarý communication. I only ever saw this 
lighthouse close-up during the day. Driving at night, from a distant vantage on the 
surrounding roads, I N,, ý, ould see its rays of light beam out across the ocean. However, I 
had some companions who went to the lighthouse at night, as they knew the lighthouse 
keeper. I was never invited to go there with them. It was too risky they said. They spoke 
of climbing up onto the lighthouse tower and of the sense they had of hanging suspended 
on the edge of the world, of losing themselves in limitless vastness. I was envious, yet 
also I was suspicious of the desire to seek out such earth-defying experiences. There 
seemed to me to be a denial of the mundane in such excessive desires. 
However, as my engagement with Disappearance at Sea intensified, these 
associations began to slip away and were taken on lines of thought far removed from my 
autobiography. The processual power of the film's images, the final sequence in 
particular, moved me far from the critical spectator called for in radical film practice and 
psychoanalytic film theory and from the clich6 of Proustian revelation and the 
correspondence between a present image and a past memory fragment. Although it has 
to be said that traces of the autobiographical fragment, the questions it raises of distance 
and proximity in relation to experience, do impinge on the transportation generated by 
the film. This film moved me, both literally and affectedly. I was moved by its 
blankness. When the screen goes blank in the final cut, this momentary suspension of 
film time engendered an unhinging of temporality unprepared for by the endurance of 
waiting through the two-minute duration of previous shots. However, the disarray 
engendered by the unhinging of temporality in this momentary suspension of film time 
was formally re-negotiated by the appearance of the light beam that gently punctuated 
the surface of the darkness enfolding me in its rhythmical motion. I was transported 
from the past and from the lighthouse as representative of the boundary between earth 
and oceanic excess. I was equally transported from the stasis of negativity and 
distanciation. I found myself in another relation of proximity to an image, one that does 
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not rely on the binary logic of presence/absence, narrative/suspension, but one in which I 
was moving in a sequence of intimate displacements. What was happening? 
Gilles Deleuze in Proust and Signs puts a different gloss on Proustian 
revelation. Deleuze insists that the Combray, (Proust's childhood home), which appears 
to the narrator when he tastes a madeleine cake in the present is not siMply Combray as 
it was experienced in the past, but Combray in a forrn in which it was never experienced 
that 'breaks with the subjective chain' of association (Deleuze, 2000: 154). What is 
recovered is not a lost time or an experience of plentitude but rather -a kind of self 
displacement moving in, what Deleuze calls, 'the empty forin of time', which is time as 
open contmuity as opposed to abstract chronology. For Deleuze, this memory was a new 
sign erupting into the present, a synthesis of the past and its virtual future- 'The signs of 
art ... give us a time regained, an original absolute time that includes all the others' 
(Deleuze, 2000: 24). Signs for Deleuze have two halves. One is their objective side, the 
side of recognition. In recognizing the sign we miss its significance, the way it signifies 
something other than the object we identify. We use recognition, memory and 
association to cover over the violence of the sign, the fact that it might put a force or 
pressure on us to think something new rather than resuscitate some tired or comfortable 
old formulation. This is 
the natural direction of perception or representation. But it is also the 
direction of voluntary memory, which recalls things and not signs. It is, 
further, the direction of pleasure and of practical activity, which count 
on the possession of things or on the consumption of objects. And in 
another way, it is the tendency of intelligence. The intelligence tends 
toward objectivity, as perception toward the object (Deleuze, 2000: 29). 
Deleuze is interested in going beyond these subject/object scenarios, where the object is 
reduced to the level of association rather than being engaged with in 
its impetus to open 
onto a subjectless sensuousness. 
Deleuze's attempt to think beyond the comforts of recognition, while still 
retaining a link to the image, inspires my attempt to theorize 
the encounter with 
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Disappearance at Sea outside of the mutually exclusive paradigms of distanciation 
(narrative blockage/rupture) and recognition (narrative continuity as illusion). However, 
the question remains as to the stakes involved in this liberation beyond recognition. How 
different is it from Slavqj Zizek's 'subýjective destitution, which is also a liberation from 
the fonns of identity? How is this opening, what Deleuze calls the violent side of the 
sign, different from rupture and the formal stasis it instills on narrative? These are some 
of the questions that are obliquely posed as I proceed through the following 'montage 
text' and which will be elaborated on in the following chapters. The disjunctive 
processuality of the other 'maintenance of time' that occurs in the dynamic of the space 
of viewing, is what I shall demonstrate in the following 'montage text'. ' I shall attempt to 
find a form of narration structured by iMages and according to a process of additiVe and 
subtractive continuity, as opposed to the goal oriented forin of literary classical narrative 
which filin is measured against. 
11 borrow the term 'processuality' from Barbara Kennedy who in her PhD thesis, Towards an 
aesthetics of sensation: A reconsideration of film theory through Deleuzian Philosophy and 
Post- 
Feminism, Staffordshire University, Nov 2000. puts forward the triad, processuality, force, and 
intensity, as being descriptive of what a text does rather than what is might mean (Kennedy, 
2000: 2). The notion of narration as a form of maintenance, I borrow from P. A. Sitney's 
discussion of Maurice Blanchot's fictional writing in his Allodernist A Jontage: The 
Obscurity of 
Vision In Cinema and Literature. Commenting on Blanchot's sentence 'Now, the end' in one of 
his recits, Sitney traces the etymology of the common French word of 
"now". maintenant. He 
comes up with the useful notion, for my purposes, that 
"now" derives from the idea of holding 
something in hand as well as being enjoined with the notion of a moment-to-moment process of 
writing (Sitney, 1990: 105-6). 
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3.2 MONTAGE TEXT NO. 1: NARRATIVE DURATION IN I)ISAPPEARANCE 
A TSEA 
SHOT ONE a close-up of the interior of the revolving lamp of the lighthouse 
at evening. Land and sky are interchanged in the process, the 
land rotating at the top of the lens, the sky at the bottom. 
The camera is still. Its gaze fixed. The movement of the lighthouse lamp breaking the 
stillness, its movement doubled by the constant rotation of the two revolving bulbs, 
Main and Standby, Recorded light in motion, pr jected as a light in motion image, of I1 01 
light in motion. Expanded reflexivity 
The projector stands exposed facing the screen in the space. Celluloid chums noisily 
through its spools. Light emitting instrument illumines an image of light, an emanation 
bounded by the frame of the screen. A space cut out against an expanse of blackness, 
pierced by the light of the projector, but illuminating an off-screen geography... 
Upon the screen's surface, an unseeing view is inscribed. The image de-frames the 
projection of light in motion, fracturing it into interconnected crescent shaped segments. 
Neither window, frame, nor mirror, the cut out flatness of the screen's rectangle echoes 
the flatness of an image whose emanation revolves back upon itself Yet between the 
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intervallic dela. v of these enfolding, refracting, crescents of light, another space is 
generated... 
In this intervallic space, a ditkrence circulates. Is this di rence, the dif N krence between 
a material reality and afictitious one? An exposure ofthe discontinuities 
between the place ql'the spectator and the technical apparatus that projects and 
contains the scene? A separation ofspectator and image that echoes the 
material separation between individualfilmftames that when projected. flow as one 
continuous unit on the screen? Is this shot an exposure qf the component parts 
qffilm that mainstream cinematic experience usually overrides infavour of the narrative 
continnio, between here and there? 
Where am I in relation to this image projection? Do I take a correct critical distance 
firom the vision in this image, a vision without perspective, close-zip and 
unseeing, a blind mechanical recording and transmission, a kino-eye? Or do I deny my 
inability to see such sights and. forget that I am looking at an image brought to 
me from a place I can never go? Do Igo there in cybernetic union with this mechanical 
eye? Am I disturbed by the gap between theflatness of the screened image, the 
mechanical rotating light bulbs that do not see me, and the sense I have of the image as 
being the terminus qf my vision and therqfore having a modicum qf depth? 
Do I lose the composure of my spatial coordinates and become unseated by the 
resistance to fiantasy projections thatfore-grounding the cinematic apparatus 
engenders? Ifso, then what is the appeal of this image that reflects on the conditions of 
the viewing apparatus? 
For I am chained, captured and captivated by this image, just as Jean-Louis Baudry 
predicted, except that he thought that seeing the mechanics of vision laid bare 
would cure me qfspecular attachment. And it is true that myfailed attempt to align the 
disorienting reversals of'sky and earth in this image with my (narcissistic) 
bodily co-ordinates isfirustrating. Yes, my tranquility is disturbed, my bodily symmetry 
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collapsing, bitt not so that I conld or woidd nirn awayftom the image. Inslead, I 
1611o", the internal cuttings ofthe image, the patterns ofthe prism moving across the 
screenftom right to left, unIblding repetitively, seeming to progress, yet 
simultaneously, refilling the parameters ofthis exchange so that the space between one 
JbId and another is almost imperceptible. A repetition without traces. 
In this horizontal exchange one, ffirrow seems to disappear into the next, creating the 
appearance ol'an all-over surIbce, aflat suýtbcefiull ofactivity supercession, 
. 
1racting. Strips qfInminosity precession, nn1blding, swallowing, swelling, contracting, re 
and darkness are vertically exchanged in this prism, fialling between the 
parameters qfliquidflow. Between the light cadences that rain down through the image 
and those that spreadporously across it, an intervallicspace opens up. 
Not the abyss of emptiness, but aspacing that links me to the stop1start rhythm ofits 
continuous commotion. 
CUT 
SHOTIVO a view with the lighthouse prism to the left of the scene 
overlooking the headland below and the sun setting on the 
horizon beyond. 
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At last a view before which I can locate my body in space. To the left, the lighthouse 
lamp continues to rotate. The camera remains fixed. I still stare captivated, but the 
sunrays that cut across the image make me blink. Their radiance and the clear view of 
the horizon, relieve the intensive machinations of the previous scene, breaking the hold 
of its hy ic all I . pnoti -over surface. 
My location is affirmed by the parameters of the view 
presented for my contemplation. A sublime view in fact. A reddened sky bounded by a 
darkening honzon line that sets a limit to the vast beyond it intimates. This line gives me 
a position from which to orient myself in relation to the infinite celestial body of the 
sunset whose intense colour belies its vaporous transparency, A transparency as 
mimaterial as projected film, but the materiality of the medium is not in question here. 
Rather there arises a sense of desire and longing in a space carved out for such effects. 
I remember a lighthouse firom the past. Not that it comes to me as an image. No image, 
but the one infiront of me. The lighthousefrom the past is a notion. What this notion 
brings to me now is afeeling that ifl look at this image for long enough I might see 
something that was hiddenftom me then. The image as evidence qf an intangible 
quality, as revelatory qf some mysteriousness facet of myseýf, a blind spot that remains 
unknown to me and around which all images circulate. Sublime indeed An image that 
might recover this lost body of the past 
The view lingers. The parameters of its sublime proportions begin to shift. 
Sunsets are 
picture-postcards. The sun sets everyday. It happens whether 
I am there to watch it or 
not, When I watch a sunset, it seems like a special event, although 
it's one I encounter by 
chance, not one that I mark off on my calendar. 
The film image of a sunset is a special 
event. It is a singular sunset. It happened 
like that. The 'it has been' of this sunset 
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reawakens a longing in me to see a sign appear in the transparency of the sky that would 
break its the unfathomable space of emptiness, the vacuous air with which it surrounds 
the earth. This longing stems from a desire to escape the confines of a body pinioned to 
a gaze that reftises to illuminate its inner core. An inner dark point, which haunts a body 
that, otherwise, relates to images as if they belong to it in the field of perception. 
Bounded within the, frame, the screen acts as a container that sets definite parameters to 
the boundless. A beautiful image as a barrier to some rupture beyond theframe, 
an unthinkable of 'screen. The beautiful image is tinged with terror. The solace it brings 
is always marked with the sign qf its demise, as if it might dissolve into some 
unthinkable beyond where darkness would not relate to light, but exists as a pure 
vacuum. A black hole. An attraction to this blankplace ofsuspension enters into 
the space mapped by a horizon between here and there. A desire to leave the location 
of light and day and move towards pure darkness, the boundlessness intimated 
by the horizon. This is the desire that took them to the lighthouse by night. The 
lighthouse, a solitary towerjutting up on the headland, marking the boundary 
between land and sea, between here and there, allowing them to remain attached to the 
land while they dipped theirfeet in the unfathomable. As they hung off the edge 
of the world, they laughed the heady laugh qf the mad 
But machinic workings refuse to provide the ground that allows armoured 
bodies to taste infinityftom within the boundaries (? fform. Machinic workings have no 
horizon between here and there. They are relational, repetitious, and take place 
in the here and now. 
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CUT 
SHOT THREE another close-up view of the Interior of lighthouse lamp. 
Nightfall encroaches 
Eyes wide open, somnambulant, I 
Film time has leaped over clock time and night has fallen. Distinctions between earth 
and sky are less discernible. The lines of cominunication are shifting from dual 
vertical/horizontal refraction to an emphasis on the horizontal. Striated reflections of 
light and dark fall in and out of the circular furrows of the lamp (sur)face. They form, 
deforin, reforin, across the screen. Set in the glass prism's interior, the two glass bulbs 
rotate around each other, their transparency trapping and unleashing the refracted 
cadences of light that pass through them. Main and Standby display a translucent 
faciality minus the settings of features. Fixed to a base, yet completely open to change. 
Devoid of psychological expression, their interiors expose the array of mechanical 
fittings and fixtures and nocturnal refractions that pass through them. 
Does that mean they are expressionless? Is expression dependent on the articulation of 
ftatures? "at could be expressed in the anemic, face? The gaze ofa stranger or a 
Deleuzian cinema where paralysis unleashes the vitality qf time? 
III 
The riveted circular shards of glass made liquid by motion and projection break up the 
frontality of the screen making space deviate into a series of lights and darks that slide, 
one to the other, in constant communication. Refractions loosened from and by this 
reflective accordion superimpose themselves in a shadow play that conjures rainbow 
colours and circular rhythms that exceed the screen's rectangularity. Outside this 
regularity but populating it from within its surface density. Intense receptive surface 
effects, my bodily co-ordinates are being distributed across this surface density 
becoming emptied ftom inside out. 
No longer a body pinioned in firont ofa view and surrounded by space, is this 
emptying a revelation of my internal blindspot, the point at which I am viewed? In being 
a body stretched outflat between a light source and an unseeing view that 
erodes the space offantasy projection, am I merely a rqfl. exive emptiness mirroring the 
close-tip's dissolution of the frame of containment and the mark- ofa horizon? 
The screen is no longer a container, but a rq/racting device infected by the liquidfluidity 
of an of . 
f-screen without measure. In this deregulated illumination I cannot 
maintain a perspective on the image. I cannot view the skin stretchedflat because I am 
embedded in theflatness of the image's motion, not outside it viewing it with the 
gaze of estrangement. Does this turning of the internal to the suýface mean that, 
y 
. 
Tects of although I am not outside the image, I am still simply a product of the ef 
the image production blindlyfollowing another set ofdictates? Do I merely repeat what 
is performed before me? Does the passivity of receptivity mean that I have no 
agency in relation to an image that has no depth, yet continues to entrap me? Am I at the 
mercy of its eddy andflow, the stoplstart of its continuous commotion? This 
immersion in the micro-movements of the image that casts no shadow is more terrifying 
than the view that suspends the body's agitation above the unfathomable depths 
ofsublime proportion. 
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CUT 
SHOTFOUR Again, the sunset, This time more of the lighthouse lamp Is 
included in the shot on the left side, The sky Is redder and 
darker than the previous sunset scene, Gull cry overrides the 
noise of the film churning through in the projector. 
The horizon is being swallowed by the swift onset ofdarkness. A dark gap begins to 
yawn open. I cling to the disappeari . ng streaks of burnished golden light that 
tinge the top edge of the image. The encroaching darkness exposes the architectural 
structure of the lighthouse lamp. Bluish streams of light are emittedftom its 
pri . sm, cutting across the screen, emissaries of an artificial lighting that scintillates the 
blackness. Its bulbous body stolidly retains its lattice like structural identity, 
impervious to the disruptive effects of these intermittent light rays. This body is vigilant, 
keeping watch over the unfathomable immensity beyond its location. 
It is, afier all, a machine, its perpetual motion the result ofelectrification. Its inner 
chamber grinds away relentlessly. Its, function as a navigation point depends on 
its automatism. While the electrical. 1blds of its inner prism, gain in intensity, the scene 
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belbre me is dying, Not being an antomajon, I am losing my way in the image, 
losing the view, which allows me to intimate the infinite. Immensity is being prQlected 
bock on me. Ally body is becoming a host tosome, tbreign invasion. 
But the sound ol'giills crying, a densely populated community, suggests other means of 
navigation, the dip and eddy qfflight rather than the stasis ofthe watchtower. 
CUT 
SHOT FIVE close-up of headland with the light searching the rocks. Gull cry 
increases. 
Light beams are now being thrown out on the suýface of the image as ýfthey stem, from 
my residence. They punctuate the scene in pulsating staccato intervals like a 
heartbeat. They pick up details of the rock. /ace, lose them, moving on to the next detail. 
A (sur)face broken into fi-agments. Groping betweenflashes, I manage not to 
crash into the rocks that protrudeftom theflattened suýface of this ill-defined terrain. 
Propelled by thisfibreign light source across the amorphous greyness, I have the 
sensation qfteetering on the brink qfan overwhelming proximity to something 
groundless. Beams qflight pierce the interstices of the darkness that enguýlý me, 
casting me in. fbrmless, vhapes whose only outline is the layers qfgull-cry that 
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accompany thisftee-lbll into onferspace Is this what happens when you get lost 
in the cavernous depths qfthe imagination? 
When yoit reach the other side qfa tbrtress identity, yon become an entity that 
floats withont definition, beating an automatic pnIse that carries You on its wavelengths, 
a body withont wi/l, antomaton. 
CUT 
SHOT SIX - back to the lighthouse lamp, This time the camera looks Into the 
bulbs from the lattice structure facing the exterior of the lamp's 
surface. Nightfall. 
Is this grey and indigo and black and brown andyellow and white? Am I here and there 
and in between, everywhere and nowhere? Where am I? Positioned in 
unbearable proximity to this non-seeing apparatus, I receive neither an image that 
reflects me nor a screen that mediates my gaze. from the impossible and 
unbearable abyss of the sublime. Yes, the image is unbearable in the sense that it refuses 
my narci . ssistic co-ordinates, but I have given these up. Gladly. This image in 
which I am caught is almost. /eatureless. It underwrites identity by continuall refracting yý 
andproducing an intangible horizontal space that continuously wraps itseýf 
around itseýf and on to infinity. It reflects nothing but it moves me. It captures me in its 
shimmering, folds, the lamp's rotating axis slicing light into crescent moons that 
supercede, displace, replace the next one, the _Ibrmer 
one, a motion in which I am 
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devolved into a series ofwavebands that exceed thefield ofthe screen. 
Space is collapsed into movement, a movement that doesn't extend in space but rýfracts 
in time. This retýaction in time is akin to the serialization ofthe seýf that Gilles 
Deleuze puts. forward as a model of subjectivity. It is also akin to the shi firom the ft 
movement-image to the time-image that he writes about in the cinema books, 
wherefilm images no longer extend in space, but u),? 1bld in time to infinity. Continually 
peýtbrming exchanges between appearances and disappearances rather than 
engagi . ng in the relative stabilioý ql'one-to-one correspondences between absence and 
presence. These exchanges are vertiginous, continually unfolding in an infinite 
reftaction of movement. Have I replaced one sublime infinitefor another? Have I 
replaced the immensity I master by my power to build myseýf into an 
I. mpenetrable. fortress by the immensity which sends me spinning into never-ending 
firee-fall, the danse macabre qfMain and Standb ? Is there any end to this y 
undif 
. 
ferentiated space where shades of light and dark. flicker and slide from one side to 
the other in constant oscillation? Is there any choice between these two 
modes ofgroundlessless? 
CUT 
SHOT SEVEN the screen goes blank, the light from the projector exposes an 
absence of image. After a few seconds, a faint searchlight 
beams across the screen at regular intervals reforming a horizon 
of sorts. From left to right, as it passes across screen, it lights up 
cloud fronds. A seagull flies past the right-hand comer of the 
image, an almost imperceptible quiver. 
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Jump cut Abrupt disappearance of the image. 
Momentary arrest Suspension qffilm time, oj'reverie. 
A pause, an interval, that sends the after effects of light slices scurrying to the sidelines 
and exposes before me a screen bereft of anything but the faint light of the projector. 
Vertiginous extension into infinite refractory space is briefly halted No longer dizzy or 
armoured in the. /ace of dissolution, I duly perceive the banality ofa surface deposed of 
interiorfantasies. Is this a termination point? The poise of emptiness, inner core 
exposed? Is my perspective on this scene the point-of-view of the gaze ofa stranger? The 
materiality of the film scene and my mirroring subjectivity lay bare. Bereft of dizzying 
intensities or sublime terror, I crash. 
Into what? 
Blankness? 
But there is still something going on. Light from the projector still motivates, however 
dully, the surface of the screen. No images rise up to cover this surface activated by the 
barely illuminating light of the projector. This factious illumination pulsates regardless 
of the disappearance of the image. The negative duration of machinic light intersects 
With my passage through time. This light does not carry me away on the waves of 
electricity's force field. I am here linked with it moving through time, a diegetic time 
where distinctions between real and fictional merge into one dis/continuity. Blankness is 
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content as I move through it beating a pulse that is uniquely my own in relation to its 
invisible vibration. Absence of content does not mean passive gazing at empty forrn, but 
negotiation o the continuous pulsation of a He In relation to the empti,, ' form of time. 
Not only does this film moment tell me this, but iI ith II it recovers an image wi which to think 
through the sensation of finding myself linked to the dynamism of a blankness with 
finitude written into it. 
The screen darkens. Black becomes a colour qfter the semi-darkness (? f the 
blank screen. A . 
/aint beam of light cuts across the top haýf of the screen, redefining a 
horizon of sorts. I am both. following its motion across the blackness of the 
screen, fialling between the intervals qflight, and, remaining still as it punctuates the 
night sky. A facilityfor still moving, two positions condensed into one. The body 
re-finds it's outline as a thread that loops across shifting boundaries that are themselves 
reconfigured in the process, rather than being stolid markers between here and 
there. The connections interwoven between things are no longer set in geometric space 
or obliterated by temporalflow, but undulate in the intervals that resound like 
thefaint beam ofa searchlight invisible to the naked eye. Or like the din ofgulls cawing, 
a sound that articulates an unheard but constant sonority, invisible to the naked 
ear. A pulsing calm. Strips of light pattern the surface like afan, one beam 
disappearing, another appears, re-making the field of vision as a space where 
remoteness is at a hand's throwfrom aface. Runningfrom the danger of 
horizonlessness, she re-found spatial co-ordinates grounded in a poetics qf a 
light-imaged temporality. It reverberated in a series ofstaccato-like impulses beating 
across her sockets. Raising her hand to her (sur)face, she could touch the 
fronds-like edges of clouds, trail along the wings qf a gull, play the keys of the night 
along her cheekbones. She was elastic yet rooted to the spot. Perched, alert and 
waiting, for nothing, the bifurcating movements of the moment rising and. 
/alling in 
continuous discontinuity. 
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31. 3.3 FROM'SUBJECTIVE DESTITUTION'TODISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS 
The structure of the preceding 'montage text' is in part determined by the 
shot pattern of Disappearance at Sea, by the way the film cuts between positing a view, 
the shots of the sunset and the horizon, and its gradual dissolution in the close-ups of the 
lighthouse lamp. These two scenarios engender an oscillatory position for the spectator 
where she moves between a scene of dissolute scattering and a scene in which she 
confronts a limit to the threat of dissolution, i. e. the horizon-line. In this commentary, 
these two 'subliMe' positionalities shall be evaluated in terms of Gilles Deleuze's and 
Slavoj Zizek's philosophies, references to whom occurred obliquely in the 'montage 
text'. Following the procedure in the 'montage text', where Zizek's notion of 'subjective 
destitution' was displaced by Deleuze's continuous serialization of the self, in the 
elaboration of their philosophies here, a similar displacement of the one for the other 
will also be performed. Part of this displacement in turn loops back on the encounter in 
chapter two with Zizek's notion of a static emptiness, which I am claiming the encounter 
with absence in Disappearance at Sea debunks. However, my attempt to elaborate the 
encounter with the film engenders a growing disenchantment with Deleuze, which was 
obliquely voiced in the 'montage text'. I will elaborate here on my problems with 
Deletize's, albeit inspiring, ideas in preparation for the necessity in chapter four of a 
hybridization of Deleuze with aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology C7-'' 
My aim in this chapter is to develop my claim that the moving sensation 
that Disappearance at Sea unfolds in its ostensibly most disjunctive moment, i. e. the cut 
to the blank screen, is outside the economy of oscillation between 'narrative' stoppage, 
stasis, and interminable narration, flow. This moment generated or revealed another 
kind 
of motion where stoppage and flow are con/fused rather than clearly defined positions. 
Rather than disjunction for its own sake and absolutely, this other motility of the (blank) 
image has, I maintain, another kind of narrational continuity, which displaces the 
vantage points of either identity or non-identity, narrative/non-narrative. 
The motility 
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engendered bv this filmic moment tells me that there is another modality of relation 
available when identity/identification is dissolved or suspended. It presents something 
other than the non-relation of an infinite scattering or the non-relation of the stilled 
perspective of 'the gaze of the stranger', the former, the result of an absolute dissolution 
of limits, (which I shall find in Deleuze), the latter, the result of an encounter with the 
limit of the subject. So far, most of my critical attention has been on the latter mode of 
non-relation, as evinced by Zizek's 'subjective destitution'. I shall now turn my attention 
to the notion of mobile scattering and to Deleuze. However, extending my discussion in 
chapter one where I critiqued the binary choice of either narrative or non- 
narrative/rupture. I shall here question whether the sensation of infinite scattering is 
merely narrative's chaotic underbelly and thereby bound to that binary rather than 
offering a position outside of it. The final moment In Disappearance at Sea seemed to 
offer a positionality not bound by this binary. I shall return to the feminist stakes 
involved in seeking this other position, which, as I have already said, I shall not couch in 
terms of gender per se. My aim is to divorce the binary of narrative structure versus 
chaotic rupture, articulations, which are underpinned in (film) narratology by the 
positions of masculinity and femininity. ' This divorce might free the feminine from its 
associations with rupture and non-meaning and offer another mode of relation to an 
image of blankness. 
The first stage in achieving this goal is to look at the possibility for a mode of 
relation other than the one of self-reflection in 1970s radical 
film theory and in Zizek's 
approach. Gilles Deleuze also discusses the notion of 
being submitted to the image in his 
books on cinema, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image. 
However, his notion of submission does not place the viewer in a mirror relation 
to the 
image, but in a relation of reversibility where the viewer, immersed in 
the image, is 
subjected to the revolving axis of what 
Deleuze, influenced by Henri Bergson's 
philosophy, calls the actual and the virtual. 
This axis is sometimes defined by Deleuze in 
rather commonsensical. terms, e. g. 
'[e]very moment of our life presents two aspects, it is 
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actual and virtual, perception on one side, recollection on the other' (Bergson in Deleuze, 
1989: 79). However, the virtual is not to be equated with memory images, although It Is 
a confusing concept as Deleuze refers to it in at least two ways. On the one hand, he 
talks about the virtual image in the pure state which has no need of becoming actual, but 
which corresponds to the actual image by a process of duplication as if in a mirror. 
[T]he virtual image in the pure state is defined, not in accordance with a 
new present in relation to which it would be (relatively) past, but in 
accordance with the actual present ol'which it is the past, absolutely and 
simultaneously: although it is specific it is none the less part of 'the past 
in general', in the sense that it has not yet received a date. As pure 
virtuality it does not have to be actualized, since it is strictly correlative 
with the actual image with which it fonns the smallest circuit which 
serves as base or point for all the others (Deleuze: 1989: 79-80). 
On the other hand, he describes the circuit of exchange between the virtual and the 
actual, which results m the becorning actual of the virtual. 
When the virtual Image becomes actual, it is then visible and limpid, as 
in the mirror or the solidity of finished crystal. But the actual image 
becomes virtual in its turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and 
shadowy, like a crystal barely dislodged from the earth (Deleuze, 1989: 
70). 
What is the ment of this approach in tenns of what I have discussed so far? 
In chapter two, Peter Gidal referred to 'the other film', determining that this 
other film needed to be released by means of foregrounding the materiality of the 
medium. This approach exaggerated a dichotomy between narrative and non-narrative, 
flow and cut. Taking the first of Deleuze's formulations of the virtual, 'the other fih-n' 
would always be in a relation to the flow of images rather than requiring their 
suspension in order to come into being. The materialist avant-garde ur-ground of the 
medium would instead be a non-ground, with which images form in synchrony without 
being a translation of it due to the force of its all-encompassing nowhereness. 
Re- 
phrasing this in psychoanalytic tenninology, what is exposed 
in the cut s the lack of a 
ground, rather than the ground as lack. For Deleuze, the world 
before we exist is full of 
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virtual differences, some of which move towards actualization - the creation of beings. 
However, this process is not simpl,,,, goal-oriented, but is continually in motion. Human 
identities are not the end result of a process founded on lack, but are nodal points in a 
web of continuously bifurcating series of differences. Adapting this approach to 
narrative, rupture, and/or the foregrounding of the medium, could instead be seen as a 
momentary break that exposes the continual folding of the image in relation to its 
invisible substrate, i. e. pure virtuality, rather than revealing the empty, traumatic, ground 
of reflection. Taking the latter of Deleuze's formulations, the becoming actual of the 
virtual would mean that rupture loses its force as an absolute mark between signification 
and non-meaning, but is incorporated as part of the process of differentiating 
sedimentations that the pure virtual, the groundless ground of being, is capable of 
actualizing in any present moment. Between these two fortnulations, lies a capacity 
whereby new configurations of the spectator's relation to the image might come into 
being. 
It is this capacity that interests me and which seemed to unfold in the encounter 
with Disappearance at Sea. The actual-virtual circuit, which Deleuze refers to as a 
crystal-iniage, has two aspects to it. It is an 'internal limit of all the relative circuits, but 
also outer-most variable and reshapable envelope, at the edges of the world, beyond 
even moments of the world' (Deleuze, 19 8 9: 8 1). In this taxonomy, a cut to a blank 
screen can be re-conceived as a literal figuring of the interstitial unfolding of the visible 
and the invisible that occurs in each moment in time rather than being an index of the 
invisibility that haunts representation. This threshold, the interstice of the cut, rather 
than 
being seen as a moment of discontinuous disjunction, can be viewed as a moment that 
unleashes the continuity of non-chronological time relationships characteristic of 
life 
rather than narrative logic per se. 
' In this pause, space is flattened and so cannot be used 
to plot out the sequential relationships characteristic of narrative as a structure 
that is 
imposed on the flotsam and jetsam of everyday 
life. The point here is that the cut neither 
forms the end of one scene and the beginning of another, as in classical montage, nor 
the 
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gap characteristic of semiotic theories of non-narrative, which, in equating the image 
with an utterance, can only conceive of a cut as a break in narrative. In a Deleuzian 
taxonomy, 'the cut has become the interstice, it is irrational and does not form part of 
either set, one of which has no more an end than the other has a beginning' (Deleuze, 
1989: 181). 
This irrational cut is not divorced from continuity though. It reconciles 
continuitv with 'the sequence of irrational points, according to non-chronological time 
relationships' (Deleuze, 1989: 18 1). Montage then takes on a new sense. The interstice 
of the irrational cut presents us with the force of the body's passage through time as 
muneasurable entity, what Deleuze would call the empty fonn of time. (I'm thinking 
here of the body as a general corporeal aggregate of which the amalgamation of the film 
irnag, e and the spectator would be the actual distributions. ) The blank screen can be seen 
as actualizing a limit towards which the other shots are unfolding, i. e. the end of the 
filin, but, in presenting this limit, the image relation is not destroyed or suspended. It is 
revealed instead as a site of potential exchange between circuits of virtual and actual 
images, and circuits of the virtual and the pure virtual. Disappearance at Sea could be C) 
said to 'actualize' this exchange in the return of the light beam. The way it cuts the screen 
up into a series of black and white pennutations that continuously create shifting 
distinctions between the here and there, appearance and disappearance, seems to echo 
the continuity of the virtual revealed by the image of absence. In terms of a metaphorical 
reading, one could read this return as a sign of continuity, maybe even some kind of 
transubstantiation of the spirit, that after death, there is light. While I do not adhere to 
this kind of narrativization of the film, as it fills in a blankness with extraneous meaning, 
the sense of mobility that the return of the lightbeam engendered had a 
kind of joy to it. 
This joy was not beyond signification, but was bound up with the sensation of 
being able to acknowledge something outside myself that I am impartially, yet 
intinlately, connected to. I would define this 'feeling' in terins of a relation of 
'disjunctive 
synthesis I, a conceptualization that 
Constantin Boundas uses to describe the Deleuzian 
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form and process of narrativization. He describes this process as 'a divergence which is 
no longer a principle of exclusion, and a disýjunction, no longer a means of separation' 
(Boundas, 1994: 109). To think of narrative in this way is to think of it as a structuring 
that expresses the secret substrate of everyday life from within its borders. It is to no 
longer think of it as an imposed stnicture, which in turn creates an unrepresentable 
remainder. Instead, in the process of disjunctive synthesis, the limit itself changes in 
relation to what it delimits so that there is a procedural exchange between feeling and 
telling. 
However, I shall also take issue with the direction of Deleuze's formulation of 
the relation between the image and the spectator. Deleuze discusses the importance in 
contemporan, cmema of the image of absence, the black screen or the white screen. He 
mentions the director Philippe Garrel as being able, in films such as Lenfant secret 
(1982), 
to give an extraordinary intensity to these irrational cuts so that the series of 
anterior images has no end, while the series of subsequent images likewise 
has no beginning, the two series converging towards the white or black 
screen as their common limit. Moreover in this way, the screen becomes the 
medium for variations: the black screen and the under-exposed image, the 
intense blackness which lets us guess at dark volumes In process of being 
constituted, or the black marked by a fixed or moving lummous point, and 
all the combinations of black and fire, the white screen and the over- 
exposed image, the milky image or the snowy image whose dancing seeds 
are to take shape... (Deleuze, 1989: 200). 
While this quotation suggests an abstract and vertiginous interrelation between the poles 
of light and dark, I shall argue that in tenns of Disappearance at Sea, this is not a 
limitless vision that disregards the bounds of location. In fact, Deleuze's reference to the 
vertigo of spacing in Cinema 2: The Time-Image will be transformed in my analysis, 
which will ultimately address questions of boundaries rather than infinity (Deleuze, 
1989: 180). In what follows I shall attempt to weigh up the stakes involved in 
considering the relation engendered by the moment of the blank 
film image as being 
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constitutive of a suýjectivity outside the parameters of identity/non-identity, 
narrative/excess. 
The stakes involved in this intuition and desire to think about the 
dissolution of identity as having narrational parameters rather than as a lapse into chaos 
and disorder relate to the feminist subtext in the introduction. As I mentioned there, the 
excessive underside of narrative, the scattering of its ordering function, is firmly mapped 
onto the figure of the woman. When she appears as figure, she acts as an obstacle to 
narrative flow, a limit it continually revolves around. ' But her appearance also signifies 
an absence in psychoanalytic tenns, an absence that gives way onto the absence of 
limits, chaos, or what I want to call here, in preparation for what follows, infinite 
scattering. To think an absence as being generative of narrative rather than engendering 
its collapse, is an attempt to ultimately reconfigure the negativity of this groundless 
ground of the feminine, a ground which calls out for a limit to be imposed on its chaotic 
overwhelming force, its sublime nature. In making a case for the subjectivity generated 
by the disjunctive film moment as being of a narrational order other than excess, (the 
latter deemed as feminine and either celebrated or feared depending on which camp you 
find yourself in), I want to move away from gendered accounts of spectatorship. 
However, my attempt to find narrational continuity in the supposedly suspended image, 
to reconfigure that space as other than excess or stillness, is motivated by an 
underground desire to unhinge female subjectivity from those values. 
Underground, 
because I have no desire to name this other narrational value as feminine as that would 
merely recapitulate to the other side of a binary which would still supports 
its opposite 
tenn - 
For now, I suggest that this other narrational value is to do with the 
interrelation between form and the real of everyday 
banality. I want to introduce my 
encounter with Deleuze with the following quotation: 
[I]f everyday banality is so important, it is because, being subject to 
sensory-motor schemata which, are automatic and pre-established, 
it is 
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all the more liable, on the least disturbance of equilibrium between 
stimulus and response [ ... j suddenly to free itself from this schema and reveal itself in a visual and sound nakedness, crudeness and brutality 
which make it unbearable, giving it the pace of a dream or a nightmare (Deleuze, 1989: 3). 
3.4 GILLES DELEUZE ENCOUNTERS STROMBOLI (1949) 
Unlike semiological or psychoanalytic accounts of spectatorship where the 
spectator is a component of the cinematic apparatus, in the cinema Deleuze calls 'time- 
image' cinerna, the spectator metamorphoses into a seer immersed in film's flow of 
images .4 
'This is a cinema of the seer and no longer of the agent', he says (Deleuze, 
1989: 2). His concern is not with the narrative trajectory of a characters passage from one 
state to another, but in the way a character's hallucinatory visions allow the director to 
move from one kind of image sequence to another. This proffers a different kind of 
narrative trajectory for the viewer, an image narration. The viewer becomes submerged 
in the film IMaRe. a dvnamic which would seem, on the face of it, to consist of 
immersion in a smooth non-conflictual image-space rather than the tension of conflictual 
identification in a psychoanalytic account of spectatorship. How does this smooth 
immersion relate to the suspended film image? What possibilities for 'the real' are 
unleashed in this approach to the film image? 
Deleuze mentions Stromboli in chapter three of Cinema 2: The Time-Image 
where he contrasts habitual recognition to attentive recognition referring to Henri 
Bergson's ideas on memory. Habitual recognition is extensive. Perception extends itself 
into the usual habituated movements so that 'I recognize my friend Peter' (Deleuze, 
1989: 44). By contrast, in attentive recognition, the extension of perception is inhibited. 
This inhibition of the goal of the sensory-motor apparatus implodes on the figure of the 
object presented, leading me to return to the object and create multiple 'descriptions' of 
aspects of its form, a move that Deleuze sees as the opening up of different planes. 
The 
image in attentive recognition becomes a pure optical (and sound) 
image of the thing 
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rather than having a functional role to play in a subject/obýject dichotomy as in habitual 
recognition (Deleuze, 1989: 44). Where does the encounter beyond habitual recognition 
lead us? Out of this world or to a more fully embedded relation to it? 
The encounter beyond habitual recognition is similar to Karin's encounter with 
the volcano in Strornboh or my encounter with the blank image and the strange light 
source in Disappearance at Sea. Deleuze discusses Stromboli: 
[A] foreign woman whose revelation of the island will be all the more 
profound because she cannot react in a way that softens or compensates 
for the violence of what she sees, the intensity and the enormity of the 
tunny-fishing ("It was awful... "), the panic-inducing power of the 
eruption ("I am finished, I am afraid, what mystery, what beauty, my 
God... ") (Deleuze, 1989: 2). 
This seems like a description of an epiphany, a term that Zizek was keen to counter in 
his anal,,, sis of the film in chapter two because it gives the suspended moment substantial 
meaning. Does Deleuze's analysis perpetuate the notion of an awe that suspends the 
everyday? Or does this revelation lead to the everyday? Taking his stride from Andre 
Bazin's analysis of neo-realism as a response to a perceived crisis in cinema, Deleuze 
states the case, which dominates the time-image: 
If all the movement-images, perceptions, actions and affects underwent 
such an upheaval, was this not first of all because a new element burst 
onto the scene which was to prevent perception being extended into 
action in order to put it in contact with thought, and, gradually, was to 
subordinate the image to the demands of new signs which would take it 
beyond movement? (Deleuze, 1989: 1). 
This new element is the transformation of action into hallucination, a form of expanded 
duration in which a character becomes immobilized. By inference the viewer would also 
become immobilized, prey to a vision that possesses him/her. However, this immo i ity 
is contradictory, as, rather than remaining in the suspended paralysis of 
Zizek's 
'subjective destitution', here immobility opens onto the animated banality of the real. 
What do I mean by this? Deleuze's opening film example serves to illustrate this 
phenomenon. 
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[11n Umberto D, De Sica constructs the famous sequence quoted as an 
example bN Bazin: the young maid going into the kitchen in the 
morning, making a series of mechanical, weary gestures, cleaning a bit, 
driving the ants away from a water fountain, picking up the coffee 
grinder, stretching out her foot to close the door with her toe. And her 
eyes meet her pregnant woman's belly, and it is as though all the misery 
in the world were going to be born. This is how, in an ordinary or 
evervdav situation, in the course of a series of gestures, which are 
insignificant but all the more obedient to simple sensory-motor 
schemata, what has suddenly been brought about is a pure optical 
situation to which the little maid has no response or reaction. The eyes, 
the belly, that is what an encounter is... (1989: 1-2). ' 
At first glance, this approach does seem similar to Zizek's analysis of Stromboli where a 
rupture in the narrative trajectory of the film suspends action and leads to a 
disengagement from identity. For Zizek, this suspension exposes the frozen pose of the 
empty form of the subject, the gaze of the stranger, which is theoretically the perspective 
from which a liberation from identity (and images) might ensue. In giving the reason 
why psychoanalysis is liberatory, Zizek quotes Lacan's essay 'Aggressivity in 
Psychoanalysis'. The passage is worth citing in full because it illuminates the static 
nature of the pose in the scenario of subjectiVe destitution: 
[A]s Lacan points out, the paranoiac feelings of persecution that 
characterize the mirror stage are constituted by a stagnation similar to 
"the faces of actors when a film is suddenly stopped in nuid-action" : 
"Now, this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of 
human knowledge: that which constitutes the ego and its objects with 
attributes of permanence, identity, and substantiality, in short, with 
entities or 'things' that are very different from the Gestalten that 
experience enables us to isolate in the shifting field, stretched in 
accordance with the lines of animal desire" (Jacques Lacan, 
"Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", in Ecrits: A Selection (New York: 
Norton, 1977), p. 17. ) 
What Lacan renders visible here is "Platonism in its becoming": 
he does not refute Platonism by directly denouncing the illusory nature 
of eidos but by exposing the genesis of the subject's fixation on the 
immobile eidos (Zizek, 1992: 66). 
In this scenario of becoming a subject, there is a defmitive 
bar between chaos and 
stability. it Is pertinent here that Lacan compares the stability of 
the ego to a freeze- 
frame. In subjective destitution, itself a kind of freeze-frame, the subject is perched 
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between its emptN fon-nal structure and the chaos that this form mitigates. This 
perspective momentarily severs the ego's attachment to the content of its form, 
potential1v offering the chance of shifting its attachment to that content. However, 
interesting as this analysis is on its own ternis, using it as a mode of approach for film 
has one crucial limitation, which for me is the limitation of the Lacanian account of 
subjectivity. 
What characterizes film is mobility not immobility, regardless of the fact 
that a film is comprised of separate frames. While film is not quotable in any way that 
does not freeze the image, this freezing is a betraval of the mobility and dynamism of 
film, which renders it different from a photograph, although, as we have seen, in 
Barthes'analyses the static image generates movement (Bellour, 1975). 1 am interested 
in considering the 'stilled' image in Disappearance at Sea as generating a dissolution of 
the subject, but I question the absolute negativity of Zizek's account as it ultimately 
leaves the image relation out of count. His emphasis on poised stasis, the gaze of a 
stranger, poses the possibility of dynamism in terms of the disappearance of the image 
and does not say very much about how an image can be affecting without necessanly 
acconunodatmg one's psychological needs and desires. Can Deleuze open up a way of 
thinking of how an image can be affecting without being either psychologically tied to 
desire or to be aiming at the point beyond desire? 6 
While the state of immobility Deleuze attributes to the time-image also has 
to do with a certain freezing of the co-ordmates of movement, his mode of approach 
seeks to move beyond the either/or of narrative movement versus rupture. A Deleuzian 
approach follows the film image as it continues to unfold in the stasis of the hallucinated 
moment. A very different account and assumption of subjectivity is generated 
here. For 
Deleuze, as I have intimated, there is not simply a choice between empty form and 
superficial content, as all forins are simulacra rather than 
being divided into those that 
are ideal and their actualized copies as in Plato's 
formulation. Rather than remaining on 
the actual side of the mirror/screen fixedly staring at the choice 
between empty forin and 
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superficial content, Deleuze maintains that all fort-tis emerge from processes of copying, 
doubling, imaging and simulation (Colebrook, 2002: 98). Deleuze, like Alice in Lewis 
Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, passes through to the other side of the image, 
where distinctions between form and content, stability and chaos are difficult to 
maintain, where 
the observer becomes a part of the simulacrum itself, which is 
transformed and deformed by his point of view. In short, there is in the 
simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming-unlimited, as in the 
Philebus where "more and less are always going a point further, " a 
becoming alwavs other, a becoming subversive of the depths, able to 
evade the equal, the limit, the Same, or the Similar: always more and 
less at once, but never equal. To impose a limit on this becoming, to 
order it according to the same, to render it similar - and, for that part 
which remains rebellious, to repress it as deeply as possible, to shut it up 
in a cavern at the bottom of the Ocean - such is the aim of Platonism in 
its will to bring about the triumph of icons over simulacra (Deleuze, 
1990: 258-9). 
As we shall see shortly, because in Deleuze's forniulation of subjectivity, there is no 
founding moment as such, no definitive bar separating form and chaos, the physio- 
bl. psychological immobility generated by the 'pure optical situation' opens out onto the 
mobility of the circuit of exchange between virtual and actual images. While Deleuze 
does not say much more about Karin in Stromboli, his account of how the circuit of 
exchange between virtual and actual configures change in relation to Yasujiro Ozu's 
films is pertinent to my initial encounter with Disappearance at Sea. 
Referring to the camera's attention to still objects like vases in Ozu's films, 
Deleuze discusses the extended temporality of the 'pure optical situation' that emerges 
from this concentration in terms of duration. He states that '[flime is the full, that is, the 
unalterable form filled by change' (Deleuze, 1989: 17). In this phrase, we have the hint 
of a crucial difference between Zizek and Deleuze. Deleuze also maintains that there 
is 
an empty fonn, time itself, but this form is not, as the emptv form of the subject is, a 
bound structure. Thereby the emergence of subjectivity is not irredeemably cut or 
separated from this empty form, but always in relation to it. As 
Deleuze says 'it is we 
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who are internal to time, not the other way round (Deleuze, 1989: 83). In other words, 
there is a kind of sN-nthetic whole that is open to things that are passing. This synthetic 
whole does not hannonize the things that erupt within it, but continuously connects and 
fractures the directions of change or movement. 
3.5 DELEUZIAN SERIALIZATION OVERTAKES LACANIAN FORMAL 
STAGNATION. 
When Boundas puts forward the notion that narrativization in Deleuze is 
serialization, it is obvious from the outset that this is not narrative as we are used to 
thinking about it (Boundas, 1994: 100). While Zizek's analysis depends on the 
dichotomy between classical narrativity and non-narrative, perhaps thinking about 
narrative in terms of serialization might break down the binary that that position poses 
and allow for the continuous affectivity of the image in terms of an attachment that is 
not severed by rupture. Taking a Lacanian position means seeing the image either as a 
substantial illusory pacifier of psychic disturbance, or, if the image resists that desire, the 
subject is propelled towards its inherent split and poised on the precipice of extinction. 
Disjunction here is negativity, its dynamism informed by the threat of defusion of the 
death drive, whereas Deleuze offers a theory of an briginary disjunctive synthesis' as 
constitutive of subjectivity (Boundas, 1994: 10 1). This notion is useful in order to think 
I of narratives that can accommodate, without compromise, fragmentation and 
multiplicity' (Boundas, 1994: 100). As Boundas puts it: 
The usual response to these questions is that the fragmentation of the 
subject brings about loss of meaning and the collapse of the personality. 
But even if this were the case for the life of the self-constituting self, 
why would the frittering of (existential) meaning prevent the narrative 
biographer from making sense of her data? The standard edition of 
Freud's works is full of case studies (often in narrative form) of patients 
with shattered selves (Boundas, 1994: 100). 
7 
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W'hile for Lacan, as for Freud, there is an order beyond the subýject, a transcendent death 
drive, which poses an internal blindspot at its heart, Deleuze inverts this position. The 
transcendental is not beyond the subject, but is rather the groundless yet founding 
moment of subjectivity, which opens It up to the heterogeneous disarray of a chaotic 
multitude of sense impressions. In order to make sense of this disarray, the subject is the 
outcome of a process which subjugates difference to identity. However, identity is not 
erected on an absolute bedrock here, but is the continuous serialization of the relation 
between the 'chaosmos' (an amalgamation of chaos and cosmos) and the subject as a 
'cracked F (Boundas, 1994: 102). ' Deleuze maintains the connectivity and reversibility 
of difference and identity and his critique aims at keeping the fort-ner free from its 
traditional subjugation to identity. As Deleuze states in Negotiations, Lacan's Symbolic 
Order stabilizes the dispersal of sense in the Real, anchoring it in a central fixed signifier 
(Deleuze, 1995.33). To keep this stabilization from occurring, Deleuze develops the 
destabilizing effects of the death drive rather than the other path Freud offered, i. e. the 
path of stasis incurred in the regression to zero. Zizek also maintains the disruptive force 
of the death drive, but as a structure that gives the subject a perspective from which to 
view the failure of the Symbolic to render it complete. For Zizek the death drive is a 
point of inconsistency, which tears meaning apart and, in its positive aspect, is the 
source of the drive to posit meaning in turn. 
It is this constant oscillation and negative repetition between narrative and 
aced with the collapse of non-narrative (death) that I want to break away. Either I'm f 
meaning or I'm constantly positing the question what does this mean? The latter is the 
impetus for the drive towards narrative, an impetus which, however dallying and 
circuitous, is, as Peter Brooks insists, always in search of closure, the end. 
The fort-ner, 
the collapse of meaning as subjective destitution, is the liberation 
from narrative, the 
exposure of its seductions, pleasures, and definitions. This 
liberation though, is the limit 
of sense, the risk of nonsense and is thereby uninhabitable as a subject position. 
Structurally, this is the psychotic core of the subject that in turn forces us to come up 
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with another story to fill in the unbearable emptiness of its empty ground. Negation as 
the motivation for narrativization - what is wrong with this? Is it not the case that 
deprivation is the point at which something new comes into being? How could 
sign'A, ing activity be generated if not for sensory/symbolic deprivation? Critical 
analysis of art/film using a Lacanian methodology always seems to stop at the point at 
which something new might come into being. It does not demonstrate something new as 
that would be to affirm an ideological position. Does Deleuze's conception of an 
loriginanT disjunctive synthesis', whereby the death drive is figured in terins of 
affirmation rather than negation, open up the possibility of an affective engagement with 
the image of suspension on its terms rather than from the perspective of the structure of 
the subject? 
Deleuze acknowledges an early debt to Lacan borrowing a notion of an 
agent he named "object = x" necessary for'originary disjunctive synthesis'to operate. 
This "object = x" sounds very similar to Lacan's 'objet a' In the sense that it is an empty 
place within a system. However, this place of emptiness is not a static point within a 
structure, but a dynamic shifter within a system of serialization: 
the object =x leaps from one series to another, "always absent from its 
place" and never totally landing or transferring itself to any one series, 
for, if it did, the result would be premature closure and an abrupt end of 
the narration (Boundas, 1994: 101). 9 
The point of interest here for the development of this thesis is that 'an abrupt end of 
orms relations between narration' never occurs. Deleuze's concept of the "object = x" f 
the aforementioned couplet of a 'cracked V and the 'chaosmos', between a modality 
capable of translating aspects of identity fTom one series to another and the becoming- 
world in which these serializations take place (Boundas, 1994: 102). It does not 
forin a 
structural symbiosis in relation to the subject where, regardless of the position the 
subject assumes, Lacan's 'objet petit a' maintains its rigidity as an empty place in the 
structure. If the moment of becoming that Zizek points out 
in Lacan's mirror-stage is 
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like a photograph, static, posed, poised between aii absent referent and substantial 
identity, in Deleuze, the becoming world, as referred to in the citation above from The 
Logic ofSense, is ruled by metamorphosis. Deleuze's notion of subjectivity as a 
becoming in relation to a dynamic, shifting, absence (the virtual) makes his ideas 
conducive to the rethinking the spectatorial effects of the moving image of vacuity. 
As opposed to the absolute cut of separation (from the image), in a 
Deleuzian trajectory, the process of cutting is both connective and separating. 
Becoming-subject cannot be constituted through a juxtaposition of 
"immobile segments". Participation in immobile segments has always 
been responsible for the hieratic and static world of Being (Boundas, 
1994: 105). 
N, contrast, 'disjunctive synthesis ... places series in communication and in resonance 
BI 
with one another the very moment it separates one from the other' (Boundas, 1994: 10 1). 
This mmute, but crucial difference between a cut that separates absolutely and one that 
connects and separates simultaneously can be exemplified in the distinctions between 
Lacan's notion of the death drive as negativity and Deleuze's as affinnation. As Keith 
Ansell Pearson states 'Deleuze's reconfiguration of the death-drive can be illuminated by 
considering the distinction he makes, drawing on Blanchot, between "personal" and 
11 
inipersonal" death' (Pearson, 1997: 63). 
Blanchot rightly suggests that death has two aspects. One is personal, 
concerning the I or the ego, something which I can confront in a 
struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which 
causes everything to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, with no 
relation to 'me', neither present nor past but always coming, the source 
of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent question ... 
The first 
signifies the personal disappearance of the person, the annihilation of 
this difference represented by the I or the ego. This is a difference which 
existed only in order to die, and the disappearance of which can be 
objectively represented by a return to inanimate matter, as though 
calculated by a kind of entropy (Deleuze, 1994: 112-113). 
im The desire of the death drive as the return to inanimate matter is, Deleuze clai s, the 
Freudian conception, which leads Freud to posit the death drive in opposition to Eros 
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and prevents him from discovering the aspect of the death drive that is indistinguishable 
from Eros. 'O For Deleuze, Thanatos is completely indistinguishable from the 
desexualization of Eros and the resultant fon-nation of a neutral and displaceable energy. 
The other face or aspect of death, the one Deleuze asserts, 
refers to the state of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, when they assume a 
shape which excludes my own coherence no less than that of any 
identity whatsoever (Deleuze, 1994: 113). 
For Deleuze, Freud pacifies this other death by the dichotomy between instinctual 
defusion and the desire to return to stas's, these psychic states corresponding to the 
narrative categories of the dilatory middle, with its postponement of the end, and the 
directive desire for the end. Deleuze's turn to the other face of death emphasizes 
the interminable and the incessant, the formless as the product of the 
most extreme forinality. This is how the story of time ends: by undoing 
its too well centred natural or psychical circle and forming a straight 
line which then, led by its own length, reconstitutes an eternally 
decentred circle (Deleuze, 1994: 115). 
Zizek points out that there are two conceptions of death in Lacan also - this is in keeping 
with Lacan's reforinulation of Freud. One is real, biological death; the other, absolute 
death, the destruction of the signifying network, a destruction that 'liberates nature from 
its own laws and opens the way for the creation of new forms of life ex nihilo' (Zizek, 
1989: 134). This sounds like Deleuze's state of free differences, but there is one 
important distinction. In Deleuze the creation of new forms of life does not occur ex 
nihilo, but is still linked to the vital universe of becoming. It is not 'a sublime body' 
exempted from the life cycle (Zizek, 1989b: 134). 
Discussing a Dickens character in Our Mutual Friend who lies on his death 
bed, Deleuze states that 
in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft and 
sweet penetrating him ... Between 
his life and his death, there is a 
moment that is only that of a life playing with death. The life of the 
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individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases 
a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that 
is, freed from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens ... 
The life 
of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent 
to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no 
other (Deleuze, 2001: 28-9). 
That this is not a sublime elevation of the individual to a state beyond phenomenal 
existence is clear from the following citation: 
But we shouldn't enclose life in the single moment when individual life 
confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a 
given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived 
objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that 
are merely actualized in subjects and objects. This indefinite life does 
not itself have moments, close as they may be to one another, but only 
between-times, between-moments, it doesn't just come about or come 
after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the 
event vet to come or already happened, in the absolute of an mimediate 
consciousness (Deleuze, 2001: 29). 
This vision is what Zizek, from the perspective of the symbolic, would perhaps call 
'fanaticism'. '[flanaticism is an misane visionary delusion that we can Immediately see or 
grasp what lies beyond all bounds of sensibility' (Zizek, 1989: 204). As Zizek points out 
in The Ticklish Subject, a being able to close this gap and fully comprehend the diversity 
of phenomena that comprise its origins would be a noumenal archerypeus intellectus no 
longer constrained by the limitations of temporality (Zizek, 1999: 43). " However, for 
Deleuze immediacy and mediation are not mutually exclusive. It is this interconnectivity 
that I find useful in thinking about the disappearance of the image in Disappearance at 
Sea. 
The force of the immediacy of the between-moments of a life, the 
continuous invisible flow of time through our representations, i. e. the moments we can 
articulate, this force issues from the final image sequence of Disappearance at Sea. The 
pulse that issues from the momentarily blank screen resonates with the invisible yet 
sensed spatiality that includes the spectator within its environs. The actuals of subject 
and object, body and screen are exchanged within the immanent parameters of virtuality, 
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parameters that are invisible but no less felt. In this scenario, the T is opened out onto an 
ongoing process of narration as serialization, finding itself situated, obliterated and 
renewed in the midst of the chaotic force field of unbound differences. Within this 
boundless field, the T is in a disjunctive dialogue with its other, the non-1, rather than 
being a locutionan, boundan, between divorced real/ms. 
In making this analogy, I am perhaps guilty of literally mapping the 
disjunctive dialogue between light and dark that occurs in the final scene of 
Disappearance at Sea onto the movement of differential subjectivity in the space of 
suspension. However, my point is that the disjunctive dialogue between light and dark in 
the film's final sequence intimates a movement beyond the representational system of 
vision where this movement would be seen in terms of an oscillation between absence 
and presence. 12 Instead, this disjunctive dialogue, (discontinuous continuity), generates 
or co-substantiates a mode of subjectivity beyond recognition, so that it becomes a 
question of an InInlersive blindness, rather than seeing at a distance. " Here it is not a 
question of an image being posited on a subject's horizon. Yes, "I" am in the gallery 
space confrontmg a screen, but "I" am being excavated from that location and becoming 
a seer in Deleuze's sense, absorbed by the surface effects of the image where 
oppositional categories revolve upon one another. T am no longer confronting a limit or 
carving out space, but am caught up in a machinic dispersal of infinite movements 
across poles of overlapping permutations of in/distinction. 
3.6 TWO KINDS OF SUBLIME: PAUL SCHRADER'S TRANSCENDENTAL 
STASIS AND LEO BERSANI'S IMMANENT LIGHTING. 
But perhaps I should be wary of this formulation. What I seem to be 
saying here is that the trajectory of the 
final scene in Dean's film correlates with a 
generative narrative process, where narrative is thought of as a connective structure 
which can be added to infinitely rather than issuing towards a 
definite ending. 
14 It is 
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useful to think about a process of narrative whereby ruptures/digressions and endings 
would not be the poles of oscillation/tension that keeps the process in motion. But in 
breaking away from that trajectory, is there a danger of becoming utterly dislocated from 
the sense of things that constitutes a life as it is lived'? Initially, Deleuze'e time-image is 
strongly related to the everyday, as we saw above In the references to neo-real'sm and 
YasuJiro Ozu's films. Through the physically immobilizing effects of repetition and 
boredom, an encounter with the psychologically mobilizing dynamic of time ensues. 
However, Deleuze's trajectory seems to dissolve an embodied relation to that mobilizing 
d-8-namic, whereas, in relation to Disa earance at Sea, while "I" am displaced from the PP 
subject position of positing the image before me, "I" am still in a material, embodied 
relation to this image of dispersal. Does Deleuze provide any scope for thinking of this 
durational dispersal in terms of embodiment? To explore the ramifications of this 
problem, I shall contrast Deleuze's analysis of Paul Schrader's Transcendental Style in 
Film: Bresson, Ozu, Dreyer with Leo Bersani's use of Deleuze in an as yet unpublished 
paper based on Jean-Luc Godard's Le Mepris (1963) called Tonmng Couples: Godard's 
Contempt'. 15 
In Transcendental Style in Film: Bresson, Ozu, Dreyer, Schrader identifies 
a 'transcendental expression' in art that 'attempts to bring man as close to the ineffable, 
invisible and unknowable as words, images and ideas can take him' (Schrader, 1972: 8). 
Interestingly, he states that critical enquiry into this mode of expression ends at the gulf 
(apona) of mysticism. 
Although, a critic cannot analyze the Transcendent, he can describe the 
immanent and the manner in which it is transcended. He can discover 
how the immanent is expressive of the Transcendent (Schrader, 1972: 
8). 
Schrader's procedure, while not intentionally psychoanalytic, bears an inadvertent 
resemblance to Zizek's dissembling of the subject. While Zizek would not 
be in 
sympathy with Schrader's notion of transcendence, the 
latter occupies a similar position 
138 
to the empty subject's confrontation with the Real or voiding of identity that we saw in 
Zizek. Schrader sees immanence as the enemy of transcendence, whether it be external 
(realism, rationalism) or internal (psychologism, expressionism), in other words, all 
ideological constraints. Transcendental style in film reduces constructs such as 'plot, 
acting, characterization, camerawork, music, dialogue, editing'to stasis, making them 
non-expressive so that an emphasis on a kind of frozen forin that transcends content can 
occur. 
Transcendental style stylizes reality by eliminating (or nearly) those 
elements which are primarily expressive of human experience thereby 
robbing the conventional interpretations of reality of their relevance and 
power (Schrader, 1972: 11). 
Transcendental style involves a three-step procedure in the procurement of this break 
with reality in the service of something beyond that reality. Schrader, like Deleuze, 
refers to Ozu's films as exemplary. In an Ozu film, action occurs in the middle of a 
scene, with the highpoints of conventional drama, the beginning and the end, being 
neglected. Firstly, says Schrader, we are given a meticulous representation of the dull, 
banal, commonplaces of everyday living. Nothing much appears to be happening. Then, 
a disparity. a rupture, occurs in this seamless world of everyday rituals and objects. In 
evocative ternis that correlate with Deleuze's analysis, which itself in part relies on 
Schrader's, Schrader characterizes this as 'the growing crack in the dull surface of 
everyday reality' which 'becomes an open rupture' in the cold context of the everyday. 
And finally in a moment of decisive action, there is an outburst of 
spiritual emotion totally inexplicable within the everyday that results in 
an unresolved tension between a maximum of human expression and 
non-expression (Schrader, 1972: 43). 
The third step follows - the disparity is not resolved but transcended 
by means of 
freezing the decisive action into stasis. 'The decisive action does not resolve disparity 
but freezes it into stasis' (Schrader, 1972: 49). 
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I Tjhe ever-Ndav and disparity are experiential. They taunt and tease the 
spectator's emotions. Stasis is fon-nalistic, it incorporates those emotions 
into a larger forin. Stasis transfon-ns empathy into aesthetic appreciation, 
experience into expression, emotion into forrn (Schrader, 1972: 5 1). 
This resonates with Zizek's gaze of a stranger whereby the subject is posed in a static 
forinal relation/confrontation with the constraints of psychological and ideological 
expression. 
Deleuze is interested in Schrader's analysis, as this empty forrn for Deleuze 
is Time itself, the manifestation of its formal indeterminacy within the horizon of the 
everyday banality. However, Deleuze is adamant that there is no need to call on a 
transcendence to describe this occurrence. 
[I]t seems to us that nature does not, as Schrader believes, intervene in a 
decisive moment or in a clear break with everyday man. The splendor of 
nature, of a snow-covered mountain, tells us one thing only: everything 
is ordinary and regular, everything is everyday! [ ... ] Daily 
life allows 
only weak sensory motor connections to survive, and replaces the 
action-image by pure optical and sound images, opsigns and sonsigns 
(Deleuze, 1989: 15). 
"le Deleuze discusses these situations in terms of making us grasp something 
intolerable and unbearable, e. g. 'Stromboli: a beauty which is too great for us, like too 
strong a pain' (Deleuze, 1989: 18), he does not consider the suspension of motor 
connections as a freeze-frame. " Rather it reveals another kind of continuity. The notion 
of a beauty too strong like a pain is reminiscent of the discourse of the sublime, whereby 
the image pains us because it presents our inadequacy to cross beyond the threshold of 
representation and commune with the transcendent, i. e. nature, the Real, unmediated 
immanence. Schrader's analysis brings us to that threshold. 
However, Deleuze, as I have said, reverses the traditional metaphysical 
positions of immanence and transcendence, whereby the latter can only be 
beyond the 
immanent on the actual plane of consistency, while, on the plane of the virtual, the 
transcendental field itself is immanent (Deleuze, 2001: 32). This reversal allows for 
continuity between the everyday and the cosmic. 
Deleuze, in positing a new seeing 
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function which opens us up to the 'whole image without metaphor, in its excess of horror 
or beauty, uillustifiable' may sound like Zizek. Yet I want to persist in insisting that the 
minute difference between them in tenris of how they conceptualize the ground of this 
moment of excess is crucial to the reconsideration of an enlivening relation with the 
image. It is the difference beMeen being poised at the frozen moment of the genesis of 
the subject or being immersed in the moment of extinction, which reveals the 
commingling of forces, the circulation of differences. In relation to Disappearance at 
Sea, I am not saying that the pacing of the light beam across the darkness of the screen, 
illuminating the edges of clouds, represents such a scenario. What I am saying is that 
this image generated a spectatorial alignment, which intimated the inner sensation of the 
commingling of forces, the play of free differences liberated from the co-ordinates of 
identit)-, what Boundas. following Deleuze, refers to as 'the virtual in the process of 
actualization' (Boundas, 1993: 42). 
The problem though is that while this dispersal is a desirable state of 
existence, how does the actual not get repeated? (This is a similar question to critiques 
of Kiisteva on the effectivity of the semlotic that I mentioned in chapter two. ) How 
dynamic is the actual? How is the actual changed by its temporal interaction with the 
virtual? How can mere oscillation be avoided? While I do not want to return to my 
feminist subtext in depth as yet, I must admit that my reservation to Deleuze's notion of 
subjectivity as free liberated differences stems from the insistence in feminist theory on 
the importance of the located body. " While the co-ordinates of a non-nalized perception 
may be reconfigured in Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism', the scene of the 
body 
which depends on space is not eradicated. We are not disembodied mental imaginaries 
existing in a pure temporality, but finite entities that, while 
being traversed by 
'chaosmotic' differences, cut specific shapes out of the formal indeterminacy of time. 
The limitat'On of Deleuze for a theory of embodiment can perhaps be 
made more explicit by looking at Leo Bersani's use of 
his ideas, which relates to 
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Deleuze's problematic discussion of the brain and the image that features in chapter eight 
of Cinema 2: The Time-Ima e. In that chapter, Deleuze claims that 9 
[elverything can be used as a screen, the body of a protagonist or even 
the bodies of the spectators, everything can replace film stock, in a 
virtual film which now only goes on in the head, behind the pupils, with 
sound sources taken as required from the auditorium. A disturbed brain- 
death or a new brain which would be at once the screen, the film stock 
and the camera, each time membrane of the outside and the inside 
(Deleuze, 1989: 215). 
In this vision, embodiment evaporates in favour of an emphasis on liquid, gaseous, 
perception without a perceiving subject similar to the drugged vision Deleuze mentions 
in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. " In Ton-ning Couples: Godard's Contempt', Bersam 
moves in the direction of a 'liquid, gaseous, perception without a perceiving subject', 
although, as I've already mentioned - see note x this section - Bersani's reading of 
Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', while sharing Deleuze's linkcing of Eros and 
Thanatos, dramatically diverges from Deleuze's emphasis on the desexualization of Eros 
that ensue as a result of this link. However, Bersani's use of Deleuze is particularly 
apropos to this discussion because it relates to a film moment, the final scene In 
Godard's Le Mepris where the horizon nearly vanishes. Bersani's complex analysis of 
the narrative of this fihn and the relation of the main characters, Paul and Camille, to the 
mythic couple, Odysseus and Penelope, does not interest me here. What does interest me 
is his analysis of how Paul and Camille's psychological desires fix them in positions of 
stasis. According to Bersam, fascination and seduction immobilize Paul and Camille, 
respectively, in the imprisoning psychic space of Camille's contempt for Paul. (Camille 
seeks to imprison Paul's fascinated gaze. ) 
In the filin, various scenarios are acted out around this dialectic, the 
outcome being that neither one is seen by the other and, more 
importantly, the missing 
movements between them, reduce nature to a deadened backdrop, reminiscent of 
Zizek's 
notion of the mortifying nature of the symbolic order. 
Bersam, interested in the 
possibility of escape from this mortification, posits an imaginary realm where 
the lack in 
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desire would not create voids in space, would not render space apart, fractured. Space, 
he savs, becomes discontinuous when it is invaded by foreign bodies whose inner habitat 
has the false extensibility of a purely psychic space. Our psychology darkens the 
transparency of light and spatial connectedness. Instead of psychological fracture, he 
suggests that the film itself is aiming at a totality beyond that of the fragmentation of 
bodies effected by camera cropping and the separation of one subject from another 
within the narrative. In the final scene of Le Mepris, the horizon line is reduced to nearly 
nothing but a uniform spectacle of sky and water. Bersani claims that this elimination of 
the distinction between subjects and objects engenders a new spatial relation where 
everything is now illuminated from a light that comes from the elements towards us as 
opposed being illununated by a light projected artificially on the scene (Bersani, Jul 
200 1: conference paper). '9 In this new spatial relation, Bersani suggested, it is possible 
to move -within nature as an appearance that registers and responds to other appearances. 
While I am interested in the idea that a film moment can suggest a mode of subjectivity 
whereby one might move as an appearance that registers and responds to other 
appearances without reducing them to an objectifying stasis, how are distinctions to be 
made in such a continuous flow of bodies and light? 
I am interested in Bersani's thesis that the vanishing of the horizon in Le 
Mepris is suggestive of a space where, rather than being Unprisoned by one's 
psychology, one might become liberated from it. In this, his thesis echoes the liquidation 
of identity in Zizek's 'subjective destitution' with the crucial difference that for Bersani 
this liberation is full of movement rather than being a suspension of movement. For 
Bersani, this liberation consists in the ernission of light ordinarily hidden by psychic 
darkness. Losing our fascinating and crippling expressiveness, he said, might be the 
precondition for our moving freely within nature (Bersani, Jul 200 1: conference paper). 
Bersam put forward a model of subjectivity whereby the relation to the other is not via 
recognition and desire. In his analysis, the 
disappearance of the horizon seduces the 
characters into the openness of the imaginary, effecting a shift 
from sexuality to 
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sensual ity A, hereby subýjectivity is a play with the possibility of undoing forms and 
structures (Bersam, Jul 2001 -. conference paper). Can this analysis be related to the 
disappearance of the horizon in Disappearance at Sea, the cut to the emptying of 
expressive forrn and the ensuing reappearance of a light without a point of view? I do 
not think that the encounter with the moment of suspension in Disappearance at Sea 
engenders an embrace of imaginary pre-symbolic being such as Bersam claims for Le 
21) Mepris 
. While there are similarities between Bersam's claims and mine in terms of how 
the disappearance of the horizon effects a sense of continuous space, I would not define 
this continuity as imaginary, but'real'. 21 
There are two pathways that can be taken from Deleuze's notion of the 
time-image. The one I've elaborated here via Bersani is the one that relates to Deleuze's 
appropriation and affirmation of the visionary-romantic interpretation of experimental 
film where mind and film are viewed in a relation of limitless syncopation. (I deal with 
this more thoroughly In section 4.4 when I look at Deleuze's analysis of Michael Snow. ) 
Bersani embraces a Deleuzian notion of film as an open totality in which appearances 
(matter) communicate seamlessly with other appearances as a phenomenon of mind or 
spirit (Bersam, Jul 200 1: conference paper). In Bersani's reading of Le Mepris, this 
results in the mnemonic contingency of particular bodies like those of Paul and Camille 
with other bodies, i. e. the precursors, Odysseus and Penelope. The eradication of the 
limit here creates an infinite machinic assemblage where forms and structures are 
continuously in contact, their intrinsic identities being continually undone by this 
contact. If, Bersam said, Camille and Paul had let themselves be seduced into the 
openness of the imaginary, they might have left their condemned coupledom for the 
fteedom to reappear always as subjects that are too multiple, too unfinished ever to be 
loved. For Bersani the final scene in Le Mepris is suggestive of an uninjured nature, a 
nature not broken by the appearance of the subject. In the final scene, there is no trace of 
land or human presence. The use of artificial (film) lighting is no longer necessary, as it 
was in an earlier scene of the sky and the water where the water's foam carried traces of 
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human passage. Now, a light that comes from the elements moves towards us, 
illuminating everything. We are liberated by the force of this immanent light, a light that 
our expressive being had blocked. But what do we become? This pathway of Deleuzian 
thinking leads to a melting of the subýject into the cosmological, into the particles of an 
undifferentiated matter. 
However, the pathway less trodden on but also offered by Deleuze is the 
one hinted at in his citation of Michelangelo Antonioni to explain the difference between 
the horizon in the metaphysical tradition, where it marks an unsurpassable limit, and in 
Ozu's philosophy, where it signifies the continuity of the ordinary and cosmic. 
22 
Antomom spoke of "the horizon of events", but noted that in the West 
the word has a double meaning, man's banal horizon and an inaccessible 
and always receding cosmological horizon. Hence the division of 
western cinema into European humanism and American science fiction. 
He suggested that it is not the same for the Japanese, who are hardly 
interested in science fiction: one and the same horizon links the cosmic 
to the everyday, the durable to the changing, one single and identical 
time as the unchanging form of that which changes (Deleuze, 1989: 1 
Although this geographic partition has a kind of mythic aspect to it, the cultural 
distinction between two ways of conceiving the horizon is relevant to this discussion. 
From the perspective of (Western) man, the unattainable is always receding in relation to 
an articulated limit. The desire to exceed this limit can lead to madness, as this limit 
preserves the subject's boundaries between itself and the other. This limit is also the 
horizon against which self and other locate themselves. It has to do with position and 
separation and is the obstacle and ground of negotiation. In the version of the horizon 
attributed to the Japanese, the horizon does not act as a limit. Rather, it connects that 
which is continuously changing to an unbounded forin that Is eternally present. The 
simultaneity of this connection, rather than the oscillation between excess (madness) and 
banality, allows for another kind of relation between self and other. The ramifications of 
this difference can be explored by contrasting two versions of madness in relation to the 
lack of honzon/limit: Zizek's reference to Hegel's 'dark night of the soul' and Deleuze's 
reading of Michel Tournier's novel Friday. 
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Zizek describes the psychotic realm of a universe devoid of symbolic work, 
or the horizon, using Hegel's dark night of the soul. 
The human being is this night, th' I II- is empty nothing, that contains 
everything in its simplicity - an unending wealth of many presentations, 
images, of which none happens to occur to him - or which are not 
present. This night, the inner of nature, that exists here - pure self - in phantasmagorical presentations, is night all around it, and just so disappears. One catches sight of this night when one looks human 
beings in the eye - into a night that becomes awful... (Hegel in Zizek, 
1992: 50). 
In Zizek's forinulation, this dark night of the soul is a vision of the world without a 
subject, the latter being a defensive forination projected onto the world in order to 
contain this unruly (projectile) madness. This dialectic can be mapped in terms of the 
figure of narrative/non-narrative. The non-narrative moment being the moment of excess 
that either freezes the subject in its tracks, allowing insight into the moment of its 
genesis (creation ex nihilo), or destroys the subject by swallowing it in the chaotic wild 
visions of the Real. However, is this 'dark night' always and only awful? 
Peter Dews points out how Zizek's interpretation of the Hegelian dictum the 
negation of the negation, i. e. the loss of a loss, 'condemns the subject to a perpetual 
alienation' (Dews, 1995: 255). Zizek's scenario of'subjective destitution'ls an example 
of the 'loss of a loss' whereby the subject, in confronting its constitutive lack, is split into 
what Dews refers to as a'nonsubstantial self-relating which maintains its distance from 
inner worldly objects' (Dews, 1995: 249). Whereas for Hegel, Dews suggests, and for 
Lacan in his later work, this dictum can be read as 
the self-destruction of the negative relation between consciousnesses 
whose relation to themselves (and thus to each other) is negative or 
abstract (polarised between empirical plenitude and reflective vacancy, 
or vice versa), with the result that the other ceases to be a limit of the 
self (Dews, 1995: 248). 
In other words, the other (object) takes on an internal self-sufficient determination, 
which is not the result of the subject's positing of it in relation to itself 
The entities of 
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subject and object then enter into a much more involved dynamic instigating a series of 
self-relations/mediations whereby the parameters of distance and immediacy are not 
mutually exclusive. I am not going to explore whether this is true of later Lacan or 
evaluate Dews' analysis of Hegel, which is based on Hinrich Fink-Eitel's commentary on 
Hegel's Science qfLogic, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. " What is of interest 
here, aside fTom the explicit analysis of the lack of intersubjectivity in Zizek's 
conception of the subject, is the fact that Dews' reading of Hegel echoes Deleuze's 
concept of 'inu-nanent self-differentlatlon' (Kerslake, 2002: 13). In other words that there 
is an immediate self-relation that differentiates self from self rather than the self having 
to posit the other in order to differentiate itself 
Deleuze's use of this terminology in relation to cinema changes the way I 
might think about the relation to the cut to the empty screen in Disappearance at Sea. 
Rather than being poised on the brink of genesis, frozen in a static gaze, exposed to the 
'dark night of the soul', this empty moment throws me into communication with a self- 
differentiation more intimate than that posited by a relation to an other outside of myself 
The "I" is cast upon a sea of clamoring fragments that echoes the way that time cuts a 
life up into pieces vet also provides the consistency which allows for seizure of and 
movement through the unpredictable shapes that form on this sea. The sensible here 
ý11 means the changeable that which is capable of a change in direction like the wind or 
tidal flow. The moment of disjunction generates an event of connection, a narration that 
includes the spaces between things, the intervals, rather than ornitting these spaces for 
the irnposed clarity of a narrative structure. The "I" becomes a series of nodal points, 
points of intersection between the currents and light-waves of multiple connections. 
Deleuze uses Michel Toumier's retelling of the Robinson Crusoe story, 
Vendredi ou les limbes A Pacifique, to show that in the absence of others the world 
does not necessarily fritter away into nothingness. In the absence of others, in the 
absence of a common horizon, a necessary grounding 
for the mapping of space as we 
usually conceive of it, Tournier's Robinson is subject to a universe where objects 
hit him 
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with the force of prqjectiles. (This II ias mentioned above in 
is similar to the phantasmagori 
Zizek's 'dark night of the soul'. ) 'A brutal opposition between light and darkness, with no 
transitions to protect his eyes, mark the spot that the retreating others leave behind' 
(Boundas, 1993: 38). This is a psychotic universe, Deleuze being attracted in his work to 
24 states of psychotic derangement which he terms schizoanalysis . However, according to 
Boundas, 
[i]n Deleuze-Tourmer's account, without the others, Robinson's desire is, for the first time, restored to him, separated from its object, desire is 
spared of an earlier obligatory detour through sexuality, and finds, for 
the first time, its telos, perfection and completeness within itself (Boundas, 1993: 3 8) . 
25 
Is this simply the kind of delusional narcissism that Zizek's analysis is pitted against? By 
contrast to Lacan's negative account of narcissism, Deleuze puts forward a narcissism of 
universal unfolding whereby formal resonances between the self and things in the world 
create and de-create identity (Deleuze (1994). Olkowski (1999)). 26 What this narcissism 
reveals is the dynamic relation between the living individual embedded in his or her 
surrounding world and that world embedded in him/her. This magnifying narcissism is 
the other (repressed) side of the subject who exists in a frontal or reflective critical 
relation to the world. When the horizon of positing subject and posited object 
disappears. chaos is not necessarily the result. Rather the splinters (shards of light) that 
emerge from this disappearance can allow for new or other formations of existence to 
appear and continue in the face of a so-called symbolic dissolution. The vanquished 
horizon and its dislocated return in Disappearance at Sea allows for a connection to 
occur between the impersonal movements of a life and a singular subject who exists 
against the world as a space populated by others. There is communality between both 
these forins of being rather than a divorce/bar between them. The supposedly chaotic life 
world doesn't just come knocking at a stable symbolic order, but the two are involved in 
a mutual commingling. The site of madness is not simply a ground upon which the 
symbolic is created as a secondary defense mechanism, creating a transcendental realm 
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out of an empirical one. In Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, the subject is never a 
static voi ,a structure that separates and protects one from the chaos of the life world. 
The difference between Deleuze and Zizek can clearly be seen in the 
reference Zizek makes to Henri Bergson, Deleuze's main mediator in the cinema books. 
Zlzek savs- 
In our evervdav attitude, we are "spontaneous Bergsonians". we bemoan 
the fate of immediate life experience, we point out how the fullness of 
life flow escapes forever the network of language categories, we laugh 
at those who become so entangled in the fictitious world of symbols that 
thev lose the taste of effective life [ ... 
J One of the lessons of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis - and at the same time the point at which Lacan rejoins 
Hegel - is the radical discontinuity between the organic immediacy of 
"life" and the symbolic universe: the "symbolization of reality" implies 
the passage through the zero point of the "night of the world". What we 
forget when we pursue our daily life, is that our human universe is 
nothing but an embodiment of the radically inhuman "abstract 
negativity" of the abyss we experience when we face the "night of the 
world" (Zizek, 1992: 51-53). 
The choice here is between being immersed in the network of symbolic fictions, which 
serve as a support for daily life or suspending these in traversing the fantasy, and 
confronting again the radical negativity upon which they are founded. Transgressing the 
symbolic order does not enable us to (re)establish inunediate contact with the 
presymbolic life substance. Rather it throws us back into what Zizek calls 'that abyss of 
the Real out of which our symbolic reality emerged' (Zizek, 1992: 54). This, as I have 
already said, allows the subject/spectator some leeway from the signifier but this 
analysis stops at that point of distanciation. Thence the criticism against psychoanalysis 
that it 'is only capable of decomposing the personality structure and cannot offer a 
positive altemative to the pathological structure it demolished' (Zizek, 1992: 66). To the 
question of why psychoanalysis isn't followed by "psychosynthesis", some 
reconstruction of sorts, Zizek retorts by saying that 'successful psychoanalysis as such 
already is the required "synthesis" insofar as it explains the genesis of the split, i. e. 
conceives of it in its becoming' (Zlzek, 1992: 66). In other words, the subject's 
confrontation with the originary drama of its positing of reality as the answer to its 
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inability to accede to full self-knowledge, grants the subject some detachment from its 
neurotic pursuit of meaning and the belief that it lies out there somewhere. By contrast, 
in a Deleuzian trajectory, the point of momentary suspension II is the entry into the 
dvnamics of the encounter, which forces one to think beyond the frame of recognition. 
Deleuze-Tournier's Robinson can be read as a cinematic figure in the sense that 
Deleuze's analysis of cinema also takes us to a site of madness where cinema 'spreads an 
"experimental night" or a white space over us' (Deleuze, 1989: 201). 
[I]t works N,,, Ith "dancing seeds" and a "luminous dust", it affects the 
visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the world with a suspension 
which contradicts all natural perception (Deleuze, 1989: 201). 
However, in the 'luminous dust' of that 'experimental night', something new is 
constituted rather than this night merely exposing the ground zero of representation as in 
Zizek's 'night of the world'. This new thing, a new constitution of bodies, as Deleuze 
describes it, is not new in the sense that it wasn't there before, but is new in the sense 
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that it wasn't perceived or felt before. On the other hand, this cinema of 'constituting 
bodies, and in this way restoring our belief in the world, restoring our reason ... giving us 
back reasons to believe in the world and in vanished bodies'has a price, which is, like 
Tournier's Robinson, a confrontation with madness (Deleuze, 1989: 201). 
[T]he object of cinema is not to reconstitute a presence of bodies, in 
perception and action, but to carry out a primordial genesis of bodies in 
terms of a white, or a black or a grey (or even in terms of colours), in 
terms of a "beginning of visible which is not yet a figure, which is not 
yet an action" [but] a process of constitution of bodies from the neutral 
image, white or black, snowy or flashed (Deleuze, 1989: 201). 
Deleuze's use of language here is very seductive and his evocation of the lununous 
particularity of black, grey and white resonate strongly with the sense of continuity 'in 
the face of absence that I encountered in the final scene of Disappearance at Sea. I 
would like to go with it, embrace it as a methodology, but I have a nagging 
doubt in the 
back of my mind, fed by what I perceive to be the disintegration of location that emerges 
in this primordial genesis. On the one hand, this luminous, differentiated, 
darkness 
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resonates with my relation to the blank screen in Disappearance at Sea, where the 
possibility of another kind of relation with absence, one where absence is populated with 
differentiating movements that traverse the passage between self and subject, emerges. 
However, on the other hand, I am still concerned with the question of the kind of body 
we are talking about here. The deformed/reformed horizon patterned by the light beam is 
still for me bound to a human body as opposed to Deleuze's emphasis on 'inhuman 
narration' (Deleuze, 1989: 102). 
Writing on Dean's work, Michael Newman elaborates on how the utter 
disorientation and destruction of the world brought about by the loss of the horizon 'can 
open up the possibility of a relation with another, infinite time and space' (Newman, 
2001: 25). Clearl-v, Deleuze's ideas in the cinema books point in this direction, as do 
Bersam's use of them. I do not necessarily disagree with this notion, but find myself 
cautious in appropriating ts opening out onto the infinite and the loss of 
finitude/location it seems to imply. This desire for the infinite bears traces of 
metaphysical longing and melancholy. While Dean herself is drawn to melancholic sites 
of abandonment and tragic stories of failure in relation to the infinite, my relation to 
Disappearance at Sea is the obverse of any melancholy sense of loss or failure . 
2' The 
film moment seemed, on the contrary, to engender a joyous sense of finite infinitude 
dependent on a sense of being located in time and space. 
Dean's discussion of the horizon of time in relation to another of her films, 
Banewl (1999), is particularly pertinent. This 59-minute film of the solar eclipse focuses 
on cows in a field, cutting intennittently between long-shots and close-ups of the cows 
and shots of the changing light in the sky. While for me, this film is less radical than 
Disappearance at Sea, its imagery being bound by more commonsensical spatial 
relations, Dean's description of the horizon of time in relation to Banewl bears 
comparison to Deleuze's aforementioned citation of Antonioni and the dual registration 
of the inhuman and the human. This is the direction I am going in, as opposed to the 
eclipse of the human in the suspended film moment of duration. 
151 
The eclipse was about waiting for darkness to happen and then equally for the return of a normal sun. The clouds allowed us to experience the 
coincidence of cosmic time and scale on our terms and in our human time, measuring it against the movements of animals and the fine detailing of the natural world (Dean in Dietrich, 2002: 49). 
While in Disappearance at Sea, the nightmarish quality of dark nights and disappearing 
images were more emphatic and not naturalized by overt reference to a humanly 
habitable ground as in Banewl, I would still want to locate the film's engendering of 
displacement on some kind of human scale. It is still a kind of spectator, some kind of 
"I", that locates the sense of disparate fragments being traversed in an additive 
accumulation, rather than as a mere digression that delays narrative closure. What kind 
of spectator is a displaced spectator? What kind of embodiment is generated here? 
3.7 THE FEMINIST SUBTEXT RETURNS: THE MATHEMATICAL SUBLIME 
RE-READ AS A MODE OF DIS/CONTINUITY THAT IS NOT OTHER TO 
THE DYNAMIC SUBLIME. 
D- 
TwS *1 Braidotti is a fetm* nist who speaking as a Deleuzian, 'believes that 
desire is the effective motor of political change, as opposed to willful transformation' 
(Braidotti, 1993: 54). Yet for her, as for me, there are contradictions in Deleuze's 
thinýg that make him both attractive and unconducive for a feminist praxis. As she 
points out, Deleuze's recourse to the perversity of dissolute multiple identities in his 
concept of becoming, a verb conjoined with the nouns woman, animal and child, can 
only be embraced by a male theorist located as a subject in relation to a phallic order. " 
While she finds his emphasis on a ground of desire unattached to specific coded objects 
useful, the one-sided emphasis of its co-existence of multiple temporalities tends to 
obviate against the very real and continuing struggle for recognition that is associated 
with a feminist subjectivity. 
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Fragmentation being woman's historical condition, we are left with the option of either disagreeing with Deleuze's theory of becoming, or of flatly stating that women have been Deleuzian since the beginnings of time (Braidotti, 1993: 51-2). 
Deleuze she says in failing to cross the time variable with the variable of sexual 
difference creates a 'naively undifferentiated' philosophy of time and becoming 
(Braidotti, 1993: 52). A feminist praxis is loathe to give up on embodiment as the very 
real site of struggle and negotiation of identity, This body is not reducible to anatomy or 
coded identity per se, but is an amalgamation of cultural and fantastical interrelations of 
signs. For me, a notion of embodiment is still operative in the film moment of 
suspension regardless of the liberation of the senses that can be instigated by the 
'expenimental night'that spreads itself across my field of vision. Braidotti gives a useful 
working definition of the body which, for me, signifies how embodiment impinges on 
any spectatonal relation, however immersive and infinitely dispersed it may be. 
The body in question is best understood as a surface of signification, 
situated at the intersection of the alleged facticity of anatomy with the 
symbolic dimension of language (Braidotti, 1993: 49). 
Therefore even if and when we are propelled beyond the symbolic dimension of 
language, we are not beyond the realm of signifying materiality. " My insistence on 
embodiment is not the same as the traditional phenomenological notion of the body as 
an anchoring site for a perceiving consciousness. Although, I am in sympathy with 
aspects of that tradition, which I shall look at in chapter four, I want to retain Deleuze's 
notion of the becoming actual of the virtual as it is suggestive of an infinite process of 
anchoring and potential. This notion is important to avoid the use of embodiment as a 
non-discursive materiality. 
Rather than asserting embodiment as mitigating against the delusions of an 
abstract universal attachment to the mental vertigo of infinity, which is common in 
feminist theory, I am interested in Christine Battersby's emphasis on transforming 
aesthetic tradition by thinking a 'response to the infinite and overwhelming [that] 
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involves immanence, rather than transcendence' (Battersby in Jones. 2000: 3 2). 31 
Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism' which locates the transcendental field as immanent 
. 4nd grounding as opposed to being beyond discourse is a positive move in this direction. 
While there are problems in his tendency towards the vertiginous devolution of the 
molecular, which for Braidotti has to do with his positioning as a (male) subject, there 
are glimpses in his thinking that attach this vertigo to the body, a tired and waiting body 
at that. 
The daily attitude is what puts the before and the after into the body, 
time into the body, the body as revealer of the deadline. The attitude of 
the body relates thought to time as to that outside which is infinitely 
further than the outside world (Deleuze, 1989: 189). 
This suggestion points in the direction of an embodied sublime, whereby the 
discontinuity that occurs in the encounter with the suspended (film) moment reveals the 
continuity of how the mark of time's passage through the body is always attached to the 
time of what Deleuze calls 'an indefinite life' (Deleuze, 2001: 29). 
Let me reiterate: 
This indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be 
one to another, but only between-times, between-moments, it doesn't 
just come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time 
where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the 
absolute of an immediate consciousness (Deleuze, 2001: 29). 
This immanence can be related to aspects of the Kantian sublime, the mathematical 
aspect as opposed to the dynarnic, which has to do with power and the preservation of 
the self in the face of immensity. Why would I want to make this link/leap? What does it 
have to do with the feminist subtext of this thesis? How does it relate to my encounter 
with Disappearance at Sea? In seeking to explore the possibilities for a feminist re- 
appropriation of the sublime, a sublime for female subjects, Jones tends to overlook the 
somewhat intractable nature of the sublime as a gendered mode of 
being. For both 
Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, the two main theorists of the modem sublime, only 
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men should attempt the sublime mode of thought that nature's incommensurability gives 
rise to. Female suýjects were relegated to the world of the particular, not having the 
rational (moral) capacity to encompass the abstract face of the universal. " I shall attempt 
*dc this b*nary in my rewo iI to overri II-- rking of the sublime, using Joan Copjec's mapping of 
the Kantian sublime onto Lacan's diagrams of sexuation (Copjec (1995)). While I do not 
subscribe to her position, it is worth rehearsing as it refon-nulates Zlzek's moment of 
'subjective destitution' in gender terms. In doing this, she allows me to clarify the terrain 
that needs to be remapped in order to expand on the sublime subjectivity the experience 
Disappearance at Sea generated for me. 
There are two types of sublime in Kant's formulation, the mathematical and 
the dynamic. The dynamic sublime is experienced as an overwhelming of the forces of 
nature, The subject appears to be caught up, dissolved in a flux of powerful material 
forces. However, the 'terrifying sight of nature's power is recuperated as it inspires man 
to transcend his phenomenal limits and reaffirm his supersensible destination' (Jones, 
2000: 39). Although different from the dynamic sublime, the mathematical sublime is 
also a discourse of power, albeit a conceptual rather than an actual power. Nell Hertz 
describes its impact in a manner conducive to my eventual reformulation. Rather than 
bemig threatened by an overwhelming force, as in the dynamic mode of the sublime, the 
nund is instead blocked 
by the fear of losing count or of being reduced to nothing but counting - 
this and this and this - with no hope of bringing a long series or a vast 
scattering under some sort of conceptual unity (Hertz, 1985: 40). 
However, In Kant this interminable flux is fearsome, a fear that instigates the 
compensatory positive movement whereby, following 'a painful pause', 
(a moment of 
suspension), the mind returns victorious and exults 'in its own rational 
faculties, in its 
ability to think a totality that cannot be taken 
in through the senses' (Hertz, 1985: 40). 
Dynamic or mathematical mode, the mind triumphs, in the former, being able to master 
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infinity, in the latter, being able to conceive of its irresolut I ion. The failure of the 
imagination is deemed necessarv to this latter mode. Hertz cites Kant: 
For there is here a feeling of the inadequacy of [the] Imagination for 
presenting the ideas of a whole, wherein the imagination reaches its 
maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks back into Itself, by which, however, a kind of emoti III in Hertz, satisfaction is produced (Kant 1985: 50). 
This emotional satisfaction is on the side of reason. It is derived from 'the recognition 
that what the imagination has failed to bring into a unity (the infinite or the indefinite 
plural) can nevertheless be thought as such, and that the agent of this thinking, the 
reason, must thus be a guarantor of man's "supersensible destiny"' (Kant in Hertz, 1985: 
50). However, as Thomas Weiskel points out, '[i]t is not logically necessary that the 
reason's capacity for totality or infinity should be invariably construed as power 
degrading the sensible and rescuing man from "humiliation" at the hands of nature' 
(Weiskel in Hertz, 1985: 52). 
Weiskel maps the sublime onto psychoanalysis, rather predictably seeing 
the shift from the excess (blockage) of the imagination to the conflict and struggle 
involved in moral reason as a shift from the maternal to the paternal superegoic 
identificatory pattern. The problem here is one that has continually arisen in this thesis - 
the positing of dualities situated in an oppositional, and hierarchical, relation to one 
another. The senuotic, excess, chaos, are seen as primary forces and are associated with 
femininity, the maternal, while structure, order, and narrative are seen as secondary 
forms applied to formlessness of the foriner, thereby guaranteeing the integrity/identity 
of the subject. Interestingly, in the light of my analysis of Zizek's moment of 'subjective 
destitution', Hertz states that although the moment of sublime blockage 'might have been 
rendered as one of utter self-loss, it was, even before its recuperation as sublime 
exaltation, a confirmation of the unitary status of the self (Hertz, 1985: 53 ). 33 As the 
typical feminist critique of (male) dissolution goes, you can only afford to ostensibly 
lose yourself if you have achieved the so-called unitary status of subject-hood in the first 
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place. And more importantly, this dependence means that any dissolution of the subject 
Nvill always refer back to the pre-posited unity rather than generating a new position on 
its own terins. Needless to say, I am arguing for the possibility of the latter. 
While Copjec's analysis is also framed in binary terms, she does not adhere 
to the notion of hierarchy and primary and secondary modes of being, which is a first 
step in attempting to conceive of another mode of being altogether. In Copjec's Lacanian 
framework, the female side of sexual difference, is mapped onto the mathematical side 
of the sublime. This side of Lacan's sexuation diagram is deemed to be a site of 
impossibility., because it lacks the limit necessary for the creation of a universe, a world 
out of the simultaneity of phenomena. This is opposed to the male, dynamic side of the 
sublime, which posits a limit that allows for the carving out of (phallic) identity from the 
totality of phenomena. On the female mathematical side, there is instead a moment 
where the failure of the imagination does not resurrect reason's ability to conceive of the 
(impossible) simultaneity of phenomena. Is there then simply an overwhelming of 
phenomena on the female side, which correlates to the traditional equation of femininity 
with excess? Does this moment of the dissolution of all limits (differences), as Braidotti 
warns, relegate femininity to the outside of culture/language/the social order? Yes, but 
only in terms of the external perspective found on the male side. There, yes, woman can 
be placed outside culture, signifying the 'possibility of a realm beyond, unlimited by our 
phenomenal conditions', a realin which depends precisely 'on the foreclosure of the 
judgement of existence' (CoPiec, 1995: 23 6). Thence the patriarchal notion that woman 
is incapable of ethical behaviour. However, between this difference, i. e. a 
difference 
between prohibition/lack and impossibility/lack of a lack, two kinds of 
failure ensue 
which are not symmetrical. 
The failure of representation to do anything other than present, in 
impoverished images of absence and vacuity, the negative aesthetics of 
the limit belongs 
to the male side. It is tinged with loss and melancholy. 
Failure is located differently on 
the female side. Absence or vacuity presents the impossibility of a metalanguage, 
the 
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impossibilitv to set a limit, what Co 'ec calls 'the surplus declarations of existence, Pi I 
(CoP. Jec. 1995 - 23 1). (1 am reminded here of my reference in chapter one to Kathy 
Acker's allusion to the eradication of metalanguage in performative writing. ) We seem to 
be back again to excess as the other side of narrative order, except that I would say that 
this feminine excess is onljý an excess from the perspective of the male side, the 
dynamical side 'where this surplus is subtracted from the phenomenal field' (Copjec, 
1995: 230). Copjec ends ReadMy Desire with the suggestion that'[i]t is now time to 
devote some thought to developing an ethics of inclusion or of the unlimited' (Copjec, 
1995: 236) rather than accepting the (male) perspective that because the female side has 
a lack of linut, women are micapable of developing the superegoic powers necessary for 
ethical behaviour. 
While this is beyond the scope of my argument, it is worth mentioning that 
in a chapter of her more recent Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation, 
Copjec attempts to develop this suggestion in terms of a generative absence. 34 Copjec 
focuses her argument on Kara Walker's The End of Uncle Tom and the Grand 
Allegorical Tableau ofEva in Heaven (1995), a wall Mstallation comprised of black life- 
size silhouetted paper cutouts of scenarios depicting black racial stereotypes. In relation 
to one of Walker's scenarios in this installation, depicting a group of women sucking one 
another's breasts, Copjec asks whether it is possible to speak of a sameness that is 
distinct from the opposition between sameness and difference of positive characteristics. 
This other sameness, she says, would be 'the return of self-difference rather than the 
elirnination of it' (CoPiec, 2002: 103). In relation to the blank (negative) space that exists 
between the silhouetted figures in Walker's installation, Copjec reads this encircled 
absence as a transgenerational gift of the object 'nothing'. 
" She says: 
The repetition of suckling women registers, I would argue, the woman's 
reencountering of her difference from herself. Here we have the portrait, 
in other words, of what Deleuze referred to as an "aesthetic existence, " 
the doubling or relation with oneself that is the rule of freedom (CopJec, 
2002: 103). 
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In proffering an ethics of inclusion or of the unlimited, Copjec's avowed Lacanian 
position begins to sound extraordinarily close to Deleuze's notion of narrativizatioin as 
serialization that I dealt with earlier in chapter two. Copjec asserts the possibility of the 
universe of women, as opposed to its impossibility, putting forward the notion of 
absence as something circling amongst women as a pure source of satisfaction, rather 
than the melancholy dissatisfaction it engenders in the male universe of possibility. The 
lack of a lack, the Lacanian position ascribed to the female side, rather than being 
relegated outside the differential series of language, takes up a position within it, 
becoming manifest as an uncanny realm able to mobilize absencefor an immediate yet 
contingent pleasiire - my emphasis. In this universe, rather than the absolute cut/limit of 
(male) subtraction, there is an additive opening out onto a continuous field of 
pleasurable discontinuity. This dis/continuity bypasses the categories of narrative as 
content (which attempts to limit/master the ultimate beyond, i. e. death) or non-narrative 
as an excess towards which is turned the melancholy face of reason. 
I would relate this mobilizing absence to the additive interval presented by 
Disappearance at Sea. Rather than the negative aesthetics of the sublime, the kind of 
sublimity presented by Disappearance at Sea generates a space of freedom, not as 
something I contemplate as a dry realm of possibility but as an inter(im)mediate site of 
inclusion. "I" cannot tell from where the light beam is emanating. In fact, it no longer 
seems to be coming from an outside source. It is not emanating from me either. 
Rather it 
spreads across the surface of the filmic scenario as a continuous 
inten-nittent rhythmic 
pulse, which enfolds the viewer as a series of light and dark wavelengths. 
If this 
sensation can be called sublime, it is perhaps in the sense of 
Adomo's insistence, in his 
critique of Kant's radical negativity, that'the sensual moment is itself 
differentiated' and 
does not necessitate repression by the abstraction of the 
'spiritualized work of art' 
(Adorno, 1984: 137). Adorno criticizes the conservatism of Kant's ascetic attitude. 
He 
says that '[b]y situating the sublime in the awesomeness of sheer magnitude, 
i. e., in a 
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dimension of power, he betrayed an unmitigated complicity with domination' (Adorno, 
1984: 284). Adomo's rephrasing of Kant resonates with the sense of (sublime) 
dislocation that Disappearance at Sea generates in the final scene. 
Mountains are sublime not when they crush the human being, but when 
they evoke images of a space that does not fetter or hem in its occupants 
and when they invite the viewer to become part of this space (Adomo, 
1984: 284). 
Is this intennediate space of inclusion, as I interpret it, related to Co jec's desire to think Pi 
about an ethics of inclusion in relation to a possible universe of women? Does the 
subjectivity I am exploring in relation to the (dis)continuous film moment, have 
something of a sublime femininity about it? 
The excessive blockage that Hertz' categorizes as Mstituting the 
mathematical sublime and which is fearsome in the Kantian model can be interpreted 
differently by recourse to Deleuze. Hertz' fonnulation of subliMe blockage as a 'this and 
this and this' bears a strikirýg resemblance to Deleuze's description of the interstice that 
relates images in a vertiginous spacing rather than a chain of associations with, of 
course, one distinction - it is not an occasion of blockage but dis/contMUous mobility. 
Fihn ceases to be "images in a chain ... an uninterrupted chain of images 
each one the slave of the next", and whose slave we are [ ... 
]. It is the 
method of BETWEEN, "between two images", which does away with 
all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, "this and then that", 
which does away with all the cinema of Being = is (Deleuze, 1989: 
180). 
It is because of the positivity of this mode of accumulation that I am drawn to Deleuze's 
concept of image narration in relation to that final scene in Disappearance at Sea. My 
thesis is that this scene repositions the either/or of a goal driven narrative as an 
interminable flux, a 'this and then that' and this and then that and so on ad finitum, which 
would relate to the sublime femininity I outlined with recourse to Copjec. 
However, as 
I have already stated, interminable flux, for me, does not rule out location, but 
reconfigures it as a process of signifying attachments rather than a set of 
fixed 
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identifications, I shall ftirther develop the operatics of location in chapter four. Here I 
just want to repeat that a reconceived notion of location is pertinent to a feminist prqject, 
as it differentiates the latter from the pervasive dissolution of identity that circulates in 
poststructuralist theory generally, and in Deleuze specifically. " While Hertz' 
forinulation initially seems to recapitulate the male side of the sublime, his discussion of 
Wordsworth's The Prehide enticingly suggests a way of conceiving of a 'this and then 
that' as a relation on its own ternis rather than being seen as an interminable field that 
requires the Oedipal imposition of narrative to give it form. His analysis of this poem 
brings me closer to my agenda to release the impoverished work of art's presentation of 
immensity from the negative aesthetics of sublime and the sacrifice of dis/continuous 
sensation, (the imagination), for the (moral) complexity of reason that traditionally goes 
Withit . 
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In his discussion of the last four lines of a passage from The Prelude, Hertz 
claJims that the poem tells of a moment of 'thoroughgoing self-loss - not the recuperable 
baffled self associated with scenarios of blockage, but a more radical flux and dispersion 
of the subj ect' (Hertz, 19 8 5: 5 8). (Needless to say, it is Hertz' idea rather than 
Wordsworth's poem that interests me. ) It is this version of sublimity that recalls for me 
the final scene in Disappearance at Sea where the confrontation of a one to one relation 
with the horizon is superceded for the dislocating effects of a continuously moving 
horizon that follows the cut to the blank screen. In the passage Hertz refers to, 
Wordsworth describes a state when 'objects become "melted and reduced/ To one 
identity, by differences/ That have no law, no meaning, and no end"' (Hertz, 19 8 5: 58 -9). 
This is reminiscent of Deleuze's unhinging of difference from the subjugation of identity 
and the fact that this unhinging does not reduce the world to indifference 
(Deleuze, 
1994: 268). As Hertz says 'it is not that differences disappear, but that the possibility of 
interpreting them as significant differences vanishes' (Hertz, 1985: 59). In this scenario, 
he claims, the poet risks tumbling into 
his text through the loss of distinction. However, 
in the poem, the poet encounters a 
Beggar's blank face which acts as an emblem that 
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'triangulates the poet's self in relation to his double, who is represented for a moment, as 
an emblem of minimal difference fixed in relation to itself (Hertz, 1985: 60). 
The power of the emblem is that it reestablishes boundaries between 
representor and represented and, while minimizing the differences 
between them, keeps the poet-impressario from tumbling into his text 
(Hertz, 1985: 60). 
In the becoming-light of the spectator generated by the final scene in Disappearance at 
Sea, is there something which acts as an emblem, a third term which simultaneously 
unites and differentiates rather than differentiates by separation? 
I would say that there is and that it is the conjunction of the cut and 
duration, which becomes a temporalized, intervallic, spacing in the return of the light 
beam. " In the continuous interstices of light and dark, which enfold the spectator, the 
inner sensations of becoming-light are exteriorized. Interestingly, Deleuze maintains that 
sensation 'is only a break within the flow of absolute consciousness' (Deleuze, 2001: 25), 
which again suggests the notion of rupture/disturbance. However, for Deleuze, 
becoming is bevond sensation conceived of as bodily affect. " Deleuze's 'transcendental 
empiricism' involves, 'however close two sensations may be, the passage ftom one to the 
other as becoming, as increase or decrease in power (virtual quantity)' (Deleuze, 2000: 
25 - my emphasis). 
40 What I want to emphasize here is the notion of an interstitial 
opening that is distinct from sensation, yet links the traffic of one sensation to the other 
in a disjunctive synthesis. In other words, I am arguing for a scenario where sensations 
are liberated from one another, yet a connective tissue links these disjuncts together as 
overlapping vectors that traverse the biological/cultural bodily entity but are not 
located 
within it. 
The notion of surface traversal as opposed to interior containment will 
become important in what follows, as the movement of sensation in this opening is 
divorced from ownership in the way that bodily sensations are not. This Invisible yet 
felt 
interval between the sur/faces of the on-screen gaps of 
light and dark conjoins with my 
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internal mapping of those sur/faces to produce an exterionty where the co-ordinates of 
inside and outside are extended in a flattened sequence, are, in effect, serialized. This 
point of opening is of course where the actual and the virtual are in constant dialogue, 
the shift from one to the other overlapping in a continuous repetitive motion rather than 
operating teleologically. 41 
Hertz' analysis of Wordsworth tallies with Rachel Jones' explicitly feminist 
analysis of the mathematical sublime, which can further add to this exploration (and 
accumulation) of the sublime subjectivity of the (dis)continuous film moment. Her 
analysis brings infinity and femininity together in a way that adheres to the concept of 
the spectator as a processual entity, yet does not forego the notion of location, albeit 
reconfigured. Her analysis is useful in avoiding the problems inherent in feminist film 
theory's insistence on the female spectator as a unitary entity, an insistence which led to 
42 - the concept's demise. Similar to Hertz, Jones also looks at the collapse of difference in 
poetry, in her case Expressionist poetry where images are provided in which '[t]he 
undoing of the perceptual subject [ ... ] mirrors the collapse of the external world' (Jones, 
2000: 36). In one of the poems she looks at, Lichtenstein's Punkt, this occurs by means 
of the permeation of the subject by an intense light whereby'the object-world becomes a 
flux of creeping luminosity, the gaze of the subject is extinguished, and objective reality 
itself collapses' (Jones, 2000: 36). The description of this image resonates with the shot 
in Disappearance at Sea of the close-up of the light bulb at night. The Kantian subject of 
the sublime, fearing the descent into undifferentiated chaos, would recuperate this failure 
of the imagination as the power of reason. However, for me, female spectator, the 
encounter with Disappearance at Sea demonstrates that the 'undoing of the perceptual 
subject' does not necessarily mean that the world is destroyed. 
In fact, very interestingly for my purposes, Jones suggests the continuance 
of a life world in the face of the destruction of recognition by recourse to Deleuze's 
ideas. The Expressionist vision of subject-object dissolution she says 'does not merely 
dissolve but reconfigures both poles of the subject-object relation' (Jones, 2000: 40). 
163 
Rather than opening out onto undifferentiated chaos, what she calls 'this posthuman 
sublime', which involves 'the reciprocal meltdown of suýject and object serves as a point 
of release for a dynamic life of transindividual intensive forces, unlimited by the organic 
boundaries of phenomenal nature of psychological unity' (Jones, 2000: 40). And more 
importantly for my purposes, she reconfigures this Deleuzian scenario in terms of female 
subjects. She says that 
[NN, Ihilst this dissolution ruptures the history of the modem subject, its 
significance is transfortned if viewed from the sideways perspective of 
those who have not been historically positioned as fully constituted 
subjects. For those who have been aligned with, rather than 
constitutively opposed to, both materiality and the object, the sublime 
dynamisation of the external world and the breakdown of stable 
boundaries between subject and object holds open the possibility that 
identity itself might be differently configured. On the contrary, the 
activities of animate matter might become that through which identity is 
formed without needing to oppose subjects to objects (Jones, 2000: 41). 
Rather than dissolution, Jones puts forward the idea of displacement, a term I have 
alreadv used in my analysis of Disappearance at Sea. It is not a question of the collapse 
of all differentiation between self and other, but rather the generation of 'transformative 
becornings' (Jones, 2000: 48). These transformative beconungs map out differential 
relations in a series on the surface of a mirror that glistens but does not reflect the 
oppositional relation between a subject that posits and an object posited. 
The 'narrative as story' progression of Disappearance at Sea stages and 
displaces all the sublime modes that Jones too displaces in favour of her re-reading and 
which I passed through in the 'montage text' on the film. The lighthouse on the horizon 
sets up the co-ordinates of the desire to transcend limits. The close-up of the lighthouse 
bulb supplants that desire by dissolving the categories of space and time - initially you 
know it is going from evening to night, but when night falls, the scene becomes grey and 
indistinct. The pacing of the lightbeam across the dark screen 
displaces locatable co- 
ordinates, reconfiguring them in a luminous spatiality, which reaches past me rather 
than 
being posited by me. The cut to the blank screen exposes the (back)ground of what 
has 
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been occurring in the film, i. e. the dispersal of the traditional narrative tropes of the 
either/or of progression/rupture or dissolution. This overtly non-narrative moment calls 
attention to the integrity of the opening that is closed off by narrative ordering. This 
opening moves me into the mu-nanence of a life lit by an animate materiality, released 
from being a frozen sea of surfaces, the mirror reflection being one such surface. 
[B]y relocating play in the infinite reaches of the Milky Way more 
usually associated with the sublime [ ... 
] such stellar spaces no longer 
constitute an abyss in which the imagination fears to lose itself [ ... ] 
but 
are instead the site of unbounded relations which orient those who are 
both active subjects and material objects via a ceaseless play of (self-) 
transformation (Jones, 2000: 49). 
To claim the final scene of Disappearance at Sea as generating a series of 'unbounded 
relations which orient those who are both active subjects and material objects via a 
ceaseless play of (self-) transformation', is to reclaim absence as a site of interstitial 
unfolding different from the negation of substance. 
My point is that Disappearance at Sea, in presenting a dynamic absence, 
makes continuity palpable, emphasizing the interconnections between different orders of 
time, machinic, human, and, eternal. The fact that time continues to pass in the 
suspended moment, the fact that the "I" continues to form as a locus for the on-going 
displacements effected in the face of dissolution, counters the idealism of Zizek's empty 
gaze of the stranger. To say this is not to fall prey to the egoic delusions of mastery that 
proponents of 1970s film theory claimed were engendered by film's 'illusory' continuity 
(see chapter two). The "I" here is not the stable unified subject premised and posited 
by 
film theory, but simply a grammatical locus for sensations that traverse and fracture a 
body in space and time. In this discontinuous continuity, difference is a 
'mere nothing in 
terins of metric time, the slightest disparity, which consists in 
being aware of an internal, 
intervallic vacuum, outside-in, future-past 
just arriving, just departing' (Canning, 
1994: 79). In this interstitial dis/continuity, the immanence of a life is felt in that moment 
before the impetus towards constructing secondary narrative structures 
hides its glow 
and integrity. What is produced in this space is a 
distribution of moments of reflection, a 
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series of constructions where identities form and disappear, not as oscillation but a series 
of continuous discontinuities. This immanence is in the world, not beyond it as 
possibility or outside it as impossible. This is what I would want to put on the female 
side of the sublime, a move that will have even more pertinence in relation to the 
I montage text' in section 4.2. based on News From Home, a film whose critical reception 
hinged around the image of woman as absent rather than absence per se. 
' See Teresa de Lauretis's essay 'Snow on the Oedipal Stage' in Alice Doesn't: Feminism, 
Semiotics, Cinema, (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1984) for a concise account of 
sexual difference in narrative and avant-garde cinema. In relation to Michael Snow's PRESENTS 
(198 1), she savs that 'women spectators find themselves placed once again in a negative semantic 
space' (de Lauretis, 1984: 76). It is this space that I seek to reanimate, the space between the so- 
called ' "active" look of the camera and the "passive" image on the screen, a space where, though 
invested by the cone of light from the projector, they [women spectators] cast no shadow' (de 
Lauretis, 1984: 76). 
2 Deleuze discusses the relation of continuity and 'non-chronological time relationships' in 
relation to Orson Welles, Alain Resnais, and Jean-Luc Godard in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, p. 
181. 
3 See Laura Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, (London: Macmillan Press, 1989) and Teresa 
de Lauretis, Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema. (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan 
Press, 1984). 
4 The translators introduction to Cinema 2: The Time-Image situates Deleuze's transition between 
the two cinema books in historical terms, referring to 'the crisis of the "action-image" after the 
Second World War. The unities of situation and action can no longer be maintained in the 
disjointed post-war world. This gives rise to the pure optical and sound situations from which the 
"direct time-image" emerges' (translators, 1989: xv-xvi). 
5 Deleuze defines the encounter as '[s] omething in the world forces us to think. This something is 
an object not of recognition but of a ftindamental encounter' (Deleuze, 1994: 139). 
6 For Deleuze, '[dlesire is not form, but a procedure, a process' (Deleuze, Kafka, 8). 
' Although coming from the phenomenological position that Boundas is critiquing, David Carr in 
Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) makes a similar 
point. While Carr insists on the collapse that ensues from fragmentation, saying that 
'if bodily 
coherence and coordination themselves fail us we are edging toward the nightmarish or towards 
unconsciousness', he also maintains that at any present we have the sense that experience will 
continue in the future because we expect our bodily equilibrium and co-ordination 
'to maintain 
themselves in future protention' (Carr, 1986: 28-9). 
8 The notion of an interrelation between a 'cracked P and the 'chaosmos' is akin to 
Deleuze's claim 
in Difference and Repetition to elaborate 'a Cogito for a dissolved self which would incoporate 
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elements of 'the originary "nowhere" and the displaced, inodified and always recreated "here-and- 
now" ' (Deleuze, 1994- xxi). Boundas, however, is here referring to Deleuze's The Logic ofSense, p. 176. 
9 In sticking to Boundas' figuration of Deleuze's lolýject = x, and narration. I am guilty of 
overlooking the phallic dimension of Deleuze's formulation of the 'object = x' and his proximity to Lacan. which is apparent in The Logic of Sense, pp. 227-229. Feminist scholars have critiqued Deleuze for his phallocentrism - see chapter 2 of Dorothea Olkowski's Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation. (Berkeley. Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), especially p. 3 9. However, Boundas' figuration lends itself to the evolving constellation of 
iny thesis in a Nva), that, for me, makes it worth suspending such concerns. 10 In connection with Deleuze's formulation of the interrelation between Eros and Thanatos, it is 
worth mentioning Leo Bersani's reading of Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'. In a similar 
vein to Deleuze, Bersani maintains that Freud reduces pleasure to a death like stasis which 
represses 'the masochistic, nonnarrative, timelessly replicative grounds of sexuality' (Bersani, 
1984: 39) (italics mine). However, by contrast to Deleuze, Bersani takes the deformation of 
narrative enacted by the force of the death drive in the direction of eroticization, of a masochistic 
self-shattering of the subject that desires to repeat a pleasurable intensity indistinguishable from 
pain. Deleuze also sees this deformation in terms of a masochistic theatre but he emphasizes the 
desexualization of Eros, a move which eradicates the subject of self-shattering that Bersam 
maintains. in favour of a kind of intense abstraction - the pure form of time (Deleuze, 1994: 114). 11 Interestingly enough, in The Ticklish Subject, Zizek seems to return to the mobility of desire in 
Lacan as opposed to the death throes of the drives. He critiques the circularity of the drives, the 
fact that they have no goal and get caught up in process. So there is a mobile world in Lacan, but 
it is on the side of inventing narratives by which the subject seeks to fill in the void at the heart of 
subjectivitý-. There is never a correct fit between the invention and the desire for meaning. The 
inconsistency between these registers, which inevitably keeps the subject's identity from absolute 
confirmation/closure, generates the creative practice of narration. This sounds logical. My 
problem with this approach to narration is that its creative motion seems to be pitted against an 
absolute void, which always threatens to undo the work of narrative rather than being its co- 
constituent. The subject is forever oscillating between narrative attachments and detachments, 
whereas I am trying to articulate a mode of narration outside these co-ordinates. Zizek's return to 
desire is consistent with his thinking in The Sublime Object of1deology where he seems less 
attached to the sublime act of annihilation. There he says that traversing the fantasy is bound up 
with the recognition of the terrifying dimension of this 'blind automatism of repetition' and then, 
'on the basis of this fundamental recognition, to try to articulate a modus vivendi with it' (Zizek-, 
1989b: 4-5). 
12 Deleuze's most precise account of the repression of difference in a system of representation can 
be found in the final chapter of Difference and Repetition. There he argues that' [flepresentation 
is a site of transcendental illusion' which subjugates difference to 'the identity of the concept and 
the thinking subject' rather than allowing the free circulation of difference (Deleuze., 1994: 265 & 
266). He argues for the openness of 'that profound fracture of the I which leads it to think only in 
thinking its own passion, and even its own death, in the pure and empty form of time' (Deleuze, 
1994: 266). 1 am associating this fracture with the film moment of suspension. However, unlike 
'subjective destitution', the T continues to exist and be affected in the moment of suspension. 
13 One of the most useful accounts of this notion of the image beyond representation that 
correlates with a Deleuzian approach as well as incorporating phenomenology is Jean-Luc 
Nancy's notion of the image as a form of presentation which allows the invisible to be seen in a 
kind of blind proximity. My main reference for this is a paper by Alena Alexandrova called 
'Touching Inside-Out' which was given at the IAPL Conference, Rotterdam, 8 Jun 2002. See 
http: u/barnetts/Alexandra. htm, accessed 13 Jun 2002. See also Jean-Luc 
Nancy's The Sense of the World, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), particularly the chapter 'Art, A Fragment', pp. 128-9. hi of infinite addition, 14 While Deleuze's notion of serialization lends an abstract air to ts process 
Gilberto Perez in The Material Ghost: Films and Their Mediums discusses narrative in film as an 
open-ended structure that is not synonymous with story which 
has a practical correlation with 
Deleuze. Perez makes a crucial distinction between dramatization and narrativization. Narrative 
constructed on dramatic principles has one action with a 
beginning, middle and end for its 
structure. Narrative outside of dramatic principles, on the other 
hand, is the presentation of an 
incomplete view of the world. it is the undoing of drama's negation of the world we 
inhabit 
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Closure here is always provisional, narrative as open-ended arrangement admitting of indefinite addition. To illustrate the point of narrative as an aggregate structure, he gives the example of Robert Flaherty's A loana (1926) where the camera is held on a boy climbing a coconut tree. The camera doesn't simply follow the boy but waits until he leaves the frame before moving higher to take in another view of him climbing the tree. The point here Perez says is that Flaherty makes a sequence of something that is not. We are given partial views of the scene in a piecemeal fashion. The scene is invested with the sense of a telling, one thing after another. Here, as opposed to the usual opposition between telling and showing, narration and description, telling in this sequence is a way of showing. 
Is I heard this paper at the conference 'Conducting Bodies: Affect. Sensation. &, Memory' at The University of New South Wales. Sydnev on July 19,2001 and, although as yet unpublished, I justiA, my use of it here because of its relevance to my thesis and on the basis of my extensive previous knowledge of Bersani's work. See notes x and xx this chapter, note xii chapter 1, and notes xxvii and xxviii chapter 4 for my other references to Bersani's published work. 16 Andrew Klevan, in Disclosure of the Eveývdqv: Undramatic Achievement in Narrative Film discusses Ozu's Late Spring (1949) in terms of the revelation of the everyday in the 'careful 
patterning of mundane locations' that is contrary to Schrader's notion of rupture and disparity (Klevan, 2000: 145). Earlier in the book, Klevan, while in sympathy with Deleuze's insistence of a new encounter being revealed in the everyday scenario, is critical of what he calls Deleuze's tendency 'to speak the extreme language of limit situations' (Klevan, 2000: 47). My trajectory 
will also lead me towards a similar critique of Deleuze. " Insisting on the perspective of 'the female feminist subject', Rosi Braidotti critiques the naive 
undifferentiation of Deleuze's theory of becoming and philosophy of time. She posits that, rather 
than the Deleuzian dissolution of identities based on the Phallus which bypass gender., it is 
necessan, to insist on the 'politics of location' (Braidotti, 1993: 54). "' See for example John Johnston's 'Machinic Vision', Critical lnqui, ýv, 26 (Autumn 1999) which 
embraces the infinity of Deleuzian gaseous perception as a way of describing the decoded field of 
electronic iniformational impulses. Johnson appropriates chapter eight in Cinema 2: The Time- 
Image where the contact between 'cerebral processes and membranes ... replace screen, film stock, and camera', as a way of evaluating cinema (Johnston, 1999: 45). This is the very chapter with 
which I shall part company later on as I remain attached, like Dean and Akerman, to the 
materiality of film process and its relation to a material rather than an android body. 19 Bersani stated in the lecture that the inspiration for this notion is Deleuze's cinema books and 
his use of Henri Bergson's ideas. 
20 There is much in Bersam's earlier essay 'Stalled Movement' that is pertinent to my exploration 
of how the scene of spectatorship is dispersed by the impact of Disappearance at Sea's immersive 
light movements. I find myself in sympathy with Bersani's discussion of spectatorship when, in 
discussing the repetitions of Alain Resnais'Afon Oncle dAmerique, he states that It1he unified 
ego that might have mastered the film is now scattered within the film, and the ego is reduced to 
(or enobled by? ) a consciousness of itself as the moves of a cinematic composition' (Bersani, 
1993: 179). However, the outcome of this dispersal is ultimately a reconnection with a lost 
nature, a return to an all-embracing nature that identity removes us from. He discusses a moment 
where the boundaries of one of the characters, Claude, are visually absorbed into a reflection of a 
tree, the branches becoming his netowrk of veins and arteries. For Bersani '[t] hat reflection, then, 
opens him up - as if he were abruptly cut open ... and as 
if he were rejoined - ripped away from 
his self-imprisoning aphorisms - to the world' (Bersani, 1993: 207-8). These sentiments are 
repeated in the analysis of the disappearance of the horizon in Le Alepris. 
21 For Deleuze. the term imaginary, if it is to be used at all, has to do with the indiscernibility of 
the real and the unreal rather than relating to a pre-symbolic realm of being (Deleuze, 1995: 66). 
22 This other pathway, in which an emphasis on the potentiality of everyday banality is found, is 
also picked up on by Jon Beasley-Murray in his essay 'Whatever Happened to Neorealism? 
Bazin. Deleuze, and Tarkovsky's Long Take'. He states that as opposed to serniological readings 
of cinema, 'which remain content to avow the impossibility of the real' (Beasley-Murray, 1997: 8 
web version), Bazinian or Deleuzian realism 'promote the possibility of inhabiting a real defined 
as radically ambiguous and open' (Beasley-Murray, 1997: 1 web version). Related to this context, 
Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier refers to Deleuze's 'second voice', which comes through in 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, a voice in which 'there can be heard the echo of a demand for love 
that does not come from love of film alone', (Ropars-Wuilleumier, 1994: 259). She frames this 
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second voice in terms of rupture, but it is a rupture in which negotiation (continuity) takes place rather than avant-garde suspension. 
A rupture between man and the world has been carried out, but the cinema offers a mirror where this rupture can be read, and in being read. is sutured. Not a reconciliation. but a conciliation, is offered by film, which negotiates an exchange between the image and the real (Ropars-Wuilleumier, 1994: 259). 
23 However, in a manner that does relate to this thesis, Dews' reading tallies with Christian Kerslake's analysis of the Hegelian notion of sense as a connective means of expression between the universal and the particular rather than being the prerogative of either of these realms. See 'The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuze and the Problem of Immanence', Radical Philosophy, 113 (May/June 2002). In other words, the view of language that Zizek ascribes to Hegel, i. e. that the word murders the thing, does not take into account that for Hegel negation is not absolute but a movement that links thought and experience. 24 Schizoanalysis is of course a pun on psychoanalysis and is proffered to counter the organising forces of the latter, what Deleuze, with Felix Guattari, calls 'arborescent structures' based on the hierarchical structure of a tree as opposed to rhizomatic. a-centred structures. 'Schizoanalysis 
... treats the unconscious as an acentred system, in other words, as a machinic 
network of finite automata (a rhizome). and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the 
unconscious' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 18). 
25 Is it any wonder that Zizek claims that when Lacan says "I raise myself up against the 
philosopher of perversity", the philosopher he has in mind is Deleuze? (Zizek, 2000: National 
Film Theatre. London - my lecture notes). In The Metastases ofEnjoyment: Six Essays on Women 
and Causaliýv, Zizek calls Deleuze a perverse philosopher because he omits the redress of the 
symbolic order. Deleuze deals with the Real and the Imaginary, omitting the third term of 
castration, which instigates the constitutional lack upon which the subject is founded (Zizek, 
1994: 136n26). The stabilization of the dispersal of sense in the Real by means of the Lacanian 
notion of the transcendental signifier is what Deleuze, influenced in part by Lacan's notion of the 
Real, would object to in the latter's philosophy (Deleuze, 1995: pn Negotiations). 26 See Deleuze's discussion of a contemplation prior to perception/sensation in Difference and 
Repetition, p. 74.01kowski's account of narcissism inspired by Deleuze in Gilles Deleuze and the 
Ruin ofRepresentation echoes Leo Bersam's discussion of narcissism as a mode of inaccurately 
repeating the forins in the world as one gravitates towards them. See 'A Conversation with Leo 
Bersani', October, no. 82, (Fall, 1997). 
27 The notion of the constitution of a new body via a cinema of liberated sense organs has 
precedence in Sergei Eisenstein's notion of the fourth dimension in cinema, a dimension 
perceptible only to a liberated sensory field itself dependent on the interrelation between 
rhvmthic and overtonal montage. While the use of rhythmic montage is minimal and irregular in 
Disappearance at Sea, the use of sharp splicing combined with lengthy, static shot duration, 
creates a pulse that generates an invisible (overtonal? ) plane which could be said to resonate with 
the spectator's physio-psychological (inner) bodily rhythms. See Eisenstein's 'The Fourth 
Dimension in Cinema' in The Eisenstein Reader, (ed) Richard Taylor, (London: BFI, 1998). 
While Deleuze's political agenda is less definable than Eisenstein's, for Deleuze too 'the birth of 
the visible which is still hidden from view' has revolutionary potential, having to do with the 
collective utterances of 'the people who are missing' (Deleuze, 1989: 201 & 221). 
28Dean's attraction to Bas Jan Ader's fatal performance piece In Search of the Miraculous 11 
(1975) is a case in point. Ader, a 1970s conceptual/performance artist interested in exploring 
boundaries between art and life, was lost at sea in making this work, which involved crossing the 
Atlantic from Falmouth, Cornwall, to Falmouth, Massachusetts in a l3ft sailboat. In Search ofthe 
Miraculous 1 (197? ) consisted of a series of 16 black & white photographs, the last in the series 
showing Ader standing at the ocean's edge by night, illuminating the water with a flashlight. As I 
have already mentioned, Dean's lightbeam in the final scene of Disappearance at Sea was made 
by shining a flashlight on a piece of steel. It may be happy coincidence, but its worth 
remembering that her film Disappearance at Sea II (Voyage de Guerison) (19 97), which takes 
the Tristan and Isolde story as an oblique reference, is a journey about healing. That 4 minute 
film, which records the horizon line where sea meets sky from a lighthouse by day, ends with the 
blinding force of sunlight almost eradicating the horizon. Then the film plunges into darkness, a 
series of rumbling noises erupting as the projector continues to motor for a few minutes longer. 
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, C) This is also the basis of Lisa Jardine's critique of Deleuze. See Olkowski's useful summary of feminist critiques of Deleuze in chapter 2 of her Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin oJRepresentation. In 'A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics', Elizabeth Grosz takes a pragmatic view of how Deleuze can be of benefit to feminism - see Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of'Philosophy, Constantin Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (eds), (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 187-212. 
30 The notion of the body as itself a surface of signifying materiality co-extensive with language rather than divorced from it will be developed via phenomenology in chapter 4 of this thesis. However, here I think it is pertinent to mention how feminist theorists such as Teresa de Lauretis 
in the 1980's would find the serniosis of Charles Sandor Peirce more conducive to thinking of the field of meaning in terms of social change. while the orthodox abstraction of Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic theories influenced Lacan and Zizek. It is also worth noting that Vicki Kirby 
in Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, exposes the dynamic fluidity of signification 
that de Saussure discovered and attempted to control by abstraction. Her purpose is to undermine the false dichotomy between nature and culture, body and language, a project which has a 
particular investment for feminism. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze refers 
constantly to Peirce in order to explore the signifying substance of the imaginary but he leaves 
him behind in Cinema 2: The Time-Image where the Nietzschean universe of becoming and 
eternal return is embraced. However, there are moments within Deleuze's shift in emphasis from 
materiality to chaosmotic melting, where he maintains a connection to the real. This is why I insist, as does Braidotti and Grosz, that aspects of Deleuze's philosophy are profitable to the 
feminist project of new subjectivities. For a useful introduction to Peirce's serniosis, see James 
Hoopes introduction to Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic, (Chapel Hill and London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 199 1) where he discusses thought as a process of 
interpretation possessing a material quality and thence as bodily feeling. 
31 For Jones the purpose of this is to philosophically reinstate 'a sublime for female subjects' 
(Jones, 2000: 33). who. in Western modernity, have instead been 'culturally aligned with matter, 
embodiment. affect, and "nature"' (Jones, 2000: 32). 1 am less keen on naming this immanent 
sublimity female, as I think that the male model of the sublime doesn't account for a male subject 
per se but reduces the latter to an abstraction. Instead of the engendering of a (sublime) space for 
subjectivity to engage with itself, the male subject of the sublime does not engage with himself 
but with the higher invisible force of Reason. 
32 See Christine Battersby's Genius and Gender: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics, (London: 
Women's Press, 1986), for an account of the sublime in terms of gender. In Edmund Burke's 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) he 
contrasts the terror of the sublime to the delicacy and gracefulness of the beautiful. While Kant in 
The Critique of Pure Reason (178 1) insists that 'only males should attempt the sublime' 
(Battersby, 1986: 77). 'Thefair sex hasjust as much understanding as the male, but it is a 
beautiful understanding, whereas ours should be a deep understanding, an expression that 
signifies identity with the sublime' (Kant in Battersby, 1986: 77 - emphasis hers). 
33 Also of interest in Hertz' analysis is his use of this mode of the sublime to describe the scenario 
of the scholar who in this day and age is subjected to more than s/he could ever hope to know or 
read, the flood of publication threatening 'the very knowledge that publication purports to serve' 
(McFarland in Hertz, 1985: 4 1). Rather than culture aiming at an integration of awareness which 
should mean that one reads less, the proliferation of secondary literature provides more to 
consume so that one's own thinking becomes blocked by other people's ideas beyond a certain 
point. I have acutely felt the repercussions of this scenario throughout the writing of my thesis. In 
this chapter, I am deliberately referring to secondary literature on Kant, not to simply give an 
account of what he says, but because this literature is more pertinent to the ultimate trajectory of 
my thesis. (I am referring to Jones, Hertz, and CopJec here. ) McFarland, somewhat farcically 
takes this to its logical conclusion that there will be more and more remembered by the computer 
and forgotten by man, and that 'the test of meaningful publication will be to think and write in a 
way a computer could not' (McFarland in Hertz, 1985: 42). Somewhat farcically as he 
nevertheless goes on to add to this literature, calling up the figure of Schopenhauer in which to 
voice his dismay at the current state of things. Hertz sees this position of the scholar 
in sublime 
terms - he reaches a limit and 
falls back on the proper scholarly name to recuperate the immensity 
of the flood of publication. Ropars and Polan also put forward the same point 
in relation to the 
use of the names of film directors in the cinema books, that they are the only points of 
location in 
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a project that designs to take on board the immensity of time as the outside that cinema puts one 
into communication with. 3' The chapter I refer to is called 'Moses the Egyptian and the Big Black Mammy of the Antebellum South: Freud (with Kara Walker) on Race and History, pp. 82-107.1 first heard CopJec present this chapter at the conference Woy Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ICA, London, 
November, 2000. 
35 To the list of Freudian objects: the breast, the facces, the phallus, Lacan adds three more: the 
gaze, the voice, and the object 'nothing' (Lacan, 1979: 103). 
36 See Rosi Braidotti's Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Diffirence in Contemporary 
Feminist Theoty, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) for her insistence on new figurations of location and embodiment and their importance to feminism as a kind of nomadism. See especially her chapter on Deleuze, 'Discontinuous Becomings: Deleuze on the Becoming- 
Woman of Philosophy', pp. II 1- 12 3. 
3- Although Jean-Francois Lyotard is critical of Burke's sensational sublime and Kant's emphasis 
on mastery, his contemporary reworking of the sublime echoes these sentiments. For Lyotard, the 
sublime moment is similar to the radical film theory's avant-garde moment of distanciation in that 
it counters contemporary tendencies towards the so-called democraticization of (aesthetic, 
cognitive. political) experience, which emphasize unity, security, identity, popularity (Lyotard., 
(1984b)). The sublime is a critical moment of self-reflection whereby works of art investigate 
whether they will be able to find an audience. Worthy works are thereby perceived by Lyotard as 
being directed towards the future as a possible horizon and they generate a dismantling of 
consciousness in the viewer. coupled with the suspension of the question (moral) Is it happening? 
(Lyotard, 1984a: 43). 
What is sublime is the feeling that something will happen, despite everything, 
within this threatening void, that something will take "place" and announce that 
everything is not over. That place is mere "here", the most minimal occurrence 
(Lyotard, 1991: 93). 
Joanna Zy1inska, who argues for a feminine mode of the sublime as a form of displacement in an 
argument that partly resonates with mine, insists on the applicability of Lyotard's aesthetics and 
she unabashedly alters his emphasis on the future tense to the immediacy of the here and now. 
Although. I am arguing for the immediacy of displacement also, I find her appropriation of 
Lyotard problematic. 
Indeed, Lyotard has drawn our attention to the possibility of the sublime 
occurring in the most minuscule perspective: It is the fact that something (rather 
than nothing) is actually taking place that for him is the source of sublime 
feeling (Zylinska, 2001: 7). 
I would argue that for Lyotard, while the questioning is taking place, it is a proposition directed 
towards the future, which inflects the present moment with negativity. The sublime is aesthetic 
resistance to the illusions of totality rather than a generative mode of self-mediation/affection in 
the present. 
3" D. N. Rodowick also focuses on the interval in his Gilles Deleuze's Time Allachine, (Durham 
and London, Duke University Press: 1997), pp. 144-145. 
39 It is worth noting that feminists who use Deleuzian ideas such as Rosi Braidotti and, more 
importantly for this thesis, Barbara Kennedy on film, pursue the line that Deleuze is a 
philosopher of bodily affect. I shall refer to this in more detail in chapter 4. 
40 He emphasizes even more in What is Philosophy?, co-authored with Felix Guattari, that he is 
not talking about bodily sensation but sensation liberated from bodily co-ordinates. 'Sensations, 
percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any 
lived' (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1994: 164). 
41 In'Toward the Unknown Body', Theatre Topics, vol. 10, no. 2,2000, Petra Kuppers's puts 
forward a not unrelated notion of a third term that circulates between the actual and the virtual. 
For her this is the term 'change, see p. 137. She also uses the virtual in relation to corporeal 
feeling. 
42 See Annette Kuhn's, Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema, (London and New York: 
Verso, 1994), p. 214 for an account of this problematic in female spectatorship. Also see Janet 
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Bergstrom's and Mary Ann Doane's 'The Female Spectator: Contexts and Directions', Camera 
Obscura, nos 20/21, May-September, pp. 5-27. 
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Chapter Four 
4.1 PERFORMING THE DIS/CONTINUOUS FILM MOMENT FROM THE 
FUTURE: STEPHEN HEATH AND THE IMPOSSIBLE QUESTION OF A 
WOMAN'S DESIRE. 
Having articulated the film moment of suspension as mobilizing a series of 
continuously displacing movements that generate a spectatori I is ial field of undulation, a'th* 
and then that'and so forth, I felt that I needed to find a way of expanding on embodiment 
and location that would go beyond the limits of a Deleuzian model without backtracking 
into essentialism. While Deleuze provides an account of a liberated subjectivity that 
resonates NvIth the encounter with Disappearance at Sea, that encounter was still an 
occasion for the embodiument of liberated sensations rather than an occasion of an absolute 
dissolution of the body. This latter tendency in Deleuze seems to repeat traditional notions 
of the sublime, merely substituting the celebration of the shattering of the ego into cosmic 
particles for the fear that institutes mastery over such shattering. The integrity of the subject 
is still maintained. Using a ferninist approach to the sublime and ideas of dissolution, the 
term displacement is more appropriate to my project as it not only retains some reference to 
location, but also implies the undermining of the maintenance of the subject. In other words, 
the spectator, while continually being displaced in relation to itself, still serves as a channel 
for the differentiated movements of space and time that occur in the film moment that 
suspends recognition. These differentiated spatial and temporal movements, their dynamic 
extensions and infinite serializations interface with a body that has a dimension particular to 
it. 
in my insistence that this interfacing is a fonn of location, a link with 
phenomenology suggests itself However, such a link would have to be strategically made 
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rather than overtIv embraced due to the emphasis in classical phenomenological approaches 
on a sovereign consciousness able to observe and deduct the essence of its location. The 
form of embodiment I am exploring is divested of a gaze that would soar above the 
phenomena in which it is iminersed. In his Phenomenology ofPerception, Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty says something similar: 'The perceiving body does not successftilly occupy different 
points of view beneath the gaze of some unlocated consciousness which is thinking of them. 
For it is reflection which objectifies points of view or perspectives, whereas when I 
perceive, I belong, through my points of view, to the world as a whole, nor am I even aware 
of the limits of my visual field' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 329). However, even in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserlian transcendence, the subject is still performing on an 
object, as becomes explicitly clear in the chapter in Phenomenology ofPerception on the 
sexual object. ' That said, it is to Merleau-Ponty's unfmished, posthumously published, The 
Invisible and Visible that I tum to develop a theory of the displaced form of embodunent 
that I find in the suspended film moment. The evolution of Merleau-Ponty's ideas in this 
book have inadvertent links with Deleuze's, but importantly differ from them in avoiding 
cosrmc dissolution without inevitably positing a body as a container, a definition which 
implies the kind of depth model I have been undermining with recourse to Deleuze. So, 
what I set out to look for at this stage of my journey was a way of uniting the notion of 
displacement with location in the film encounter. 
At this point it seemed necessary to the development of the argument that the notion 
of embodied displacement, while suggested by the encounter with suspension in 
Disappearance at Sea, should be thought in relation to another film encounter. This had less 
to do with a desire to compile a comparative study, which would relate a number of film 
examples together, and more to do with the logic of the encounter. The singularity of the 
encounter should be repeatable; otherwise it might seem like an otherworldly experience, 
whereas I am claiming that what the encounter reveals is the pulsating movements of a 
life. 
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These movements are singular, but are nonetheless on-gomig like a humming noise that 
occurs in tandem with the dramatic forins of narrative that structure a day, a humming noise 
that is constant, yet nonetheless breaks off every so often for a breath to be taken. Needless 
to say, this gap between breaths is barely perceptible. 
One of the features of Disappearance at Sea that was key to this revelation, In 
conjunction vvith and inclusive of the cut to the blank screen, was the fact that the film was 
empty of all dramatic action, engendering a feelMg of boredom in the spectator. One was 
keen1v aware of the passing of time. But this boredom in the face of nothing happening was 
siMUltaneously engrossing, due to the proximity to an image whose light effects 
hypnotically revolved around and around and the use of static camera. The image was 
safeguarding the spectator's boredom, keeping it from falling into stupor or distractiOn. 2 It 
was this paradox of a boredom that is simultaneously fascinating that created the context for 
the enliVenmg subsistence in emptiness that occurs with particular force in the final cut. 
One's habitual identity displaced by the forgetting of self engendered by the moment of 
blank suspension, its energy turns towards the movement of the body through time. While 
this movement is continuous, a formal encounter seems to be required to reveal it. I wanted 
to find such a space again to confirm, paradoxically, that is always happening and that it can 
happen again. 
At one of the screenings scheduled to coincide with Tacita Dean's ediibition at Tate 
Britain, 200 1,1 encountered another moment of displacement which located me in a moving 
relation to the surface of the film image and subjected me to the liberating movements of 
difference within the self and that displace the self in relation to itself. The fihn was Chantal 
Akerman's News From Home (1976). The film is 90 minutes long and for most of that Wine, 
the camera presents statically held shots of what seem like the back streets of 
New York. I 
would have found the duration of these shots boring in the extreme 
initially if it were not for 
the fact that, similarly to Disappearance at Sea, this film also resonated with a 
fragment of 
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my autobiography. About ten minutes into the film, Akerman reads the first of the letters 
that are scattered throughout the soundtrack. I too had received almost the same letters on 
moving from one countn, to a city in another. Ordinarily, this detail would occasion an 
identification between filmmaker and spectator, an identIficatIon that film theory considers 
an over- identification, collapsing the female spectator's difference fi7om the female 
protagonist and replicating the relegation of the mother/daughter lack of distinction in 
Mulvey's 'half-light of the imaginary' (Mulvey, 1975: 7). ' However, like a third term that 
prevented the poet from collapsing into his text in Hertz' analysis of The Prelude, and yet 
was not the infamous third tenn of Oepidal logic, in News From Home, the disinterested 
duration of the shots, the sense of giving oneself over to their time, acted like a third term 
making the collapse of positions between mother/daughter, filmmaker/spectator beside the 
point. Instead, the spectator is opened up to the sense of the non-goal oriented witnessing of 
a life. Speaking of a performance video installation, yet relevant here, Petra Kuppers states 
that 'the witnessing of life affords a bridge between spectator and object, via the "third 
term", change, without collapsing the object into the same (that is, without making the 
spectator and the object the same)' (Kuppers, 2000: 137). 
This sense of a free-floating witnessing of a life, the subsistence in a non-goal 
oriented activity characteristic of certain states of boredom, is different from the strategic 
mducement of boredom that was the effect of the distanciating filmic strategies in 1970s 
avant-garde film such as Peter Gidal's. 4 Gidal wanted to return the viewer to his or her own 
situation in real time and space - the film not offering the comforts of second order narrative 
escape. However, the difference between one kind of boredom and another is the degree of 
fascination that accompanies it. ' Watching News From Home or Disappearance at Sea or, 
for that matter, one of Warhol's static camera films, the sense of boredom one finds oneself 
in does not distance one from the screen image. It is not a case of avant-garde 
boredom as 
resistance, but a concentrated boredom that fixes attention 
in relation to the image. 
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In one of his more poetic essaN- s, Peter Gidal discussing boredom Warhol's early 
films says that '[c]oncentration on nuances of movement (in time) not only makes the 
slightest change of position (even breathing) important, but also is involved with silence in 
visual terms. It is not stasis, but a silence fi//ed'(Gidal, 1971: 90). Gidal, in going on to 
assert that in this extended durational confi7ontation with another on-screen, 'one learns, 
hypnotically, about change (one's own and that of an 'other')' (Gidal, 1971: 90), clearly 
attributes this awareness of inner movement to the spectator, which is where I would want to 
situate it. This form of boredom is not distraction or ennui but a sense of subsisting in the 
absence of goal directed activity and being opened to the inner vibrations of this space. 
Rather than being empty, this boredom is full of the pulse of the body, the inner perception 
of a 'this and then that', the accumulation and passage of time in the body, the body as a 
deadline that moves and is moved by linkages that form between the folds of each 
serialization to which it is subject(ed). The sense of these inner movements were constant 
throughout News From Home, but again, near the end of the film, inaugurating the end of 
the Min, a particular encounter with a fleeting suspended moment engendered a particular 
configuration of the pulse beat of emptiness. Again, the encounter with another 
dis/continuous film moment motivates me to attempt to mobilize its dynamic in a textual 
performance, hence the second 'montage text' in section 4.2. In this encounter, the "I" finds 
itself moving in relation to other exterionzations of movement in a mode of a temporalized 
spacing, a series of gatherings and dispersals that are continually travelling towards other 
aggregations of the self. It is this performance that I am offering as a form of narration, a 
voicing of that substrate of existence which, in an economy of second order narrative, would 
be called the hidden secret of things (Ricoeur, 1984: 76). 
News From Home is doubly interesting in ternis of how its historical context adds to 
the structure of the argument of this thesis. It brings me back to 1970s film theory and, 
moved forward by my Deleuzian-inspired reading of Disappearance at 
Sea, It allows me to 
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reconfigure phenomenology as an answer from the future to the historical question of 
absence in News From Home. While Aken-nan is documented in tenns of feminist filin 
history, News From Home occupies a place in the history of fihn theory that is not reducible 
to the categorization of Akerman in tenns of feminist fihn history per se (Kuhn (1982), de 
Lauretis (1987), Fowler (1995), Barker (1999)). This other place, which is more pertment to 
my exploration here, is Stephen Heath's discussion Of News From Home as an example of a 
film that 'did not suture in the way of the system' (Heath, 198 1: 100). However, for him in 
198 1, the displacements that thereby ensue as a result of the film's refusal to solder'the 
junction of symbolic and imaginary' are read in terms of the negativity of resistance (Heath, 
19 8 1: 10 1). They have to do with 'the construction of a central absence - the absence of the 
daughter, differently posited on image and sound tracks', what Heath refers to as 'the 
impossible question of a woman's desire' (Heath, I gg 1: 99). 6 The negatiVity of this question, 
the refusal to positivize feminine desire, as to do so would still fall prey to the dominant 
logic of patriarchy, bears a tangential relation to Zizek's reference to the femMine act that 
suspends ideological ties In relation to Karin in Stromboli. Heath's analysis of News From 
Home: 
Following the Oudart-Dayan scenario, there is then no suture: the look is 
not appropriated into the imaginary field of the film, the Absent One is not 
resolved, the fihn has no shot/reverse shot sequence, no figuration of the 
images, nothing but their continual replacement. Yet, the spectator is 
included and moved in the film, in a structure and a rhythm of lack and 
absence (which are not the same thing). What is the direction of these 
images for this voice and its story, of this voice and its story for these 
images? The final shot can retrospectively produce the images as those of 
the daughter but the film remains in its tune in the lack of each image 
We are placed in the film but that place is not secured, is shifted, and turns, 
in the meanings the film makes in that insecurity, in those dislocations, on 
the construction of a central absence - the absence of the daughter, 
differently posited on image and sound tracks. From that absence, the filin 
refuses to suture, to convert Other to Absent One (such a conversion near to 
the position of the mother in her letters), hence to resolve as the sign of 
something for someone, to fix a unity - "sign represents something for 
someone". Or rather, it refinds suture effectively as a term of the logic of 
the signifier, poses the problem of the relations of the subject on the 
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symbolic and the holding of those relations in the imaginary, in which 
problem lies the real of the film, that of ferninism, and of film, that of 
image, voice, noise, duration, rhythm, the impossible question of a woman's 
desire in all that (Heath, 1981.99-99). 
Can the question of impossibility, absence, and negativity, be thought differently from the 
perspective of my viewing of the film in 2001, given the theoretical trajectory of my journey 
in this thesis'? 
In the feminist subtext in section 3.7,1 ended with the notion that a mobilizing 
absence, N-N-hich engenders continuous discontinuity, 'disjunctive synthesis' is on the female 
side of the sublime (mode of being). The displacements that occur on this continuum do not 
relate to absence as a rigid structural principle, or as an unrepresentable gap, which the 
figure of Nvornan signifies in discourses of patriarchy. Instead, I am arguing they generate a 
ceaseless play of self-transformations, performances of temporalized spacMg. Watching 
News From Home in 200 1,1 am far removed in time from Heath's preoccupations, although 
at the beginning of this research, I was still close to the theoretical context that infornis his 
work. However, followIng the encounter with Disappearance at Sea and subsequent 
reading, I became attuned to the durational dimensions of suspended film moments rather 
than thev being representative of a frozen or digressive distanciation. Therefore, when I 
encountered the moment of suspension that Heath refers to in News From Home, "I" was 
placed differently in relation to it. Instead of posMg a question around an absence, the film 
moved me beyond any meta-analysis of impossibility, and threw me instead into the 
sensational flux of a 'this and then that' rather than a 'this is not that yet'. This other 
kind of 
movement gets one out of the impasse of the parameters of oscillation that Heath operates 
withm m the chapter m Questions of Cinema, 'Film Performance'. 
I am interested in reconfigunng Heath's notion of film perfonnance, as I think 
it has 
something to add to Peggy Phelan's contemporary ontology of performance as a suspended, 
but animated, unmarked present (Phelan, 1993: 156). While I am in sympathy with 
Phelan's 
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emphasis on the 'generative possibilities of disappearance' effectuated in the performative 
moment, her ontology risks reifying that disappearance and its resistance to the marked 
order of representation (Phelan, 1993: 27). Her categorization of the present (moment) as 
existing in'the suspended animation between the Past and the Future'tends to keep the 
inNisibility she is interested in as a space other to the order of the visible and repeats the 
7 aesthetics of negativity that I am seeking a way out of (Phelan, 1993: 156). For me, 
following a Deleuzian trajectory, the present moment is itself open to bifurcations of past 
and future that (de)mark it and keep it continually on the move. While Heath does not 
escape dialectics in his essay, his use of repetition can be read as a productive marker of 
invisibility that avoids positing this realm as the hole or gap within the field of the visible. 
Heath struggles with a dialectical model of film experience, a model wherem the 
side of the dialectic favoured by Heath, i. e. the heterogeneous aspect of film experience, 
always has to foreclose on its chaotic nature in order to create (narrative) sense. (This in not 
unlike Phelan's marked/umnarked orders of being. ) Given that the oscillation between these 
two orders are what comprise the film experience for Heath, it is difficult to see how the 
'new relations of filin perfonnances'he calls for can be effectuated (Heath, 1981: 129). Yet, 
in the light of a Deleuzian approach, the area between these points of oscillation can be 
reconsidered on its own terms, thereby bypassing the seemingly inevitable oscillation and 
ensuing hierarchies of chaos/sense, excess/order, non-narrative/narrative. The process of 
engaging with or being engaged by the film moment becomes instead a simultaneously 
heterogeneous homogeneity. What do I mean by this? 
Initially, Heath's notion of film performance relates to the narrative film, which he 
says is always performing the subject as a coherent stable identity in time. His call for'new 
relations of film performance' would stem from'a film without any subject perfon-nance, or 
rather a performance only in the difficulty, the difference, outside of a time, a vision', 
characteristics he attributes to Michael Snow's Wavelength (1967) (Heath, 19 8 
1: 12 9). 
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However, in a related essaN7 in the same volume, 'Repetition Time', Heath cautions against 
the eviction of narrative in Structural/materialist film. If the passage/performance of a film is 
held over and above 'the historical problem of meaning and subject position', this stress on 
the self- sufficiency of the experience of the process of the film creates 'an existence outside 
contradiction, the concern Nvith "materiality" becoming a defined and limited project with its 
confirmed audience' (Heath, 1981: 174). In other words, it is not'simply a question of 
opposing "non-narrative" to "narrative... but of finding other ways of organising the triadic 
temporal phases of film. which he details as ýpreconstruction, construction (or 
reconstruction) and passage' (Heath, 1981: 173-174). Heath means, of course, ways other 
than the way he perceives the classic narr ative film's deployment of narrative as a means of 
holding the dispersal of the subject in check. 
However, Heath's own description of the narrative function in 'Repetition Time' is 
paradoxically useful, being closer to my notion of the displacing movements of narration 
than to the cliched notion of classical narrative that pervades 1970s radical filin theory. In 
that essav, Heath describes the narrative cinema as bringing 'Into play a whole number of 
figures, rhymes, movements that cut across the film in differing rhythms, shifting the 
spectator in their relations' (Heath, 19 8 1: 167). This motion, other than the ultimate sense of 
purpose and direction, which motivate these figures, is not unlike the process of narration 
that I am making a case for in this thesis. In 'Film Performance', Heath describes this 
narrative motion in terms of a 'phasing between two constant moments that... are layered 
together: the subject-reflection and the subject-process' (Heath, 1981: 116). Subject- 
reflection stems from Lacan's mirror-stage, it being a narrative effect or series of effects that 
'produces the coherence of view and viewer ... 
the film thereby proposed for the subject it 
includes and creates in a scenario of desire fulfilled, a subject bound up in the consistency of 
the imaginary' (Heath, 1981: 116). Subject-process, although Heath does not explicitly state 
this here, echoes Julia Kristeva's subject-m-process, in that this movement is a 'multiple 
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circulation, the perpetual movement of difference'that always exceeds the closure that 
subject-reflection instills. '[T]he subject-process is the "more"' (Heath, 1981: 116). (Again, 
this is not unsimilar to Phelan's position, derived from Lacan, that'the subject exceeds [I 
and fails to appear in the image of it' (Phelan, 1993: 20) and, in fact, his argument 
progresses likewise). 
While Heath may favour the disruption of 'subject-process' over 'subj ect-reflection', 
his emphasis on 'the operation of the two together (the layering, the phasing)' is suggestive 
of film performance as a mode of spacing between differences that are continually In 
operation (Heath, 1981: 119). Rather than necessitating a particular kind of object such as 
the avant-garde film in order to 'disturb the perforinance, to break the whole coherence of 
vision' (Heath, 1981- 121), Heath's very discussion of phasing already, albeit unwittingly, 
suggests performance as a disturbing phenomenon that is never achieved, regardless of 
genre. Although, he continues as if it were achieved (narrative coherence), deeming filin 
performance a somewhat predictable process which repeats the same phasing for an empty 
spectator who mirrors the oscillation of the stasis of reflection and the movements of excess. 
'To see a film again you need to forget it, but you always need the film again ... the process, 
exactly the time of its perfon-nance of you -subject - in time' (1981: 122). Unlike the 
tnarrative j oin of a fi Im' th at rec asts 
iz repetition - difference, the interminable flux of desire, the hori on of 
death - 
into the balance of a fiction ... certain 
developments of repetition away from 
the classic narrative order in avant-garde film entail a threat to that function, 
a threat translated in the common reactions of "boredom", the irritation of 
ti nothmig happens" (Heath, 1981: 124). 
Heath does not consider the heterogeneity of the spectator apart fi7om the materiality of the 
film text. Heath's notion of film performance which, viz-a-viz the avant-garde film is a 
performance without a subject, still consigns the spectator to mirroring the 
film/text, here as 
a dispersed body-subject. However, his formulation of the motion of phasing 
is suggestive 
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of a mode of film perforinance that goes beyond this mirroring, incorporating another kind 
of agency into its unfolding. 
Recastmg Heath's ten-nniology of subject-reflection and subject-process in the light 
of Deleuze's Mterplay between the virtual and the actual opens out a mode of film 
performance as a phasing motion which resonates with my encounter with the final scene in 
Ne-ws From Home. I shall demonstrate this in the followIng 'montage text'. Taking a 
Deleuzian approach, phasing, rather than being between two constant moments, can be seen 
as a process whereby spectator and film are put into a series of temporalities which coincide 
and diverge, generating a series of unpredictable, bifurcating, movements rather than an 
oscillation bounded by the parameters of narrative/dispersal. What is produced is neither the 
film as text nor spectator as text, but a distribution of moments of interconnection, which 
rebound off one another, thereby becoming altered in the process. 
This model of film spectatorship, if it can be called a model, would be generative of 
a scenario whereby identities form and disappear not as oscillation but a series of continuous 
discontinuities. In other words, it is not a case of a return to form or form simply losing 
momentary coherence. The aspect of Deleuze that I am particularly referring to here is his 
emphasis on the sensible as 'the non-repeatable basis for the difference between 
actualizations' (Baugh, 1993: 15). Co-extensive with this emphasis is the notion that the 
sensible is not merely an area of being that requires explanation/formulization 
by conceptual 
knowledge, but is in-itself an intelligent producer of sense. In Heath's Kristevan 
formulation, 
the dispersal of sense characteristic of the drives forms a kind of chaotic ground zero, which 
is contMually being bound up into the (necessary) fictions of identity. 
However, in a 
Deleuzian formulation, the dispersal of sense is the groundless ground of identity. 
Therefore, the destiny of each performance of identity is not subject-reflection, 
but 
constitutes a here and now actuality that self-differentiates itself - 
film performance then as 
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the enactment of this self-differentiatmg motion put in play by the film image but not a 
mirror reflection of it. 
This minute distinction relates to the previous discussion on the sublime. There I 
attempted to recast the negativity traditionally attached to sublime indeterminacy in terms of 
a series of joyous displacements that are nonetheless embodied. A similar pattem emerges 
here. The negativitv of the sublime has its basis in Hegelian thought where'the "this" given 
in sensory actuality is an empty. negative universal' (Baugh, 1993: 17). It cannot be positive 
and full of content. As Baugh puts it: 'With respect to its utter indetenninacy and lack of 
content, being, the here and now existence of something, Is ldentIcal to nothlng'(Baugh, 
1993: 17). From this standpoint, the sensible cannot be perceived unless it is subjected to the 
retrospective conditions of knowledge, thereby the here and now is no longer here and now 
(cannot exist in itself) but becomes a perspective, (remember Zizek's gaze of the stranger), 
on the conditions of existence. The sensible is here relegated to the condition of possibility 
only. 
From this standpoint, which is not simply particular to academic philosophy but 
filters into the cultural sphere in general, it is not hard to see how representations of the 
image of woman hold a particularly uncanny place within film theory. Her image is used as 
a positive signifier to cover over the fundamental emptiness at the core of being, yet the very 
same image threatens to expose that very lack/nothing at the heart of being. In Heath's 
discussion of News From Home, the refusal to give a positive image of woman Is read, 
given this basis, as an assertion of negativity - thence 'impossible desire. However, my 
encounter with the film brought something of the sensory immediacy of a here and now 
in 
the process of self-differentiatmg itself into play. Rather than emptiness preserved or raised 
as a question, absence became an actualization of real existence rather than the engendering 
of retrospective or prospective fantasy. This is not a contradiction from a 
Deleuzian 
perspective, where the sensible is the 'real condition of experience' that explains 
'the 
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conceptual and the abstract conditions of all possible experience' (Baugh, 1993: 17). 
Absence in an image, in a gap between the image and my perception of it, the absence of 
myself to myself, is not determined from the perspective of rationality, as a still point, static. 
Absence in a vitalist universe is always changing in relation to itself 
It is this approach to absence that I encounter in conjunction with both fihns in this 
thesis, but News From Home brings in a historical dimension that relates absence 
specifically to the question of femininity. It also belongs to an era in which phenomenology 
was more in vogue as a methodology for film analysis. ' In my encounter with News From 
Home, these histories are altered. Heath's 'Impossible desire', recast in terms of a 
reconfiguration of his notion of 'phasing', becomes sensibly actual rather than either 
oscillating between the poles of identity/chaos or simply refusing a position (the gaze of the 
stranger). The film's generativity recasts phenomenology's positing of space from the 
standpoint of sovereign consciousness in terms of the spatial extension and dimension of 
separable interrelated units which open up a plurality of viewpoints that do not make a 
whole. The spectator therefore is engaging in the film performance of continuous 
discontinuity, the particularity of each performance, its here and nowness, deriving from the 
distribution of bifurcating time lines that produce the internally differentiated moment of the 
present. 
From here out, the shape of the thesis as a loop becomes more apparent. The 
following 'montage text' and its accompanying theoretical commentary repeat, albeit 
differently, the self-differenciating movements of absence that comprised the previous 
chapters motiVated by the cut to the blank screen in Disappearance at Sea. A bifurcating 
link across absences forms between News From Home and Disappearance at Sea. These 
two films overlap at certain points on this loop and spiral away from one another at other 
points. Between the folds of the loop, a female spectator is becoming discontinuously 
continuous. 
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'Swe Judith Butler's Butler, 'Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description. A Feminist Critique 
of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology', in Jeffner Allen and Iris Manon Young (eds. ), The Thinking 
_11use: Feminism and . 11odei-n French Philosophy, (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 85- 100, for a thOrOLIgh critique of Merleau-Ponty's chapter on the sexual object in 
Phenomenology of Percepion. 
2 See Michael L. Raposa's Boredom and the Religious Imagination, (Charlottesville- University Press 
of Virginia, 1999) for an interesting account of the varieties of boredom delineated in Western and 
Eastern philosophy. 
Also see (Doane, 1982). 
While Stephen Heath refers to the avant-garde strategy of boredom as distanciation (Heath, 1981 
167), what I'm referring to as a fascinating boredom can be related to the pleasure director Jacques 
Rivette refers to as stemming from a kind of "floating attention" that multiplies the possible fonns of 
the spectator's attentiveness to the textý 
This pleasure... can tend more in the direction of... let's not say work - which is a 
large XjT ord that has been much abused... but, this pleasure in fact passes through 
certain stages, certain periods, which can equally well be attentiveness, perplexity, 
irritation, or even boredom (Rivette in Rodowick, 1991 - 105). 
This seems relevant as D. N. Rodowick refers to Rivette's use of extended duration to cut loose the 
spectator's synchronization with the linear and ineluctable forward movement of the plot and the 
detemunation of time by the filmstrip. 
' h-1 a related but idiosyncratic context, Roland Barthes discusses the hypnotic boredom that fascinates 
him in his essay'Leaving the Movie Theatre', in The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 345-349. Fascinating boredom is the theme of Jodi Brooks' 
inspirational essay Between Contemplation and Distraction- Cinema, Obsession and Involuntary 
Memon-', in Kiss Ale Deadly: Feminism and Cinemafor the Moment, Laleen Jayarnanne (ed), 
(Sydney- Power Publications, 1995), pp. 77-90. 
6 Heath's allusion to the impossible in relation to the feminine can be related to Lacan's infamous 
statement'The Woman does not exist'(with a bar crossing the'The') (Mitchell and Rose, 1982: 48). 
Heath critically evaluates Lacan's ideas of femininity in his 1978 essay, 'Difference', Screen, vol. 19, 
no. 3, Autumn, pp. 50-112. 
71 would say that Phelan accepts the post-structuralist strain of thought even as she attempts to 
undermine it. When she claims 'performance uses the body to frame the lack of Being promised by 
and through the body - that which cannot appear without a supplement' (Phelan, 1993: 15 1), isn't this 
a nice condensation of Lacan and Derrida? The position I am trying to evolve is that the body is 
neither in full possession of itself nor is it lacking because it is always moving. 
" For a concise account of what he calls 'the phenomenological schema' as a methodology for film 
analysis In the 1970s, see James Peterson's Dreams of Chaos, Visions of Order: Understanding the 
American Avant-garde Cinema, Detroit and Michigan- Wayne University Press, 1994), pp. 77-80. 
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4.2 MONTAGE TEXT NO. 2: INTERVALS OF INNER FLIGHT: CFIANTAL 
AKERMAN'S NEWS FROM HOM-b-(1 976). 
Red bricks. Concrete. Grev sidewalks. A road, enclosed 
bv sidewalks, lined with reddish brown brick buildings, 
this image alights in front of me. I wait and a car pulls out 
from a side street on the left and drives across the screen 
exiting to the right. Space recedes from the foreground of 
the image into the distance. A space to be inhabited by the 
imagination, a street to be walked down or driven through, 
I situate myself here at the apex of the triangular arc of 
depth-of-field. 
It may be signýficant that it is at the same moment (around the age of three) that the little 
human 'invents'at once sentence, narrative, and the Oedipus. ' 
A car pulls out from the kerb and drives into the foreground, 
moving towards me, yet not coming closer. Another car 
appears in the foreground and drives off into the distance 
without losing its definition as a locus of interest in the 
static frame of the moving image. A strange space this, 
appearing deep and tangible, yet flattening all that traverses 
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it into blocks of colour and light. A space divided into 
geometrical sections, buildings. skN,,,, pavement, and road. 
Traffic, both human and mechanical, stratiA, the surface 
of these blocks, creating passages in which I move, 
retracing mv steps, building up density. intensitv in 
the image. Clusters of spatial effects built like a wall, 
whose stones lie in separate contact with one another, 
uncemented. I fall into their crevices, abandoning the 
lookout point at the apex of the triangle. 
I see myselfat the labyrinth's gate, ready to get lost in the city and in this story. 
Submissive. 2 
Cut to another image of the city, more road, more traffic, 
a scene similar to but not the same as the previous shot. Does 
this shot follow the previous one in real time or did it 
precede it? It appears to follow it, but does not perfonn 
the linear continuity of narrative. That linear flow is 
unhinged by the untimely cut from one shot to another as 
if the film were a series of stacked images rather than a 
continuous thread forwards in time. A series of shots of 
the city, 59 in all, stacked in continuous separability. one 
and then the other. 
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59 in all, with an average length q1'89 seconds, but the range J. n duration is drastic: 
1ýom 20 seconds to II minwes. And both extremes are siiblect to the same principle: 
each new shot in a sense retitrns its to a beginning, to a newspace which contains no 
mode ofarticidation grafied týom shots preceding it. 3 
There is a montage principle at work, though not 
the ones of narrative progression, parallel action 
or conflicting information. The connections 
between these isolated frames comes from a place 
outside of the on-screen image. As I wait for a scene 
to change, I purview its details because there is 
nothing else to do. I forget what I am looking at. I 
forget that I am looking and become a vision with- 
out focus. I become a tired and waiting body, yawning, 
sighing, xvith the lack of stimulation. Although my gaze 
remains fixed to the screen, I no longer identify the mise- 
en-scene in fTont of me. I am diff-used in the time of 
waiting, a dispersed and withdrawn body-subject. 
The image changes. I become aware of this change after 
the fact, the cut from one image to the next jolting me into 
awareness, motivating my gaze to begin again scanning 
the surface details of this new scene. Until.. 
[I]n my view montage is not an idea composed qfsuccessive shots stuck together but an 
idea that DERIVESftom the collision between two shots that are independent ofone 
another. 4 
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My scanning ability satiated. I fall into a N\aking 
slumber. The noise of passing traffic punctures the 
scene like the rasping sounds of a breath being 
released after holding it in for irregular, short, 
spells. I am swayed into an uncomfortable semi- 
a, wareness bv the sound of tire tracks on tar, 
prompted into an attention that wanes as the 
sound fades in the distance. Or is it the case that 
I have become so attuned to the din that its drone 
surrounds me like the waves of the ocean9 I begin 
to slip into the between time of dreaming, a drift 
that is brought up fast by signs that say No Parking 
Here. Don't Walk. Walk. One Way Only, Park Fast. 
I grasp them for clues as to how I should locate myself 
in the image. A block of light shinu-ners in the middle 
distance, framed by the angles of sidewalk, barred by 
horizontal beams that jut across the image. Is it an exit'? 
Above the din of traffic's breathing, a woman Is voice 
erupts off-screen, 
"'De. cw CJICwLtaV-'it says, "Whe4-11 arelyoul ccnti4ý h4oine/? We, milw 
youl very mkccW 
The eruption of this voice introduces another scene 
into cinematic space, a letter from a mother to a 
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daughter, the filiiii-nakcr. As the voice recites them, 
the words mark the invisible screen of niv mental 
landscape frorn left to right. I stare blindly at the 
image in front of me, split between following items 
of traffic that zoom past and listening out for a 
message from the other place the voice is locating. 
Characters and events, entanglements and trials of 
evervday livingry populate this place. It seems to 
be more clearlN, defined than the place on-screen. 
I went to the c1tv and 
what I saw every day was Soho, the subway, loneliness 
evervwhere. I needed to be there 
[tjo see people as blurred as Ifielt myself that did me a lot ol'good. They seemed to be 
going nowhere, and I didn't know where I was going either [ ... jI was always drýfting. 
5 
p 
A frame within a fTame, a subway window is 
centralized in the image. It gives the appearance of 
remaining still while streams of subway stations 
and tunnels seem to jet past its surface opacity. A 
faint reflection of a woman dressed in white appears 
on this window, but the density of the image pulls 
what lies beyond it and in front of it onto the same 
level of indistinct greyness. The train stops, the doors 
191 
swish open framing the station Nvall. A network of 
discoloured white tiles fill the surface blankness of 
the image without a gap, except for a sign that reads 
Christopher St., A gap does exist though between the 
visible parameters of the frame and the invisible 
parameters of my location, a gap that cuts the image 
out from an expanse of darkness that surrounds me. 
The graffiti on the subway Nvindo", forms the pattern 
of a question mark, a date. 
"Where am P nat time is it? ff . 
The words in the letter are recited as if by a speaker of a 
foreign language, s-vmtax understood without the emotional 
resonance acquired over a lifetime. The voice is pat, 
speaking quickly, breathlessIv. Just as there are no spaces 
between the blocks of detail on the surface of the image, 
there are no spaces between the words in the letter, no 
punctuation or expressive tones. Another sound erupts 
into this cinematic scenario, the sound of weeping. It 
spreads itself between the invisible flow of words across 
the screen and the attention that hovers over the densely 
stacked images on screen. I am moved by the words in 
the letter. I supply their deadpan delivery with a 
resonance all my own, contaminating the purity of the 
frame with this upheaval of affect. But was this frame 
ever pure in the first place? Her passion for roaming 
took her underground in search of a 
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ncittral and distant contact. 
Some shots are held for a long time, some for a short 
time, each one intemally divided into flattened, 
geometrical, blocks. External space is cut into durations 
that seem as arbitrary as the things that pass in and out 
of the shots. A rhythm of pace and interruption. Except 
for the shot of the black woman who sits arms folded 
plonked on a chair at the kerb. A clamour of window 
frames, lampposts, billboards, and traffic, to which she 
seems oblivious, surround her. She stands out from the 
flow, a human presence that remains perfectly still for 
the duration of the shot. Cars move past her, one after 
another. She passively sits. Her body a refusal of motion, 
her gesture deposited there at that street comer as if 
sedimented in time. Deposited there and absorbed into 
the tapestry of noisy detail. However, we have seen this 
street comer, this woman, earlier in the film, from a side 
and distant angle where her now impervious presence 
blended seamlessly into the lamppost on her left, any 
traces of character drowned by the film's main 
protagonists, traffic and its seeming vagaries. Now, this 
time, she seems to have stagnated into a gaper, a badaud, 
mute and waiting. 
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Bitt the chain ol'states olftmale body is not closed: descending, lrom the mother or 
going back to the mother, it serves as a revelation to / .. 
J the environment, which now 
makes itsell'seen or heard only thrmigh the window ofa room, or a train, a whole art of 
smind The states qf1he body secrete the slow ceremony which Joins together the 
corresponding attitndes, and develop aftmale gest which overcomes the history qfmen 
and the crisis ofthe world" 
Steps to the underground fill the centre of the image. 
People move up and down this thoroughfare and off- 
screen. They pass each other by without a glance. The 
camera pans to the right. slowly, jaggedly. performing 
a 3360-clegree pan, as if looking for something, or, 
nothing'ý A train pulls up on the platforin. An image of 
its interior, a concave perspective of a carriage corridor, 
creates an effect of stillness against the shrieking sound 
of steel on track. A man in a yellow shirt enters the 
carriage and stares in the direction of the camera. A sense 
of the filmmaker's vulnerability becomes palpable. After 
what seems like an age, he backs down and moves off 
into another carriage. Out on the platform, space is 
fractured into a series of horizontals and verticals, the 
horizontal lines of three platforms receding from fore- 
ground into the distance, the vertical lines of pillars 
that hold the structure in place. As people enter the 
frame, they walk behind these pillars, disappearing 
from view as they wait for the next train to arrive. A 
man dressed in white reappears in the frame, after 
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disappearing behind a pillar and exiting the frame, 
not wanting to remain still while waiting. White on 
white, Two trains arrive simultaneously, fraCtUring 
the space even more, one of them pulling into view 
on the surface of the image most proximate to mv 
gaze. They move off, leaving the space bare vet as 
flat as before. Suddenly, I notice a couple embracing 
on the distant platfonn. I say suddenly because, 
although this is the first instance of visible human 
intimacy in the film, the gesture is quickbý 7 submerged 
in the devouring flatness of the image, I very nearly 
didn't notice it, my roving gaze forgetfully engaged 
bv the dully luminous swarms of random detail that 
accumulate in various directions within the frame. 
Unable to rest on a singular detail, my roving gaze is 
held, all the same, by the implacable stare of the camera 
fixe. This gesture of contact between human bodies 
momentarily halts nomadic passage through the image. 
But this interlude of intimacy, its lightness of touch 
quickly disappears as yet another subway pulls across 
the screen, blocking the couple from view. Through the 
window, I see one of them get on the train. Above the 
din, I hear snatches of a letter from a mother. 
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'You*ý favw s<ntvwLs- very p(: )IirLkcLt/, 
a+ui/ AAU Of th4el sadýý of p e, 4()PL42ý 
Translated and perfon-ned by the daughter, the 
&ut a-, Uttle/ sa& a*i& bor&ng, 
1.11 Whe*11a4l-elyou, conu4ý 
mother's words are erased by the rumbling drone 
of city noise. It droxvns out her pleas and 
supplications. Transportation and noise remove 
the daughter from the temporal measures of rural 
life, the events of marriages, births, and illnesses, 
parties, feuds, and arguments that mark out week- 
ends and evenings and days. Time in the city flows 
in an endless cvcle of moming, noon and night, a 
flow whose difference is dissolved by underground 
travel, by the gaudy brightness of neon which lights 
up the night. The seasonal passage of time disappears 
in the city. In the film, there are two, maybe three, 
night sequences, definitive breaks in the daylight 
sequences, but these are neither in 'real' time nor 
serve narrative progression. By contrast the letters 
recount a chronological, albeit elliptical, progression 
of time which the imagcs give no clucs to. You must 
have received the letter I sent you two days ago. I 
received your letter yesterday. It is summer now, 
chronology without dates, out of sync with the content 
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and rhythrn of the shots. A letter begins at an arbitrary 
point during a shot's duration. Sometimes, the shot 
changes in the middle of its recitation. Often it remains 
the same. Although, the sequence of shots is random 
and seemingly disinterested, although they accumulate 
in a dense stacking motion, change is occurring in 
relation to this presentation. Change is occurring in my 
relation to them. I spend time with them. I lend them 
my time. They leave me alone with myself, making me 
feel the weight of oppressive connections and dis- 
connections. Is there any escape from the moumful 
nostalgia of home or the rootless vagaries of nomadism? 
Neither the exilic dream of return to organic connection nor the nomadic celebration Qf 
rootless liberty, I believe, quite offers the best option for living in a world of 
dif p 
. 
ferences. ' 
A smooth long tracking shot takes me to the edges of 
the city. The camera is propped on a car, control given 
over to the predetemuned network of traffic lights: 
stop, start and go. This passivity liberates me from the 
burden of choice as I am carried down I Oth avenue, my 
gaze bouncing off the surfaces of bricks and broken 
store windows, the close-up view at kerb level blocking 
access to the city's labyrinthine thoroughfares. At gable 
ends, the city's tall buildings crawl up sidewalks, 
becoming a bluish grey washed out mass that disappears 
off into the horizon. Myriad details preoccupy the fore- 
front of the image. Directions from an invisible source, 
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the off-screen traffic lights, tell the camera to stop. It 
pulls up beside a parked truck, the name on the side, 
Fiebiger Inc.. Choice relinquished, the camera moves 
off again, coming to a stop at the shop sign, Grumbacher. 
Being stationed at these proper names is arbitrary, but 
they forin a provisional solidity in the wavy flow of 
camera movement. This tracking shot is taking a long 
time. Where are we going? Anywhere? Back to a shot 
of the interior of a subway car. People pass in front of 
the camera, barely acknowledging it, somnambulant. 
Suddenly, the claustrophobic constriction of this enclosure 
is broken as the subway track stretches out of the tunnels 
and the train rattles over the swarming city. Hulking masses 
of dilapidated buildings pass off-screen from right to left. 
Is this the beginning of freedom? The noise is deafening, 
yet imbued with the promise of escape. On and on and on 
and then back again to a view of the city's thoroughfare 
framed this time from the back of an off-screen car which 
moves slowlv ahead of the on-screen traffic. Yellow taxis 
frame the traffic flow, a flow that is strangely gentle now, 
rolling forwards. Another letter interrupts the image, but 
"I" can barely hear it, calmed as I am by the sense of 
198 
something col"ing to an end. 
When yon wriie something where the end is the same as the beginning WY really boring. That's very cliched, to have no ending. 'O 
Cut to an indefinable dark image. Is it night'? A dull 
light reveals the close-up of a cavemous space. 
Dislocated, I am removed from the peculiar, hýpnotic 
flatness of the image. Is this a hole in its dense fabric? 
No, something else is happening still. In the absence 
of a fapde, I am not falling into a vertiginous void. "I" 
am imbricated in the nervure of a darkness that bears 
me from within, in its texture, 
first mute, then uttered " 
The sound of water gushes in the silence as the camera 
slowly moves out from this murky environs. The 
river slivers and laps the shore. Off-screen, a boat 
pulls away from the city's edge leaving traces of 
its motoric passage in the frame. Seagulls follow 
its traffic, choreographing the skyline in arabesques 
that dip and dive, loop and separate. The off-screen 
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boat moves out yet ftirtlicr, the vertical and horizontal 
lines of city architecture lose distinction. Buildings 
blur into the horizon, blue and fuzzy at the edges, 
becoming almost sk-y. Another kind of vacancy 
opens up in the silence, a desert populated by over- 
lapping grains of light and bird sound. The letters 
have stopped. The voice is silent. No more reciting, 
recounting, imitating, 
No character, nofictioning look to be seen, - the shots succeed with no other tie than the 
fact of that succession, until the last shotfirom a boat drawing awayfirom New York, the 
city gradually lost in the image to the expanse of the sea, thefilm ending as it vanishes 
on the horizon the impossible question ofa woman's desire in all that. 12 
But is it a question of desire here, desire, forever 
circling around a lost inu-nediacy? At the end of 
Mona Hatoum's video Measures ol'Distance (I 989)ý 
the screen goes black, a moment which is followed 
by the appearance centre-screen of a photograph of 
the artist's mother in the shower, an image we have 
seen diff-use fragments of throughout the video. 
This moving image work is also interspersed with 
the voiceover of a daughter translating and reading 
her mother's letters from Beirut sent to her while 
she is in exile in London. However, here the Arabic 
letters actually appear on-screen, the density of the 
200 
calligraphic text both forbidding access to images 
of the mother's body, the ponit of exile, and also 
protecting that body from other's gaze. A narrative 
of intimacy and distance, the space that opens up 
here is the space of desire between two human 
suýjects, a space mediated by text and image. I can 
identif-v, with them. In News From Home, by contrast, 
absence becomes unhinged from being a space 
around which desire circulates. Absence is regenerated 
by the passing of time through phenomena, the sense 
of which reveals the minute differences hidden by 
identity. Not the impossible question of a woman's 
desire, but the fluid dN, -namism a present that discloses 
the movement of how I subsist in time, a movement 
that is onh, Unpossible between the poles of alienation 
and desire. Instead of measures of distance, 
a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two 
creating 
the double reference, the identity qfthe retiring into oneseýfwith the leaving qfoneseýf 
of the lived through with the distance. 13 
I 
The water laps at my edges. I swim into the vanishing 
horizon moving between the current of the waves. "I" 
dip and dive, swirl and curve, on seagull's wings, 
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tI orrning arabesques in the skv. I am moving across 
the water, away from the mirage of the city but I am 
not retuming home. Home no longer exists to return to, 
It does not lie awaiting return except in an etemal mNihic 
past, But the past does not exist preserved. It moves with 
me. Have I become a nomadic traveler then'? The news 
in the letters possessed me. I internalized their words. 
I swallowed them whole and repeated them. I 
perforined their residency, alloxving her voice, her 
pleas, her demands, and sorrows to invade the space 
of the drift. I was oppressed in the city, the constant 
drone of traffic and erratic flow of people. I stood 
still, heavy and silent, as a war was staged between 
noise and voice. I received her inscriptions but I 
parroted them outwards into the flatness of a space 
whose blank gaze held me while I played with trance- 
like states and echoes. At the end of this process, I 
became free. There is a never-ending in the space that 
opens up in the final film moment of dislocation. After 
having subjected myself to the stacked weight and time 
of the film's images, in that final scene, I am rewarded 
with lightness, a kind of gaiety. If I identify with anythin , 9 
it Is with the flight of the seagulls as I am carried away on 
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the surface skin of a duration in which I participate. 
Opened up to liquid motion, I became a tracerv of 
something gathering and falling between the current, 
between the swoop of gulls in the blueness. I move with 
the motor and animal calls that populate this new space, 
the curve of a wing, the ruffle of a wave. Not the impossible 
question of a woman's desire, but the fluid dynamism of the 
discontinuity of the real that discloses the movement of how 
I subsist in time, contained and flowing like a river at the edge 
of a city. In the semi-silence I hear my own voice and it says 
'Now, hete" 
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4.3 SPECTATORSHIP, PHENOMENOLOGY AND FILM THEORY: 
RECUPERATING PHENOMENOLOGY FOR FILM PERFORMANCE. 
As I stated at the end of section 4.1, this final chapter of the thesis can be seen as 
forining the shape of a loop in relation to the chapters motivated by Disappearance at 
Sea. This is the case in two senses. Firstly, the film moment of absence in News From 
Home traverses chronological time to resonate with the film moment of absence in 
Disappearance at Sea. Aside from introducing historical issues into the argument, this 
resonance is emotive, in the sense that these films suspended moments moved me into 
the openness of 'a silence filled' with resonating and diverging rhythms, generating a 
performance of embodied displacement. Secondly, in tracing the patterns of the 
resonance between these two films, chronologically spanning twenty years, I began to 
realise that the theoretical allegiances I was making in doing this were also beginning to 
move towards one another. What I mean by this is that repetitious alliances and 
reservations about these alliances were leaping across the linear arrangement of the 
different chapters of the thesis and creating a pattern of their own. Therefore, in the same 
way that I oscillated between readings of Deleuze's ideas in chapters two and three. in 
this final chapter, I still oscillate between these readings of Deleuze but here they are 
mediated by recourse to the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
The reason why Merleau-Ponty comes in here is twofold. My reservations with 
Deleuze had to do with whether or how one could locate the movements of virtuality in 
the actual world of action, how these movements effect real bodies in space and time, 
rather than effecting a bodily vaporization. Although many of 
his ideas are conducive to 
expanding on the sensibility of the film encounters, the disappearances in the 
film 
moments and the movements they generate, while dislocating, still 
incorporate an 
embodied spectator not a disembodied brain. I needed some analysis of space and 
embodiment and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology seemed appropriate not 
least because 
of its surprising resonance with Deleuze, which 
I shall demonstrate later. This move to 
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phenomenology is also historically appropriate because of the link between film and 
phenomenologv in the 1970s. In fact, Akerman herself makes a connection between her 
filmmaking and phenomenological sentiments: 
"For mv cinema ... the most suitable word is phenomenological: it is 
alwavs a succession of events, of little actions which are described in a 
precise manner. And what interests me is just this relation to the 
immediate look, with the how you look at these little actions going on. And it is also a relation to strangeness" (Aken-nan in Heath, 1978: 10 1). 
However, my resurrection of phenomenology has less to do with historical allegiance, 
than with how a select reading of it might expand on the positionality of the spectator in 
relation to the film moment of absence that unhinges one from symbolic identification, 
yet does not, I insist, destroy narrative sense. 
The structure of the following commentary will be repetitious. Deleuze will 
reappear and be grappled with in a way that folds back on the discussion in chapter 
three. The purpose of this is not to create a mirror echo of my reservations with his ideas 
there, but to create a ripple effect that, in spreading backwards rather than outwards, can 
take his ideas spiraling towards another destination. This destination is not the one of 
narrative goals and endings, but the place where the accumulation of wanderings meet 
and bounce off one another, accreting marks of difference between repetitions, in turn, 
echoing the fonn of subjectivity mediated by the displacements effectuated by the image 
of absence. In this trajectory, the non-narrative moment is transformed into a scene of 
narrational intensity. In excavating the aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that 
are of use of me, I aim to expand my notion of spectatorship as a perfortnance of 
dis/continuous narration. I shall hybridize those aspects with the elements in Deleuze 
that have been conducive thus far, and further mitigate against those that have not, i. e. 
the dissolution of the spectator. The following analysis will form a new constellation of 
the bodies of phenomenology, film moments of absence, along with that of the spectator. 
The emphasis on the processual interrelation between the spectator and the 
image in the preceding 'montage text' based on News From Home can be related to 
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phenomenological approaches to film, at least to Vivian Sobchack's definition of how 
such an approach differs from the psychoanalytic models that have dominated film 
theory. As opposed to a psychoanalytic model, she claims, a phenomenological one 
does not posit a single and totalizing structure of identification with the 
cinematic. Image, but rather differentiates among a variety of subjective 
spectatorial modes that co-constitute the cinematic object as the kind of 
cinematic object it is. This model ultimately offers a more dynamic, 
fluid, and concrete description of film viewing than does its 
psychoanalytic counterpart (Sobchack in Gaines and Renov, 1999: 24 1). 
This turn to a phenomenological approach at this late stage in the thesis, although hinted 
at throughout, might seem regressive, as phenomenology, given its Husserhan emphasis 
on pure consciousness, has generally fallen out of favour as a methodology for art 
appreciation, regardless of subsequent attempts by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and, more 
recently, Ricoeur- to overcome Husserl's idealism by emphasizing the life world. ' 
Indeed, as Dudley Andrew, writing in the 1970s, puts it 'no sophisticated theorist 
working today would consider' returning to the postwar phenomenological model 
(Andrew M Nicholls. 1985: 627). However, writing almost thirty years ago, Andrew 
identifies a return to what he calls the neglected tradition of phenomenology in film in 
the light of 'signs of the collapse of rigid structuralism' (Andrew in Nicholls, 1985: 626). 
Andrew makes the claim that a phenomenological analytic approach is descriptive and 
inuuersed in what it is describing as opposed to the explanatory, endistanced perspective 
assumed in structuralism (Andrew in Nicholls, 1985: 627). The affn of 
phenomenological approaches, according to Andrew is 
the description of one or another sort of consciousness the spectator 
assumes in apprehending movies: a global response to the movie 
complex, a "perceptual" stance in relation to the "animation and 
definition" of images, and a narrative stance implicating the spectator's 
consciousness through the processes of identification and individuation 
in relation to a sequence of images all directed toward some goal or 
experience (Andrew, 1985: 629). 
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If a phenomenological approach opens up the question of film as a dynamic, processual, 
experience, can it also contribute to thinking about this experience in a non-intentional 
%,,, av, as not simply being constituted by a spectator's consciousness'? 
This might seem a strange question to put to a philosophical approach which, as 
Derrida critiques in his essay 'Speech and Phenomena', puts such a central emphasis on 
the capacity of the subject to be present to itself in the moment of the now. 'The present 
of self-presence would be as indivisible as the blink of an eye' (Derrida, 1991: 18). ' 
However, the merit of turning to Merleau-Ponty to explore the notion of an tramersive 
experience which is not being constituted by oneself is to offset the abstraction of 
Deleuze's question in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image: How is it possible to speak of an 
Apparaitre without a Seer? As I shall go on to show, there are very productive tensions 
in Merleau-Ponty's thought between early and late work, i. e. between Phenomenology of 
Perception and later The Visible and the Invisible, which suggest a much more radical 
account of the subject/object relation generated by an image of absence, one that does 
not foreclose on embodiment, yet does not equate the latter with self-presence. 
I am not alone in looking to phenomenology to account for film spectatorship. 
The fact that phenomenological approaches 'have so far drawn minor attention', due to 
the dorninance in film studies in the seventies and much of the eighties of 'an 
interrnixture of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism, and Barthesian 
senuotics', is changing (Plantinga, 1993: 511). There is a recurrence of interest in 
phenomenological approaches to film. Recent publications include: Allan Casebier's 
Film and Phenomenology: Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic Representation 
(Cambridge University Press, 199 1), and Vivian Sobchack's The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology ofFilm Experience (Princeton University Press, 1992). Also, other 
recent publications on film, such as Laura Marks' The Skin of the Film (2000) and 
Rachel 0. Moore's Savage Theory (2000), while not using an overtly phenomenological 
method, emphasize the role of sensory experience in relation to film, the former citing 
Merleau-Ponty in particular. While Casebier's study reinstates the intentionality of 
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phenomenological deduction from a Husserlian perspective, it is to Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology that most of this revival is addressed. I also turn to Merleau-Ponty, to 
develop my question of how absence (in the suspended film moment) generates 
something positive and dynamic in itself rather than being the negative component of the 
presence/absence binary. While Merleau-Ponty's philosophical method is usually 
thought of in terms of perceiving figures in a gestalt against a ground/background that 
contains them, there is evidence to the contrary in The Visible and the Invisible that this 
ground is not mereIv a background (spatial) container against which the flux of things 
are defined and perceived. By contrast, in that later book, while Merleau-Ponty retains 
the notion of Gestalten, the nature of the back/ground is rendered, not simply as an 
indetenniate, yet static, field against which things are defined, but as itself being 
formed by the elements that are formed in relation to it. 
In this, there are echoes of Deleuze's notion of the groundless ground of 
subjectivity and the notion of narrativization as serialization that I looked at in chapter 
three, rather than the stable onginary, and thereby inert, ground to which the trajectory 
of narrative is always returning, as might be said of Zizek's position. The crucial 
difference between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty though is that for the latter this shifting 
ground is more implicitly related to a body which, while being displaced in relation to 
itself, is still communicating with itself and other bodies via what he calls 'the flesh of 
the world'. Merleau-Ponty's concept of 'flesh' resonates with Deleuze's notion of pre- 
individual singularities, in the sense that it is an anonymous field of in/visibility, what 
Deleuze might call virtuality. However, in Merleau-Ponty, 'this anonymity innate to 
Myself that we have previously calledflesh' and into which I emigrate and am 
captivated, so that 'the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer 
know who sees and which is seen' is not without agency (Merleau-Ponty in Sobchack, 
1992: 118). It is still the 'place' from where I am 
always oriented to the world from the "here and now" that is the unified 
field of a body - not "any" body, but "some" body, a body that matters 
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like no other because it is lived as "mine". It is my body that synopsizes 
the various modalities of perception so that the perceived world makes 
its sense someplace (Sobchack, 1992: 82-3). 
To hold this position, does not necessarily mean that this body and what it perceives is 
fully present to itself In fact, what makes Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of interest to 
m,,,, thesis at this stage is the dialectic it maintains between (so-called) pre-reflective 
experience and the retrospective exercise of narrative structure. 
This might sound as if I am merely advocating the bind of forever oscillating 
bewýeen chaos and structure that I have been at pains to break away from in this thesis, 
the kind of oscillation that I claim the particular film moments took me away from. 
However, I am not, which is why I qualify the terrn'pre-reflective experience'. Pre- 
reflective experience is not unsimilar to Henri Bergson's notion of habit in the sense of 
be' what one is immersed in in everyday life. And as Bergson makes a case for Ing 
attention to the processes of intuition that form the lining of every conscious perception 
171ir 0 
we make f the world, Merleau-Ponty calls for an openness towards this flux also. As 
Sobchack puts it: 
As a research method, phenomenology calls us to a series of systematic 
reflections within which we question and clarify that which we 
intimately live, but which has been lost to our reflective knowledge 
through habituation and/or institutionalization (Sobchack, 1992: 28). 
Instead of analysing meaning as an abstract system of language, attention is given to 
what Andrew calls 'the "other-side" of signification, those realms of prefonnulation 
where sensory data congeal into "something that matters" and those realms of post- 
formulation where that "something" is experienced as mattering' (Andrew in 
Nichols, 
1985: 627). 
However, the subtle distinction between oscillation, which suggests to-mg and 
fro-Ing between structure and chaos and what I want to claim as the narrational quality 
of so-called pre-reflective experience, is that in the latter mode, it is not a case of 
moving between one realm and another but of moving in two 
directions simultaneously. 
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In other words, that the identity being constituted out of and bv means of the array of 
sensations on offer is simultaneously able to translate those sensations into an image and 
able to co-exist alongside the movement of that translation. In other words, that the on- 
going process, the ontological vibrations of what Merleau-Ponty might call 'the flesh of 
the Nvorld' are continually felt rather than simply and only put to rest as an object or 
symbol to be contemplated or interpreted. This is analogous to the type of engagement 
the film moments drew me into, Disappearance at Sea, as a vectoral movement across a 
surface, News From Home, as an accretion within a space. 
To recap slightly: while Deleuze has been inspirational in leading a pathway out 
of the psychoanalytic approach to moments of emptiness as being devoid of content and 
thereby suspending the imaginan, illusions of the subject, I part company with him when 
he moves in the direction of a temporality without limits, an empty form of time that 
pays no heed to human time. 4 Aside from it being theoretically problematic, it is not 
what I encounter in the film moments, which, while they seem to extend infinitely, are 
not without limits. Initially locating time in the body, Deleuze goes on to divorce the 
two, or rather, to locate the body in the empty forrn of time. As Deleuze, appropriating 
Bergson, puts it: 
Bergsomsm has often been reduced to the following idea: duration is 
subjective, and constitutes our internal life. And it is true that Bergson 
had to express himself in this way, at least at the outset. But, 
increasingly, he came to say something quite different: the only 
subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, 
and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round (Deleuze, 
1989: 82-83 ). 5 
While Deleuze does say that '[flime is ... the interiority in which we are, 
in which we 
move, live and change', the occlusion of space from this picture makes it difficult to see 
where and in relation to what movement and change could occur, other than 
being the 
infinite unfolding of pure virtuality (Deleuze, 1989: 82). There is a sense in which to 
be 
subject to this unfolding is to be paralyzed in actua ity. 
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When Deleuze, in relation to the films of Louis Malle, says that 'bodily states 
themselves link up with movements of the world', (Deleuze, 1989: 60), he is referring to 
characters in the filin, the murderer's movements who are blocked by the halting of the 
lift in Lift to the Scaf) Id. But what about bodily states .. 
fi) other than those on celluloid but 
are no less included in the space of the film? What about the space between the viewer 
and the image on-screen? This space might itself be an image but what interests me is 
how it is in the process of constituting itself rather than melting into the undifferentiated 
matter of a cosmic vision, which seems to occur in Deleuze's notion of infinite 
serialization. 
[T]he before and after are no longer themselves a matter of external 
empirical succession, but of the intrinsic quality of that which becomes 
in time. Becoming can in fact be defined as that which transforms an 
empirical sequence into a series: a burst of series. A series is a sequence 
of images, which tend in themselves in the direction of a limit, which 
orients and inspires the first sequence (the before), and gives way to 
another sequence organized as series which tends in turn towards 
another limit (the after). The before and the after are then no longer 
successive deten-ninations of the course of time, but the two sides of the 
power, or the passage of the power to a higher power. The direct time- 
image here does not appear in an order of coexistences or simultaneities, 
but in a becoming as potentialization, as series of powers (Deleuze, 
1989: 275). 
The before and after, the passage of time through the body, becomes liberated from any 
particular body. The problems this liberation poses for thinking the relation of the body 
to the serialized image sequence can be seen in Barbara Kennedy's work, which 
unabashedly embraces Deleuze's language of flows and intensities to discuss the 
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unleashing of affect in film experience. As a Deleuzian advocate, Kennedy says that 
this approach situates the spectator's body beyond phenomenology's emphasis on the 
'lived body', instead proffering 'the complex understanding of "body" as processes of 
congealment, imbrication, consilience, assemblage, aesthetics and the molecular' 
(Kennedy, 2000a: 50). 
There is much in Kennedy's thesis that I empathize with, her desire to 'counter 
the negativity of cinepsychoanalyis' for one thing, but her absolute incorporation of 
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Deleuze results in ail unfortunate contradiction between the celebration of a 'subjectless 
subjectivity' on the one hand, and, an emphasis on the visceral nature of affect, on the 
other (Kennedy, 2000a: 2& 45). This move to my mind resubstantializes the'visceral' 
body as mute ground of anonymous being, a position which Deleuze is actuall Iy at pains 
to avoid and which I also want to avoid, as it falls back into the trap of positing a mute 
material affective dimension beneath symbolic meaning. ' As she puts it: 
'mind/body/brain meld with the image an assemblage of filmic sensation where affect 
affords the ultimate "material emotion" which is beyond any subjective vision' 
(Kenned-v, 2000a: 53). Shortly, I shall import Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to show 
how this material substrate is itself imbricated in a signifying dynamic which enfolds 
both the particularity of subjective vision and the anonymity of a-subjective vision. I 
agree with Kennedy's general claim that 'camera-movements and set-ups effectuate the 
rhythms, vibrations, resonances and forced movements which are illustrative of 
Deleuze's idea of sensation' (Kennedy, 2000a: 134). However, to claim, as she does, that 
in the viewing scenario, 'brainibody/image are coagulated into a malleable set of images, 
into a materiality of emotion... [t]he body in motion, in locomotion, in the film's 
diegesis, connects with the bodies/minds/brains of those who view the film', reduces the 
viewing space to an undifferentiated mass (Kennedy, 2000a: 144. Instead of lack, 
Kennedy's use of Deleuzian flows and intensities inserts the positive difference of 
undifferentiation which, in Deleuze's terms would actually deny difference resulting 
instead in 'undifferenciated being, without difference' (Deleuze, 1994: 268). 
9 This move 
repeats the separation between narrative order on the side of the symbolic and life 
experience on the side of chaos, rupture, a separation that I am claiming becomes 
undone in relation to the final scene in News From Home. 
By contrast to the emphasis on an inhuman abstraction in Deleuze's trajectory, in 
Merleau-Ponty 's phenomenology, communicatIon or'Interimpfication' between flow and 
structure is always the issue, 
10 The questions I repeatedly ask myself in relation to the 
two films in the 'montage texts', i. e. what time is it? and, where am P, are questions that 
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Merleau-Ponty poses as being continuous motivators of the process of moving across the 
gaps between time and space (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 105). 1 argue that both film 
moments, in different ways, set one free from the coordinates of the space and time of 
definition. The viewing experiences that both film moments generate relate to the notion 
of becoming as a process in itself, which does not have a predetermined ending or a 
definitive starting point. Therefore elements of Deleuze's trajectory through the time- 
image and its generation of states of becoming are relevant. However, the process of 
becoming is for me still attached to something specific. It is not vertiginous and does not 
send me spinning off in all directions. It does not propel me into 'a sidereal time, a 
system of relativity, where the characters would be not so much human as planetary, and 
the accents not so much subjective as astronomical, in a plurality of worlds constituting 
the uMverse' (Deleuze, 1989: 102). 
While Merleau-Ponty mainly discusses 'natural objects', attached as Deleuze 
would say, to the phenomenological life-world, he also discusses an identity of division 
that is very similar in many respects to Deleuze's. The main difference is that Merleau- 
Ponty locates the body in the intersection between the points of crossover between one 
part of the divide and another. For me it is crucial to take this understanding of another 
kind of becoming into spectatorial space. Merleau-Ponty puts it thus: 
[1] the seer am also visible. What makes the weight, the thickness, the 
flesh of each colour, of each sound, of each tactile texture, of the 
present, and of the world Is the fact that he who grasps them 
feels 
himself emerge from them by a sort of coiling up or redoubling, 
fundamentally homogenous ... a whole virtual center 
(Merleau-Ponty, 
1968.114-115 - my emphasis). 
In this description of the interrelation between particularity and anonymity, 
Merleau- 
Ponty maintains a tension between these two aspects or 
faces of subjectivity. He says 
we are experiences, that is, thoughts that feel behind themselves 
the 
weight of the space, the time, and the very Being they think, and which 
therefore do not hold under their gaze a serial space and time, not the 
pure idea of series, but have about themselves a time and a space 
that 
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exist by piling Lip, by proliferation, by encroachment, by 
promiscuity... ontological vibration (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 115). 
It is this interrelation between the virtual and the actual, suggested by Merleau-Ponty in 
The Visible and the Invisible, that I would want to maintain in opposition to recent 
feminist returns to phenomenology where the emphasis has been on situating the sensory 
body in terms of individual ownership. It is against the lack of this interrelation in recent 
retums to phenomenology, that I would still want to hold onto aspects of Deleuze's 
thinking that inadvertently extend Merleau-Ponty's unfinished work, A hybridization of 
these two thinker's ideas can help me to articulate the sensation of the viewing 
expenences of the film moments. 
However, I cannot rush headlong into this hybridization, as the problems with 
phenomenology also need to be addressed in the way I have addressed the problems 
with Deleuze. The conservative nature of phenomenology exposes itself in one of the 
recent returns to phenomenology, Laura Marks' The Skin of the Film: Intercultural 
Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses. It drives Marks' reading of Deleuze's assertion 
that cmema 'can give us "the genesis of an 'unknown body, ' which we have in the back 
of our heads, like the unthought in thought ...... as a commonsense assertion 'that cinema 
may Indeed be capable of bringing us to our senses' (Marks, 2000: 148). However, as I 
shall go on to demonstrate shortly, the senses as Deleuze conceives them, are certainly 
not the senses we assume as being rooted in the body and are far removed from the 
traditional phenomenological framework that Marks discusses as follows. 
Given the nature of memory, the audiovisual image necessarily evokes 
other sense memories, perhaps even memories that belong to that 
"unknown body. " For example, when I am watching a scene shot in a 
garden in Sham Mootoo's Her Sweetness Lingers (1994), close-ups of 
magnolia flowers remind me of how they feel and how they smell, and 
the buzzing of insects reminds me of the heat of summer. For me the 
tape calls up associations with gardens I have known in my ancestral 
Alabama, associations that are probably somewhat different from the 
artist's and other viewers' associations with them (Marks, 2000: 148). 
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cite this lengthy quotation as an example of the personal, autobiographical level of 
association that Marks' analysis remains with. Whereas for me, in relation to the 
lighthouse and the city in the films I have encountered, personal associations are only 
initiatory points behind which is unleashed an unknown, enigmatic body that is 
somewhat removed from autobiographical knowledge and definition. The problem with 
Marks' analysis from my perspective is that she never examines the constitution of the 
body that she claims is a container of this sensuous knowledge. Also, in emphasizing 
how postcolonial cinema and experimental film use senses beyond the visual, such as 
smell and touch, to engage and recover bodily memories, she unwittingly reasserts the 
very hierarchy that she wants to readdress between mind and body, dominant and 
marginal. In terins of visuality, she celebrates films that 'blur' and 'muffle' the experience 
of the visual and point thereby 'to the possibility of less ocularcentric ways of seeing' 
(Marks, 2000: 135-6). 
While there is a case to be made for this opposition between the ocular and the 
haptic In Deleuze's own work, his allocation of touch with haptic vision is not to assert a 
specific bodily sensation of tactility, but to overrule such distinctions between eye and 
hand. This is exemplified in Logique de la Sensation, his book on painter Francis 
Bacon. " 
To characterize the connection between eye and hand, it is certainly not 
enough to say that the eye is infinitely richer, and passes through 
dynamic tensions, logical reversals, organic exchanges and 
vicariances ... 
We will speak of the haptic each time there is no longer 
strict subordination in one direction or the other ... 
but when sight 
discovers in itself a function of touching that belongs to it and to it alone 
and which is independent of its optical function (Deleuze in Polan, 
1994: 252). 12 
I adhere to the dominant theory that film is a visual medium and that the sensations it 
cultivates stem from or lean on the visual order. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the visual sense operates as an isolated facet in the space of viewing. 
Nor does 
it mean that soft-focus or blurry imagery are necessarily tactile and 
bodily and in 
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opposition to the harsh contour of clear definition, Taking a Deleuzian approach, the 
visual becoming haptical does not necessarily mean that one is propelled out of the 
optical. What this means is that the visual is broken down as a component sense. In fact, 
the capacity of the component senses is broken down by the impact of the image of 
sensation and what is unleashed is a kind of sensory chaos. No one sense is available for 
any recognized channel. This is more interesting in terins of how something new and not 
recognized can come into play. Rather than the return of a familiar memory or the 
rupture of a buried one, for Deleuze, the Image of sensation generates the return of 
something new. In Proust and Signs, Deleuze refers to the famous scene from Proust's 
Remembrance of Things Past, where the taste of a madeleine cake sends a shudder 
through him and he begins to 'hear the echo of great spaces traversed. Undoubtedly what 
is thus palpitating in the depths of my being must be the image, the visual memory 
which, being linked to that taste, is trying to follow it into my conscious mind' (Proust in 
Brooks, 1995: 86). Deleuze says that the visual memory that occurs here is not the return 
of the Combray Proust knew as a child, what returns in the image is Combray'not as it 
was experienced in contiguity with the past sensation, but in a splendor. Ahat never has 
an equivalent In reality' (Deleuze, 2000: 56). In other words, the process of translation, 
or mediation, which could also be called time itself, has transformed the image into a 
scene of familiar estrangement. 
Rather than the senses being interrelated as in traditional phenomenology, 
Deleuzian derangement of the senses causes each one to attain its own singularity, which 
is not individualized as belonging to an individual. This notion of the derangement of the 
senses is crucial to avoid the redefinition of the self-same body, a body re-found or a 
body returned to its owner. For me, the problem in Marks' analysis is that bodies are 
assumed to have definite owners and are culturally bounded by custom and personal 
memory. I do not want to make a claim for the meltdown of cultural specificity per se, 
but for me the sensations unleashed by the discontinuous film moment exceed 
personalized frames of reference although they intercede with them 
in their passage 
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through the body, In Marks' trqýjectory, these moments would be the return or recovery 
of something lost. In my film encounter scenarios, the image of absence evokes 
something, which is not substantiated in an identity. 
To keep the question of what is evoked and made present open, Deleuze's notion 
of the 'liberated sense organs' is a useful notion, at least in part, 
[I]t is no longer a motor extension which Is established, but rather a 
dreamlike connection through the intermediary of the liberated sense 
organs. It is as if the action floats in the situation, rather than bringing it 
to a conclusion or strengthening it (Deleuze, 1989: 4). 
However, as I repeatedly reiterate throughout this journey, Deleuze's evacuation of 
ag, ency from this sensational disordering is so absolute that it ends up reifying the work 
of art as a form of abstraction, albeit a deformed one, but one which does not seem to 
have a link to anybody. 
Perceptions are no longer perceptions, they are independent of a state of 
those who experience them. [ ... ] 
Sensations, percepts, and affects are 
beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. [ ... ] 
The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 164). 
This position ends up uniting romanticism and fon-nalism in the work of art. 
The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of 
creation is that the compound must stand up on its own Sometimes 
this requires what is, from the viewpoint of an implicit model, from the 
viewpoint of lived perceptions and affections, great geometrical 
improbability, physical imperfection, and organic abnormality (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1994: 164). 
The problem becomes one of how these independent compounds of sensations are 
located by and for anyone. When Deleuze, with Guattarl, says that 'sensory 
becoming is 
otherness caught in a matter of expression' (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 177), 1 find 
myself saying yes but to what end? Who or what kind of agency 
is the outcome of this 
transformation? 
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In The Deleuze Connections, John Rajchman suggests that habitation and 
abstract derangement are not mutually exclusive in a Deleuzian framework, as they 
would not be in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology where anonymity and particularity are 
always interrelated. The following rather lengthy citations from Rajcliman are 
suggestive, perhaps unwittingly, of some connection between Deleuzian anonymity and 
the notion of somebody inhabiting these moments of derangement. Rajchman refers to 
Virginia Woolf s Mrs. Dalloway. 
When in What is Philosophy? Deleuze says that "art is sensation and 
nothing else, " he is trying to capture an idea that runs through his work 
[ 
... ] 
Affects and percepts are the two basic types of sensation, of which 
the artwork may be said to be a composite. [ ... ] affects go beyond the 
subjects that pass through them, and they are impersonal, even inhuman, 
and percepts are not ways of presenting nature to the eye, but are rather 
like landscapes, urban as well as natural, in which one must lose oneself 
so as to see with new eyes, as, for example, with Mrs. Dalloway. 
conversely, the aim of art is, through expressive materials, to extract 
sensations from habitual sensibilia - from habits of perception, memory, 
recognition, agreement - and cause us to see and feel in new or 
unforeseen ways (Rajchman, 2000: 134-5). 
This and: 
An hour of a day, a river, a climate, a strange moment during a concert 
can be like this - not one of a kind, but the individuation of something 
that belongs to no kind, but which, though perfectly individuated, yet 
retains an indefiniteness, as though pointing to something "ineffable" 
(Rajchman, 2000: 125). 
Then that 
A life is in fact composed of many such moments - that is part of what 
makes it singular. They are the sorts of occurrences that come to us 
rather like the "waves" of which Virginia Woolf spoke - bits of 
experience that can't be fit into a nice narrative unity, and so must be 
combined or put together in another way ... 
They precede us as subjects 
or persons, and yet they are always "expressed" in our lives. Even a 
death should be thought of as singular in this way, as involving an 
"impersonality" that no "generality" can cover -a sort of "it is dying" 
(Rajchman, 2000: 85). 13 
However, the point for me is that these impersonal intuitions can only be felt 
by the 
bodies they are expressed through. When I encounter the abstract movements of 
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temporalized spacing that pulsate across the flattened image-screen in a reconfiguration 
of a static absence, I am moved by this current. I am addressed and incorporated by it 
rather than swallowed whole and dissolved in its trajectory. 
4,4 FROM A PHENOMENOLOGY OF PURIFIED VISION TO ONE OF 
EMBODIMENT -A SOJOURN WITH MICHAEL SNOW 
The stakes involved in the distinctions I am trying to make between a subjectless 
subjectivity that incorporates agency and one which dissolves it, can be exemplified by 
looking at how Michael Snow's films have been written of by Deleuze and, historically, 
in terrns of a phenomenological methodology, The choice of Snow here is threefold: 
one, Akennan's early films have been compared to Snow's work (Margulies (1996)), 
two, Deleuze's writing on his films provides one of the clearest examples in the cinema 
books of the kind of destruction of the human world Deleuze associates with cinematic 
vision, three, Snow's films were written about in the 1970s using a phenomenological 
approach (Sitney (1974), Michelson (1979)) and an analysis of this writing inadvertently 
shows how close the raw vision Deleuze attributes to Snow's Wavelength is to the 
phenomenological subject of intentionality that Deleuze himself critiques. This last point 
is key in highlighting the pitfalls of Deleuze's ultimate trajectory and in signaling why 
Merleau-Ponty can be useful in avoiding the idealism inherent in Deleuzian'pure vision'. 
For Deleuze, Snow's films generate a seeing purified vision devoid of human 
aggency. In fact, La Region Centrale (197 1), a film of a remote Canadian landscape, 
recorded by the pre-programmed choreography of a machine that endlessly turns and 
swivels like an automaton, seems to correspond to Deleuze's rhetorical question: 
But how is it possible to speak of images in themselves which are not 
for anyone and are not addressed to anyone? How is it possible to speak 
of an Appearing [Apparaitre], since there is not even an eye? (Deleuze, 
1992: 59). 
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In Deleuze's reference to The Central Region', we find a succinct example of how 
cinema is viewed as an Appearing without a seer, external or otherwise. 
Mi 
* 
chael Snow's The Central Region does not raise perception to the 
universal variation of a raw and savage matter without also extracting from it a space without reference points where the ground and the sky, the horizontal and the vertical, interchange. Nothingness itself is 
diverted towards that which comes out of it or falls back on it, the 
genetic element, the fresh or vanishing perception, which potentialises a 
space by retaining only the shadow or the account of human events 14 (Deleuze, 1992: 122) 
. 
This is admittedly only one aspect of Deleuze's work on cinema, and not the one I am 
retaining, but for the moment I want to emphasize it as it sheds light on how I am 
distinguishing my approach from Deleuze and why I am returning to aspects of Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology. 
There is precedence in Deleuze's philosophical intercessor, Henn Bergson, for 
this kind of punfied vision. 
Pure perceptions- therefore, or images are what we should posit at the 
outset. And sensations, far from being the materials from which the 
image is wrought, will then appear as the impurity which is introduced 
into it, being that part of our own body which we project into all others 
(Bergson, 1988: 234-235). 
This is an idea that Bergson repeats in the first chapters of Matter and Memor and one y 
that initially made me balk, suggesting as it did that the sensational, affective, body is a 
contaminant. Linking affection with sensation, he says that '[a]ffection is, then, that part 
or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies, it is 
what we must first of all subtract from perception to get to the image in its purity' 
(Bergson, 1988: 58). 1 found it hard to relate this desire for a pure perception with 
Bergson's equal insistence on the necessity of the body as a special kind of linage within 
the field of images, one which 
constitutes at every moment, as we have said, a section of the universal 
becoming. It is then the place ofpassage of the movements received and 
thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between the things which act 
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upon me and the things upon which I act - the seat, in a word, of the 
sensori-motor phenomena (Bergson, 1988: 151-152). 
The notion of the body as an image within the field of images does indeed destabilize 
the situatechiess of phenomenology's 'perceiving subject' (Deleuze, 1992: 57), but 
Bergson's qualification of this destabilization maintains a dynamic relationship between 
a screened image and the spectator as an embodied image which can be linked to the 
Merleau-Ponty of The Visible and the Invisible. Bergson's notion of the body (spectator) 
as a place of passage creates an interval between movements received and movements 
thrown back. Although body and image are essentially of the same matter, if the body 
did not act as a differenciating passage, the 'universal variation' of movement-images 
Nvould have the quality of an etemal force or a drearnerless drearnscape, a drugged 
vision, Deleuze is fond of this motif, whereas Bergson still maintains a balance between 
dream and action. 
Although takmig the opposite direction of traditional phenomenology, Deleuze's 
acentred universe has a strangely similar outcome. In both positions, the embeddedness 
of a particular body in the scene is eradicated, the formal emptiness of phenomenology's 
transcendental subject being partner in crime to Deleuze's formal chaos of sense 
perceptions as discussed above. Annette Michelson, an influential proponent of the 
phenomenological method of film analysis in the 1970s, succinctly sums up this 
similarity, referring to Snow's work as the example par excellence. 
15 By contrast to 
Deleuze, she sees Snow as reintroducing, albeit in a questioning way, a sovereignty of 
the spectator which had been threatened by the 'spatial disorientations' of 
Stan 
Brakhage's experimental filmmaking (Michelson, 1979: 118). 
Wavelength, then, appeared as a celebration of the "apparatus" and a 
confirmation of the status of the subject, and it is in those terms that we 
may begin to comprehend the profound effect it had on the 
broadest 
spectrum of viewers - especially upon those for whom previous assaults 
on the spatiotemporality of dominant cinema had obscured that subject's 
role and place. The spectator for whom that place was obscured - and 
threatened - by the spatial disorientations of say, 
Dog Star Man, (a 
space purely optical and a temporality of the perpetual present) could 
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respond, as if in gratitude, to Snow's apparently gratifying confirmation 
of a threatened sovereignty (Michelson, 1979: 118). 
In fact her analysis of Brakhage, which refers to his book, Metaphors ql'Vision, is 
strikingly close to Deleuze's analysis of Snow in the sense of detennining a purified, 
unlocatable, luminous, vision, what Michelson calls 'a hallucinated gaze' (Michelson, 
1979: 116). 16 This emphasis on a vision uncorrupted by language, prior to the fall, 'the 
gaze of fascination' develops, she says, in the late '60s into the use of filmic signifiers to 
create spaces of 'analytic inspection' (Michelson, 1979: 116). In this move, which 
Michelson sees in terins of continuity rather than as a different strain of American avant- 
garde fihnmakm , 
'[t]he hallucinated viewer was, so to speak, replaced by the cognitive 9, 
viewer, but common to them both was the status of transcendental subject' (Michelson, 
1979: 116). She defines the latter in terins of being a liberated eye, an eye unfettered by 
a bodN,,. 
This seems to me to be strikingly similar to Bergson's notion of purified vision 
mentioned above, which is echoed in Deleuze's analysis of Wavelength (see note xvi this 
section). As Michelson discusses, while Snow in La Region Centrale does subject 
spatio-temporal certainties to questioning, the film's infinitely mobile framing, its 
mimesis of and gloss upon spatial exploration offer, most importantly, a 
fusion of primary scopophilic and epistemophilic impulses in the 
cinematic rendering of the grand metaphor of the transcendental subject 
(Michelson, 1979: 123). 
For her, and I agree, La Region Centrale hyperbolizes the 'disembodied mobility of the 
eye-subject' (Michelson, 1979: 12 1). This corresponds with Snow's assertion that: 
I wanted the spectator to be the lone center of all these circles. It had to 
be the place where you can see a long way and you can't see anything 
man-made. That has something to do with a certain kind of singleness or 
remoteness that each spectator can have by seeing the film (Snow in 
Michelson, 1979: 120). 17 
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That this occurs from a central position is exemplified in La Region Centrale by the 
figure X that appears at regular intervals throughout the film stretching from comer to 
comer of the frame. Snow discusses this figure X as re-centring the viewer, 'a reminder 
of the central region - the whole thing is about being in the middle of this - the camera 
and the spectator... from the ecstatic centre of a complete sphere' (Snow in Wees, 1992: 
170). 18 
Needless to say the idea of centering the viewer in a position that gives him a 
definite (mental) perspective over the displacements that this sublime machinic vision 
subjects him to is typical of the masculine side of the sublime that I looked at in chapter 
three. It ends in the fon-nalism of what Merleau-Ponty would call abad dialectic'which 
can assemble discontinuity into an overall thetic schema and in so doing 'ends up 
at ... 
fon-nalism' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 13 8). 19 It is averse to the movements of the 
female sublime, which proceeds by means of openness to ambiguity and displacement. It 
is in order to avoid the stasis of forinalism that I want to hybridize Deleuze with 
Merleau-Ponty. 
MN, deliberation over readings of Snow's work here has another purpose. 
Akerman's early work has been compared to his (Margulies, 1996: 80-83). Margulies 
comparison of their work in terins of how they approach narrative is apropos to my 
thesis. She says that they both create an equivalence between two kinds of narrative, 'one 
made up of the episodic or discrete event,, the other based on accumulation or structural 
intensification' (Margulies, 1996: 82). However, the crucial difference for me is that, 
unlike Snow's deployment of these narrative figures, the intensity that builds up by 
means of accumulation in Aken-nan's News From Home, does not derive from'a 
structural insistence in a single direction' as Margulies claims for Snow's work 
(Margulies, 1996: 82). '0 While the viewer as disembodied eye is continually being 
recentred in relation to the transcendence of space and time in La Region Centrale, 
Akerman talks about wanting the viewer to be confronting the space in her films. 'I want 
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people to lose themselves in the frame, and at the same time to be truly confronting the 
space'(Aken-nan in Indiana, 1983: 58). 
While I would not frame the difference between them in terms of sexual 
difference per se, Catherine Fowler claims that 'a distinction must be made between 
Snow's and A-ken-nan's disniption of the cinematic gaze' (Fowler, 1995: 145). She 
unambiguously states that Snow undertakes this in the name of 'structuralist 
experimentation' while Akennan's stance is inflected with a sense of 'her sexual 
difference' (Fowler, 1995: 146). Undoubtedly, the protagonists in Akennan's Jeanne 
Dielman: 23 Quai duCommerce, 1080 Bruxelles (1975) and Je tu il elle (1974) can be 
viewed as radical representations of femininity, (Akerman resists the label feminist), but 
it is a bit of a stretch to imbue the more abstract aspects of her filmmaking to 'her sexual 
difference'. That would be to take Akerman's assertion of how her camera positioning 
relates to her physicality in a rather literal way. Fowler does not intend this perhaps but 
her claim leads her to posit the final scene in News From Home as a zoom back, the 
reverse of Snow's zoom forth in Wavelength (Fowler, 1995: 146). Aside from the 
equation of sexual difference with film technique, as if the later was simply an 
anatomical prosthesis, Snow's zoom forth is not actually a continuous zoom forwards 
but gives the illusion of being one. And, more importantly, Akerman's framing in the 
final scene of News From Home is not a zoom at all. As opposed to Fowler's assertion 
that in Wavelength Snow closes down space to concentrate on one specific area, Le. the 
photograph, I concur with William C. Wees that the final zoom into the photograph 
opens out onto infinity, a kind of absolute openness rather than closure or compression 
(see note xvii, this section). 
However, I do agree with Fowler's assertion that Akennan replaces closure with 
'aperture' which gives way onto an alternative conception of the spectator as the 
locus 
for the processual nature of the film (Fowler, 1995: 147-149). While 
Akennan's images 
in News From Home are centrally framed, space is continually 
being asserted in 
temporal terms, is being given time, rather than containing it. 
" Even, or especially, in 
225 
the final scene, the unhinging of sensation that I was subjected to and the sense of being 
transported elsewhere was not beyond the body or in relation to a static body outside the 
frame. The body as a passage for the liberation of sensations was itself passing through 
the time frame of the image, its temporalized spacing, its duration. Merleau-Ponty 
describes this sensibility: 
As the nervure bears the leaf from within, from the depths of its flesh, 
the ideas are the texture of experience, its style, first mute, then uttered, 
Like every style, they are elaborated within the thickness of being and, 
not only in fact but also by right, could not be detached from it, to be 
spread out on display under the gaze (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 119). 
The sensations unleashed in the filmic texture of the final moment of News From Home 
change the pacing of the scene They do not return to a sovereignty which is affordably 
lost because it is so finylly entrenched in the first place, as in Michelson's analysis of 
Snow's assertion of the transcendental subject in La Region Centrale. 
This is one of the main points of the feminist critique of philosophers of 
dissolution as I demonstrated in chapter three using Rosi Braidotti's critique of Deleuze - 
you can only lose a self if you begin from the position of stable subject. In News From 
Home the position of the self is to do with finding a position or positions that are not 
pre-given. In fact, the strange thing about the visual perspective of say the subway or 
road shots, which seem to be framed according to the logic of the vanishing point, is that 
when you try to place yourself at some supposed geometric central axis, it doesn't work. 
The gap created by the image between its intimate compression and your removal from 
it engenders a double displacement, which sets a process in motion whereby engagement 
with the image can only be rendered by means of to-ing and fro-ing in a type of space 
outside it, an intervallic space. The opaque stillness of the image generates movement. 
But not the mirror movements of Snow's La Region Centrale where you 
find yourself 
following the trajectory of the camera performing those 'circling, spiraling, rising, 
sweeping movements, crossing the distances between peaks, creating, 
in imperceptible 
loops through empty skies, reversals of direction' which seem to question 
'through 
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kinetic counter-example and disorientation, the "ground" of the Kantian " iew" which vi I 
founds the modem sense of "place... (Michelson, 1979: 122), 
It is against this grand vision and disembodied mobility that Akerman's News 
From Home performs. The movements incited are traceable not in or by the image per se 
but as a kind of invisible drawing between spectator and image, a drawing which 
captures them both in a space that exceeds their boundaries. The spectator then becomes 
a point in the vectoral crossing of the two movements of the spatializaton of duration 
and the temporalization of space. The spectator as body is perhaps a kind of passive join, 
an interval, in this intersecting loop., the traversal through the spatio-temporal 
dis/continuities of News From Home being bound up with a kind of subjection to the 
image. One could say that the viewer is subjected to the construction of space in 
Wavelength, even more so in La Region Centrale where the viewer becomes a kind of 
involuntary camera, but passivity in Snow is still bound up with the centralized 
viewpoint from which the viewer follows the camera's movements. In viewing News 
From Home, passive reception is a state where control is given over to the image, but at 
the same time, the image refuses that power, instead creating, a lack of centre as 
opposed to Snow's 'restoring and remapping the space of perspective construction' 
(Michelson, 1979: 118). 
Furthennore, my point is that the lack of centre in News From Home is not a 
static inert unrepresentable absence - '[t]he unspoken, that which cannot 
be figured, the 
ruptures in the coherence of male, patriarchal discourse' (Flitterman-Lewis 
in Fowler, 
1995: 40). It is rather full of the crossing of the movements of durational rhythms 
between film. and viewer. It is, following Merleau-Ponty, a virtual centre, which is 
fundamentally empty, but is in a dynamic relation to the things that coil around 
its 
mobility. 
Phenomenology is an attempt to film, in slow motion, that which 
has 
been, owing to the manner in which it is seen in natural speed, not 
absolutely unseen, but missed, subject to oversight. 
It attempts, slowly 
and calmly, to draw closer to that original intensity which is not given in 
227 
appearance, but from which things and processes do, nevertheless, in 
turn proceed (Michelson in Peterson, 1994: 78/9). " 
This more positive description of the phenomenological method is apropos to my thesis 
and echoes Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible when he discusses a kind of 
dynamic passivity, where intentional attention to the pre-reflective is somewhat 
dispossessed, while at the same time. the pre-reflective dynamic is not inoperative. 
Vivian Sobchack's return to Merleau-Ponty, while mentioning this dynamic 
passivity, foregoes its ramifications which are more suggestive of a subjected than an 
intentional subject evolving in the film encounter, the agency of the former being what 
interests me and what I shall go on to develop. Meanwhile, Sobchack discusses the film 
encounter in terrns of intersubjectivity, as one between two subjects, two 
consciousnesses, which live one another's vision introceptively. Sobchack attributes the 
other consciousness to the film's body rather than to the filmmaker. I agree with her 
claim that '[t]he direct engagement, then, between spectator and film in the film 
experience cannot be considered a monologic one between a viewing subject and a 
viewed object. Rather, it is a dialogical and dialectical engagement' (Sobchack, 1992: 
23). For her, the film is a view-viewed, (its objectal. status), and a viewing-view, (its 
status as a subject), not, she says, a human subject but a viewing subject. The film's 
subjectivity is 'one that manifests a competence of perceptive and expressive 
performance equivalent in structure and function to that same competence performed by 
filmmaker and spectator' (Sobchack, 1992: 22). 
I find Sobchack's attribution of subjectivity to the film itself problematic. It is 
necessary for her notion that the film experience is between 'two viewing subjects who 
also exist as visible objects' (Sobchack, 1992: 23) and it allows her to revert to the 
traditional account of intersubjectivity in phenomenology, as a space where two 
subjects, who have the capacity to be objects for one another, meet. 
However, while I 
agree with her assertion that '[i]n the film experience, all signification and all 
communication start from the "affinity" that is the act of viewing, coten-nmously 
but 
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uniquely perfon-ned by both film and spectator' (Sobchack, 1992: 23), 1 would claim that 
what is performed occurs in an intermediate arena between both film and spectator 
rather than bv them each in their own spaces. -13 Part of the problem with Sobchack for 
me, in her use of Merleau-Ponty's ideas as a model for cinematic intersubjectivity, lies in 
her reliance on Phenomenology qlTerception as opposed to the later, unfinished, The 
Visible and the Invisible. (She cites the latter on a few occasions but does not distinguish 
between it and ideas from the earlier tome. ) 
In Phenomenology (? fPerception, while Merleau-Ponty attempts to detennine 
the positions of the subject and the object as being mutually constitutive and mutually 
transformative, his tendency to posit their encounter as allowing the being of the 
(non-nal) subject to be altered but leaving the object relatively unchanged has been 
questioned by feminist philosophers (Butler (1989), Grosz (1994b)). Undoubtedly, there 
is much in Phenomenology ofPerception that hints at the transformation of both subject 
and object in the intersubjective encounter. Indeed Merleau-Ponty does state there a 
desire 'to leave behind us, for once and for all, the traditional subject-object dichotomy' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 174). 
The task for us is to conceive, between the linguistic, perceptual, and 
motor contents and the form given to them or the symbolic function 
which breathes life into them, a relationship which shall be neither the 
reduction of form to content, nor the subsuming of content under an 
autonomous forin (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 126). 
However, the underlying premises of this overlapping of boundaries between subject 
and object tend to show themselves for what they still are in the chapter 'The Body in its 
Sexual Being'. There his allocation of the female body as 'a fixed essence as opposed to 
an open existence', undermines his challenge to the dominant theories of the object as 
inert matter and thereby incapable of change (Butler, 1989: 94). In fact, as 
Butler shows 
in her reading of this chapter, Merleau-Ponty's potentially expansive notion that 
sexuality expresses existence gets figured as a voyeuristic relation where an alienated 
subject, as a purely disembodied gaze, defines its object as mere 
body (Butler, 1989: 
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agree wi A Butler's critique. Mapping this chapter on gender onto other passages 
in the book highlights the difficulty Merleau-Ponty has I iding giving a privileged in avoi i 
position to a knowing consciousness that gazes over'the expressive significance' that he 
theoreticalk, attributes to all modalities of existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 291). 
However, I think Butler is mistaken to attribute absolute disembodiment to the gaze that 
Merleau. -Pontv discusses as a tNpe of natural perception not bound up with empiricism. 
It is true that when Merleau-Ponty discusses this gaze that does not objectify the 
human Nvorld, as does the human eye, it sounds like a cosmological transcendent seeing 
not unlike in fact what I have been taking issue with in Deleuze. In fact, he describes 
how, by contrast to the 'natural' gaze which is directed towards all possible views of the 
object without positing one of them as being distinct and separate from my experience, 
the (human) eyes become prosthetic entities in the move towards positing an object in its 
autonomy (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 70-7 1). We move from 'an open and indefinite 
multiplicity of relationships which are of reciprocal implication' towards 'the absolute 
positing of a single object' which 'is the death of consciousness since it congeals the 
whole of existence as a crystal placed in a solution suddenly crystallizes it' (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 7 1). On the other hand however, Merleau-Ponty does retain the 
siMUltaneous occurrence and interconnectivity of both the ontological gaze of the world, 
which we do not see as such and the bits of the world we carve out of it by means of 
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sight . 
Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own 
being, the one for which I am responsible and for which I make 
decisions, but another self which has already sided with the world, 
which is already open to certain of its aspects and are synchronised with 
them. Between my sensation and myself there stands always the 
thickness of some primal acquisition which prevents my experience 
from being clear of itself I experience the sensation as a modality of a 
general existence, one already destined for a physical world and which 
runs through me without my being the cause of it (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 
126). 
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The notion of interconnectivity between an image seen and something felt beyond its 
frame, a loop between these arenas is conducive to mN, pro'ect here. The slight problem 91 
that Merleau-Pontv poses, and that Deleuze criticizes him for, is that he contrasts the 
gaze, this natural perception, to the cinema screen which he says lacks the openness of 
the visual field of the gaze (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 5& 68). (In this sense, the cinema 
screen would not be unlike the closed off nature of the female body object in the chapter 
in Phenomenology qfPerception, 'The Body III in its Sexual Being). 
What phenomenology sets up as a norm is "natural perception" and its 
conditions. Now, these conditions are existential co-ordinates which 
define an "anchoring" of the perceiving subject in the world, a being in 
the world, an opening to the world which will be expressed in the 
famous "all consciousness is consciousness of something... The 
cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away 
from them and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring of 
the subject and the horizon of the world. Hence it substitutes an implicit 
knowledge and a second intentionality for the conditions of natural 
perception (Deleuze, 1992: 57)ý 
In Deleuze's revision and return to Henn Bergson as a theorist of cinema'the model 
cannot be natural perception, which does not possess any privilege. The model would be 
rather a state of things which would constantly change, a flowing-matter in which no 
point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable' (Deleuze, 1992: 5 7). 
As opposed to the absoluteness of Deleuzian decentnng, Merleau-Ponty, In the 
way he privileges the masculine subject over the female object in the aforementioned 
chapter, seems to privilege the 'indeterminate field of natural perception' (the gaze) over 
and above the selective and thereby limited field of (mechanical/prosthetic) vision. 
While it is the case that a film is comprised of mechanically selected bits of the world, 
presented as a delimited field surrounded by a zone of blackness (Sobchack, 1992), 1 
have been arguing for the notion of the dynamic of film as an intersection or looping of 
two movements, one continuous, the other discontinuous, which generates a 
dis/continuous performative field between screen and spectator. These two movements 
are actualized by the irregularity of the cut and its relation to the continuous 
duration of 
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the static camera image. In reference to the Image of duration, where the Image lasts 
longer than Nvc need it to last for inforinational purposes, the continuous fluildi y of a it 
gaze without purpose begins to make itself felt in the viewing situation. This sense of 
continuity is not incompatible Nvith the discontinuous delimitations, the intemal and 
external montage or cuts that are perfon-ned by both viewer and film. The viewer not 
only internalizes the actual cuts of the film, but also incorporates them into the 
constellation of internal montage that is occurring continuously in relation to the static 
duration of the image. Thereby the spectator is linked and open to the constant variation 
that temporality perforins on a body, the body as a bounded contour being turned inside 
out as it , vere, ex-corporated, in relation to a film skin emptied of interior depth. 
Up to now in this chapter I have been critical of Merleau-Ponty, while at the 
same time, developing aspects of his ideas that I want to hybridize with the Deleuzian 
notions that I have found companionable on this joumey. I now want to take Merleau- 
Ponty on board less critically. By contrast to the justified criticisms of Merleau-Ponty 
that Deleuze makes above, Merleau-Ponty, in his essay'The Film and the New 
Psychology', puts movies on a par with natural objects. In that essay they are both seen 
as exhibiting surface behaviours and gestures that 'make us see the bond between subject 
and world, between subject and others' (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 5 8). Although his 
emphasis is still on conscious perception and the behavioural aspect of films is 
considered in terms of characters rather than the more abstract aspects of images, 
Merleau-Ponty's linkage of the texture of a film's surface and the outside world is 
conducive to the modality of discontinuous linkage that I am developing. The modality 
of 'interimplication' between the continuous and the discontinuous, that I claim occurs in 
the encounter with the suspended film moment of blankness can be developed 
further by 
recourse to The Visible and the Invisible. There, the positions of subject and object are 
superceded by an emphasis on the chiasmic 'coiling up of experience over experience' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 113). Elizabeth Grosz summarizes: 
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[Iln his last text he [Merleau-Ponty] explores the interrelations of the 
inside and the outside, , the subject and the object, one sense and another 
in a common flesh - which he describes as the "crisscrossing" of the seer 
and the visible, of the toucher and the touched, the indeterminacy of the 
"boundaries" of each of the senses, their inherent transpossibility, their 
refusal to submit to the exigencies of clear-cut separation or logical 
identity (Grosz, 1994: 94). 
It is this movement of "crisscrossing" that resonates with the performativity generated 
by the still moving image of blankness in the film encounters. My relation to this image 
is not one of pure negativity, disengagement, distanciation, but a sense of being between 
the crossing of two movements that intersperse and displace one another continually. 
Mhat we seek is a dialectical definition of being ... that must rediscover 
the being that lies before the cleavage operated by reflection, about it, 
on its horizon, not outside of us and not in us, but there where the two 
movements cross, there where "there is" something (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968: 95). 
For Deleuze, cmerna's great advantage is that 
because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which 
it makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural 
perception goes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of things 
to centred perception, it could go back up to the acentred state of things, 
and get closer to it (Deleuze, 1992: 58). 
Whereas In a phenomenological approach, even one as close to Deleuze as I am arguing 
Merleau-Ponty is in The Visible and the Invisible, what Sobchack calls 'the latent 
visibility' of the indeten-ninate field of the gaze can never be isolated in such a manner 
(Sobchack, 1992: 90). For Merleau-Ponty there is always a'strange adhesion of the seer 
and the visible' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 13 9), rather than the 
disappearance of the 
spectator into the seer, immersed and fractured in the 'acentred state of 
things'. 
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4.5 HYBRIDIZfNG DELEUZE AND MERLEAU-PONTY: GROUNDfNG THE 
INFINITE TEMPORALIZATION OF THE INTERVAL IN THE PASSIVE 
DYNAMISM OPREVERSIBILITY. 
As opposed to the criticisms of phenomenology that it relies on centred subject 
and that it relies on the transparency of 'objective' description, Merleau-Ponty insists on 
the imbrication of the subject in the things he/she tries to describe, thereby not being 
able to soar above or bracket them off The way he does this can be used as a corrective 
and complement to Deleuze's notions of dissolution of the spectator into the seer and so 
expand on the spectatorial sensibility I am trying to give an account here. In chapter 
three, I discussed the path of Deleuze's thinking that interested me most as being the one 
where he refers to 'the horizon of events' where one and the same horizon links the 
cosmic and the everyday. Merleau-Ponty has a similar notion, the difference being that 
he emphasizes the seer's own place and time within the transcendent space of the flesh, 
or anonymity. 
The superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision and for my 
body. But the depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence 
contains my vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the 
full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all 
the visibles with it. There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one 
in the other. Or rather, if as once again we must, we eschew the 
thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two circles, or two 
vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon as 
I question myself, the one slightly decentred with respect to the other... 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 138). 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze discusses the subjectivity that plays across the 
interstices of difference as being one where '[t]he identity of the player has disappeared, 
as has the resemblance of the one who pays the price or profits from the consequences' 
(Deleuze, 1994: 284). Instead we have a situation where '[oln one side, nothing but an I 
fractured by that empty form [of time]. On the other, nothing but a passive self always 
dissolved in that empty form' (Deleuze, 1994: 2 84). The combination of a passive self 
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dissolved in the empty form of time, and the "I" fractured by that forin, i is not dissimilar, 
I think, to Merleau-Ponty's ontological vibrations as variation that preexist the reflective 
ego that resolves differences into coherent form, establishing a coherent identity. 
Deleuze's passive self, not to be mistaken for a state in opposition to active. is 
echoed by Merleau-Ponty's body that is itself in the midst of things and thereby cannot 
get a perspective on them as essences in themselves. In making this comparison, I want 
to iqlect into Deleuze's cinematic world, a body, the spectator, which, while not outside 
the events on the screen, is different from them. And inject into Merleau-Ponty's 
embodiment situation, a technology which allows for a cinematic image to be an 
openness onto the various vibrations in which I participate before "I" begin the egoic 
attempts to separate out its components under the spread of my gaze. I want to develop 
the notion that the serialization of displacements that the self undergoes in relation to the 
mobilizing blankness of the final image sequence of New From Home mfers a model of 
subjectivity akin to the narcissism of what Deleuze calls 'passive contraction' and 
Merleau-Ponty calls 'emigration into the outside'. 
Thus the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is still himself he sees: 
there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision. And thus, for the same 
reason, the vision he exercises, he undergoes forin the things, such that, 
as many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my 
activity is equally passivity - which is the second and more profound 
sense of narcissism: not to see in the outside, as others see it, the 
contour of a body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, 
to exist within it, to emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated 
by the phantom so that the seer and the visible reciprocate one another 
and we no longer know which sees and which is seen (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968: 139). 
I want to begin this exploration by way of the feminist subtext thread of this thesis. 
Passivity is usually denigrated in feminist film theory. It has negative 
connotations. As Kaja Silverman puts it: 
The notion of passive reception is rendered problematic within political 
theory and practice because of its apparent association with resignation 
as well as inactivity. To be in a receptive relation to external stimuli is 
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assumed to imply a passive acceptance in the face of the "given" (Silven-nan, 2001: 27). 
For feminist film theory, passivity relates to the negativity of the woman's look, a 
position of powerlessness, 'the passi IIIII ive, feminine identification with the image (body, 
landscape)' (de Lauretis, 1984: 144). In order to counter this negative view, de Lauretis 
puts forward the notion of what she calls a double narrative figural identification, 
whereby the female spectator moves between the narrative image (body, landscape) and 
the figure of narrative movement (thought of as a person). She is of course considering 
classical narrative film. However, in a film such as News From Home, the figure of 
movement is synonymous with the narrative image. The character, or subject of 
movement, is absent, buildings, roads, and passers-by becoming equal protagonists on a 
surface, by turns, becoming depersonalized as individual entities, becoming Imes, shapes 
and colours, and taking on abstract qualities of movement within the space, as well as 
retaining their nomenclature. By means of the fixe nature of Akerman's camera, the 
viewer is deliberately placed in a state of moving between information and abstraction 
and is thereby made aware of the minute movements occurring within the stillness of the 
image. 
De Lauretis, relying on a psychoanalytic model, would see the collapse of the 
narrative image and the figure of narrative movement as a condensation of the two 
positionalities of figural identification into 'the masochist position, the (impossible) 
place of a purely passive desire' (de Lauretis, 1984: 15 1). However, attending to the 
image of figural abstraction in News From Home in terms of a double narrative motion 
opens up de Lauretis' position which, in the emphasis on impossibility, echoes Heath's 
analysis of the film. One might ask instead, is passive properly in opposition to active, is 
the fixed image passive in relation to narrative action? Doesn't the internal image 
differences that this film generates suggest another mode of relation? What would it 
mean to think of passivity, of passive reception as a kind of liberation from the 
oppositional, the contradictory, the movement of oscillation between narrative and 
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stasis? In the above citation, Merleau-Ponty suggests another form of movement which 
can be occurring when one is captivated bv the outside (image), a movement of 
continuous discontinuity, a movement of disruptive passivity. 
Stephen Koch discusses passivity in relation to Andy Warhol. " Koch's analysis 
usefully allows us to see the stakes involved between different fonns of passivity. Koch 
discusses Warhol's early films, Empire ( 1964) and Sleep (1963), as generating a kind of 
'passive meditation' where 'the darting vivacity of the gaze becomes a stare' (Koch, 
1991: 3 1). 'Perception is introjected and internalized, visuality itself loses its vivacity 
and is touched by an autistic, unresonating stillness', which, Koch maintains, ultimately 
denies the senses (Koch, 1991: 72). 1 want to claim that the passive meditiation 
generated by News From Home is simultaneously full of the 'darting, impulsive visual 
flashes by which the space of action is defined' (Koch, 1991: 3 1). That while Akenuan's 
fixed camera and extended duration is technically not unlike Warhol's, the sensibility 
generated in the viewer is very different. Earlier I mentioned Peter Gidal's analysis of the 
silence of Warhol's early static camera films engendering an 'extended durational 
confrontation with another on-screen' whereby the viewer leams about change, one's 
own and that of an other (Gidal, 1971: 90). This analysis somewhat contrasts with 
Koch's as it suggests an active engagement with the imaged 'other'. I agree with both of 
them in the sense that there is an active engagement but, this engagement, because it 
takes place within the scenario of confrontation, eventually becomes numbing. 
I saw Warhol's Henry Geldzahler (1964) at Tate Modem, London in February 
2002. When the image, Geldzahler, appeared, I wondered how I was going to be able to 
sit through 45 minutes of looking at this man, as I found him repulsive, arrogant, and 
dominating the space. However, after some time went by I found myself forgetting about 
this on-screen creature's personality, and caught up in the indefinite time of a kind of 
witnessing, so that when the film ended, I was surprised by how quickly what 
I knew to 
be 45 minutes had passed. In a sense, I seemed to have disappeared for a time, 
completely submitting to the image. The dynamic of confrontation entails the parameters 
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of recognition and alienation. I bestow recognition to the other and vice versa. When 
that recognition is refused, I become alienated by the image and react in either of two 
ways, outward aggression to force the other (image) to recognize me or submission to 
mv own disappearance that the other's refusal of recognition commits me to. In relation 
to Warhol's Henry Geldzahler I would say that I occupied the latter scene. 
The scenario set up by Akerman's camera is different, Disappearance is there 
from the start. It is not a confrontation, a relation between one subject and another, but a 
space of free-floating, endistanced, looking from a place that is not needed by the image, 
at a place, the image, which is not dependent on my gaze for its being. I am placed in the 
midst of two gazes, neither of which is performed for my deliquescence, as Warhol's 
gaze seems to be, albeit a numbed deliquescence. In News From Home, one gaze 
extends in front of me, an extension that cumulatively builds up a layered surface rather 
than receding in depth. The other gaze extends behind me, its vaporousness illuminated 
bv the screen cut out of this vast blackness, creating a place, which allows the gaze of 
accumulation to rest. These two gazes, one layered, the other, vaporous, intersect and 
crisscross like two vectors on a Moebius strip. 
Deleuze's model of subjectivity, if it can be called a model, in Difference and 
Repetition, can be used to expand on the kind of mobile passivity generated by the 
vectoral intersecting of these two gazes. In that book, Deleuze discusses passivity in 
terms of a self-affection, whereby, in becoming the object of a passion (an image) the 
self disperses itself into a series of differenciated movements, as opposed to becoming a 
static object in relation to the desire of another. Deleuze's model of passive synthesis Is 
comprised of three inter-linked components which seem to me to relate to the processual 
unfolding of News From Home, the interconnection between the extended duration of 
the shots and the level of diffusion they generate that is exaggerated in the final 
sequence. To stress the aspect of linkage 'Is particularly important to my goal of avoiding 
the absolute dissolute diffusion that Deleuzian trajectories can sometimes take. 
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The first Iin]kage of suýjectivity is a passive synthesis, which initially binds the 
scattered and diffiise excitations the self is suýjected to, reproducing them on a 
privileged surface of its body (Deleuze, 1994: 96). The self is the result of contracting 
the chaotic energic field in which it is immersed. 2' As Deleuze puts it, rather than this 
being a once and for all occurrence, '[alt the level of each binding, an ego Is formed in 
the Id, a passive, partial, larval, contemplative and contracting ego. The Id is populated 
by local egos... ' (Deleuze, 1994: 97), not as in Freud one entity. As Deleuze explains: 
'It (the eye or seeing ego) produces itself or "draws itself' from what it contemplates 
(and from what it contracts and invests by contemplation)' (Deleuze, 1994: 97) . 
2' The 
passive synthesis produces passive selves. However, unlike as in psychoanalysis where 
this kind of self-affection would be a turning back of libido on itself, and therefore 
destructive (masochistist), for Deleuze this self-affection produces a play of differences 
which move in two directions simultaneously. This is the second passive synthesis. One 
direction moves towards identity, the other direction moves towards a deepening of the 
initial passive synthesis and organises itself in relation to virtual objects. 
Whereas active synthesis points beyond passive synthesis towards 
global integrations and the supposition of identical totalisable objects, 
passive synthesis, as it develops, points beyond itself towards the 
contemplation of partial objects which remain non-totalisable (Deleuze, 
1994: 101). 
For Deleuze, these partial (virtual) objects, are absent in terms of representation, but 
they are not absolutely absent. They are always folding over and exchanging places with 
totalisable objects, fon-ning a pattern like a Moeblus strip. They forni one side of the 
interval, the side of disguise and play. On the other side of the interval are the totalisable 
objects of need and desire. In this re-conception of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, the emphasis is on the recasting of difference as a space of play between 
things, sensations and images. As the interval between things is continually moving and 
shifting within the parameters of the game, the substitution of one object or sensation 
for 
another is not haunted by a fundamental absence. As opposed to the psychoanalytic 
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approach where absence is registered as a limit of representation, for Deleuze, absence 
or the virtual is an unstable category which is continually being displaced and generating 
the ncN\, - totalisable object. As opposed to the unrepresentable, in Deleuze, absence 
becomes the element that, in being missing from the picture in one place, continually 
returns to it in another place, creating new variations and relations to the virtual, itself a 
moving entity. 
Aken-nan's films have been written of as always being addressed to the mother 
(Barker, 1999). No one can refute that the mother is figured as a prominent absence in 
News From Home, but, for me, the force of that final scene has to do with how it 
exceeds contaimnent in a defimte form of address and how that excess is not the 
maternal excess that heralds the collapse of distinctions between self and other, but one 
where difference is reconfigured as self-affection. Rather than remaining within the 
terms of an immobile passive address where the self is absorbed by the other, which was 
rný,, reaction to Warhol's Henry Geldzahler, my claim is that the processual 
reconfiguration of absence in News From Home is generative, in the final sequence, of a 
new forination of passive subjectivity rather than a regression to the archaic space of an 
origmary passivity. (In psychoanalytic theory, this would be deemed a pre-symbolic 
symbiosis or merging with the mother. ) In that final image sequence, the "I" is released 
its into a scattering that doesn't have a definite goal in mind, but contracts and extends i 
reach in relation to this image where the horizon is continually shifting the frame. The 
"I" forms other series of contemplations of itself - of water, sky and air, the space of 
breathing that the openness of the image releases. Contemplations that in turn produce 
sensations of movement that are localised by the body/spectator but are not reducible to 
that body as an object in space. The joy triggered by these mobile possessions is that, 
while they require the individual, they are also groundless. In this 
final sequence, a force 
or forces outside of myself towards which I gravitate touch me. 
'9 
Floating along the motion of the water, dipping and curving along the 
flight 
lines of the seagulls, a vacant "I" follows the undulations of movement that 
form one 
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over the other, disappearing like tones of wave swill on a river. As Deleuze puts it: 'It is 
firstly because water is the most perfect environment in which movement can be 
extracted from the thing moved, or mobility from movement itself (Deleuze, 1992: 77). 
And on land, movement always takes place from one point to another, 
always between two points, while on water the point is always between 
two movements: it thus marks the conversion or inversion of movement, 
as in the hydraulic relationship of a dive and a counter-dive, which is 
found in the movement of the camera itself (the final fall of the 
entwined bodies of the two lovers has no end, but is converted into an 
ascending movement) (Deleuze, 1992: 79). 
There are no human bodies visible, no lovers or any others, simply a movement away 
from the shore, a moving away which is also a moving towards, two directions that 
overlap in a loop, cracking the air like a whip, fabricating a space where I am fractured 
yet connected, spread out, yet contracted. In this miniscule gap, the "I" is different from, 
displaced from itself as a bounded entity, the different forms of its displacing (self- 
affectMg) movements relating to one another in a continuum. Geometric space becomes 
unsedimented, the "I" being carried away by/on those continuous inner movements that 
lie behind its character as a marker of identity, a shifter. 
The motor forces of these film moments - torchlight bouncing off a bent sheet of 
steel, an engine slicing through water - propel me into a field of repetitious formations 
that are continually per/forming infinitesimal differences upon the surface of my body. 
Differences between one gradation of light and another, one ripple of water against the 
monotone spreading of the horizon across the screen, between these differences, the "I" 
simultaneously coils in upon itself and opens out onto a vacancy with which it conjoins 
to produce an(other) fon-n(s) of itself 
A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a 
single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being 
for 
all beings: on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has 
reached the state of excess - in other words, the difference which 
displaces and disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, 
causes them to return (Deleuze, 1994: 304). 
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This shifting interrelation between monyinity and particularity is key if one is to avoid 
falling back onto a notion of primordial materiality that preexists Identity, the outcome 
of which is an identity that forms in retrospect to the moving dynamic of the suspended 
excess of the (film) moment. This Deleuzian view Is not incommensurate with Merleau- 
Pontv, contra Sobchack, when he makes statements such as: 'In reality there is neither 
me nor the other as positive, positive suýjectivities. There are two caverns, two 
openesses, two stages where something will take place' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 263). 
This something that takes place is the crossing of the two movements of what 
Merleau-Pon-ty calls 'reversibility'. The example from Merleau-Ponty that is always 
taken up to illustrate this notion of reversibility is that of the left hand touching the right 
hand. Both Luce Irigaray and Elizabeth Grosz take it up, Irigaray to critique Merleau- 
Ponty's reassertion of mastery, i. e. that the hands are in an asymmetrical relation, one 
having dommiance over the other Wrigaray (1993); Grosz (1994b)). However, it must be 
pointed out that the example of the hands comes from Phenomenology ofPerception and 
that, although Merleau-Ponty discusses tactility in The Visible and the Invisible, 
'reversibility' is not necessan, ly reducible to a commonsense notion of tactility. It is a 
much more interesting concept, which can profitably be related to the immanently 
transcendent space of the film experience. 
In fact, what Merleau-Ponty develops out of this concept of reversibility is a 
preobjective, anonymous visibility which includes my particular carvings out of vision 
and those of others, but 'extends further than the things I touch and see at present' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 143). He does discuss the hands, the handshake in terms of a 
reversibility of touching and being touched, however he dislocates this mutual touch 
from a perceiving consciousness. It is rather a general field in which I revolve, 
displaying an inside and an outside. The only gap between inside and outside 
is the 
folding of the body as it coils around the field of visibility. 
The body unites us directly with the things through its own ontogenesis, 
by welding to one another the two outlines of which it is made, 
its two 
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laps: the sensible mass it is and the mass of the sensible wherein it is born by segregation and upon which, as seer, it remains open (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1968: 136). 
The body as seer is propped on the visible. 
What we call a visible is, we said, a quality pregnant with a texture, the 
surface of a depth, a cross section upon a massive being, a grain or 
corpuscle borne by a wave of Being. Since the total visible is always 
behind, or after, or between the aspects we see of it, there is access to it 
only through an experience which, like it, is wholly outside of itself 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 136). 
The dehiscence of the body, its two parts, being seen and seeing, is a way of locating 
what is rather 'sometimes wandering and sometimes reassembled', i. e. visibility itself 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 138). The abstract nature of the invisible ground of visibility can 
be linked to Deleuze's concept of virtuality. 'O Both terms are used to replace the notion 
of an ontological or absolute void or absence that constitutes the subject in metaphysics 
and which finds its way into film theory via Lacan. 
For Merleau-Ponty'our openness upon "something"' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968-. 
162) is beyond the parameters of identity and non-identity, as it is for Deleuze, but the 
ment of Merleau-Ponty's approach for my thesis is that mvisibility or virtuality is co- 
dependent on the actual experiencing body. It does not have a life of its own. A rather 
lengthy citation from The Visible and the Invisible makes apparent Merleau-Ponty's 
interconnection and interdependence between the idea and the sensible. 
But this hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand 
touching, between my voice heard and my voice uttered, between one 
moment of my tactile life and the following one, is not an ontological 
void, a non-being: it is spanned by the total being of my body, and 
by 
that of the world, it is the zero of pressure between two solids that 
makes them adhere to one another. My flesh and that of the world 
therefore involve clear zones, clearings, about which pivot their opaque 
zones, and the primary visibility, that of the quole and of the things, 
does not come without a second visibility, that of the lines of 
force and 
dimensions, the massive flesh without a rarefied body, the momentary 
body without a glorified body. When Husserl spoke of the 
horizon of 
the things - of their exterior horizon, which everybody 
knows, and of 
their "interior horizon, " that darkness stuffed with visibility of which 
their surface is but the limit - it is necessary to take the term seriously. 
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No more than are the sky' or the earth is the horizon a collection of 
things held together... it is a new type of being, a being by poros1tyn 
pregnancy, or generality, and he before whom the horizon opens is 
caught up, included within it. His body and the distances participate in 
one same corporeity or visi i ity in general. Which reigns between them I 
and it, and even beyond the horizon, beneath his skin, unto the depths of 
being (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 148-9). 
It is not at all necessary, to see this emphasis on 'depth' as an opposition to surface. In 
fact. Merleau-Ponty, like Deleuze, equally insists that the way things appear is how they 
mean. The invisible idea, he says, 'cannot be detached from the sensible of appearances 
and be erected into a second positivity' or abstraction (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 149). Ideas 
appear in sensible disguises but not so as to reveal a hidden depth. Rather to voice an IF 
mvisible yet transparent depth -a surface depth, the double lining of the sensible to 
which we are ourselves attached. 
When "I" am carried away on the surface of the image and moved between its 
folds what is revealed is not an empty night, Zizek's reading of Hegel's dark night of the 
soul, but a double-sided void, one side of which is always extending beyond itself, the 
other side of which coils in upon itself, this double movement producing the 
'interimplication' of states of difference. 
As the secret blackness of milk, of which Valery spoke, is accessible 
only through its whiteness, the idea of light or the musical idea doubles 
up the lights and sounds from beneath, is their other side or their depth 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 150). 
The feminist implications of this discussion should be apparent, in the sense that 
I am 
emin'nity offering a theoretical case for the image of absence, which is associated with 
f 
and the negation of representation, as having two sides, its surface appearance and 
the 
affective interval that lines this surface. This latter is the double-sided extensive void 
(object x) that animates my relation to the surface dimensions of the image, 
turning 
bodily depth inside out and dispersing it in time as a form of spacing. 
I claimed that 
something of this dynamic was operative in my discussion of 
Barthes' narration of the 
moment of the punctum in chapter two and in my 
discussion of the sublime as a form of 
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displacement in chapter three. The feminist implications of this temporalized spacing 
can be elucidated ftirther with reference to Elizabeth Grosz's recent turn to the work of 
Henn Bergson and her use of Deleuze's ideas. " 
In a recent discussion of the value of Bergson's philosophy for thinking the 
future, Grosz accuses vitalist philosophers, of which Bergson would be one, of not 
seeing that space is as dynamic as time. Vitalism, she says, 
refuses to see spatiality as just as susceptible to the movement of 
difference as duration... Just as time is amenable to both flow and 
discontinuity 
... so too is space. Space is no more inherently material than duration and is no more the privileged domain of objects than 
memory is subjective and to be denied to spatial events: each is as 
amenable as the other to being disconcerted by difference, which in any 
case refuses such a clear-cut distinction between them (Grosz, 1999: 
22). 
Grosz's point here is that the vitalist tendency of exempting the dynamism attributed to 
temporal flow fTom space risks losing the connection between actual and virtual 
inter/action. This danger thereby keeps the actual, i. e. the place where real bodies exist, 
in a static unchanging relation to a separate dynamic transcendent sphere. 
While Bergson does seem to favour time's discontinuities over the traditional 
view of space as a pre-existing container into which things are put, there are moments in 
Matter and Memory where he seems to allow for another conception of space, one which 
is equally subject to the conjunction of flow and discontinuity of time. 32 This is when he 
discusses the concept of extensity, a concept which overrides the time/space dualism and 
is pertinent to thinking of the body of the spectator as confronting space in as dynamic a 
way as it is subjected to the unhinging, de-psychologizing effects of a nonhuman time. 
His contrasting of extensity to homogenous space is useful here, the latter being the 
concept of space we use when we consider space as a container or arena in which to plot 
things. Homogenous space is a geometrical, diagrammatic conception of space that 
actually overlies the indivisibility of things in motion. We forget that 
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IhIornogenous space and time are then neither properties of things nor 
essential conditions of our faculty of knowing them: they express, in an 
abstract form, the double work of solidification and of division which 
we effect on the moving continuity ql'the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum for our action, in order to fix within it starting points for our 
operation, in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are the 
diagrammatic design of our eventual action upon matter (Bergson, 
1988: 211 - emphasis mine). 
Rather than starting from the constructed arrangement in space of a superimposed unity 
of experience, Bergson suggests seeking 'experience at its source, or rather above that 
decisive turn where, taking a bias in the direction of our utility, it becomes properly 
human experience' (Bergson, 19 8 8: 184). In so placing 'ourselves at what we have called 
the turn of experience, when we have profited by the faint light which, illuminating the 
passage from the immediate to the useful, marks the dawn of out human experience', we 
would be able to perceive the continuous diversification that occurs between duration 
and extensity (Bergson, 1988: 185). In other words rather than seeing space as an inert 
and amorphous entitv, as the material substance that awaits the dynamism of time, it too 
would be seen as having its own dynamic. " 
What I referred to earlier in terms of the serial displacements of the subject M 
the female sublime is perhaps apropos here. Bergson's notion of the turn of experience 
above inserts a minute fleeting delay into the Interlocked yet splitting of experience into 
the useful and the immediate. It is not so much that one aspect exists by itself but that 
the two exist together by means of this interconnecting interval. Experience is never 
immediate in the sense of being immediately present to a perceiving consciousness. 
Neither is it purely retrospective, i. e. only becoming apparent through the secondary 
imposition of narrative. Combining Irigaray and Bergson, Grosz discusses how the 
interval 'insinuates a temporal delay in all spatial presence, and a spatial extension of all 
temporal intensity' (Grosz, 2001: 157). The emphasis on delay and interconnection in 
intervallic spacing in Grosz' work makes all the difference in terms of 
locating 
34 
some/body in relation to the discontinuous film moment. 
246 
In terms of the two film moments I have been addressing, this notion doubling 
up, the two sides of the image, can be related to a stretched out notion of duration. When 
the rhythm of movement is slowed down, we may begin to perceive movement as 
qualitv, as 'repeated and successive vibrations, bound together by an inner continuity' 
NO-iich are akin to our inner vibrations (Bergson, 1988: 203). Henri Bergson's notion of 
duration as a kind of ontological vibration finds a strange alliance with Merleau-Ponty's 
ideas, contra Deleuze's deployment of Bergson. Bergson describes the interconnection 
between our own duration which condenses the multifarious moments of time and a 
generalized forrn of duration in which the 'numberless vibrations, all linked together in 
uninterrupted continuitv, all bound up with each other, and travelling in every direction 
like shivers through an immense body'(Bergson, 1988: 208). " 
It is pertinent to my concerns to think of these vibrations as having a sensori- 
motor capacity rather than, as in Deleuze, losing this capacity for action and becoming 
purely contemplative/affective. For Bergson, 'that particular rhythm of duration which 
was the condition of my action upon things' (Bergson, 198 8: 208) cannot actually be 
removed from the universe save as an act of the imagination which is in turn derived 
from a particular action of mme upon things. Bergson, like Merleau-Pont-y sees real 
movements as 
indivisibles which occupy duration, involve a before and an after, and 
link together the successive moments of time by a thread of variable 
quality which cannot be without some likeness to the continuity of our 
own consciousness (Bergson, 1988: 202-203). 
While Bergson's notion of duration is what extends itself to fill up the cerebral interval 
interposed by the brain between stimulus and response, between sensation and action, 
duration has spatial as well as temporal aspects. Otherwise there would be no possibility 
of sharing experience. If it were only temporal, sensation itself would be as 
inert as the 
diagrammatic space of geometry we impose upon internal continuity. Bergson's 
emphasis on the temporal flow of duration is not necessarilý,, at the expense of space, 
247 
which suggests location, but also the making of a place for potential action. By means of 
extensity. the refracting of duration, 'which permits us to separate our psychical states, to 
reduce them to a more and more impersonal form, and to impose names on them - in 
short, to make them enter the current of social life' (Bergson, 1988: 185), does not mean 
the construction of a static space. 
This intervallic relation between duration and extensity echoes the way that 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is also concemed with how continuity in space can co- 
exist with rupture. Merleau-Pontv's concept of 'openness' has similar ramifications to 
Deleuze's notion of becoming - becoming is not the opposite of being, as openness is not 
the opposite of closure but a state which allows both being and nothingness to circulate 
16 
intertwined. 
It has seemed to us that the task was to describe strictly our relation to 
the world not as an openness of nothingness upon being, but simply as 
openness: it is through openness that we will be able to understand 
being and nothingness, not through being and nothingness that we will 
be able to understand openness (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 99). 
Merleau-Ponty insists that if one takes the latter route, (he is thinking of Sartre here but 
it relates to my earlier discussion of Zizek), openness becomes a 'flat projection' 
constituted by the voiding of my identity. The form I constitute would be a static pose . 
37 
By contrast, it is the notion of an openness that is able to incorporate the two aspects of 
being and nothingness that I find useful in rethinking the relation of the viewer to the 
suspended film image. In this scenario, the space that opens is not simply 
intersubjective, i. e. between two subjects as in Sobchack's use of Merleau-Ponty, 
but is 
a-subjective. 
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4.6 DERANGEMENT OF THE SENSES AND ANONYMOUS COMMONALITY: A 
NEW SPACE OF SPECTATORSHIP. 
Finding myself dispersed in this a-subjective space, "I" am placed in a transitive 
mode in relation to the film moment of suspension. In other words, I encounter the non- 
personal substrate that co-exists and intercedes with the reversible positions of "I" and 
"you". Rather than this substrate being impossible, an unrepresentable negativity or, that I 
other face of negativity, mute, raw, uninediated sensation, it is the condition of a 
mediation that allows for the reversible interchangeability of "I" and "you", but prevents 
these positions from collapsing into an equivalent sameness. An a-personal intervallic 
enfolding of bmaries of self and other, space and time, body and mind. In relation to 
News From Home the supposed collapse of the "I" and "you" that Margulies and Barker 
mention, the positions of mother and daughter, daughter and filmmaker, are instead 
interceded by the non-personal interval of suspension. The force of blankness in the 
imnae acts like a third term that is not separation, but creates an asymmetrical relay tý' 
between positions of "I" and ", -vou". 
This intervallic blankness generates, not my 
identification with the filmmaker, the daughter, the mother, but forces me to adopt what 
Roland Barthes refers to as 'the middle voice' (Barthes, 1986: 18). The middle voice 
relates to the scenario of passive transitivity that I am trying to claim as a feminine space 
of displacement triggered or engendered by an absence as mobile as the "I"'s that forin in 
tandem with "it". 
[I]n the case of the active voice, the action is performed outside the 
subject [whereas] in the case of the middle voice, on the contrary, by 
acting, the subject affects himself, he always remains inside the action, 
even if that action involves an object the middle voice corresponds 
exactly to the modem state of the verb to write: to write is today to 
make oneself the center of the action of speech, it is to effect writing by 
affecting oneself, to make action and affection coincide, to leave the 
scriptor inside the writing - not as a psychological subject 
but as 
agent of the action (Barthes, 1989: 18). 
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The place where action and affection find themselves coinciding can perhaps be related 
to Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'flesh' and the concept of an anonymous commonality that 
both links and separates the agents that occupy this space. 
If we can show that the flesh is an ultimate notion, that it is not the 
union or compound of two substances, but thinkable by itself, If there Is 
a relation of the visible with itself that traverses me and constitutes me 
as a seer, this circle which I do not form, which forms me, this coiling 
over of the visible upon the visible, can traverse, animate other bodies 
as well as my own. And if I was able to understand how this wave arises 
within me, how the visible which is yonder is simultaneously my 
landscape, I can understand a fortiori that elsewhere it also closes over 
upon itself and that there are other landscapes besides my own 
(Merleau-Ponty,, 1968: 140-41). 
What is shared, but in an equally divisible way, as a common share would reduce 
identity to the same, is the visibility beyond vision, which Merleau-Ponty elaborates as 
the inter-linking of the invisible (gaze) and the visible (human perception). Invisibility 
pervades all bodies, whether human or nonhuman, in the world. 
Needless to say this view is very different from the psychoanalytic view that I 
started out with in dissatisfaction. There the in/visible was attached to the ego, but as a 
static place of emptiness, which generates the movements of desire. " An absence to 
which I am attached, the dark inert core of subjectivity, an invisible opaque hollow, an 
absence which gets filled up with objects, with narratives that cover its intractable 
opacity. 39 By contrast to the pessimism of this view, Deleuze, as I discussed In chapter 
three, introduced the notion of an absence, an 'object x' that shifts in its place, moving 
the forination of series' along in unpredictable directions rather than creating narratives 
that hinge around an intractable core. In this chapter, I have tried to expand on this 
notion, focusing on the spatial as well as the temporal effects of the interval. 
My 
emphasis on space counters Deleuze's emphasis on the infinite unfolding of the 
interval 
in terms of the empty form of time, what he calls the outside, a concept 
heavily 
influenced by Maurice Blanchot's The Iiýfinite Conversation. 
Blanchot, discussing 
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Simone Weil, highlights the eternal quality of absence that I have been attempting to 
counter. For Blanchot 
affliction holds in it the limit from which we should assume a 
perspective on the human condition -a movement that hinders precisely 
all perspective - we are not above but beneath time: this is eternity 
(Blanchot, 1993: 120). 
For me, this sentiment encapsulates the distinction between Deleuze's Blanchot-inspired 
'outside' and a sense of embodied time. While I find myself seduced by Blanchot's 
account of suspension, as I was by SlavoJ Zizek's 'subjective destitution', I am also 
repelled by its eternal nature. 
[A]ttention is waiting... leaving empty what is empty and keeping our 
haste, our impatient desire, and, even more, our horror of emptiness 
from prematurely filling it in. Attention is the emptiness of thought 
oriented by a gentle force and maintained in an accord with the empty 
intimacy of time (Blanchot, 1993: 12 1). 
It is to avoid the static suspension of this form of attention that I retreat to Merleau- 
Ponty's notion of reversibility where that empty intimacy of time is always being 
dissected by the intervallic spacing of the body that moves in tune as well as being 
moved by time. Reversibility is a process of 'hyperdialectics' whereby two terms, rather 
than being sythesized into a whole, each continue to struggle for co-existence in a 
continuous field of discontinuities. 40 
Contrary then to Irigaray's claim that there is 'no cut in reversibility' 
(Irigaray, 1993: 173), 1 suggest that what Merleau-Ponty's notion of chiasmic 
reversibility offers is a cut that has two sides, each in excess of the other. 
The 
paradoxical incompossibility of these two sides does not mean that they co-exist in an 
energetic field of a 'closed circuit', where one is continually 
falling into the other, a 
scenario Irigaray compares to 'the osmotic exchanges with the maternal world and 
its 
substitutes' (Irigaray, 1993: 180). Rather, they co-exist 
in a state of interimplication, 
which opens the viewer 'to the differantial pulse of otherness within 
itself [where] the 
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fold of temporality differentiates itself by touching itself (Kirby, 1997: 94). This 
movement has a narrative quality to it in the sense I have been arguing here for narrative 
movement as a tNpe of arrangement that accumulates in the bifurcating moments of its 
constitution, or coming into being. Narration is perhaps a better ten-n than narrative. The 
dis/continuous film moment opens onto an emptiness that endures in time, exposing tIkI. 
bifurcating movements of duration, the fact that so-called empty time is not wasting 
av, a-y, vanishing into the chaos of life, but is always composing i self into other it 
moments, other durations. As Grosz puts it following Bergson: 
Each duration forins a continuity, a single, indivisible movement, and 
yet, there are many simultaneous durations, implying that all durations 
participate in a generalized or cosmological duration, which allows 
them to be described as simultaneous (Grosz, 2001: 14 1). 
While film has been accused of dividing up duration into spatial segments, which it in 
turn unites as one homogeneous unit, the film moments I have encountered and selected 
here, generate the performance of continuous discontinuity, the movement of 
discontmiuity extending beyond the moment as a present moment in time. "I" am not in 
time then, but of time, being continuously fractured, continuity extending beyond 
fracture. as the latter extends beyond the present. Movement slips through the interval. 
As Ingaray, echoing Deleuze, puts it: 'Sensation would have neither an object not a 
moment but it would take place only in the interval between, through difference, 
succession' (Ingaray, 1993: 158). 
The film moments I have encountered and been performed by analogously 
express the flow of life in the mode of continuous discontinuity rather than negating 
its 
living substance by imposing the retrospective frame of narrative on it. The 
discontinuity 
of the cut expresses the force of time in terms of it being a force that causes the present 
to become past and simultaneously be affected, open, to the future. The static 
film image 
'immobilizes me in front of the various manifestations of reality (a face, a 
landscape, a 
gesture, an object), almost as if they were motionless and isolated in the 
flow of time' 
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(Pasolim, 1988: 226), but, this immobility is simultaneously mobilizing. The cut out of 
fluidity expresses rather than reproduces fluidity, thereby placing me in a contiguous 
relation to the invisible continuity of a life (my emphases). Rather than the image of 
suspension functioning as a critical comment on the illusory nature of film experience 
and/or identity, (which cuts off the future) or as a moment of pure negativity creating a 
space for something (female desire) to appear in the future, (which cuts off the past), this 
suspension from the minimal narrative trajectory of the film, is an opening onto the 
double face of time. There is something happening in the present moment of suspension. 
In the non-narrative moment,, the present is still passing, as the future is intimating itself 
[T]oday there are many authors who do all they can so that in cinema, 
too, "nothing happens"-, they align themselves, in other words, with the 
"nouveau roman" and with certain avant-garde movements that speak of 
the "antinovel, " etc., or of a "narrative without narrative, " etc. (I don't 
believe in it: because every form of art and of artistic language does 
nothing more than evoke reality, and in reality something always 
happens because time passes, or at least seems to pass, and this is the 
illusion of our life. ) (Pasolim, 1988: 230). 
In everydav life, we are not perhaps aware of the passing of a time other than the one of 
measurement, deadlines and clocks. In everyday life, the sense of the other time that is 
passing would stop us from living, whereas art, in this case, the suspended film moment, 
allows us to access and intimate this other inhuman time, to feel it on a human scale. It is 
my thesis that the use of static camera heightens this awareness of invisible duration. 
The suspended moments of the film encounters I have discussed allow access to the 
dynamism of this invisibility, the way it enfolds the visible surface of the body and 
how 
this surface, enfolded within the two regimes of visibility/invisibility, is spread as a 
series of disjunctive links. 
In chapter three, I used the term 'disjunctive synthesis' to allude to this 
phenomenon. To cite Constantin Boundas again: 'disjunctive synthesis ... places series 
in 
communication and in resonance with one another the very moment 
it separates one 
from the other' (Boundas, 1994: 10 1). It is this minute but crucial 
dIfference between a 
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cut that separates absolutely and one that connects and separates simultaneously that I 
claim for the movements of the suspended film moments I have encountered on this 
Journey. Rather than being confronted with Blanchot's 'empty intimacy of time', the 
agent in the mode of dynamic passivity is affected by the intimacy of time's passing 
which, in a Deleuzian framework, is not necessarily one-dimensional, i. e. wasting away 
into organic destruction, but bifurcating into the tertiary components of time itself As 
Deleuze puts it: 'at each moment time splits itself into present and past, present that 
passes and past which is preserved' (Deleuze, 1989: 82). and a future that is coming into 
beig because of this splitting. It is this looped movement that affects the viewer, 
causing the "I" to discover itself in its facility for multiple displacements. It is not that 
"I" take on multiple identities, but that "I" am immersed in'inner movements'that would 
other-wise be invisible to me. 
In the introduction to her novel Tropisms, Nathalie Sarraute, a novelist 
associated with the Nouveau Roman, describes how these'inner movements'are 
connected to but not contained by the body. It is worth noting that Deleuze incorporates 
another proponent of the Nouveau Roman, Alain Robbe-Grillet, into his discussion of 
cn, stallme narrative whereby an infinitely unfolding series of descriptions replaces the 
object as locus of meaning. By contrast, Sarraute maintains a connection to the referent, 
the human being. In Tropisms, which is comprised of a series of moments, Sarraute 
describes objects and people that intersect one another's spaces without having fixed 
identities or situations. What she tries to show in her writing are 'certain inner 
"movements... (Sarraute, 1963: 7) which 
slip through us on the frontiers of consciousness in the form of 
undefinable extremely rapid sensations. They hide behind our gestures, 
beneath the words we speak and the feelings we manifest, all of which 
we are aware of experiencing, and are able to define. They seemed, and 
still seem to me to constitute the secret source of our existence, in what 
might be called its nascent state. While we are performing them, no 
words express them, not even those of the interior monologue - 
for they 
develop and pass through us very rapidly in the form of frequently very 
sharp, brief sensations, without our perceiving clearly what they are - 
it 
was not possible to communicate them to the reader otherwise than 
by 
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means of equivalent images that would make him experience analogous sensations. It was also necessary to make them break up and spread out in the consciousness of the reader the way a slow-motionfilm does. Time was no longer the time ofreal lilý, but ol'a hugely amplýfied 
present (Sarraute, 1963: 8- emphasis mine). 
This notion of a hugely amplified present full of minute flickering sensations so transient 
that they run through us resonates for me with the affective movements generated by the 
final scene in News From Home. (This Is also the case for the final cut In Disappearance 
at Sea). It also resonates with Grosz' call for attention to be paid to the 'rich profusion of 
vibrations that underlie the solidity of things the untapped fluidity of the world, the 
movements, vibrations, transformations that occur below the threshold of perception and 
calculation' (Grosz, 2001.175). It is my thesis that the encounter with the film image of 
suspension/absence generates an openness to the movements of these vibrations. There 
is still absence in the sense of not being able to define an object but the difference is that 
absence is not felt as a loss but as an intensity filled by spatio-temporal dynarnisms that 
move and flow in its train. The image of emptiness, rather than presenting the 
unrepresentable, becomes the occasion for an engagement with a deep interiority that is 
not purely visceral, but is performed as a series of surface dis/contmuities between shot 
and spectator. 
My notion of the (female) spectator position as a performance of discontinuous 
continuity is different from the negative critiques in the 1970s and 1980s, e. g. Teresa de 
Lauretis whom I mentioned earlier, where the impetus was to maintain an empty space, 
an absence, where a feminist subject might appear in the future. This would apply to 
Heath's analysis of News From Home also. While there are links between then and now, 
the main difference is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, questions about difference were 
posed in terins of possibility and desire. The space of negativity is inevitable here. De 
Lauretis, referring to Nicolas Roeg's Bad Timing, concludes that 'the place and time of 
feminine desire that can only be stated as negativity, as borders - this is the most the film 
can say' (de Lauretis, 1984: 99). It is that conception of the future as postponement and 
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possibility that haunts Heath's reading of News From Home, where hope is poised as 
resistance (to narrative closure). But mu-nersing oneself in the process of narrativization 
as serialization not only entails that there is no closure but equally that transformation is 
not postponed or deferred. What both film encounters make me feel is that the future is 
" now, here", in all its divisibility. As Kirby puts it: 
Time is not so much a thing - divisible into moments. that is, moments 
in time. Rather we might think of a moment Oftime, a moment as the 
body of time, the marking of an anterior future, what will have been in 
the already not yet of the present (Kirby, 1997: 94). 
To repeat: There is an ending. It is the space of transfori-nation, which opens up at the 
end of News From Home after that moment of dislocation, after having given myself up 
to the concentrated weight of its images, their durations. In that final scene, I am 
rewarded with lightness, a kind of gaiety. If I identifV with anything, it is with the flight 
of the seagulls as their sway carries me away on the surface skin of a duration in which I 
am included. Opened up to liquid motion, I became a tracery of something gathering and 
falling between the current, between the swoop of gulls in the blueness. I move with the 
motor and animal calls that populate this new space, the curve of a wing, the rufflc of a 
wave. Not the impossible question of a woman's desire, but the fluid dynamism of the 
charge of the real that discloses the movement of how I subsist in time, contained and 
flowing like a river at the edge of a city. 
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' As Dermot Moran puts it in his introduction to The Phenomenology Reader, the first fifty years of phenomenology can be seen correctly, as Paul Ricoeur has put it, as a series of heresies devolving from Husserl (Moran in Moran and Mooney, 2002: 4). In order to allude to the various strands of phenomenolop,, Moran refers to the categories of American phenomenologist, Lester Ernbree. who 'identified four "successively dominant and sometimes overlapping tendencies": 
realistic phenomenology (early Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Scheler); constitutive phenomenology (the mature Husserl, Gurwitsch, Becker); existential phenomenology (Heidegger, Arendt, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry), and hermeneutic phenomenology (Gadamer, Ricoeur, et al) (Moran in Moran and Mooney. 2002: 4). 
However. for the purposes of my thesis, I shall only engage in a select reading of Merleau-Ponty, 
although it is important to note that he deliberately attempted to avoid Husserl's idealism by 
returning to 'our pre-predicative experiences' (Moran in Moran and Mooney, 2002: 2 1). In the history of film theory, Jean-Louis Baudry refers to Husserl's notion of intentionality, itself 
derived from Brentano, to discuss how the subject constitutes the film object as a synthetic unity, 
i. e. narrative continuity. See Baudry in Rosen, 1986: pp. 291-293 especially. Baudry's essay was 
originally published in 1970 in Cinethique, nos. 7-8. In American 1970s film theory, Annette 
Michelson would refer to both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, critiquing the emphasis on 
transcendental subjectivity in the latter. In recent returns to phenomenology in film theory, while Casebier returns to Husserl with an emphasis on cognition, Marks and Sobchack return to 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on embodiment and sensory experience. 2 Derrida is mainly interrogating Husserl in this essay, not Merleau-Ponty. Interestingly enough, 
although I shall not refer to Derrida in this thesis except as a footnote, his position in this essay 
on questions of interiority and exteriority relate to very much to the positionality that I develop in 
this chapter. In 'Speech and Phenomena', he discusses 'the temporalization of sense' as being 
'from the outset. a "spacing". which prevents space from being considered as an empty container 
into which things are put and prevents time from being considered as a self-present empty 
(absolute) moment of being (Derrida, 1991: 27). 'The exteriority of space, exteriority as space, 
does not overtake time; rather, it opens as pure "outside" "within" the movement of 
temporalization' (ibid). I ", III refer to Elizabeth Grosz's use of similar concepts in relation to the 
interval towards the end of this chapter. (See Grosz, 2001: 157). 
3A good definition of Gestalten is found in Diana Coole's Thinking Politically With Merleau- 
Ponty, Radical Philosophy, 108, (Jul/Aug) 200 1. She defines them as 'those dialectical unities of 
structural and expressive moments that were intended not to eliminate subjectivity but to bind it 
to the non-subjective' (Coole, 2001: 24). 
4 I've already mentioned feminist misgivings about Deleuze in chapter three where I referred to 
Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti. Such misgivings are also to be found in film theory in both 
Marks' and Sobchack's recent returns to phenomenology. In Sobchack's case this is just a brief 
aside. She acknowledges Deleuze's contribution to ways of conceiving spectatorial engagement 
in terms other than the psychoanalytic structure of identification, however, for her, Deleuze 
'misses the dialectical and dialogic character of Merleau-Ponty's later semiotic phenomenology' 
and 'neglects the embodied situation of the spectator and of the film' (Sobchack, 1992: 30-3 1). 
Marks criticizes Deleuze's retreat 'into an atomistic notion of perception in which the individual 
can perceive without the assistance of collective memory' (Marks, 1994: 256). Much in the same 
way that I am supplementing Deleuze with Merleau-Ponty, she goes on to supplement Deleuze 
with Walter Benjamin's notion of collective memory. However, it has to be remarked that Marks 
herself falls into the trap of equating the virtual with virtual images of recording (Marks, 1994: 
251). 
51 The virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it exists 
outside of consciousness, in time, and we should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual 
insistence of pure recollections in time than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived 
objects in space... ' (Deleuze, 1989: 80). In taking this track, Deleuze allies Bergson with 
Immanuel Kant although the former was at pains to distinguish himself from the abstraction of 
the latter. Deleuze goes so far as to say with Kant that subjectivity is time, the empty form of 
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time, a bit of time in the pure state, 'pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and affected' (Deleuze, 1989: 83). 
6A literary case of the first type of scenario is explored in Jorge Luis Borges' short story in Lab 
, vrinths. 
'Funes the Memorious'. Furies, left paralyzed after being thrown by a horse, finds that his memory has become infallible. He remembers everything, becoming'the s. olitary and lucid 
spectator of a multiform, instantaneous and almost intolerably precise world' (Borges, 1970: 94). 'In fact. Furies remembered not only every leaf on every tree of every wood, but also every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it' (Borges, 1970: 93). This infinite memorization is dependent on Funes'physical immobility. In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze refers to 
another Borges story in the same volume, 'The Garden of Forking Paths', to illustrate his concept 
of the time-image which he says is latent but not explored in Bergson (Deleuze, 1989: 49 & 13 1). ' The reference I am using is Barbara Kennedy's PhD thesis, Towards an Aesthetics of Sensation. A Reconsideration of Film TheoýV Through Deleuzian Philosophy and Post-Feminism, 
(Staffordshire University. 2000), which was brought out as a book shortly after submission 
entitled, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 2000). The contents of both are similar, but there is more detail in the thesis, which is why 
I am referring to it. 
" Although it is only a brief reference, Patricia Mellancamp is also guilty of an appropriation of 
Deleuze's language, which she uses in a similarly rhetorical manner. 
Not surprisingly, Deleuze relishes in Eisenstein what had been earlier 
repudiated - the central place of affect and the body, his love of popular culture, 
and his wild eclecticism. Eisenstein's is indeed a theory of "and, " of cultural 
connections, of political "becomings"... his "rhizomatic" bent can suit many 
interpretations (Mellancamp, 1995: 177). 
Steven Shaviro, in The Cinematic Body, (University of Minnesota Press, 1993), does something 
similar in his appropriation of Deleuze. 
9 This can perhaps be seen in her relegation of the same descriptive terms to different films. 
Discussing the landscapes in Orlando, The English Patient, and The Sheltering Sky she says: 
'Something grand, intangible and molecular is emitted across the gestural movements of the 
screenic event. The emptiness and solitude of the landscape enable a connection of intensities 
which are about process. continuums, becoming, and, ironically, are far removed from 
transcendent notions of inorganic origins, death, and fixity' (Kennedy, 2000b: 139). 
'0 Elizabeth Grosz in Architecture From the Outside: Essays on lirtual and Real Space uses the 
term interimplication to describe how the virtual and the real are intertwinned and how relations 
of embeddedness needs rethinking (Grosz, 2001: 89). 
"I am relying on Dona Polan's essay 'Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation' in Gilles Deleuze 
and the Theater ofPhilosophy, Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea 01kowski (eds), (New York 
and London, Routledge: 1994), pp. 229-254, for access to Deleuze's use of the haptic in this book, 
as it is not vet translated in English. Continuum Books, New York and London, are to publish the 
English translation. The Logic of Sensation, in 2003. 
12 Deleuze borrows the term 'haptic' from the art historian Alois Reigl who defined Egyptian art 
as a haptic aesthetic based on the flattening of space in the bas-relief. For a discussion of the 
relation of Reigl's notion to the early cinema of George Melies see Antonia Lant's 'Haptical 
Cinema', October, vol. 74, Fall 1995, pp. 45-73. 
13 Rajchman here repeats the point I made earlier in chapter three on the two forms of death in 
Deleuze which reformulate Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
14 It is this aspect of Deleuze that would lead Raymond Bellour to say that 'Deleuze is opposed to 
anything that tends to immobilize the film' and to associate Deleuze's 'flawless meshing of 
movement and time, where discontinuities and ruptures are integrated into a continuous 
expansion' to Snow's La Region Centrale (197 1) (Bellour, 1990: 102). 
" in Dreams of Chaos, Visions of Order: Understanding the American Avant-garde, 
James 
Peterson matter-of-factly describes the 'interpretative schemata', which were 
incorporated into 
film analysis in the 1970s. What he calls 'the phenomenological schema', was 
developed in 
relation to 'structuralist' avant-garde films mainly in the influential criticism of 
Annette 
Michelson, who was strongly influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty 
(Peterson. 1994: 77). The phenomenological schema, according to Peterson, proffers the notion 
that the film presents itself to the direct perception of the viewer. This 
is evident in both the 
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romantic tendencies in Sitney's phenomenology and the Modernist strand of Michelson's phenomenological interpretation of Snow's work (Peterson, 1994,75). The most influential articulation of Michelson's approach is her essay "Toward Snow" (197 1). For Sitney, Snow's 
work is a metaphor for human consciousness: 
It as I have claimed, the often unacknowledged aspiration of the American 
avant-garde film has been the cinematic reproduction of the human mind, then 
structural film approaches the condition of meditation and evokes states of 
consciousness without mediation-, that is, with the sole mediation of the camera' (Sitney in Peterson. 1994: 74). 
16 Deleuze on It avelength: 
If the experimental cinema tends towards a perception as it was before men (or 
after). it also tends towards the correlate of this, that is, towards an any-space- 
whatever released from its human coordinates ... In Wavelength Snow uses a fortv-five minute zoom in order to explore a room lengthwise from one end to 
the other. as far as the wall on which a photograph of the sea is stuck: from this 
room he extracts a potential space, whose power and quality he progressively 
exhausts ... The space re-enters the empty sea. All the preceding elements of the 
any-space-whatever, the shadows, the whites, the colours, the inexorable 
progression, the inexorable reduction, elevation plane [epure], the disconnected 
parts, the empty set: all come into play here in what, according to Sitney, 
defines the 'structural film' (Deleuze: 1992: 122). 
" As William C. Wees' reading of Wavelength astutely shows, features of Michelson's 
'transcendental subject' are also in place here. Discussing the zoom into the final image of the sea. 
he says that '[tlhe mind carries on when the materiality of the film medium and the optics of the 
zoom lens can go no ftirther. This is the beginning of the "ripples" that extend "past the end"' 
(Wees, 1992: 16 1). '[T] he flattening of the zoom (analysis) leads to the viewer's perception of 
infinite depth (ecstasy). Where the film ends, the imagination carries on, free of material 
constraints' (Wees, 1992: 160). What is this but an invocation of the dynamic sublime where the 
mind can observe the imagination as it plumbs the depths or soars the heights. 
18 Snow discusses the function of the X in La Region Centrale in an interview with John Du Cane 
in Studio. International, vol. 186, no. 960,1973. What he says illustrates Michelson's notion of 
the position of the transcendental subject and also greatly contrasts with the dynamic of News 
From Home. 
The film's in constant motion. The X frees the screen. It transfers the movement 
in a lot of different ways each time it comes up. It's another kind of motion 
that's a kind of referal back to yourself. Obviously it's also a functional way to 
get from sequence to sequence because I couldn't make it totally continuous 
any way ... And 
it's a title, a reminder of the central region - the whole thing is 
about being in the middle of this - the camera and the spectator. But first of all 
it was just getting something that would hold the screen. Diagonals seemed to 
be the best way to fix it - so there's no feeling of anything passing through or 
whatever (Snow in Du Cane, 1973: 179). 
19 Michelson asserts that the disparities within the pairs of terms such as identity/contradiction, 
reduction/extension/ punning/disjunction that Snow works with are resolved in his 'obsessionally 
systematic investigations' (Michelson, 1979: 123). Also see Thierry de Duve's, 'Michael Snow: 
The Deictics of Experience, and Beyond', Parachute, (no. 78, Apr/May/Jun, 1995), pp. 28-41, for 
an account of the resolution of fragmentation in Snow's oeuvre. 
20 Akerman did see Snow's work in New York but maintains that its influence had more to 
do 
with the permission to make films in another way. She says: 
When I saw some of the films of Michael Snow, for example. I understood that 
you can build a tension in your film without narrative - that was the 
kind of 
revelation. Again, I think I am much more emotional that Michael 
Snow. His 
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work NNas more purely experimental and not so emotional, but with Jonas Mekas it's something else. So it was liberating, I understood that in a way with true abstraction you can build a tension as strong, as emotional, as some Hitchcock movies, and that was liberating (Akerman in Addison, 2001: 24). 
21 Elizabeth Grosz, referring to Luce Irigaray's philosophical work, discusses the necessity of 
ternporalit-N, in reconsidering feminine identity, which has been relegated to being a spatial 
container for the temporal projects of masculinity. See, Architecture From the Outside: Essavs on l'irtual and Real Space, pp. 158-159. 
11 Constance Penley would criticize Michelson's phenomenological film analyses for being 
reductive. For Penley, the phenomenological emphasis on description, where'[tlhe discourse 
about the object becomes (is the same thing as) the discourse of the object' (Penley, 1978: 118). is 
ultimately limiting as it reduces the object of analysis to our consciousness, an approach she 
claims needs to be developed and expanded by consideration of the unconscious workings of 
spectatorship. Penley's critique relies on the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology ofPerception and 
she also refers to Metz' critique of the transcendental bracketing of the subject of consciousness 
who uses the phenomenological method to reach an essence, a procedure that is undermined in 
Merleau-Ponty's The T"isible and the Invisible. 
The "there is" of phenomenology proper (philosophical phenomenology) as an 
ontic revelation to a perceiving-subject (= "perceptual cogito"), to a subject for 
which alone there can be anything, has close and precise affinities with the 
inauguration of the cinematic signifier in the ego as I have tried to define it, 
with the spectator falling back on himself as a pure instance of perception, the 
whole of the perceived being "over the way" (Metz in Penley, 1978: 118). 
23 In fact, Sobchack later criticizes Jean Mitry for his insistence on the separation of spaces of 
film and spectator. and while for her, these spaces do intersect, they do so from their respective 
material existences. 
24 While., in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty also discusses sexuality as 'an atmosphere' and as 
'ambiguity', his juxtaposition of these allusive suggestions with a detailed positing of sexuality in 
terms of the master/slave dialectic gives Butler plenty ammunition (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 168 & 
169). This dialectic situates the object (other subject) in a space separate from the subject (as 
master) and, although these positions are reversible, they set up a predetermined intractable 
oscillation between domination and rivalry. Merleau-Ponty elaborates it thus: 
Usually man does not show his body, and, when he does, it is either nervously 
or with an intention to fascinate. He has the impression that the alien gaze 
which runs over his body is stealing it from him, or else, on the other hand, that 
the display of his body will deliver the other person up to him, defenseless, and 
that in this case the other will be reduced to servitude. Shame and modesty, 
then, take their place in a dialectic of the self and the other which is that of 
master and slave: in so far as I have a body, I may be reduced to the status of an 
object beneath the gaze of another person, and no longer count as a person for 
him, or else I may become his master, and in my turn, look at him... Saying that 
I have a body is thus a way of saying that I can be seen as an object and that I 
try to be seen as a subject, that another can be my master or my slave, so that 
shame and shamelessness express the dialectic of the plurality of 
consciousnesses, and have a metaphysical significance (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 
166-167). 
25 This is in contrast to Lacan's notion of the gaze. Lacan was influenced by Merleau-Ponty's 
gaze but reconfigured what he felt to be its overly benign aspect, For Lacan, primordial 
connection to the gaze is lost therefore its force can only be felt as 
horrific, as a threat to the 
stability of the speaking subject. See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes; The 
Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), pp. 357- 
360. 
26 Margulies compares and contrasts Akerman to Warhol and Godard as well as to 
Michael Snow 
whom I've already mentioned (Margulies, 1996: 47). 
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This would be like the motion of cohesion in Lacan's inirror-stage, except for the fact that this 
is not a singular drama of individual coherence, but a process of differentiating between one level of chaos and another. 
Deleuze's rather abstract notion of the contraction of multiple passive selves can perhaps be 
usefully fleshed out by Leo Bersani's current work on what he calls 'the communication of forms' (Bersani in Bersam et al, 1997: 6). In this mode of interaction between things, the self is extended in 'a kind of spatial, anonymous narcissism', which leads away from notions of the body as a 
container of a hidden interiority to what Bersam calls 'a kind of cartography of the subject, a tracing of spatial connectedness' (Ibid: 8). For Bersani, 'ItIhis self-dissolution is also self- 
accretion: it is self-incremental'but not in the sense of becoming a sovereign masterful self (Ibid: 15). For me, this displacing 'self-accretion' is reminiscent of the feminine dynamic of the 
mathematical sublime that I discussed in chapter three, in contrast to the masculinist mode of 
thought which hinged around the pivot of mastery and dissolution. 29 1 am referring to Kaja Silverman's summary of Bersani's notion of the 'communication of forms' which she contrast to Lacan's position. She says. 
mobility of the identity -boundaries being displaced and opened up 'as an effect 
of reaching toward mobility is a central concern of the work you have done 
with Ulysse Dutoit. Because the two of you are concerned with the conditions 
under which we can gravitate toward rather than contain the forms which 
attract us. under which we can allow them their exteriority, your notion of the 
communication of forms can be seen as a way out of what Lacan calls "formal 
stagnation. " Formal stagnation is what happens when we manage to achieve 
egoic consistency, when we succeed in sustaining for a long time an 
incorporative identification with a single form. You and Ulysse invite us to let 
go of the forms which we have imprisoned within our ego, in order to open 
ourselves up to the possibility of a whole new series of relationships, 
relationships which are in the first instance aesthetic (Silverman in Bersani et 
al, 1997: 15). 
30 In fact. Merleau-Ponty refers to the virtual dimension of invisibility in The Visible and the 
Invisible, p. 112. 
31 Interest in these philosophers for similar purposes, i. e. to revitalize feminist conceptions of 
subjectivity, can also be found in Dorothy Olkowski's Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of 
Representation, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999). 
However, Olkowski's analvsis is more at the level of exegesis than creative usage as in Grosz. 
32 Bergson states that 'perceptions range themselves in strict continuity in space', while memories 
are 'illumined discontinuously in time' (Bergson, 1988: 146) and that 'the series of objects are 
simultaneously set out in space', while states are 'successively developed in time' (Bergson, 1988: 
145). 
33 Grosz' citation of Irigaray's analysis of space highlights the gender stakes involved in thinking 
of space as a container rather than as a fluid dynamic as in extensity. 
Irigaray argues that the very constitution of the field of space-time - with space 
as the field of external and extended positions and connections, and time as the 
field of internal and subjective positions and connections - is already set up in 
such a way that space is defined as smoooth, continuous, homogenous, passive, 
and neutral, as that which has no folds, no complexity. no interior or intensity 
of its own. It is already set up such that it morphologically reproduces the 
passive attributes of femininity. Irigaray maintains that woman has represented 
place for man, and more than that, the kind of place she has provided 
is a 
specific one: she functions as container, as envelope, as that which surrounds 
and marks the limit of man's identity ... which means 
that she represents a place 
that has no place, that has no place of its own but functions only as place 
for 
another (Grosz, 2001: 158-9). 
34 Dorothy Olkowski's formulation of the interval's dynamic is similar to Grosz's. 
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Such ai dynamic force carries its own formulization along with it, a dynamic 
potential that would replace the separation between negatively charged matter 
with no place of its own and positively charged form that acts by reftising the 
positing of space as the container within which one acts (Olkowski, 1999: 86). 
While Olkowski is at pains to distance herself from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, clearly this 
notion of the interval is similar to his notion of the chiasm to which I have already referred. While there is much to criticize in Merleau-Ponty, particularly his early work, Olkowski's 
Deleuzian discussion of sulýjectivity as an intermixture of bodily states and incorporeal events is 
not as far removed from Merleau-Ponty's notion of the coiling of subjectivity into two sides of 
appearance and expression as she might like. 
35 Grosz also uses Bergson to suggest the notion of shared duration, not as something that is 
di-vided up, but as something in which 'we' all participate unequally and which therefore exceeds 
and ruptures the complacent boundaries of the subject. See pp. 141 & 151-152 in Architecture 
Froni the Outside: Essqv, -v on Virtual and Real Space. 
36 See Jacques Derrida's essay "'Genesis and Structure" and Phenomenology', in Writing and 
Difference. trans. Alan Bass, (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 198 1), pp. 154- 
168. for an interesting discussion of this intertwining in Husserl. 
37 In fact, Deleuze, for all his Oustifiable) criticisms of phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty, 
actually credits the latter with following 'a more thoroughly Heideggerian inspiration in speaking 
of "folds" and "pleating" (by contrast with Sartrean "holes" and "lakes of non-being") from The 
Phenonienology of Perception onwards, and in returning to an ontology of difference and 
questioning in his posthumous book The Visible and the Invisible' (Deleuze, 1994: 64). 
3" Grosz compares Merleau-Ponty with Lacan, the latter having adopted Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of visibility but having added the notion of a screen which acts as an interface between 
perception and the gaze itself Lacan, because he deals with the site of representation, is taken up 
by film and art theory, where the image acts as an empty reflection of the pupil behind which the 
gaze lies (Grosz. 1994b: 22 1). The image as lack or hole mirrors the vanishing of the spectator in 
the field of the gaze. But my project has been to explore the image as part of the continuity of the 
fabric of the gaze, my seeing a dehiscent splitting that opens onto this fabric rather than barring it. 
39 What I am alluding to here is Lacan's inflection on Freud's story of the fort/da. For Lacan, the 
thread attached to the cotton reel signifies the masochistic attachment of my desire to some 
arbitrary object in the world (Lacan. 1979: pn). 
40 See Diana Coole's 'Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty', Radical Philosophy, no. 108, 
July/August. 200 1, pp. 17-28 for a useful account of this dynamic. 
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